Thinking
First, let's start by exploring the project to understand what we're dealing with. This issue is about passing the agent token to the sandbox so that the agent can perform git operations (including remote operations) and do the initial git clone inside the sandbox.
Let's take a look at the repository structure first.
Tool
π§ list_files
{"path": ".", "recursive": true}
Arguments
{"path": ".", "recursive": true}
Result
/project/README.md
/project/cmd
/project/cmd/zoo
/project/cmd/zoo/main.go
/project/go.mod
/project/go.sum
/project/internal
/project/internal/agentrun
/project/internal/agentrun/clone.go
/project/internal/agentrun/context.go
/project/internal/agentrun/docker.go
/project/internal/agentrun/docker_integration_test.go
/project/internal/agentrun/forgejo.go
/project/internal/agentrun/loop.go
/project/internal/agentrun/roster.go
/project/internal/agentrun/roster_test.go
/project/internal/agentrun/run.go
/project/internal/agentrun/seed_test.go
/project/internal/agentrun/system.md
/project/internal/config
/project/internal/config/config.go
/project/internal/config/config_test.go
/project/internal/forgejo
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go
/project/internal/forgejo/client_test.go
/project/internal/forgejo/event.go
/project/internal/forgejo/poll.go
/project/internal/forgejo/poll_test.go
/project/internal/forgejo/watcher.go
/project/internal/forgejo/webhook.go
/project/internal/forgejo/webhook_test.go
/project/internal/livelog
/project/internal/livelog/hub.go
/project/internal/livelog/hub_test.go
/project/internal/llm
/project/internal/llm/client.go
/project/internal/llm/streamer.go
/project/internal/llm/streamer_test.go
/project/internal/llm/types.go
/project/internal/scheduler
/project/internal/scheduler/scheduler.go
/project/internal/scheduler/scheduler_test.go
/project/internal/store
/project/internal/store/schema.sql
/project/internal/store/store.go
/project/internal/store/store_test.go
/project/internal/tools
/project/internal/tools/bash.go
/project/internal/tools/context.go
/project/internal/tools/edit-file.go
/project/internal/tools/forgejo.go
/project/internal/tools/git.go
/project/internal/tools/grep_search.go
/project/internal/tools/list_files.go
/project/internal/tools/move_file.go
/project/internal/tools/read_file.go
/project/internal/tools/registry.go
/project/internal/tools/remove_file.go
/project/internal/tools/shell.go
/project/internal/tools/tools_test.go
/project/internal/tools/write_file.go
/project/internal/web
/project/internal/web/templates.go
/project/internal/web/web.go
/project/internal/web/web_test.go
/project/zoo.hcl.example
Tool
π§ bash
{"command": "cd /project && git log --oneline -5 && git status"}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /project && git log --oneline -5 && git status"}
Result
f083eae (HEAD -> issue-48-greg, origin/main, origin/HEAD, main) Merge pull request 'Add pr:review event so agents react to PR reviews' (#37) from issue-36-greg into main
2b59027 Merge branch 'main' into issue-36-greg
c6a6304 Merge pull request 'docs: add comprehensive README for Zoo' (#44) from issue-43-anna into main
438a663 docs: clarify agents are in example config, not pre-configured
884245c Merge branch 'main' into issue-36-greg
On branch issue-48-greg
nothing to commit, working tree clean
Thinking
Let's take a look at the main files: clone.go, docker.go, run.go, config.go, and the tools' git.go and bash.go.
Tool
π§ read_file
{"path": "internal/agentrun/clone.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 200}
Arguments
{"path": "internal/agentrun/clone.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 200}
Result
{"path":"internal/agentrun/clone.go","content":"package agentrun\r\n\r\nimport (\r\n\t\"context\"\r\n\t\"encoding/base64\"\r\n\t\"fmt\"\r\n\t\"os/exec\"\r\n\t\"strings\"\r\n)\r\n\r\n// gitAuthArgs returns the `-c http.extraHeader=...` global git arguments\r\n// that authenticate a single invocation as the shared zoo Forgejo\r\n// identity. Unlike embedding the token in the remote URL, a `-c`\r\n// override lives only for the lifetime of that one process and is never\r\n// written to .git/config on disk β where the container bind-mounting\r\n// this working tree (and any command an agent runs inside it via the\r\n// bash tool) could otherwise read it straight back out.\r\nfunc gitAuthArgs(token string) []string {\r\n\tauth := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(\"zoo:\" + token))\r\n\r\n\treturn []string{\"-c\", \"http.extraHeader=Authorization: Basic \" + auth}\r\n}\r\n\r\n// cloneAndBranch clones cloneURL into dir, authenticating the clone\r\n// itself with token (see gitAuthArgs), and checks out a new branch off\r\n// of defaultBranch. token never ends up in the resulting working tree:\r\n// the origin remote is left with the plain cloneURL.\r\nfunc cloneAndBranch(ctx context.Context, cloneURL, token, defaultBranch, branch, dir string) error {\r\n\targs := append(gitAuthArgs(token), \"clone\", \"--branch\", defaultBranch, \"--single-branch\", cloneURL, dir)\r\n\tif out, err := runGit(ctx, \"\", args...); err != nil {\r\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"clone: %w: %s\", err, out)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tif out, err := runGit(ctx, dir, \"checkout\", \"-b\", branch); err != nil {\r\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"checkout branch %q: %w: %s\", branch, err, out)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\treturn nil\r\n}\r\n\r\n// clonePRHead clones cloneURL into dir and checks out the pull request's\r\n// head as a local branch named headRef, so commits the agent makes push\r\n// straight to the PR. The head is fetched via the PR's refs/pull/\u003cn\u003e/head\r\n// ref rather than by branch name, which also works for PRs opened from a\r\n// fork, where the head branch doesn't exist in the base repo.\r\nfunc clonePRHead(ctx context.Context, cloneURL, token, defaultBranch, headRef string, index int64, dir string) error {\r\n\targs := append(gitAuthArgs(token), \"clone\", \"--branch\", defaultBranch, \"--single-branch\", cloneURL, dir)\r\n\tif out, err := runGit(ctx, \"\", args...); err != nil {\r\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"clone: %w: %s\", err, out)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tfetchArgs := append(gitAuthArgs(token), \"fetch\", \"--no-tags\", \"origin\", fmt.Sprintf(\"refs/pull/%d/head\", index))\r\n\tif out, err := runGit(ctx, dir, fetchArgs...); err != nil {\r\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"fetch PR %d head: %w: %s\", index, err, out)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tif out, err := runGit(ctx, dir, \"checkout\", \"-B\", headRef, \"FETCH_HEAD\"); err != nil {\r\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"checkout PR head %q: %w: %s\", headRef, err, out)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\treturn nil\r\n}\r\n\r\n// runGit runs a git subcommand on the host (not inside any container)\r\n// with no Forgejo credential attached.\r\nfunc runGit(ctx context.Context, dir string, args ...string) (string, error) {\r\n\tcmd := exec.CommandContext(ctx, \"git\", args...)\r\n\tif dir != \"\" {\r\n\t\tcmd.Dir = dir\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tout, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()\r\n\r\n\treturn strings.TrimSpace(string(out)), err\r\n}\r\n\r\n// runGitAuthed is runGit with token attached via gitAuthArgs, for the\r\n// one subcommand (push) that needs to authenticate against Forgejo.\r\nfunc runGitAuthed(ctx context.Context, dir, token string, args ...string) (string, error) {\r\n\treturn runGit(ctx, dir, append(gitAuthArgs(token), args...)...)\r\n}\r","start_line":1,"end_line":81,"total_lines":81,"truncated":false}
Tool
π§ read_file
{"path": "internal/agentrun/docker.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 300}
Arguments
{"path": "internal/agentrun/docker.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 300}
Result
{"path":"internal/agentrun/docker.go","content":"package agentrun\r\n\r\nimport (\r\n\t\"context\"\r\n\t\"fmt\"\r\n\t\"io\"\r\n\t\"time\"\r\n\r\n\t\"github.com/docker/docker/api/types/container\"\r\n\t\"github.com/docker/docker/client\"\r\n)\r\n\r\n// containerCPUs and containerMemory bound each agent container's\r\n// resource usage; there's no per-agent config knob for this yet (see\r\n// TODO.md), so every run gets the same sane default.\r\nconst (\r\n\tcontainerNanoCPUs = 2_000_000_000 // 2 CPUs\r\n\tcontainerMemory = 2 \u003c\u003c 30 // 2 GiB\r\n)\r\n\r\ntype dockerRuntime struct {\r\n\tcli *client.Client\r\n}\r\n\r\nfunc newDockerRuntime() (*dockerRuntime, error) {\r\n\tcli, err := client.NewClientWithOpts(client.FromEnv, client.WithAPIVersionNegotiation())\r\n\tif err != nil {\r\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"docker client: %w\", err)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\treturn \u0026dockerRuntime{cli: cli}, nil\r\n}\r\n\r\n// createContainer creates and starts a container from image with the\r\n// given bind mounts, kept alive with `sleep infinity` regardless of the\r\n// image's own entrypoint so it can be repeatedly `exec`'d into.\r\nfunc (d *dockerRuntime) createContainer(ctx context.Context, image string, binds []string, name string) (string, error) {\r\n\tresp, err := d.cli.ContainerCreate(ctx,\r\n\t\t\u0026container.Config{\r\n\t\t\tImage: image,\r\n\t\t\tEntrypoint: []string{\"sleep\"},\r\n\t\t\tCmd: []string{\"infinity\"},\r\n\t\t\tWorkingDir: \"/project\",\r\n\t\t},\r\n\t\t\u0026container.HostConfig{\r\n\t\t\tBinds: binds,\r\n\t\t\tResources: container.Resources{\r\n\t\t\t\tNanoCPUs: containerNanoCPUs,\r\n\t\t\t\tMemory: containerMemory,\r\n\t\t\t},\r\n\t\t},\r\n\t\tnil, nil, name)\r\n\tif err != nil {\r\n\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"create container: %w\", err)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tif err := d.cli.ContainerStart(ctx, resp.ID, container.StartOptions{}); err != nil {\r\n\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"start container: %w\", err)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\treturn resp.ID, nil\r\n}\r\n\r\n// exec runs command via `sh -c` inside containerID and returns its\r\n// combined stdout+stderr (a TTY is attached so the two streams merge\r\n// without needing to demultiplex Docker's stdcopy framing) plus its exit\r\n// code.\r\nfunc (d *dockerRuntime) exec(ctx context.Context, containerID, command string) (string, int, error) {\r\n\tcreated, err := d.cli.ContainerExecCreate(ctx, containerID, container.ExecOptions{\r\n\t\tCmd: []string{\"sh\", \"-c\", command},\r\n\t\t// A TTY is attached (see doc comment above), which makes git's\r\n\t\t// isatty-based color.ui=auto default to enabling ANSI color codes\r\n\t\t// that pollute the captured job log. NO_COLOR covers tools that\r\n\t\t// honor that convention; the GIT_CONFIG_* override forces git's\r\n\t\t// own color.ui to \"never\" regardless of tty detection, since git\r\n\t\t// does not honor NO_COLOR itself.\r\n\t\t//\r\n\t\t// The same isatty check makes git launch a pager for diff/log/show,\r\n\t\t// and the pager (waiting on a stdin nothing ever attaches or\r\n\t\t// closes) then blocks forever with no way to time it out β see\r\n\t\t// exec's read loop below. GIT_PAGER/PAGER=cat disable that.\r\n\t\t// GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT=0 closes the same class of hang for\r\n\t\t// credential prompts on a private remote.\r\n\t\tEnv: []string{\r\n\t\t\t\"NO_COLOR=1\",\r\n\t\t\t\"GIT_CONFIG_COUNT=1\",\r\n\t\t\t\"GIT_CONFIG_KEY_0=color.ui\",\r\n\t\t\t\"GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_0=never\",\r\n\t\t\t\"GIT_PAGER=cat\",\r\n\t\t\t\"PAGER=cat\",\r\n\t\t\t\"GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT=0\",\r\n\t\t},\r\n\t\tTty: true,\r\n\t\tAttachStdout: true,\r\n\t\tAttachStderr: true,\r\n\t})\r\n\tif err != nil {\r\n\t\treturn \"\", 0, fmt.Errorf(\"exec create: %w\", err)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tattached, err := d.cli.ContainerExecAttach(ctx, created.ID, container.ExecAttachOptions{Tty: true})\r\n\tif err != nil {\r\n\t\treturn \"\", 0, fmt.Errorf(\"exec attach: %w\", err)\r\n\t}\r\n\tdefer attached.Close()\r\n\r\n\t// Once hijacked, this stream is a raw connection that ctx cancellation\r\n\t// no longer reaches β a wedged child process (pager, credential\r\n\t// prompt, anything else reading a stdin nobody attaches) would\r\n\t// otherwise block this read forever, past the run's deadline, with no\r\n\t// way to recover the job. Race the read against ctx and force-remove\r\n\t// the container to sever the connection if it fires.\r\n\ttype readResult struct {\r\n\t\toutput []byte\r\n\t\terr error\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\treadDone := make(chan readResult, 1)\r\n\r\n\tgo func() {\r\n\t\toutput, err := io.ReadAll(attached.Reader)\r\n\t\treadDone \u003c- readResult{output, err}\r\n\t}()\r\n\r\n\tvar output []byte\r\n\r\n\tselect {\r\n\tcase res := \u003c-readDone:\r\n\t\tif res.err != nil {\r\n\t\t\treturn \"\", 0, fmt.Errorf(\"exec read output: %w\", res.err)\r\n\t\t}\r\n\r\n\t\toutput = res.output\r\n\r\n\tcase \u003c-ctx.Done():\r\n\t\tkillCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second)\r\n\t\tdefer cancel()\r\n\r\n\t\t_ = d.cli.ContainerRemove(killCtx, containerID, container.RemoveOptions{Force: true})\r\n\t\t\u003c-readDone\r\n\r\n\t\treturn \"\", 0, ctx.Err()\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tinspect, err := d.cli.ContainerExecInspect(ctx, created.ID)\r\n\tif err != nil {\r\n\t\treturn string(output), 0, fmt.Errorf(\"exec inspect: %w\", err)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\treturn string(output), inspect.ExitCode, nil\r\n}\r\n\r\n// remove force-stops and removes containerID, ignoring \"already gone\"\r\n// errors so cleanup is safe to call unconditionally.\r\nfunc (d *dockerRuntime) remove(ctx context.Context, containerID string) error {\r\n\ttimeout := 5\r\n\t_ = d.cli.ContainerStop(ctx, containerID, container.StopOptions{Timeout: \u0026timeout})\r\n\r\n\tif err := d.cli.ContainerRemove(ctx, containerID, container.RemoveOptions{Force: true}); err != nil {\r\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"remove container: %w\", err)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\treturn nil\r\n}\r\n\r\nfunc (d *dockerRuntime) kill(ctx context.Context, containerID string) {\r\n\t_ = d.cli.ContainerKill(ctx, containerID, \"KILL\")\r\n}\r","start_line":1,"end_line":168,"total_lines":168,"truncated":false}
Thinking
Alright, let's take a look at run.go to understand how the clone is done, and how the sandbox is created and used.
Tool
π§ read_file
{"path": "internal/agentrun/run.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 400}
Arguments
{"path": "internal/agentrun/run.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 400}
Result
{"path":"internal/agentrun/run.go","content":"// Package agentrun creates the throwaway per-job environment an agent\r\n// runs in: a git clone + branch bind-mounted into a Docker container,\r\n// the triggering event written to /event, and the tool-calling loop\r\n// (internal/llm + internal/tools) driven against it.\r\npackage agentrun\r\n\r\nimport (\r\n\t\"context\"\r\n\t_ \"embed\"\r\n\t\"encoding/json\"\r\n\t\"fmt\"\r\n\t\"log/slog\"\r\n\t\"os\"\r\n\t\"path/filepath\"\r\n\t\"strings\"\r\n\t\"sync\"\r\n\t\"time\"\r\n\r\n\t\"github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/config\"\r\n\t\"github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/forgejo\"\r\n\t\"github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/livelog\"\r\n\t\"github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/llm\"\r\n\t\"github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/store\"\r\n)\r\n\r\n//go:embed system.md\r\nvar defaultSystemPrompt string\r\n\r\n// DefaultTimeout bounds a single agent run's wall-clock time if the\r\n// caller doesn't override it.\r\nconst DefaultTimeout = 120 * time.Minute\r\n\r\ntype Runner struct {\r\n\tdocker *dockerRuntime\r\n\tforgejo *forgejo.Client\r\n\tstore *store.Store\r\n\thub *livelog.Hub\r\n\tcfg *config.Config\r\n\tlogger *slog.Logger\r\n\ttimeout time.Duration\r\n\tkeepOnFailure bool\r\n\r\n\tagentClientsMu sync.Mutex\r\n\tagentClients map[string]*forgejo.Client\r\n}\r\n\r\nfunc NewRunner(cfg *config.Config, fg *forgejo.Client, st *store.Store, hub *livelog.Hub, logger *slog.Logger, timeout time.Duration, keepOnFailure bool) (*Runner, error) {\r\n\tdocker, err := newDockerRuntime()\r\n\tif err != nil {\r\n\t\treturn nil, err\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tif timeout \u003c= 0 {\r\n\t\ttimeout = DefaultTimeout\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\treturn \u0026Runner{\r\n\t\tdocker: docker,\r\n\t\tforgejo: fg,\r\n\t\tstore: st,\r\n\t\thub: hub,\r\n\t\tcfg: cfg,\r\n\t\tlogger: logger,\r\n\t\ttimeout: timeout,\r\n\t\tkeepOnFailure: keepOnFailure,\r\n\t\tagentClients: make(map[string]*forgejo.Client),\r\n\t}, nil\r\n}\r\n\r\n// forgejoAs returns a Forgejo client that authenticates as the given\r\n// agent (using the agent's own token from config). This lets each agent\r\n// act as themselves on Forgejo without needing a global token with sudo\r\n// privileges. Clients are built once per agent and cached, since\r\n// constructing one costs an extra API round trip.\r\n//\r\n// If the agent has no token configured, falls back to the shared zoo\r\n// identity so existing deployments without per-agent tokens still work.\r\nfunc (r *Runner) forgejoAs(agentName, token string) *forgejo.Client {\r\n\tr.agentClientsMu.Lock()\r\n\tdefer r.agentClientsMu.Unlock()\r\n\r\n\tif c, ok := r.agentClients[agentName]; ok {\r\n\t\treturn c\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tvar c *forgejo.Client\r\n\tif token != \"\" {\r\n\t\tc = r.forgejo.As(token)\r\n\t} else {\r\n\t\t// Fallback: use shared identity. Optionally log a warning\r\n\t\t// if we ever want to enforce per-agent tokens.\r\n\t\tc = r.forgejo\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tr.agentClients[agentName] = c\r\n\r\n\treturn c\r\n}\r\n\r\n// Run implements scheduler.Runner.\r\nfunc (r *Runner) Run(ctx context.Context, jobID string, agent config.AgentConfig, llmCfg config.LLM, dockerImage string, ev forgejo.Event) error {\r\n\tctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, r.timeout)\r\n\tdefer cancel()\r\n\r\n\tlogger := r.logger.With(\"job\", jobID, \"agent\", agent.Name)\r\n\r\n\trepoInfo, err := r.forgejo.RepositoryInfo(ev.Owner, ev.Repo)\r\n\tif err != nil {\r\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"look up repository: %w\", err)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tworkDir, err := os.MkdirTemp(\"\", \"zoo-run-*\")\r\n\tif err != nil {\r\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"create work dir: %w\", err)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tsucceeded := false\r\n\r\n\tdefer func() {\r\n\t\tif succeeded || !r.keepOnFailure {\r\n\t\t\tos.RemoveAll(workDir)\r\n\t\t} else {\r\n\t\t\tlogger.Warn(\"keeping work dir after failure\", \"dir\", workDir)\r\n\t\t}\r\n\t}()\r\n\r\n\tprojectDir := filepath.Join(workDir, \"project\")\r\n\r\n\t// A pr:review run works on the PR's own head branch, so the agent's\r\n\t// commits push straight to the PR. Every other event kind branches\r\n\t// off the default branch as usual.\r\n\tvar review *forgejo.ReviewDetail\r\n\tbranch := fmt.Sprintf(\"issue-%d-%s\", ev.Index, agent.Name)\r\n\r\n\tif ev.Kind == forgejo.EventPRReview {\r\n\t\t// Always fetch the current head ref, not just when the event\r\n\t\t// lacks one (the polling path doesn't carry it): the webhook's\r\n\t\t// copy could be stale if the PR's head branch was renamed since\r\n\t\t// the review, and the push target depends on it.\r\n\t\theadRef := ev.HeadRef\r\n\r\n\t\tif prInfo, err := r.forgejo.PullRequestInfo(ev.Owner, ev.Repo, ev.Index); err != nil {\r\n\t\t\tlogger.Warn(\"fetch pull request head failed; falling back to the event's head ref\", \"error\", err)\r\n\t\t} else if prInfo.HeadRef != \"\" {\r\n\t\t\theadRef = prInfo.HeadRef\r\n\t\t}\r\n\r\n\t\tif headRef == \"\" {\r\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"pr:review event has no pull request head branch to check out\")\r\n\t\t}\r\n\r\n\t\tif err := clonePRHead(ctx, repoInfo.CloneURL, r.forgejo.Token(), repoInfo.DefaultBranch, headRef, ev.Index, projectDir); err != nil {\r\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"prepare git working tree: %w\", err)\r\n\t\t}\r\n\r\n\t\tbranch = headRef\r\n\r\n\t\t// Fetch the full review (verdict, body, inline comments) so the\r\n\t\t// agent sees all the feedback, not just the triggering event. A\r\n\t\t// failure degrades to no review detail rather than failing the\r\n\t\t// run: the agent can still do its job, just without the inline\r\n\t\t// comments.\r\n\t\treview, err = r.forgejo.ReviewDetail(ev.Owner, ev.Repo, ev.Index, ev.ReviewID)\r\n\t\tif err != nil {\r\n\t\t\tlogger.Warn(\"fetch review detail failed; agent will not see inline review comments\", \"error\", err)\r\n\t\t\treview = nil\r\n\t\t}\r\n\t} else {\r\n\t\tif err := cloneAndBranch(ctx, repoInfo.CloneURL, r.forgejo.Token(), repoInfo.DefaultBranch, branch, projectDir); err != nil {\r\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"prepare git working tree: %w\", err)\r\n\t\t}\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\troster := buildRoster(r.forgejo, r.cfg.Agents, logger)\r\n\tgitName, gitEmail := gitIdentity(agent.Name, roster)\r\n\r\n\t// Local (not --global) scope, so this identity lives in\r\n\t// projectDir/.git/config: the one place both this host-side clone\r\n\t// and the container it's bind-mounted into (as /project) actually\r\n\t// share.\r\n\tif out, err := runGit(ctx, projectDir, \"config\", \"user.name\", gitName); err != nil {\r\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure git user.name: %w: %s\", err, out)\r\n\t}\r\n\tif out, err := runGit(ctx, projectDir, \"config\", \"user.email\", gitEmail); err != nil {\r\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure git user.email: %w: %s\", err, out)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\teventPath := filepath.Join(workDir, \"event.json\")\r\n\tif err := os.WriteFile(eventPath, ev.Raw, 0o644); err != nil {\r\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"write event file: %w\", err)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tcontainerID, err := r.docker.createContainer(ctx, dockerImage, []string{\r\n\t\tprojectDir + \":/project\",\r\n\t\teventPath + \":/event:ro\",\r\n\t}, fmt.Sprintf(\"zoo-issue-%d-%s\", ev.Index, agent.Name))\r\n\tif err != nil {\r\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"start container: %w\", err)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tdefer func() {\r\n\t\tcleanupCtx, cleanupCancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 30*time.Second)\r\n\t\tdefer cleanupCancel()\r\n\t\tif err := r.docker.remove(cleanupCtx, containerID); err != nil {\r\n\t\t\tlogger.Warn(\"failed to remove container\", \"container\", containerID, \"error\", err)\r\n\t\t}\r\n\t}()\r\n\r\n\t// /project is bind-mounted from the host, so it's owned by the host\r\n\t// UID that ran the clone, not whatever UID runs inside the\r\n\t// container (usually root) β git's ownership check rejects that by\r\n\t// default (\"detected dubious ownership\") unless told otherwise.\r\n\t// --system (not --global) so this holds regardless of which user\r\n\t// subsequent `docker exec` calls run as. Commit identity is\r\n\t// configured host-side, above, with --local scope so it's visible\r\n\t// from both sides of the bind mount without needing --global here.\r\n\tout, exitCode, err := r.docker.exec(ctx, containerID, \"git config --system --add safe.directory '*'\")\r\n\tif err != nil {\r\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure git safe.directory in container: %w: %s\", err, out)\r\n\t}\r\n\tif exitCode != 0 {\r\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure git safe.directory in container: exit %d: %s\", exitCode, out)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tlogAppend := func(stream, line string) {\r\n\t\tif err := r.store.AppendLog(context.Background(), jobID, stream, line); err != nil {\r\n\t\t\tlogger.Warn(\"failed to append log\", \"error\", err)\r\n\t\t}\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\trunCtx := \u0026runContext{\r\n\t\tdocker: r.docker,\r\n\t\tcontainerID: containerID,\r\n\t\tprojectDir: projectDir,\r\n\t\ttoken: r.forgejo.Token(),\r\n\t\tforgejo: \u0026runForgejoActions{\r\n\t\t\tclient: r.forgejoAs(agent.Name, agent.Token),\r\n\t\t\towner: ev.Owner,\r\n\t\t\trepo: ev.Repo,\r\n\t\t\tindex: ev.Index,\r\n\t\t\tlogger: logger,\r\n\t\t},\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tllmClient := llm.NewClient(llmCfg)\r\n\r\n\tsystemPrompt := defaultSystemPrompt + identitySection(agent.Name, roster)\r\n\r\n\tinstructions := r.cfg.EventInstructions(ev.Kind)\r\n\r\n\t// Fetch the full comment thread so the agent sees everything that's\r\n\t// been said on the issue/PR, not just the triggering event (which\r\n\t// only carries the latest comment, if any). A failure degrades to\r\n\t// no comments rather than failing the run: the agent can still do\r\n\t// its job, just without prior context.\r\n\tcomments, err := r.forgejo.ListIssueComments(ev.Owner, ev.Repo, ev.Index)\r\n\tif err != nil {\r\n\t\tlogger.Warn(\"fetch issue comments failed; agent will not see prior comments\", \"error\", err)\r\n\t\tcomments = nil\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tmessages := []llm.Message{\r\n\t\t{Role: \"system\", Content: systemPrompt},\r\n\t\t{Role: \"user\", Content: seedMessage(ev, branch, repoInfo.DefaultBranch, instructions, comments, review)},\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\thooks := r.streamHooks(jobID, logAppend)\r\n\r\n\t_, err = runLoop(ctx, llmClient, runCtx, messages, hooks)\r\n\tif err != nil {\r\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"agent loop: %w\", err)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tsucceeded = true\r\n\r\n\treturn nil\r\n}\r\n\r\n// streamHooks builds the Hooks a single Run passes to runLoop: every\r\n// delta is published live to the hub for connected dashboard viewers,\r\n// and once a reasoning/content block or tool call is complete, it's\r\n// persisted to the store as one row and the hub's replay buffer for\r\n// jobID is checkpointed β so a viewer connecting from this point on\r\n// sees it via the persisted history instead of a live replay, and is\r\n// never shown it twice.\r\nfunc (r *Runner) streamHooks(jobID string, logAppend func(stream, line string)) Hooks {\r\n\tvar reasoningBuf, contentBuf strings.Builder\r\n\r\n\treasoningOpen, contentOpen := false, false\r\n\r\n\treturn Hooks{\r\n\t\tOnReasoningDelta: func(delta string) {\r\n\t\t\tif !reasoningOpen {\r\n\t\t\t\treasoningOpen = true\r\n\t\t\t\treasoningBuf.Reset()\r\n\t\t\t\tr.hub.Publish(jobID, livelog.Event{Type: livelog.ReasoningStart})\r\n\t\t\t}\r\n\r\n\t\t\treasoningBuf.WriteString(delta)\r\n\t\t\tr.hub.Publish(jobID, livelog.Event{Type: livelog.ReasoningDelta, Text: delta})\r\n\t\t},\r\n\t\tOnContentDelta: func(delta string) {\r\n\t\t\tif !contentOpen {\r\n\t\t\t\tcontentOpen = true\r\n\t\t\t\tcontentBuf.Reset()\r\n\t\t\t\tr.hub.Publish(jobID, livelog.Event{Type: livelog.ContentStart})\r\n\t\t\t}\r\n\r\n\t\t\tcontentBuf.WriteString(delta)\r\n\t\t\tr.hub.Publish(jobID, livelog.Event{Type: livelog.ContentDelta, Text: delta})\r\n\t\t},\r\n\t\tOnTurnEnd: func() {\r\n\t\t\tif reasoningOpen {\r\n\t\t\t\tr.hub.Publish(jobID, livelog.Event{Type: livelog.ReasoningEnd})\r\n\t\t\t\tlogAppend(\"reasoning\", reasoningBuf.String())\r\n\t\t\t\tr.hub.Checkpoint(jobID)\r\n\t\t\t\treasoningOpen = false\r\n\t\t\t}\r\n\r\n\t\t\tif contentOpen {\r\n\t\t\t\tr.hub.Publish(jobID, livelog.Event{Type: livelog.ContentEnd})\r\n\t\t\t\tlogAppend(\"content\", contentBuf.String())\r\n\t\t\t\tr.hub.Checkpoint(jobID)\r\n\t\t\t\tcontentOpen = false\r\n\t\t\t}\r\n\t\t},\r\n\t\tOnTool: func(name, arguments, result string, toolErr bool) {\r\n\t\t\tr.hub.Publish(jobID, livelog.Event{\r\n\t\t\t\tType: livelog.Tool,\r\n\t\t\t\tName: name,\r\n\t\t\t\tArguments: arguments,\r\n\t\t\t\tResult: result,\r\n\t\t\t\tError: toolErr,\r\n\t\t\t})\r\n\r\n\t\t\tline, err := json.Marshal(store.ToolLogEntry{Name: name, Arguments: arguments, Result: result, Error: toolErr})\r\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\r\n\t\t\t\tr.logger.Warn(\"failed to marshal tool log entry\", \"job\", jobID, \"error\", err)\r\n\t\t\t} else {\r\n\t\t\t\tlogAppend(\"tool\", string(line))\r\n\t\t\t}\r\n\r\n\t\t\tr.hub.Checkpoint(jobID)\r\n\t\t},\r\n\t}\r\n}\r\n\r\nfunc seedMessage(ev forgejo.Event, branch, defaultBranch, instructions string, comments []forgejo.IssueComment, review *forgejo.ReviewDetail) string {\r\n\traw, _ := json.MarshalIndent(json.RawMessage(ev.Raw), \"\", \" \")\r\n\r\n\tvar instructionsSection string\r\n\tif instructions != \"\" {\r\n\t\tinstructionsSection = fmt.Sprintf(\"Instructions for this event, from zoo.hcl:\\n%s\\n\\n\", instructions)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\t// A pr:review run works on the PR's own head branch, not a fresh\r\n\t// branch off the default branch.\r\n\tbranchLine := fmt.Sprintf(\"Your working branch is %q, checked out from the default branch %q.\\n\\n\", branch, defaultBranch)\r\n\tif ev.Kind == forgejo.EventPRReview {\r\n\t\tbranchLine = fmt.Sprintf(\"Your working branch is %q, the pull request's head branch β commits you push here update the pull request directly.\\n\\n\", branch)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tvar reviewSection string\r\n\tif review != nil {\r\n\t\treviewSection = renderReviewSection(review)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tvar commentsSection string\r\n\tif len(comments) \u003e 0 {\r\n\t\tvar b strings.Builder\r\n\t\tfmt.Fprintf(\u0026b, \"Comments (%d):\\n\\n\", len(comments))\r\n\r\n\t\tfor i, c := range comments {\r\n\t\t\tfmt.Fprintf(\u0026b, \"%d. %s (%s):\\n%s\\n\\n\", i+1, c.Author, c.Created.Format(time.RFC3339), c.Body)\r\n\t\t}\r\n\r\n\t\tcommentsSection = b.String()\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\treturn fmt.Sprintf(\r\n\t\t\"You were triggered by a %q event on %s/%s.\\n\\n\"+\r\n\t\t\t\"%s%s\"+\r\n\t\t\t\"%sTitle: %s\\n\\nBody:\\n%s\\n\\n%sFull event payload:\\n```json\\n%s\\n```\",\r\n\t\tev.Kind, ev.Owner, ev.Repo, instructionsSection, branchLine, reviewSection, ev.Title, ev.Body, commentsSection, raw)\r\n}\r\n\r\n// renderReviewSection renders the submitted review as a briefing\r\n// section: the verdict, the review body, and each inline comment with\r\n// its location and id (the id lets the agent refer to a specific\r\n// comment in its reply).\r\nfunc renderReviewSection(review *forgejo.ReviewDetail) string {\r\n\tvar b strings.Builder\r\n\r\n\tfmt.Fprintf(\u0026b, \"Review submitted by %s:\\n\", review.Reviewer)\r\n\tfmt.Fprintf(\u0026b, \" Verdict: %s\\n\", humanReviewState(review.State))\r\n\r\n\tif review.Body != \"\" {\r\n\t\tb.WriteString(\" Review body:\\n\")\r\n\t\tfor _, line := range strings.Split(review.Body, \"\\n\") {\r\n\t\t\tfmt.Fprintf(\u0026b, \" %s\\n\", line)\r","start_line":1,"end_line":400,"total_lines":435,"truncated":true}
Thinking
Let's read the rest of run.go and the tools' git.go to understand how git operations are being executed inside the sandbox.
Tool
π§ read_file
{"path": "internal/agentrun/run.go", "start_line": 400, "end_line": 435}
Arguments
{"path": "internal/agentrun/run.go", "start_line": 400, "end_line": 435}
Result
{"path":"internal/agentrun/run.go","content":"\t\t\tfmt.Fprintf(\u0026b, \" %s\\n\", line)\r\n\t\t}\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tif len(review.Comments) \u003e 0 {\r\n\t\tfmt.Fprintf(\u0026b, \" Inline comments (%d):\\n\", len(review.Comments))\r\n\r\n\t\tfor i, c := range review.Comments {\r\n\t\t\twhere := c.Path\r\n\t\t\tif c.Line \u003e 0 {\r\n\t\t\t\twhere = fmt.Sprintf(\"%s:%d\", c.Path, c.Line)\r\n\t\t\t}\r\n\r\n\t\t\tfmt.Fprintf(\u0026b, \" %d. [%s] %s (comment id %d):\\n\", i+1, where, c.Author, c.ID)\r\n\t\t\tfor _, line := range strings.Split(c.Body, \"\\n\") {\r\n\t\t\t\tfmt.Fprintf(\u0026b, \" %s\\n\", line)\r\n\t\t\t}\r\n\t\t}\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\treturn b.String() + \"\\n\"\r\n}\r\n\r\n// humanReviewState maps a Forgejo review state to a readable verdict.\r\nfunc humanReviewState(state string) string {\r\n\tswitch state {\r\n\tcase \"APPROVED\":\r\n\t\treturn \"approved\"\r\n\tcase \"REQUEST_CHANGES\":\r\n\t\treturn \"changes requested\"\r\n\tcase \"COMMENT\":\r\n\t\treturn \"comment\"\r\n\tdefault:\r\n\t\treturn state\r\n\t}\r\n}\r","start_line":400,"end_line":435,"total_lines":435,"truncated":false}
Tool
π§ read_file
{"path": "internal/tools/git.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 200}
Arguments
{"path": "internal/tools/git.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 200}
Result
{"path":"internal/tools/git.go","content":"package tools\r\n\r\nimport (\r\n\t\"context\"\r\n\t\"fmt\"\r\n\t\"slices\"\r\n\t\"strings\"\r\n\r\n\t\"github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/llm\"\r\n)\r\n\r\n// gitAllowed intentionally excludes remote-mutating subcommands other\r\n// than push: agents are expected to commit and push their own branch,\r\n// not touch remotes/config/etc.\r\nvar gitAllowed = []string{\r\n\t\"add\",\r\n\t\"branch\",\r\n\t\"checkout\",\r\n\t\"commit\",\r\n\t\"diff\",\r\n\t\"fetch\",\r\n\t\"log\",\r\n\t\"ls-remote\",\r\n\t\"pull\",\r\n\t\"push\",\r\n\t\"show\",\r\n\t\"status\",\r\n\t\"rm\",\r\n}\r\n\r\ntype gitParams struct {\r\n\tSubcommand string `json:\"subcommand\"`\r\n\tArgs []string `json:\"args\"`\r\n}\r\n\r\nfunc init() {\r\n\ttool := llm.NewTool(\r\n\t\t\"git\",\r\n\t\t\"Run a git subcommand with optional arguments against the project's working tree\")\r\n\r\n\ttool.AddEnumProperty(\"subcommand\", \"The git subcommand to run\", gitAllowed, true)\r\n\ttool.AddStringArrayProperty(\"args\", \"Additional arguments to pass to the git subcommand, e.g. ['HEAD~1', 'HEAD']\", false)\r\n\r\n\tRegister(tool, git)\r\n}\r\n\r\n// git runs subcommand via Context.Git, which executes it outside the\r\n// container (see that method's doc comment for why): the container\r\n// itself is never given a credential capable of authenticating against\r\n// Forgejo, so pushing has to happen on the host side instead.\r\nfunc git(ctx Context, params gitParams) (string, error) {\r\n\tif !slices.Contains(gitAllowed, params.Subcommand) {\r\n\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"git subcommand '%s' is not allowed. Only %s are permitted\", params.Subcommand, strings.Join(gitAllowed, \", \"))\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\toutput, err := ctx.Git(context.Background(), params.Subcommand, params.Args...)\r\n\tif err != nil {\r\n\t\treturn \"\", err\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tif output == \"\" {\r\n\t\tswitch params.Subcommand {\r\n\t\tcase \"diff\":\r\n\t\t\treturn \"No changes detected.\", nil\r\n\r\n\t\tcase \"status\":\r\n\t\t\treturn \"No status output.\", nil\r\n\t\t}\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\treturn strings.TrimSpace(output), nil\r\n}\r","start_line":1,"end_line":72,"total_lines":72,"truncated":false}
Thinking
Next, let's look at the tools' context.go and bash.go to understand how the tools interact with the sandbox.
Tool
π§ read_file
{"path": "internal/tools/context.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 200}
Arguments
{"path": "internal/tools/context.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 200}
Result
{"path":"internal/tools/context.go","content":"// Package tools is the registry of functions an agent's tool-calling\r\n// loop can invoke, ported from ../a/tools but retargeted at a Docker\r\n// container (via Exec) and the Forgejo issue/PR that triggered the run\r\n// (via Forgejo()) instead of a local sandboxed filesystem.\r\npackage tools\r\n\r\nimport \"context\"\r\n\r\n// Context is bound to a single agent run (job), unlike ../a's single\r\n// global Context, since multiple agents run concurrently in zoo.\r\ntype Context interface {\r\n\t// Exec runs command inside the run's container via `sh -c` and\r\n\t// returns combined stdout+stderr. The container never holds a\r\n\t// Forgejo credential, so this cannot reach the Forgejo API or\r\n\t// authenticate git operations against it β see Git.\r\n\tExec(ctx context.Context, command string) (string, error)\r\n\r\n\t// Git runs a git subcommand against the run's working tree on the\r\n\t// host, outside the container, so that operations needing a Forgejo\r\n\t// credential (currently just push) can authenticate without that\r\n\t// credential ever being written to disk where the container (and\r\n\t// anything run inside it via Exec) could read it.\r\n\tGit(ctx context.Context, subcommand string, args ...string) (string, error)\r\n\r\n\t// Forgejo returns the actions bound to the issue/PR that triggered\r\n\t// this run, so tools don't need to be told which repo/issue to act\r\n\t// on.\r\n\tForgejo() ForgejoActions\r\n}\r\n\r\n// ForgejoActions are the actions available to an agent against the\r\n// triggering issue/PR. Implemented by internal/agentrun, backed by\r\n// internal/forgejo.Client plus the run's owner/repo/issue.\r\ntype ForgejoActions interface {\r\n\tComment(body string) error\r\n\tOpenPullRequest(head, base, title, body string) error\r\n\tRequestReview(reviewers []string) error\r\n\tAddLabel(name string) error\r\n\tRemoveLabel(name string) error\r\n\tCloseIssue() error\r\n\tReopenIssue() error\r\n\r\n\t// AssignIssue hands the triggering issue/PR off to another agent by\r\n\t// their name (which doubles as their Forgejo username); the\r\n\t// resulting issue:assigned event triggers that agent's run.\r\n\tAssignIssue(agentName string) error\r\n\r\n\t// SubmitReview submits a review on the triggering pull request with\r\n\t// the given verdict (forgejo.ReviewStateApproved,\r\n\t// ReviewStateChangesRequest, or ReviewStateComment) and body.\r\n\tSubmitReview(state, body string) error\r\n}\r","start_line":1,"end_line":52,"total_lines":52,"truncated":false}
Tool
π§ read_file
{"path": "internal/tools/bash.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 100}
Arguments
{"path": "internal/tools/bash.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 100}
Result
{"path":"internal/tools/bash.go","content":"package tools\r\n\r\nimport (\r\n\t\"context\"\r\n\t\"fmt\"\r\n\t\"time\"\r\n\r\n\t\"github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/llm\"\r\n)\r\n\r\nconst maxTimeout = 300\r\n\r\ntype bashParams struct {\r\n\tCommand string `json:\"command\"`\r\n\tTimeout int `json:\"timeout,omitempty\"`\r\n}\r\n\r\nfunc init() {\r\n\ttool := llm.NewTool(\r\n\t\t\"bash\",\r\n\t\t\"Execute a shell command in the project container. Use this to run shell commands and scripts.\")\r\n\r\n\ttool.AddStringProperty(\"command\", \"The shell command to execute\", true)\r\n\ttool.AddIntegerProperty(\"timeout\", \"Optional timeout in seconds. Must not exceed 300 seconds.\", false)\r\n\r\n\tRegister(tool, bash)\r\n}\r\n\r\nfunc bash(ctx Context, params bashParams) (string, error) {\r\n\tif params.Timeout \u003c 0 {\r\n\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"timeout must not be negative\")\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tif params.Timeout \u003e maxTimeout {\r\n\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"timeout exceeds maximum of %d seconds\", maxTimeout)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tvar execCtx context.Context\r\n\tvar cancel context.CancelFunc\r\n\r\n\tif params.Timeout \u003e 0 {\r\n\t\texecCtx, cancel = context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), time.Duration(params.Timeout)*time.Second)\r\n\t} else {\r\n\t\texecCtx, cancel = context.WithCancel(context.Background())\r\n\t}\r\n\tdefer cancel()\r\n\r\n\toutput, err := ctx.Exec(execCtx, params.Command)\r\n\tif err != nil {\r\n\t\tif execCtx.Err() == context.DeadlineExceeded {\r\n\t\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"command timed out after %d seconds\", params.Timeout)\r\n\t\t}\r\n\r\n\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"command failed: %w\", err)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\treturn output, nil\r\n}\r","start_line":1,"end_line":58,"total_lines":58,"truncated":false}
Thinking
Next, let's look at runContext in context.go (agentrun), loop.go, and docker_integration_test.go to understand how the tests work.
Tool
π§ read_file
{"path": "internal/agentrun/context.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 250}
Arguments
{"path": "internal/agentrun/context.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 250}
Result
{"path":"internal/agentrun/context.go","content":"package agentrun\r\n\r\nimport (\r\n\t\"context\"\r\n\t\"fmt\"\r\n\r\n\t\"github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/tools\"\r\n)\r\n\r\n// runContext implements tools.Context for a single agent run, executing\r\n// shell commands via docker exec against the run's container, git\r\n// commands as the host process against the run's working tree (see\r\n// Git), and binding Forgejo actions to the triggering issue/PR.\r\ntype runContext struct {\r\n\tdocker *dockerRuntime\r\n\tcontainerID string\r\n\tprojectDir string\r\n\ttoken string\r\n\tforgejo tools.ForgejoActions\r\n}\r\n\r\nfunc (c *runContext) Exec(ctx context.Context, command string) (string, error) {\r\n\toutput, exitCode, err := c.docker.exec(ctx, c.containerID, command)\r\n\r\n\tif err != nil {\r\n\t\treturn output, err\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tif exitCode != 0 {\r\n\t\treturn output, fmt.Errorf(\"command exited with status %d\", exitCode)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\treturn output, nil\r\n}\r\n\r\n// Git implements tools.Context.Git by running git on the host against\r\n// c.projectDir rather than via docker exec. Only push needs to\r\n// authenticate against Forgejo, so only it carries the token, via a\r\n// per-invocation -c override that never touches .git/config (see\r\n// gitAuthArgs) β the container this same working tree is bind-mounted\r\n// into has no way to read it out.\r\nfunc (c *runContext) Git(ctx context.Context, subcommand string, args ...string) (string, error) {\r\n\tcmdArgs := append([]string{subcommand}, args...)\r\n\r\n\tif subcommand == \"push\" {\r\n\t\treturn runGitAuthed(ctx, c.projectDir, c.token, cmdArgs...)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\treturn runGit(ctx, c.projectDir, cmdArgs...)\r\n}\r\n\r\nfunc (c *runContext) Forgejo() tools.ForgejoActions {\r\n\treturn c.forgejo\r\n}\r","start_line":1,"end_line":54,"total_lines":54,"truncated":false}
Tool
π§ read_file
{"path": "internal/agentrun/docker_integration_test.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 300}
Arguments
{"path": "internal/agentrun/docker_integration_test.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 300}
Result
{"path":"internal/agentrun/docker_integration_test.go","content":"//go:build docker\r\n\r\n// Run with: go test -tags docker ./internal/agentrun/...\r\n// Requires a reachable Docker daemon (DOCKER_HOST or the default socket).\r\npackage agentrun\r\n\r\nimport (\r\n\t\"context\"\r\n\t\"os/exec\"\r\n\t\"strings\"\r\n\t\"testing\"\r\n\t\"time\"\r\n)\r\n\r\nfunc TestDockerRuntimeExecRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {\r\n\trt, err := newDockerRuntime()\r\n\tif err != nil {\r\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"docker client: %v\", err)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 60*time.Second)\r\n\tdefer cancel()\r\n\r\n\tcontainerID, err := rt.createContainer(ctx, \"debian:unstable\", nil, \"zoo-test-run\")\r\n\tif err != nil {\r\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"create container: %v\", err)\r\n\t}\r\n\tdefer rt.remove(context.Background(), containerID)\r\n\r\n\toutput, exitCode, err := rt.exec(ctx, containerID, \"echo hello-from-zoo\")\r\n\tif err != nil {\r\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"exec: %v\", err)\r\n\t}\r\n\tif exitCode != 0 {\r\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"expected exit code 0, got %d\", exitCode)\r\n\t}\r\n\tif !strings.Contains(output, \"hello-from-zoo\") {\r\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"unexpected output: %q\", output)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\t_, exitCode, err = rt.exec(ctx, containerID, \"exit 3\")\r\n\tif err != nil {\r\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"exec: %v\", err)\r\n\t}\r\n\tif exitCode != 3 {\r\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"expected exit code 3, got %d\", exitCode)\r\n\t}\r\n}\r\n\r\n// TestDockerRuntimeGitSafeDirectory reproduces the \"detected dubious\r\n// ownership\" error git raises against a bind-mounted repo owned by a\r\n// different UID than the container runs as, and confirms the `git\r\n// config --system --add safe.directory '*'` fix Run() applies (see\r\n// run.go) actually clears it, against the same golang:latest image\r\n// zoo.hcl now defaults to.\r\nfunc TestDockerRuntimeGitSafeDirectory(t *testing.T) {\r\n\tprojectDir := t.TempDir()\r\n\r\n\tfor _, args := range [][]string{\r\n\t\t{\"init\", \"-q\", projectDir},\r\n\t\t{\"-C\", projectDir, \"commit\", \"-q\", \"--allow-empty\", \"-m\", \"init\"},\r\n\t} {\r\n\t\tif out, err := exec.Command(\"git\", args...).CombinedOutput(); err != nil {\r\n\t\t\tt.Fatalf(\"git %v: %v: %s\", args, err, out)\r\n\t\t}\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\trt, err := newDockerRuntime()\r\n\tif err != nil {\r\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"docker client: %v\", err)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 60*time.Second)\r\n\tdefer cancel()\r\n\r\n\tcontainerID, err := rt.createContainer(ctx, \"golang:latest\", []string{projectDir + \":/project\"}, \"zoo-test-git\")\r\n\tif err != nil {\r\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"create container: %v\", err)\r\n\t}\r\n\tdefer rt.remove(context.Background(), containerID)\r\n\r\n\toutput, _, err := rt.exec(ctx, containerID, \"git status\")\r\n\tif err != nil {\r\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"exec: %v\", err)\r\n\t}\r\n\tif !strings.Contains(output, \"dubious ownership\") {\r\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"expected the bind mount to reproduce dubious ownership before the fix, got: %s\", output)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\toutput, exitCode, err := rt.exec(ctx, containerID, \"git config --system --add safe.directory '*'\")\r\n\tif err != nil || exitCode != 0 {\r\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"configure safe.directory: err=%v exit=%d: %s\", err, exitCode, output)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\toutput, exitCode, err = rt.exec(ctx, containerID, \"git status\")\r\n\tif err != nil {\r\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"exec: %v\", err)\r\n\t}\r\n\tif exitCode != 0 || strings.Contains(output, \"dubious ownership\") {\r\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"expected git status to succeed after the fix, got exit=%d: %s\", exitCode, output)\r\n\t}\r\n}\r","start_line":1,"end_line":102,"total_lines":102,"truncated":false}
Thinking
Alright, let's understand the overall architecture:
1. **Current flow:**
- `Run()` in `run.go` creates a temporary directory on the host (`workDir`), and inside it `projectDir` = `workDir/project`.
- It clones the repository **on the host** (using `cloneAndBranch`/`clonePRHead` in `clone.go`), authenticating with the shared zoo token via `-c http.extraHeader=...`.
- It sets git user.name/user.email on the host with `--local` scope (written to `.git/config` inside projectDir).
- It creates a Docker container with bind mounts: `projectDir:/project` and `eventPath:/event:ro`.
- It runs `git config --system --add safe.directory '*'` inside the container.
- The agent's tools: `bash` β `docker exec` (no credentials inside the container), `git` β runs on the **host** (outside the container), and only `push` gets the token via `-c http.extraHeader`.
2. **What the issue is asking for:**
- Pass the **agent's token** to the sandbox so that the agent can perform its own git operations β including remote operations.
- Do the **initial git clone inside the sandbox**.
- There should be no need to run git outside the sandbox.
- `git pull` must simply work inside the sandbox. "Maybe we need to put something in .gitconfig, but it has to work."
So the changes are:
1. Move the clone into the container (via `docker exec`), and pass the token to the container so the clone can authenticate.
2. Set up git authentication inside the container so that `git pull`, `git push`, `git fetch` all work. The cleanest way: write a `.gitconfig` (global) inside the container with a credential helper or `http.extraHeader` set for the remote URL.
Wait β "pass the **agent** token to the sandbox". Currently the clone uses `r.forgejo.Token()` (the shared zoo token). The issue says "agent token" β meaning the per-agent token (`agent.Token` in the config). Let's check the config to see what `agent.Token` is.
Let's look at config.go and see how the agent token is used.
Also, there's an important security consideration mentioned in the comments in clone.go: embedding the token in `.git/config` on disk means the container can read it. But now we *want* the container to have the token β that's the whole point of the issue. The agent needs to be able to do git operations against the remote.
So the design:
- The container gets the token via an environment variable (e.g. `ZOO_GIT_TOKEN`), or via a git config with `http.<url>.extraheader` written to the container's global gitconfig.
- The clone happens inside the container: `git clone` via `docker exec`.
- The git identity (user.name/user.email) is set inside the container.
- The `git` tool now runs inside the container (via `docker exec`) instead of on the host.
- `git pull` must work: this requires the remote to be authenticated. Options:
a. Embed the token in the remote URL: `https://zoo:TOKEN@host/owner/repo.git`. Simple, but the token ends up in `.git/config` on disk inside the bind-mounted project directory. Since the container owns the token anyway, this is acceptable now. But it's a bit ugly.
b. Write a global gitconfig inside the container (e.g. `/root/.gitconfig`) with `http.<cloneURL>.extraHeader = Authorization: Basic base64(zoo:TOKEN)`. This way the token doesn't end up in the bind-mounted repo's `.git/config` β it's in the container's filesystem, which is ephemeral. This is cleaner and matches "maybe we need to put something in .gitconfig".
Option (b) is the elegant approach: write a global `.gitconfig` in the container that has an extraHeader scoped to the repo's URL (or to the forgejo host). That way `git pull`, `git push`, `git fetch` all work transparently.
But wait β there's a subtlety with `http.extraHeader` and `http.<url>.extraHeader`: the URL matching is prefix-based. If we scope it to the clone URL (e.g. `https://code.stdio.dk/abrander/zoo`), it applies to that repo. Or scope it to the host `https://code.stdio.dk` β that would apply to all repos on that host. The agent's token is a personal access token for that agent, so scoping to the host is fine, and arguably more useful (the agent might clone other repos? probably not needed). Let's scope it to the clone URL... actually, hmm. Let me think about which is more robust.
The clone URL from `RepositoryInfo` β let's check what format it's in. Let's look at forgejo/client.go for RepositoryInfo and CloneURL.
Also, the token in the gitconfig: `Authorization: Basic base64(user:token)`. For Forgejo/Gitea, the username can be anything (e.g. the agent's login or "zoo"). The existing code uses "zoo". For per-agent tokens, the username should probably be the agent's username, but Gitea accepts any username with a valid token. Let's keep it simple: use the agent's name as the username.
Now, where do we put the global gitconfig inside the container? The container's working directory is /project. The container runs as root (probably). The image is golang:latest (default per zoo.hcl.example). So HOME=/root, and the global gitconfig is /root/.gitconfig.
But wait β there's a subtlety with `git config --system` that's already being run: `git config --system --add safe.directory '*'` writes to /etc/gitconfig inside the container. We could do the same for the credential: `git config --system http.<url>.extraHeader "Authorization: Basic ..."`. That way it applies to any user in the container.
Actually, we could do everything in one `git config --system` call:
- `safe.directory *`
- `user.name`, `user.email` (replacing the host-side local config)
- `http.<cloneURL>.extraHeader Authorization: Basic ...`
Hmm, but wait: is `http.<url>.extraHeader` valid in system config? Yes, it's a normal git config variable.
One concern: `git pull` does a fetch + merge. The fetch will send the extra header. Good.
Another concern: the exec in docker.go sets `GIT_CONFIG_COUNT=1`, `GIT_CONFIG_KEY_0=color.ui`, `GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_0=never`. This env var mechanism *appends* config on top of normal config files, so it doesn't interfere with the system gitconfig.
Now, about the clone inside the sandbox:
- The container needs network access (it has it by default).
- The clone URL must be reachable from the container.
- The clone needs to happen after the container is created and the safe.directory config is set (actually, the clone creates the directory, so ownership is the container's UID β no dubious ownership issue at all! The repo will be owned by the container's UID (root), and the container runs as root. The host-side "dubious ownership" problem disappears because the clone is done inside the container).
Wait, but the bind mount: the host creates `projectDir` (a temp directory) owned by the host's UID. The container mounts it at /project and runs as root. When the container clones into /project, the files are owned by root (UID 0). If the host's UID is not 0, the host sees the files as root-owned. But the host no longer runs git, so that's fine.
Actually, wait, one more subtlety: the host creates `projectDir` with `os.MkdirTemp`... actually, `workDir` is created with MkdirTemp, and `projectDir = filepath.Join(workDir, "project")`. Is projectDir created on the host? Let's check: `cloneAndBranch` runs `git clone ... dir`, which creates the directory. In the new flow, the container's clone creates it. But the bind mount `projectDir:/project` requires projectDir to exist on the host before container creation. So we need to `os.MkdirAll(projectDir)` on the host first (or create it with MkdirTemp). Let's create it on the host as an empty directory, and the container clones into it.
Hmm, but if the host creates the empty directory, it's owned by the host's UID, and the container (root) clones into it β the clone creates files inside. If the host's UID is non-root and the directory is owned by the host's UID... the container's root can write to it anyway (root bypasses permissions). No problem.
Now, the token in the container: how do we pass it?
Option A: environment variable on the container (container.Config.Env). But the clone happens via `docker exec`, which uses the container's env... actually, `docker exec` inherits the container's env unless overridden. But the exec in docker.go explicitly sets `Env: []string{...}`, which *replaces* the container's env for the exec process! So if we pass the token via the container's env, we'd need to include it in the exec's env too.
Option B: write the token to a file inside the container (e.g. /run/zoo/token or /root/.zoo-token) via `docker exec` (echo > file). But writing the token via `sh -c "echo TOKEN > /file"` puts it in the container's process list (visible in `ps`), and in the exec's command line. Hmm.
Option C: write the credential directly to the gitconfig via `git config --system http.<url>.extraHeader "Authorization: Basic <b64>"` via docker exec. The base64-encoded token appears in the command line of the exec (visible in `docker inspect`/`ps` while running). This is a throwaway container, and the exec command is only visible to someone with docker access on the host β which is the same trust domain as the host itself (which already has the token in memory). I think this is acceptable.
Option D: pass the token via the exec's env: docker.ExecOptions.Env β the exec in docker.go currently has a fixed Env list. We could add an optional env to the exec call. E.g. `rt.execWithEnv(ctx, containerID, command, extraEnv)`. Then the clone command could be:
```
git -c http.extraHeader="Authorization: Basic $ZOO_GIT_AUTH" clone ...
```
Hmm, but then `git pull` later (run by the agent via the bash tool) wouldn't have that env... unless the exec's env is always included. The bash tool goes through `ctx.Exec` β `c.docker.exec(ctx, c.containerID, command)` with the fixed env list. If we add the token env to *every* exec, the agent's shell has `ZOO_GIT_TOKEN`... that's "passing the token to the sandbox" β arguably that's exactly what the issue is asking for: "pass the agent token to the sandbox so the agent can do its own git operations".
But for `git pull` to "just work", the gitconfig approach is the robust one: the credential is in the gitconfig, not an env var. The agent doesn't need to know about the env var at all. `git pull`, `git push`, `git fetch` all just work.
I think the best design combines:
1. Write a system gitconfig inside the container with:
- `safe.directory *`
- `user.name` / `user.email` (the agent's git identity)
- `http.<cloneURL>.extraHeader Authorization: Basic base64(user:token)`
2. Clone inside the container via docker exec: `git clone --branch <default> --single-branch <cloneURL> /project` (the working dir is already /project... wait, the container's WorkingDir is /project, so `git clone <url> .`? No β cloning into an existing non-empty directory fails, but an empty directory works: `git clone <url> /project`? Actually, `git clone <url> <dir>` where dir exists and is empty works fine.
Hmm wait, but there's a problem: the clone URL. What format is it? Let's check the forgejo client's RepositoryInfo.
3. For pr:review, fetch the PR head inside the container: `git fetch --no-tags origin refs/pull/N/head` then `git checkout -B <headRef> FETCH_HEAD`.
4. The `git` tool now runs inside the container: `ctx.Git` β `docker exec git <subcommand> <args...>` in /project. Since the gitconfig has the credential, push works.
5. Remove the host-side git operations: `runGit`/`runGitAuthed` in clone.go become unnecessary... actually, clone.go's `gitAuthArgs` might still be useful for building the extraHeader value. Let's restructure:
- `clone.go` β maybe rename to `sandbox_git.go` or keep the name. Functions:
- `gitAuthHeader(token, user) string` β returns "Authorization: Basic ..."
- `setupGitInContainer(ctx, docker, containerID, cloneURL, user, token, gitName, gitEmail)` β runs the git config commands.
- `cloneInContainer(ctx, docker, containerID, cloneURL, defaultBranch, branch)` β clone + checkout -b.
- `clonePRHeadInContainer(...)` β clone + fetch PR head + checkout.
6. `runContext.Git` β runs inside the container via `c.docker.exec(ctx, c.containerID, "git ...")`. Need to be careful with argument quoting! The exec runs `sh -c command`. The current `Git` runs on the host with exec.Command (no shell). If we move it to docker exec via sh -c, we need to shell-quote the arguments. The args are things like `['HEAD~1', 'HEAD']` β could contain shell metacharacters. We need to quote them properly. Use `shellQuote` (single-quote with escaping).
Let's check how other tools handle this... the bash tool passes the raw command to sh -c (intentional). For git, we need safe quoting.
7. `runContext` no longer needs `token` for push (the container's gitconfig handles auth). But wait β which token? The issue says "agent token". The agent's token is `agent.Token` from the config. Currently the clone uses `r.forgejo.Token()` (the shared zoo token). The issue explicitly says "pass the **agent** token to the sandbox". So we should use the agent's token if configured, falling back to the shared zoo token (consistent with the `forgejoAs` fallback logic).
Let's check config.go for AgentConfig.Token.
Also, the git identity: `gitIdentity(agent.Name, roster)` β let's look at roster.go.
Also, we need to check `loop.go` and the system prompt (system.md) to see if there's any mention of git running outside the container β the system prompt says "for remote (pull, fetch, push, etc.) git operations, use the git tool" β this is the agent's system prompt. Let's read system.md.
Also, let's check the `git` tool's description: "Run a git subcommand with optional arguments against the project's working tree". And in the system prompt given to me (this agent), it says "for remote (pull, fetch, push, etc.) git operations, you can use the git tool". After this change, the git tool runs inside the sandbox. The system.md might need updating if it mentions the host-side git.
Let's read the remaining relevant files: config.go, roster.go, loop.go, system.md, forgejo/client.go (RepositoryInfo), and zoo.hcl.example.
Tool
π§ read_file
{"path": "internal/config/config.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 250}
Arguments
{"path": "internal/config/config.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 250}
Result
{"path":"internal/config/config.go","content":"// Package config loads and validates zoo's HCL configuration file.\r\npackage config\r\n\r\nimport (\r\n\t\"fmt\"\r\n\r\n\t\"github.com/hashicorp/hcl/v2/hclsimple\"\r\n)\r\n\r\n// Known event kinds. issue:assigned and pr:review are resolved\r\n// dynamically (agent name must match the Forgejo assignee's username,\r\n// or the pull request author's username, respectively) so they never\r\n// carry an `agent` attribute; the rest map statically to one\r\n// configured agent.\r\nconst (\r\n\tEventIssueNew = \"issue:new\"\r\n\tEventIssueComment = \"issue:comment\"\r\n\tEventIssueAssigned = \"issue:assigned\"\r\n\tEventPRNew = \"pr:new\"\r\n\tEventPRReview = \"pr:review\"\r\n)\r\n\r\nvar staticEventKinds = map[string]bool{\r\n\tEventIssueNew: true,\r\n\tEventIssueComment: true,\r\n\tEventPRNew: true,\r\n}\r\n\r\ntype Config struct {\r\n\tLLMs []LLM `hcl:\"llm,block\"`\r\n\tForgejo Forgejo `hcl:\"forgejo,block\"`\r\n\tEnvironment Environment `hcl:\"environment,block\"`\r\n\tAgents []Agent `hcl:\"agent,block\"`\r\n\tEvents []Event `hcl:\"event,block\"`\r\n\tWeb *Web `hcl:\"web,block\"`\r\n}\r\n\r\n// Web configures the dashboard's optional bearer-token gate. Leave the\r\n// block out of zoo.hcl entirely to run without one (fine on localhost;\r\n// put a real gate or a proxy in front for anything else).\r\ntype Web struct {\r\n\tToken string `hcl:\"token,optional\"`\r\n}\r\n\r\ntype LLM struct {\r\n\tName string `hcl:\"name,label\"`\r\n\tOpenAI string `hcl:\"openai\"`\r\n\tToken string `hcl:\"token\"`\r\n\tModel string `hcl:\"model\"`\r\n}\r\n\r\ntype Forgejo struct {\r\n\tURL string `hcl:\"url\"`\r\n\tToken string `hcl:\"token\"`\r\n\tWebhookSecret string `hcl:\"webhook_secret,optional\"`\r\n}\r\n\r\ntype Environment struct {\r\n\tDockerImage string `hcl:\"docker_image\"`\r\n\tMaxLive int `hcl:\"max_live_agents\"`\r\n}\r\n\r\ntype Agent struct {\r\n\tName string `hcl:\"name,label\"`\r\n\tLLM string `hcl:\"llm\"`\r\n\tToken string `hcl:\"token,optional\"`\r\n}\r\n\r\ntype Event struct {\r\n\tKind string `hcl:\"name,label\"`\r\n\tAgent string `hcl:\"agent,optional\"`\r\n\tInstructions string `hcl:\"instructions,optional\"`\r\n}\r\n\r\n// Load reads and validates the config file at path.\r\nfunc Load(path string) (*Config, error) {\r\n\tvar cfg Config\r\n\r\n\tif err := hclsimple.DecodeFile(path, nil, \u0026cfg); err != nil {\r\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"parse config: %w\", err)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tif err := cfg.Validate(); err != nil {\r\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"invalid config: %w\", err)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\treturn \u0026cfg, nil\r\n}\r\n\r\n// Validate checks that the config is internally consistent: every\r\n// reference between blocks resolves, and required values are set.\r\nfunc (c *Config) Validate() error {\r\n\tllmNames := make(map[string]bool, len(c.LLMs))\r\n\tfor _, l := range c.LLMs {\r\n\t\tif l.OpenAI == \"\" || l.Token == \"\" || l.Model == \"\" {\r\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"llm %q: openai, token, and model are required\", l.Name)\r\n\t\t}\r\n\t\tllmNames[l.Name] = true\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tif c.Forgejo.URL == \"\" || c.Forgejo.Token == \"\" {\r\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"forgejo: url and token are required\")\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tif c.Environment.MaxLive \u003c 1 {\r\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"environment: max_live_agents must be \u003e= 1, got %d\", c.Environment.MaxLive)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tif c.Environment.DockerImage == \"\" {\r\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"environment: docker_image is required\")\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tagentNames := make(map[string]bool, len(c.Agents))\r\n\tfor _, a := range c.Agents {\r\n\t\tif !llmNames[a.LLM] {\r\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"agent %q: references undeclared llm %q\", a.Name, a.LLM)\r\n\t\t}\r\n\t\tagentNames[a.Name] = true\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tseenEventKinds := make(map[string]bool, len(c.Events))\r\n\tfor _, e := range c.Events {\r\n\t\tif seenEventKinds[e.Kind] {\r\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"event %q: declared more than once\", e.Kind)\r\n\t\t}\r\n\t\tseenEventKinds[e.Kind] = true\r\n\r\n\t\tswitch {\r\n\t\tcase e.Kind == EventIssueAssigned:\r\n\t\t\tif e.Agent != \"\" {\r\n\t\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"event %q: must not set agent; the agent whose name matches the Forgejo assignee's username is triggered dynamically\", e.Kind)\r\n\t\t\t}\r\n\r\n\t\tcase e.Kind == EventPRReview:\r\n\t\t\tif e.Agent != \"\" {\r\n\t\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"event %q: must not set agent; the agent whose name matches the pull request author's username is triggered dynamically\", e.Kind)\r\n\t\t\t}\r\n\r\n\t\tcase staticEventKinds[e.Kind]:\r\n\t\t\tif e.Agent == \"\" {\r\n\t\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"event %q: agent is required\", e.Kind)\r\n\t\t\t}\r\n\t\t\tif !agentNames[e.Agent] {\r\n\t\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"event %q: references undeclared agent %q\", e.Kind, e.Agent)\r\n\t\t\t}\r\n\r\n\t\tdefault:\r\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"event %q: unknown event kind\", e.Kind)\r\n\t\t}\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\treturn nil\r\n}\r\n\r\n// AgentConfig holds an agent's full configuration including its\r\n// Forgejo token (if configured).\r\ntype AgentConfig struct {\r\n\tName string\r\n\tLLM string\r\n\tToken string\r\n}\r\n\r\n// AgentByName returns the agent config with the given name, if declared.\r\nfunc (c *Config) AgentByName(name string) (AgentConfig, bool) {\r\n\tfor _, a := range c.Agents {\r\n\t\tif a.Name == name {\r\n\t\t\treturn AgentConfig{\r\n\t\t\t\tName: a.Name,\r\n\t\t\t\tLLM: a.LLM,\r\n\t\t\t\tToken: a.Token,\r\n\t\t\t}, true\r\n\t\t}\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\treturn AgentConfig{}, false\r\n}\r\n\r\n// LLMByName returns the llm config with the given name, if declared.\r\nfunc (c *Config) LLMByName(name string) (LLM, bool) {\r\n\tfor _, l := range c.LLMs {\r\n\t\tif l.Name == name {\r\n\t\t\treturn l, true\r\n\t\t}\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\treturn LLM{}, false\r\n}\r\n\r\n// EventAgent returns the statically configured agent name for the given\r\n// event kind, if one is declared and set.\r\nfunc (c *Config) EventAgent(kind string) (string, bool) {\r\n\tfor _, e := range c.Events {\r\n\t\tif e.Kind == kind {\r\n\t\t\treturn e.Agent, e.Agent != \"\"\r\n\t\t}\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\treturn \"\", false\r\n}\r\n\r\n// EventInstructions returns the configured freeform instructions for the\r\n// given event kind, e.g. \"Please review this pull request and respond\r\n// appropriately.\" Returns \"\" if the event isn't declared or has none.\r\nfunc (c *Config) EventInstructions(kind string) string {\r\n\tfor _, e := range c.Events {\r\n\t\tif e.Kind == kind {\r\n\t\t\treturn e.Instructions\r\n\t\t}\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\treturn \"\"\r\n}\r","start_line":1,"end_line":212,"total_lines":212,"truncated":false}
Tool
π§ read_file
{"path": "internal/agentrun/roster.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 150}
Arguments
{"path": "internal/agentrun/roster.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 150}
Result
{"path":"internal/agentrun/roster.go","content":"package agentrun\r\n\r\nimport (\r\n\t\"fmt\"\r\n\t\"log/slog\"\r\n\t\"strings\"\r\n\r\n\t\"github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/config\"\r\n\t\"github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/forgejo\"\r\n)\r\n\r\n// agentInfo pairs a configured agent with its Forgejo profile: the bio\r\n// (what its account says it does) and the name/email used to set git\r\n// commit authorship inside its container.\r\ntype agentInfo struct {\r\n\tName string\r\n\tDescription string\r\n\tFullName string\r\n\tEmail string\r\n}\r\n\r\n// buildRoster fetches every configured agent's Forgejo profile (agent\r\n// config labels double as Forgejo usernames). A per-agent lookup failure\r\n// is logged and that agent is included with an empty profile rather than\r\n// failing the whole run β one missing/unreachable profile shouldn't\r\n// block someone else's job.\r\nfunc buildRoster(fg *forgejo.Client, agents []config.Agent, logger *slog.Logger) []agentInfo {\r\n\troster := make([]agentInfo, 0, len(agents))\r\n\r\n\tfor _, a := range agents {\r\n\t\tprofile, err := fg.AgentProfile(a.Name)\r\n\t\tif err != nil {\r\n\t\t\tlogger.Warn(\"failed to fetch agent profile from forgejo\", \"agent\", a.Name, \"error\", err)\r\n\t\t}\r\n\r\n\t\troster = append(roster, agentInfo{Name: a.Name, Description: profile.Description, FullName: profile.FullName, Email: profile.Email})\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\treturn roster\r\n}\r\n\r\n// gitIdentity returns the git commit author name/email to configure\r\n// inside self's container, from its Forgejo profile, falling back to\r\n// its agent name and a synthetic zoo.local address for whichever fields\r\n// its profile doesn't set.\r\nfunc gitIdentity(self string, roster []agentInfo) (name, email string) {\r\n\tfor _, a := range roster {\r\n\t\tif a.Name == self {\r\n\t\t\tname, email = a.FullName, a.Email\r\n\t\t\tbreak\r\n\t\t}\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tif name == \"\" {\r\n\t\tname = self\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tif email == \"\" {\r\n\t\temail = self + \"@zoo.local\"\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\treturn name, email\r\n}\r\n\r\n// identitySection renders the \"who am I / who else is there\" prompt\r\n// section injected after the static system prompt: the agent's own\r\n// Forgejo profile description, and everyone else's, so it can decide\r\n// when a task is better handed off via the assign_issue tool.\r\nfunc identitySection(self string, roster []agentInfo) string {\r\n\tvar b strings.Builder\r\n\r\n\tvar selfDesc string\r\n\tvar others []agentInfo\r\n\r\n\tfor _, a := range roster {\r\n\t\tif a.Name == self {\r\n\t\t\tselfDesc = a.Description\r\n\t\t} else {\r\n\t\t\tothers = append(others, a)\r\n\t\t}\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tfmt.Fprintf(\u0026b, \"\\n\\n## Your identity\\n\\nYou are the agent %q.\", self)\r\n\r\n\tif selfDesc != \"\" {\r\n\t\tfmt.Fprintf(\u0026b, \" Your role, from your Forgejo profile description: %s\", selfDesc)\r\n\t} else {\r\n\t\tb.WriteString(\" Your Forgejo profile has no description set.\")\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tif len(others) \u003e 0 {\r\n\t\tb.WriteString(\"\\n\\n## Other agents\\n\\nIf this task is a better fit for another agent's role, use the assign_issue tool with their name to hand it off (this reassigns the issue/PR on Forgejo, which triggers their run):\\n\")\r\n\r\n\t\tfor _, a := range others {\r\n\t\t\tdesc := a.Description\r\n\t\t\tif desc == \"\" {\r\n\t\t\t\tdesc = \"(no description set)\"\r\n\t\t\t}\r\n\r\n\t\t\tfmt.Fprintf(\u0026b, \"### %s\\n\\n%s\\n\\n\", a.Name, desc)\r\n\t\t}\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\treturn b.String()\r\n}\r","start_line":1,"end_line":105,"total_lines":105,"truncated":false}
Thinking
Next, let's check the forgejo client's RepositoryInfo (the format of CloneURL), system.md, and loop.go.
Tool
π§ grep_search
{"query": "CloneURL", "context_after": 6}
Arguments
{"query": "CloneURL", "context_after": 6}
Result
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go:352: CloneURL string
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-353-}
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-354-
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-355-func (c *Client) RepositoryInfo(owner, repo string) (RepositoryInfo, error) {
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-356- r, _, err := c.sdk.GetRepo(owner, repo)
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-357- if err != nil {
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-358- return RepositoryInfo{}, fmt.Errorf("get repo %s/%s: %w", owner, repo, err)
--
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go:361: return RepositoryInfo{DefaultBranch: r.DefaultBranch, CloneURL: r.CloneURL}, nil
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-362-}
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-363-
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-364-func (c *Client) setIssueState(owner, repo string, index int64, state sdk.StateType) error {
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-365- _, _, err := c.sdk.EditIssue(owner, repo, index, sdk.EditIssueOption{State: &state})
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-366- if err != nil {
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-367- return fmt.Errorf("set state %q on %s/%s#%d: %w", state, owner, repo, index, err)
--
/project/internal/agentrun/clone.go:24:// cloneAndBranch clones cloneURL into dir, authenticating the clone
/project/internal/agentrun/clone.go-25-// itself with token (see gitAuthArgs), and checks out a new branch off
/project/internal/agentrun/clone.go-26-// of defaultBranch. token never ends up in the resulting working tree:
/project/internal/agentrun/clone.go:27:// the origin remote is left with the plain cloneURL.
/project/internal/agentrun/clone.go:28:func cloneAndBranch(ctx context.Context, cloneURL, token, defaultBranch, branch, dir string) error {
/project/internal/agentrun/clone.go:29: args := append(gitAuthArgs(token), "clone", "--branch", defaultBranch, "--single-branch", cloneURL, dir)
/project/internal/agentrun/clone.go-30- if out, err := runGit(ctx, "", args...); err != nil {
/project/internal/agentrun/clone.go-31- return fmt.Errorf("clone: %w: %s", err, out)
/project/internal/agentrun/clone.go-32- }
/project/internal/agentrun/clone.go-33-
/project/internal/agentrun/clone.go-34- if out, err := runGit(ctx, dir, "checkout", "-b", branch); err != nil {
/project/internal/agentrun/clone.go-35- return fmt.Errorf("checkout branch %q: %w: %s", branch, err, out)
--
/project/internal/agentrun/clone.go:41:// clonePRHead clones cloneURL into dir and checks out the pull request's
/project/internal/agentrun/clone.go-42-// head as a local branch named headRef, so commits the agent makes push
/project/internal/agentrun/clone.go-43-// straight to the PR. The head is fetched via the PR's refs/pull/<n>/head
/project/internal/agentrun/clone.go-44-// ref rather than by branch name, which also works for PRs opened from a
/project/internal/agentrun/clone.go-45-// fork, where the head branch doesn't exist in the base repo.
/project/internal/agentrun/clone.go:46:func clonePRHead(ctx context.Context, cloneURL, token, defaultBranch, headRef string, index int64, dir string) error {
/project/internal/agentrun/clone.go:47: args := append(gitAuthArgs(token), "clone", "--branch", defaultBranch, "--single-branch", cloneURL, dir)
/project/internal/agentrun/clone.go-48- if out, err := runGit(ctx, "", args...); err != nil {
/project/internal/agentrun/clone.go-49- return fmt.Errorf("clone: %w: %s", err, out)
/project/internal/agentrun/clone.go-50- }
/project/internal/agentrun/clone.go-51-
/project/internal/agentrun/clone.go-52- fetchArgs := append(gitAuthArgs(token), "fetch", "--no-tags", "origin", fmt.Sprintf("refs/pull/%d/head", index))
/project/internal/agentrun/clone.go-53- if out, err := runGit(ctx, dir, fetchArgs...); err != nil {
--
/project/internal/agentrun/run.go:152: if err := clonePRHead(ctx, repoInfo.CloneURL, r.forgejo.Token(), repoInfo.DefaultBranch, headRef, ev.Index, projectDir); err != nil {
/project/internal/agentrun/run.go-153- return fmt.Errorf("prepare git working tree: %w", err)
/project/internal/agentrun/run.go-154- }
/project/internal/agentrun/run.go-155-
/project/internal/agentrun/run.go-156- branch = headRef
/project/internal/agentrun/run.go-157-
/project/internal/agentrun/run.go-158- // Fetch the full review (verdict, body, inline comments) so the
--
/project/internal/agentrun/run.go:169: if err := cloneAndBranch(ctx, repoInfo.CloneURL, r.forgejo.Token(), repoInfo.DefaultBranch, branch, projectDir); err != nil {
/project/internal/agentrun/run.go-170- return fmt.Errorf("prepare git working tree: %w", err)
/project/internal/agentrun/run.go-171- }
/project/internal/agentrun/run.go-172- }
/project/internal/agentrun/run.go-173-
/project/internal/agentrun/run.go-174- roster := buildRoster(r.forgejo, r.cfg.Agents, logger)
/project/internal/agentrun/run.go-175- gitName, gitEmail := gitIdentity(agent.Name, roster)
Tool
π§ read_file
{"path": "internal/agentrun/system.md", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 120}
Arguments
{"path": "internal/agentrun/system.md", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 120}
Result
{"path":"internal/agentrun/system.md","content":"You are an autonomous coding agent working inside `zoo`, a system that\r\ntriggers you from Forgejo (a Gitea-family forge) issue/PR events.\r\n\r\n**Your environment**\r\n\r\n- Your working tree is at `/project`, checked out on the working branch\r\n named in your briefing below. For most events that's a fresh branch\r\n off the repository's default branch; for a PR review event it's the\r\n pull request's own head branch, so commits you push update the PR\r\n directly. Only `/project` persists; nothing outside it survives\r\n between tool calls.\r\n- The event that triggered you (issue or pull request JSON) is available\r\n at `/event` inside the container, and is also included below.\r\n- You have a real git remote configured with push access. When you're\r\n done, `git add`/`git commit`/`git push` your branch β that's how your\r\n work gets saved. Nothing is persisted automatically.\r\n\r\n**Tools**\r\n\r\n- `bash`, `git`, `read_file`, `write_file`, `list_files`, `grep_search`,\r\n `move_file`, `remove_file` operate on the project container.\r\n- `comment`, `open_pull_request`, `request_review`, `submit_review`,\r\n `add_label`, `remove_label`, `close_issue`, `reopen_issue`,\r\n `assign_issue` act directly on the Forgejo issue/PR that triggered\r\n this run β use `comment` to report back to the person who filed it,\r\n `open_pull_request` once you've pushed a branch with your changes,\r\n and `submit_review` to leave a review verdict.\r\n\r\nBelow, in \"Your identity\" and \"Other agents\", you'll find your own role\r\n(from your Forgejo profile) and a roster of the other agents zoo runs,\r\neach with their own role. If a task in front of you clearly belongs to\r\nsomeone else's role, use `assign_issue` to hand it off rather than\r\ndoing it yourself.\r\n\r\n**Git**\r\n\r\nYou may use normal git commands to manage your working tree. For remote\r\n(pull, fetch, push, etc.) git operations, you can use the `git` tool.\r\n\r\n**Guidelines**\r\n\r\n- Make surgical changes: modify only what's necessary for the task in\r\n the triggering event.\r\n- Before finishing, verify your changes (re-read the file, run tests or\r\n a build if the project has them).\r\n- Always leave a `comment` summarizing what you did (or why you couldn't\r\n finish), and use `open_pull_request` when you have a change ready for\r\n review. Don't leave the issue without a response.\r","start_line":1,"end_line":48,"total_lines":48,"truncated":false}
Thinking
Next, let's check loop.go to see how tools are called, and also check the forgejo client's `As` method and `Token()`.
Tool
π§ read_file
{"path": "internal/agentrun/loop.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 120}
Arguments
{"path": "internal/agentrun/loop.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 120}
Result
{"path":"internal/agentrun/loop.go","content":"package agentrun\r\n\r\nimport (\r\n\t\"context\"\r\n\t\"fmt\"\r\n\t\"io\"\r\n\r\n\t\"github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/llm\"\r\n\t\"github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/tools\"\r\n)\r\n\r\n// Hooks lets a caller observe a runLoop invocation live, as the model\r\n// streams and tool calls execute, in addition to the final []llm.Message\r\n// it returns. Any of these may be nil.\r\ntype Hooks struct {\r\n\t// OnReasoningDelta and OnContentDelta fire with just the newly\r\n\t// streamed text for the current turn, not the accumulated total.\r\n\tOnReasoningDelta func(delta string)\r\n\tOnContentDelta func(delta string)\r\n\r\n\t// OnTurnEnd fires once per completed streamer round-trip, after the\r\n\t// model's message for that turn is fully received and before any of\r\n\t// its tool calls run.\r\n\tOnTurnEnd func()\r\n\r\n\t// OnTool fires once per tool call, after it has run.\r\n\tOnTool func(name, arguments, result string, toolErr bool)\r\n}\r\n\r\n// runLoop is a headless port of ../a's App.generate(): send messages +\r\n// tool defs, get a completion, run any tool_calls and append their\r\n// results, repeat until a plain finish or ctx is done.\r\nfunc runLoop(ctx context.Context, client *llm.Client, toolsCtx tools.Context, messages []llm.Message, hooks Hooks) ([]llm.Message, error) {\r\n\tfor {\r\n\t\tif err := ctx.Err(); err != nil {\r\n\t\t\treturn messages, err\r\n\t\t}\r\n\r\n\t\tstreamer, err := client.StreamChatCompletion(ctx, \u0026llm.ChatCompletionRequest{\r\n\t\t\tMessages: messages,\r\n\t\t\tStream: true,\r\n\t\t\tTools: tools.All(),\r\n\t\t})\r\n\t\tif err != nil {\r\n\t\t\treturn messages, fmt.Errorf(\"chat completion: %w\", err)\r\n\t\t}\r\n\r\n\t\tvar completion *llm.ChatCompletion\r\n\r\n\t\tvar prevContent, prevReasoning string\r\n\r\n\t\tfor {\r\n\t\t\tc, err := streamer.Get()\r\n\t\t\tif err == io.EOF {\r\n\t\t\t\tbreak\r\n\t\t\t}\r\n\r\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\r\n\t\t\t\treturn messages, fmt.Errorf(\"stream completion: %w\", err)\r\n\t\t\t}\r\n\r\n\t\t\tcompletion = c\r\n\r\n\t\t\tif len(c.Choices) \u003e 0 {\r\n\t\t\t\tmsg := c.Choices[0].Message\r\n\r\n\t\t\t\tif hooks.OnReasoningDelta != nil \u0026\u0026 len(msg.ReasoningContent) \u003e len(prevReasoning) {\r\n\t\t\t\t\thooks.OnReasoningDelta(msg.ReasoningContent[len(prevReasoning):])\r\n\t\t\t\t}\r\n\t\t\t\tprevReasoning = msg.ReasoningContent\r\n\r\n\t\t\t\tif hooks.OnContentDelta != nil \u0026\u0026 len(msg.Content) \u003e len(prevContent) {\r\n\t\t\t\t\thooks.OnContentDelta(msg.Content[len(prevContent):])\r\n\t\t\t\t}\r\n\t\t\t\tprevContent = msg.Content\r\n\t\t\t}\r\n\t\t}\r\n\r\n\t\tif hooks.OnTurnEnd != nil {\r\n\t\t\thooks.OnTurnEnd()\r\n\t\t}\r\n\r\n\t\tif completion == nil || len(completion.Choices) == 0 {\r\n\t\t\treturn messages, fmt.Errorf(\"model returned an empty completion\")\r\n\t\t}\r\n\r\n\t\tchoice := completion.Choices[0]\r\n\t\tmessages = append(messages, choice.Message)\r\n\r\n\t\tif choice.FinishReason != \"tool_calls\" || len(choice.Message.ToolCalls) == 0 {\r\n\t\t\treturn messages, nil\r\n\t\t}\r\n\r\n\t\tfor _, tc := range choice.Message.ToolCalls {\r\n\t\t\tif err := ctx.Err(); err != nil {\r\n\t\t\t\treturn messages, err\r\n\t\t\t}\r\n\r\n\t\t\tresult, err := tools.Call(toolsCtx, tc.FunctionCall)\r\n\r\n\t\t\ttoolErr := err != nil\r\n\t\t\tif toolErr {\r\n\t\t\t\tresult = fmt.Sprintf(\"ERROR CALLING TOOL: %s\", err.Error())\r\n\t\t\t}\r\n\r\n\t\t\tif hooks.OnTool != nil {\r\n\t\t\t\thooks.OnTool(tc.FunctionCall.Name, tc.FunctionCall.Arguments, result, toolErr)\r\n\t\t\t}\r\n\r\n\t\t\tmessages = append(messages, llm.Message{\r\n\t\t\t\tRole: \"tool\",\r\n\t\t\t\tContent: result,\r\n\t\t\t\tToolCallID: tc.Id,\r\n\t\t\t\tName: tc.FunctionCall.Name,\r\n\t\t\t})\r\n\t\t}\r\n\t}\r\n}\r","start_line":1,"end_line":118,"total_lines":118,"truncated":false}
Tool
π§ grep_search
{"query": "func (c \\*Client) (As|Token)", "context_after": 10}
Arguments
{"query": "func (c \\*Client) (As|Token)", "context_after": 10}
Result
No matches found.
Thinking
Let's take a look at the forgejo client's `As` and `Token` methods.
Tool
π§ grep_search
{"query": "func \\(c \\*Client\\)", "glob": "internal/forgejo/client.go", "context_after": 4}
Arguments
{"query": "func \\(c \\*Client\\)", "glob": "internal/forgejo/client.go", "context_after": 4}
Result
No matches found.
Thinking
Let's try a different approach to search for the As and Token methods in the forgejo client.
Tool
π§ grep_search
{"query": "func \\(c \\*Client\\)", "glob": "*.go", "context_after": 3, "max_results": 60}
Arguments
{"query": "func \\(c \\*Client\\)", "glob": "*.go", "context_after": 3, "max_results": 60}
Result
/project/internal/llm/client.go:30:func (c *Client) StreamChatCompletion(ctx context.Context, req *ChatCompletionRequest) (*Streamer, error) {
/project/internal/llm/client.go-31- req2 := *req
/project/internal/llm/client.go-32-
/project/internal/llm/client.go-33- if req2.Model == "" {
--
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go:37:func (c *Client) Token() string {
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-38- return c.token
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-39-}
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-40-
--
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go:45:func (c *Client) As(token string) *Client {
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-46- client, _ := sdk.NewClient(c.baseURL, sdk.SetToken(token))
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-47- return &Client{sdk: client, baseURL: c.baseURL, token: token}
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-48-}
--
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go:60:func (c *Client) Sudo(username string) (*Client, error) {
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-61- sudoClient, err := sdk.NewClient(c.baseURL, sdk.SetToken(c.token), sdk.SetSudo(username))
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-62- if err != nil {
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-63- return nil, fmt.Errorf("forgejo client sudo %q: %w", username, err)
--
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go:71:func (c *Client) CreateIssueComment(owner, repo string, index int64, body string) error {
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-72- _, _, err := c.sdk.CreateIssueComment(owner, repo, index, sdk.CreateIssueCommentOption{Body: body})
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-73- if err != nil {
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-74- return fmt.Errorf("comment on %s/%s#%d: %w", owner, repo, index, err)
--
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go:92:func (c *Client) ListIssueComments(owner, repo string, index int64) ([]IssueComment, error) {
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-93- const pageSize = 50
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-94-
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-95- var all []*sdk.Comment
--
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go:128:func (c *Client) AddLabel(owner, repo string, index int64, name string) error {
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-129- id, err := c.labelID(owner, repo, name)
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-130- if err != nil {
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-131- return err
--
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go:144:func (c *Client) RemoveLabel(owner, repo string, index int64, name string) error {
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-145- labels, _, err := c.sdk.GetIssueLabels(owner, repo, index, sdk.ListLabelsOptions{})
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-146- if err != nil {
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-147- return fmt.Errorf("list labels on %s/%s#%d: %w", owner, repo, index, err)
--
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go:163:func (c *Client) labelID(owner, repo, name string) (int64, error) {
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-164- labels, _, err := c.sdk.ListRepoLabels(owner, repo, sdk.ListLabelsOptions{})
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-165- if err != nil {
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-166- return 0, fmt.Errorf("list labels on %s/%s: %w", owner, repo, err)
--
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go:187:func (c *Client) CreatePullRequest(owner, repo, head, base, title, body string) error {
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-188- _, _, err := c.sdk.CreatePullRequest(owner, repo, sdk.CreatePullRequestOption{
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-189- Head: head,
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-190- Base: base,
--
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go:202:func (c *Client) RequestReview(owner, repo string, index int64, reviewers []string) error {
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-203- _, err := c.sdk.CreateReviewRequests(owner, repo, index, sdk.PullReviewRequestOptions{Reviewers: reviewers})
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-204- if err != nil {
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-205- return fmt.Errorf("request review on %s/%s#%d: %w", owner, repo, index, err)
--
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go:223:func (c *Client) SubmitReview(owner, repo string, index int64, state, body string) error {
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-224- var sdkState sdk.ReviewStateType
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-225-
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-226- switch state {
--
Thinking
Now I have a grasp of the overall picture. Let me plan the implementation.
## Plan
**Goal (from the issue):**
1. Pass the agent's token into the sandbox so the agent can do its own git operations, including against the remote.
2. Do the initial git clone inside the sandbox.
3. No need to run git outside the sandbox.
4. `git pull` must just work inside the sandbox (probably via .gitconfig).
**Design:**
1. **Token selection**: Use the agent's own token (`agent.Token`) if configured, otherwise fall back to the shared zoo token (`r.forgejo.Token()`). This mirrors the `forgejoAs` fallback. The username for the Basic auth header: the agent's name (the Forgejo username) if using the agent's token, "zoo" if using the shared token. Actually, in Gitea/Forgejo, the username in Basic auth can be anything as long as the token is valid. But using the agent's username is more correct. Let's use the agent name as the username in either case β hmm, wait. If the shared zoo token is used with the username "greg", will that work? In Gitea, Basic auth with a token: the token is validated, and the username is... let me think. Gitea's Basic auth: `Authorization: Basic base64(user:token)`. Gitea treats the password part as the token (if it looks like a token) and looks up the user by that token. Actually, in Gitea's `BasicAuthenticator`: if the password looks like a token (starts with "goc" or matches a token pattern), it's used as a token and the username is ignored (or matched). The existing code uses "zoo" + the shared token, and that works. To be safe, let's use the same "zoo" username pattern... no, actually, let's think about what's cleanest:
- If the agent has a token: `base64(agentName:agentToken)` β the agent acts as themselves.
- If falling back to the shared token: `base64(zoo:sharedToken)` β same as today.
This is clean and correct.
2. **Container setup** (in `run.go` after container creation):
- `git config --system safe.directory '*'` (existing)
- `git config --system user.name <name>`
- `git config --system user.email <email>`
- `git config --system http.<cloneURL>.extraHeader "Authorization: Basic <b64>"`
All via `docker exec`. This puts the credential in the container's `/etc/gitconfig` (system scope), which is:
- Inside the container's filesystem (not the bind-mounted /project), so it doesn't leak into the repo's `.git/config` or the host's workdir.
- Applies to all git operations in the container: clone, fetch, pull, push, ls-remote.
Wait, one important detail: `http.<url>.extraHeader` β the URL used for matching is the remote URL. The clone URL from Forgejo is e.g. `https://code.stdio.dk/abrander/zoo` (no .git suffix, since it's the web clone URL). When git clones `https://code.stdio.dk/abrander/zoo`, the remote `origin` is set to exactly that URL, so the prefix match works.
Hmm, but wait: does Gitea's `r.CloneURL` include `.git`? In Gitea, the `clone_url` from the API is `https://host/owner/repo.git`. Let me verify... In Gitea's API, `clone_url` is `http(s)://host/owner/repo.git`. Yes, Gitea's `clone_url` includes `.git`. And `html_url` does not. The existing code clones with `repoInfo.CloneURL` and sets the origin remote to the same URL, so matching will work either way.
Actually, let me double-check the matching semantics of `http.<url>.extraHeader`: "git config http.<url>.extraheader β extra header to send on HTTP requests to URLs matching the <url> prefix". The match is a prefix of the request URL. The request URL for a clone of `https://code.stdio.dk/abrander/zoo.git` is `https://code.stdio.dk/abrander/zoo.git/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack`. So the prefix `https://code.stdio.dk/abrander/zoo.git` matches. And if we set the key to the full clone URL, it matches.
One subtle point: if the clone URL is `https://code.stdio.dk/abrander/zoo` (no .git) and the actual request goes to `https://code.stdio.dk/abrander/zoo.git/...` β the prefix `https://code.stdio.dk/abrander/zoo` still matches `https://code.stdio.dk/abrander/zoo.git/...`. Because it's a string prefix. So either way is fine.
Alternative: scope to the host: `http.https://code.stdio.dk/.extraHeader`. That would cover all repos on the host. Hmm, which is better? The issue says "pass the agent's token into the sandbox so the agent can do its own git operations β even against the remote". Scoping to the specific clone URL is more surgical (principle of least privilege). But scoping to the host is more flexible (the agent could clone other repos from the same forge).
Let's go with scoping to the clone URL β surgical, and matches the existing per-repo pattern. No, wait, let me reconsider. The agent's token is a personal token for that agent's Forgejo account, which can access all repos that account can access. The agent might want to `git clone` other repos (e.g., for reference). But that's speculative. The issue's focus is: the agent's own git operations on the working repo must work. Let's scope to the clone URL. Hmm...
Actually, let me think about robustness: what if the agent runs `git pull` after the origin URL has been changed? No, the agent doesn't change the origin URL. What about `git fetch <other-url>`? Unlikely.
Decision: scope the extraHeader to the clone URL. This is the most surgical and directly satisfies "git pull must just work".
Hmm, wait. Actually, let me reconsider one more time. There's a practical consideration: `git config --system http.<url>.extraHeader` β the config key contains the URL with special characters. In git config, section names can contain dots: `[http "https://code.stdio.dk/abrander/zoo.git"]`. When passing via CLI: `git config --system http.https://code.stdio.dk/abrander/zoo.git.extraHeader "Authorization: Basic xxx"`. Does the CLI parse `http.https://code.stdio.dk/abrander/zoo.git.extraHeader` as section `http`, subsection `https://code.stdio.dk/abrander/zoo.git`, key `extraHeader`?
Git config key parsing: a key is `section[.subsection][.key]`. Subsections are only recognized for specific section types... actually, the rule is: for a key like `a.b.c`, git tries to parse it as section `a`, subsection `b`, variable `c` β but only if section `a` supports subsections? No β the parsing is: the last dot-separated element is the variable name, and the middle part is the subsection. Specifically, git's `git_config_parse_key`: it splits on dots. For keys with more than 2 parts, it looks for a subsection. The rule (from git docs): "The key is case-insensitive, allows only alphanumeric characters and -, and must start with an alphanumeric character. In addition dot-separated keys... can have a subsection, e.g. `remote.origin.url`". Subsections are allowed for any section in the CLI? Let me recall the actual behavior: `git config http."https://github.com/foo".extraHeader` β the canonical form uses quotes for the subsection. On the CLI, `git config http.https://github.com/foo.extraHeader value` works β I believe git parses the middle part as the subsection. Yes, this works: e.g., `git config submodule."foo".url` etc. For http URLs, the common pattern in the docs:
```
[http "https://example.com"]
extraHeader = ...
```
And on the CLI: `git config http."https://example.com".extraHeader "..."`. Without quotes, dots in the URL would be ambiguous... but URLs don't contain spaces. The parser: `git_config_parse_key` takes the string, finds the last `.` β variable name. Then for the rest, if it contains a `.`, the first part is the section and the rest is the subsection? Let me recall the actual algorithm:
From git's source (config.c, `git_config_parse_key`):
- The key must match the pattern. It scans: section name up to the first dot. Then, if the next character is `.`, it could be a subsection. The subsection is... hmm, actually, I recall the algorithm is: find the last dot β that separates the variable. Then in the remaining prefix, the first dot separates the section. Everything between is the subsection.
Yes: `git_config_parse_key`:
```
/*
* The key is case-insensitive, allows only alphanumeric characters
* and - and must start with an alphanumeric character. In addition
* dot-separated keys (e.g. foo.bar.baz) are allowed, where the last
* component is the variable name, the first is the section name, and
* the middle components form the subsection name.
*/
```
The actual implementation: split at the last dot to get the variable. Then in the remainder, split at the first dot to get the section. The middle is the subsection. So `http.https://code.stdio.dk/abrander/zoo.git.extraHeader` β section `http`, subsection `https://code.stdio.dk/abrander/zoo.git`, variable `extraHeader`.
But wait β is a subsection containing `:` and `/` valid? Subsection values can be anything (they're just strings, and in the config file they're quoted). On the CLI, the subsection is taken as-is between the dots. I think it works. The existing code in the repo already uses `git config --system --add safe.directory '*'`, which is a simple key.
To be safe, we can pass the key with the subsection quoted: `git config --system 'http."https://code.stdio.dk/abrander/zoo.git".extraHeader' "Authorization: Basic ..."`. Hmm, but when this goes through `sh -c` in docker exec, the quoting gets layered. Let me think about how to pass this through exec.
Actually, a simpler and more robust alternative: write the gitconfig file directly via exec:
```
cat > /etc/gitconfig <<'EOF'
[safe]
directory = *
[user]
name = ...
email = ...
[http "https://..."]
extraHeader = Authorization: Basic ...
[color]
ui = never
EOF
```
But the token in a heredoc via sh -c β same exposure as the git config CLI. And the quoting for the heredoc inside a Go string that goes through sh -c is error-prone.
I think the `git config` CLI approach is cleaner. Let me verify the quoting: in Go, build the command string:
```go
fmt.Sprintf("git config --system http.%s.extraHeader %s", shellQuote(cloneURL), shellQuote(header))
```
Wait, no β the key itself: `http.<url>.extraHeader`. If we shell-quote the URL separately, the key gets split. We need to quote the whole key as one word:
```go
key := fmt.Sprintf("http.%s.extraHeader", cloneURL)
cmd := "git config --system " + shellQuote(key) + " " + shellQuote(header)
```
With single-quote shell quoting, the key is passed as one argument. Git then parses it: section http, subsection = URL, variable extraHeader.
Hmm, wait, but there's a pitfall: does git's CLI key parsing accept a subsection with a `:` in it? Let me think... `git config remote.origin.url` β section remote, subsection origin, variable url. For http: `git config http.https://github.com.extraHeader foo` β I'm fairly confident this works. Because the subsection is just "the middle part". Let me verify the git source algorithm more carefully.
From git's config.c:
```c
int git_config_parse_key(const char *var, struct strbuf *sec, struct strbuf *sub, char **var_name)
{
...
/*
* The key is case-insensitive, allows only alphanumeric
* characters and - and must start with an alphanumeric
* character. In addition, dot-separated keys are allowed,
* where the last component is the variable name, the first
* is the section name, and the middle components form the
* subsection name.
*/
...
}
```
The implementation:
```c
int git_config_parse_key(const char *var, struct strbuf *sec, struct strbuf *sub, char **var_name)
{
char *p, *q, *r;
int len;
/*
* The key is case-insensitive, allows only alphanumeric
* characters and - and must start with an alphanumeric
* character. In addition, dot-separated keys are allowed,
* where the last component is the variable name, the first
* is the section name, and the middle components form the
* subsection name.
*/
if (var[0] == '.')
return error(_("config: variable '%s' is invalid"), var);
if (!isalnum((unsigned char)var[0]))
return error(_("config: variable '%s' is invalid"), var);
p = strchr(var, '.');
if (!p)
return error(_("config: variable '%s' is invalid"), var);
...
```
Hmm, I don't remember exactly. Let me test empirically in the container later. Actually, I have a better idea β I can test it right now in my own sandbox! I'm running in a container with git. Let me test:
```
git config --global http."https://example.com/foo".extraHeader "test"
git config --list
```
Wait, but in my sandbox, `--global` writes to /root/.gitconfig β no problem, it's my own container.
Actually, I recall clearly now: the CLI accepts `git config http.https://example.com/foo.extraHeader` β the dots in the URL become part of the subsection. Because the parser takes the first dot as the section separator and the last dot as the variable separator. Let me verify empirically.
Another important consideration: **does `http.<url>.extraHeader` work with `git clone`?** Yes β the clone's smart HTTP request goes to that URL, and the header is added.
**Does it work with `git push`?** Yes, the receive-pack request to the same URL gets the header.
**Does it work with `git pull`?** pull = fetch (upload-pack) + merge. The fetch request gets the header. Yes.
3. **Clone inside the sandbox**:
After container creation and git config setup, run via exec:
```
git clone --branch <default> --single-branch <cloneURL> /project
```
Wait β the container's WorkingDir is `/project`, and the bind mount is `projectDir:/project`. The host must create `projectDir` before the container is created (bind mounts require the source to exist β actually, if the source doesn't exist, Docker creates it as a root-owned directory! That's a pitfall: if projectDir doesn't exist on the host, Docker creates it as a root-owned directory on the host. To avoid this, create it on the host first).
Then `git clone <url> /project` β cloning into an existing empty directory works. Or `git clone <url> .` from WorkingDir /project β cloning into the current directory: `git clone <url> .` also works if the directory is empty.
Then `git checkout -b <branch>` (or for PR review: fetch refs/pull/N/head + checkout -B).
Since the clone is done by the container's user (root), the repo is root-owned inside the container β no dubious ownership issue at all. The `safe.directory '*'` config is still useful/harmless (e.g., if the agent runs git as a different user, or for submodules). Let's keep it.
Actually wait β do we still need `safe.directory '*'`? The repo is cloned inside the container by the same user that runs git. So no dubious ownership. But the host's workdir is... no, the host no longer runs git. Keep it for robustness (cheap, and the integration test covers it).
4. **The `git` tool runs inside the sandbox**: `runContext.Git` becomes:
```go
func (c *runContext) Git(ctx context.Context, subcommand string, args ...string) (string, error) {
cmd := "git " + shellQuote(subcommand) + " " + joinQuoted(args)
return c.Exec(ctx, cmd) // via docker exec
}
```
Since the gitconfig has the credential, push works. No special-casing for push.
We need a `shellQuote` helper. Where to put it? `internal/tools`? No β it's needed in agentrun (the implementation of Context). Put it in agentrun (e.g., in a new file or in clone.go). Actually, the exec command is built in agentrun, so agentrun is the right place.
5. **Token in `runContext`**: no longer needed for git auth. Remove the `token` field from runContext. But wait β is `token` used elsewhere in runContext? Let me check... in context.go, `token` is only used in `Git` for push. So remove it.
6. **Changes to `run.go`**:
- Create `projectDir` on the host before container creation: `os.MkdirAll(projectDir, 0o755)`.
- Determine the git token + username: agent's token if set, otherwise the shared one.
- Create the container.
- Configure git in the container: safe.directory, user.name, user.email, http.extraHeader.
- Clone inside the container (cloneAndBranch / clonePRHead, now via docker exec).
- Remove the host-side clone and host-side git config calls.
Ordering note: currently the clone happens before the container is created. New order: workdir β container β git config in the container β clone in the container. The event file is written before container creation (no change).
One question: should the git config setup be part of `createContainer` or a separate step? A separate step in run.go is clearer, or a helper in clone.go (now maybe "sandbox.go"). Let me restructure clone.go into something like `sandboxgit.go`... actually, let's keep the filename as clone.go β it still contains the clone logic. Hmm, the file contains git helpers for the sandbox. Let me rewrite it as:
```go
package agentrun
// gitAuthHeader returns the value for the Authorization header...
func gitAuthHeader(user, token string) string {
auth := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(user + ":" + token))
return "Authorization: Basic " + auth
}
// configureSandboxGit writes the container's system gitconfig: ...
func (r *Runner) configureSandboxGit(ctx, containerID, cloneURL, user, token, name, email string) error
// cloneAndBranchInSandbox ...
func cloneAndBranchInSandbox(ctx, docker, containerID, cloneURL, defaultBranch, branch) error
// clonePRHeadInSandbox ...
```
Hmm, but these need `docker.exec`. Let me define them as methods or functions taking `*dockerRuntime`.
Actually, let me think about how the exec commands should be built. Each git operation becomes a shell command string:
- `git clone --branch main --single-branch https://... /project`
- `git checkout -b issue-48-greg`
- `git fetch --no-tags origin refs/pull/48/head`
- `git checkout -B issue-48-greg FETCH_HEAD`
- `git config --system safe.directory '*'`
- `git config --system user.name 'Greg Coolio'`
- `git config --system user.email greg@noreply.localhost`
- `git config --system 'http.<url>.extraHeader' 'Authorization: Basic ...'`
All args need shell quoting. Let me write a small helper:
```go
// shellQuote quotes s for safe inclusion in a POSIX sh -c command line.
func shellQuote(s string) string {
return "'" + strings.ReplaceAll(s, "'", `'\''`) + "'"
}
// shellGitCmd builds a `git <args...>` command line for sh -c.
func shellGitCmd(args ...string) string {
parts := make([]string, 0, len(args)+1)
parts = append(parts, "git")
for _, a := range args {
parts = append(parts, shellQuote(a))
}
return strings.Join(parts, " ")
}
```
Then exec: `rt.exec(ctx, containerID, shellGitCmd("clone", "--branch", defaultBranch, ...))`.
And a helper to run git in the sandbox with error handling:
```go
func runSandboxGit(ctx context.Context, rt *dockerRuntime, containerID string, args ...string) (string, error) {
out, exitCode, err := rt.exec(ctx, containerID, shellGitCmd(args...))
if err != nil {
return out, err
}
if exitCode != 0 {
return out, fmt.Errorf("exit %d", exitCode)
}
return out, nil
}
```
7. **The `Git` method in `context.go`**:
```go
func (c *runContext) Git(ctx context.Context, subcommand string, args ...string) (string, error) {
return c.Exec(ctx, shellGitCmd(append([]string{subcommand}, args...)...))
}
```
Wait β Exec already returns an error for non-zero exit codes. Good.
Note: `c.Exec` uses `c.docker.exec` which has a fixed env (NO_COLOR, GIT_CONFIG_*, PAGER, GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT). Good β GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT=0 prevents credential prompt hangs. If the token is invalid, git fails immediately with an auth error instead of hanging.
8. **Update the doc comments**:
- `tools/context.go`: the `Exec` and `Git` comments say the container never holds credentials and git runs on the host. Update: the container is given the agent's git credential via the system gitconfig, and Git runs inside the container.
- The comment in `tools/git.go` about push being host-side: update.
- The package comment in `agentrun/run.go`: "a git clone + branch bind-mounted into a Docker container" β the clone is now done inside the container.
- The comment in `docker.go` about GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT β still valid.
- The comment in `clone.go` about the token not ending up in the working tree β the rationale changes: the token is in the container's system gitconfig, not in the repo's .git/config.
9. **system.md**: "For remote (pull, fetch, push, etc.) git operations, you can use the `git` tool." β this is still true, and now the git tool runs in the sandbox. Actually, now that git works fully inside the sandbox, the agent can also use `bash` for git. The system prompt says "you can use normal git commands to manage the working tree. For remote (pull, fetch, push, etc.) git operations, you can use the `git` tool." This remains accurate. Maybe update it to say the git tool runs in the project container and remote operations are authenticated. Let me make a small update for clarity.
10. **Tests**:
- `docker_integration_test.go`: add a test that verifies the full flow: create a container with a bind-mounted empty directory, configure the system gitconfig with an extraHeader, clone... but cloning requires a reachable remote with a real token. The integration test environment (CI?) may not have a Forgejo server. The existing tests only test exec and safe.directory with a local repo. We can add a test that:
- Creates a local bare repo on the host.
- Creates a container with a bind-mounted empty directory.
- Runs `git config --system http.<url>.extraHeader ...` (with a dummy header) β hmm, a local file:// or path-based remote doesn't use http headers.
Better: test the gitconfig mechanism against a local HTTP server? That's heavy. Alternative: test that `git ls-remote` against a local path works from the container (verifying that git runs in the sandbox and the bind mount works), and separately unit-test the `shellQuote`/`shellGitCmd` helpers and the `gitAuthHeader` construction.
Actually β a good integration test: stand up a small HTTP git server? Too heavy. Let me check if there's a way... the test file is behind the `docker` build tag and requires a Docker daemon. In this environment, is Docker available? Let me check. If Docker is available in my sandbox, I can run the integration tests.
A simpler, meaningful integration test:
- Create a local bare repo on the host with one commit.
- Create a container with the bare repo bind-mounted at /bare and an empty project directory at /project.
- exec: `git clone /bare /project` (a local path clone β no auth needed) β verify the clone works inside the sandbox.
- exec: `git -C /project config --system user.name x` etc.
- exec: `git -C /project commit` β verify the identity from the system gitconfig is used.
- For the extraHeader mechanism: run `git config --system http.https://example.invalid/repo.extraHeader 'Authorization: Basic xyz'` and then `git config --system --get http.https://example.invalid/repo.extraHeader` β verify the round-trip (verifying the key parsing with a URL subsection!). This is the critical mechanism to verify β that the CLI accepts `http.<url>.extraHeader` with a URL containing dots/colons.
This is a solid test that doesn't require a real Forgejo.
- Unit tests for `shellQuote` (edge cases: quotes, spaces, empty string, shell metacharacters).
11. **What about `runGit`/`runGitAuthed`?** They become unused β remove from clone.go. Also check other usages: `runGit` is used in run.go for the user.name/user.email config (to be removed) and in clone.go. Let me grep for usages.
12. **`keepOnFailure`**: the workdir is kept on failure β no change.
13. **Edge: `projectDir` must exist before `createContainer`** (bind mount). Currently the host's git clone creates it. Now we must `os.MkdirAll(projectDir, 0o755)` before createContainer.
14. **Edge: cloning into /project when /project exists and is empty** β `git clone <url> /project` works. But what if the container's /project isn't empty (shouldn't happen β fresh temp directory)? No problem.
15. **What about the `git` tool's allowed subcommands?** The list includes fetch, pull, push, ls-remote, etc. No change. Now they all run in the sandbox. Should we add more subcommands? The issue says "so the agent can do its own git operations β even against the remote". The current allowlist already covers remote operations (fetch/pull/push/ls-remote). Keep the allowlist as-is (surgical change). Hmm β should we add `remote`, `config`, `rev-parse`, `tag`, `merge`, `rebase`? The issue's focus is authentication + clone location, not expanding the tool surface. Keep it surgical: no changes to the allowlist.
16. **The `token` field in `runContext`** β remove. Check other references to `runContext{...token...}` in run.go β update the construction.
17. **Which token to use for the clone?** Currently `r.forgejo.Token()` (shared). The issue says "pass the agent's token". So: `agent.Token` if non-empty, otherwise `r.forgejo.Token()`. And the username: `agent.Name` if agent.Token is set, otherwise "zoo".
Hmm wait, let me reconsider: is it correct to use the agent's token for the clone? The agent's token must have access to the repo. The agent is a Forgejo user with (presumably) access to the repo. The shared zoo token definitely has access (it's an admin). If the agent's token lacks repo access, the clone fails and the run fails. That's the intended behavior per the issue β the agent acts as themselves. And the `forgejoAs` fallback already establishes this pattern (agent's token, falling back to shared).
Let me write a helper in run.go:
```go
// gitTokenAndUser returns the Forgejo credential to give the sandbox
// for git operations: the agent's own token if configured (so the
// agent's git activity is attributed to its own account), falling
// back to the shared zoo identity for deployments without per-agent
// tokens.
func (r *Runner) gitCredential(agent config.AgentConfig) (user, token string) {
if agent.Token != "" {
return agent.Name, agent.Token
}
return "zoo", r.forgejo.Token()
}
```
18. **The comment in `docker.go` about the exec env** mentions GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT=0 for "credential prompts against private remotes" β still relevant.
19. **README.md** β check if it documents the host-side git / no-credentials-in-container design. Let me grep.
Also, let me check `zoo.hcl.example` and the README for any mentions.
Let me also check `internal/tools/registry.go` and `shell.go` β what's shell.go? Let me take a look. And also check the git tool tests in tools_test.go.
Let me look at the remaining relevant files β the tools registry/shell, tests, README, and the HCL example.
Tool
π§ read_file
{"path": "internal/tools/shell.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 60}
Arguments
{"path": "internal/tools/shell.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 60}
Result
{"path":"internal/tools/shell.go","content":"package tools\r\n\r\nimport (\r\n\t\"context\"\r\n\t\"encoding/base64\"\r\n\t\"fmt\"\r\n\t\"strings\"\r\n)\r\n\r\n// shellQuote wraps s in single quotes for safe interpolation into a `sh\r\n// -c` command string, escaping any embedded single quotes.\r\nfunc shellQuote(s string) string {\r\n\treturn \"'\" + strings.ReplaceAll(s, \"'\", `'\\''`) + \"'\"\r\n}\r\n\r\nfunc resolvePath(path string) string {\r\n\tif path == \"\" {\r\n\t\treturn \"/project\"\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tif path == \".\" || path == \"./\" {\r\n\t\treturn \"/project\"\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tif strings.HasPrefix(path, \"/project/\") {\r\n\t\treturn path\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tif !strings.HasPrefix(path, \"/\") {\r\n\t\treturn \"/project/\" + strings.TrimPrefix(path, \"/\")\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\treturn path\r\n}\r\n\r\nfunc shellReadFile(ctx Context, path string) ([]byte, error) {\r\n\tp := resolvePath(path)\r\n\r\n\t// We use base64 encoding to avoid issues with binary data and\r\n\t// special characters in the file content. The output of the command\r\n\t// will be base64-encoded, which we then decode in Go.\r\n\toutput, err := ctx.Exec(context.Background(), \"base64 \"+shellQuote(p))\r\n\tif err != nil {\r\n\t\treturn nil, err\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tdecoded, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(output)\r\n\tif err != nil {\r\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"decode base64 output of %q: %w\", path, err)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\treturn decoded, nil\r\n}\r\n\r\nfunc shellWriteFile(ctx Context, path string, content []byte) error {\r\n\tp := resolvePath(path)\r\n\tencoded := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(content)\r\n\r\n\tcmd := fmt.Sprintf(\r\n\t\t`mkdir -p \"$(dirname %s)\" \u0026\u0026 echo %s | base64 -d \u003e %s`,\r","start_line":1,"end_line":60,"total_lines":69,"truncated":true}
Tool
π§ grep_search
{"query": "git", "glob": "README.md", "context_after": 2, "max_results": 40}
Arguments
{"query": "git", "glob": "README.md", "context_after": 2, "max_results": 40}
Result
No matches found.
Thinking
`shellQuote` already exists in `internal/tools/shell.go` (unexported). Since `runContext.Git` is in `internal/agentrun`, it can't use the one in `internal/tools` (different package, unexported). I'll add a similar helper to agentrun.
The README has no mention of git. Let me quickly check the README's description of the architecture, and also check zoo.hcl.example. Also, I'll check the git tool tests in tools_test.go.
Tool
π§ read_file
{"path": "zoo.hcl.example", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 80}
Arguments
{"path": "zoo.hcl.example", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 80}
Result
{"path":"zoo.hcl.example","content":"# zoo.hcl - Configuration for the zoo daemon.\r\n#\r\n# Copy this file to zoo.hcl (gitignored) and fill in real values.\r\n\r\nllm \"Qwen 3.6\" {\r\n openai = \"https://code.stdio.dk\"\r\n token = \"TOKEN\"\r\n model = \"Qwen3.6\"\r\n}\r\n\r\nllm \"Qwen 3.8\" {\r\n openai = \"https://code.stdio.dk\"\r\n token = \"TOKEN\"\r\n model = \"Qwen3.8\"\r\n}\r\n\r\nforgejo {\r\n url = \"https://code.stdio.dk\"\r\n token = \"ZOO_SERVICE_TOKEN\"\r\n # Shared secret configured on the Forgejo webhook. Required to accept\r\n # webhook deliveries; polling works without it.\r\n webhook_secret = \"EXAMPLE_WEBHOOK_SECRET\"\r\n}\r\n\r\nenvironment {\r\n docker_image = \"golang:latest\"\r\n max_live_agents = 5\r\n}\r\n\r\nagent \"anna\" {\r\n llm = \"Qwen 3.6\"\r\n token = \"ANNA_FORGEJO_TOKEN\"\r\n}\r\n\r\nagent \"greg\" {\r\n llm = \"Qwen 3.8\"\r\n token = \"GREG_FORGEJO_TOKEN\"\r\n}\r\n\r\n# \"leon\" doubles as the expected Forgejo assignee username for\r\n# issue:assigned events - see the event block below.\r\nagent \"leon\" {\r\n llm = \"Qwen 3.8\"\r\n token = \"LEON_FORGEJO_TOKEN\"\r\n}\r\n\r\nagent \"mika\" {\r\n llm = \"Qwen 3.6\"\r\n token = \"MIKA_FORGEJO_TOKEN\"\r\n}\r\n\r\nevent \"issue:new\" {\r\n agent = \"leon\"\r\n}\r\n\r\nevent \"issue:assigned\" {\r\n // No `agent` here: the agent whose name matches the Forgejo\r\n // assignee's username is triggered.\r\n instructions = \"Please handle this issue.\"\r\n}\r\n\r\nevent \"issue:comment\" {\r\n agent = \"leon\"\r\n instructions = \"Please review what this comment says and respond appropriately.\"\r\n}\r\n\r\nevent \"pr:new\" {\r\n agent = \"greg\"\r\n instructions = \"Please review this pull request and respond appropriately.\"\r\n}\r\n\r\n# A review was submitted on a pull request (approved, changes requested,\r\n# or comment). The agent that opened the PR is triggered to handle it,\r\n# like issue:assigned: its working tree is checked out on the PR's head\r\n# branch, so changes it pushes update the PR directly. It should address\r\n# the feedback and reply to the review with a summary of what it\r\n# addressed. (Forgejo has no API to mark review comments resolved, so\r\n# that stays with the reviewer.)\r\nevent \"pr:review\" {\r\n // No `agent` here: the agent whose name matches the pull request\r","start_line":1,"end_line":80,"total_lines":83,"truncated":true}
Tool
π§ grep_search
{"query": "sandbox|container|docker", "glob": "README.md", "context_after": 3, "max_results": 40}
Arguments
{"query": "sandbox|container|docker", "glob": "README.md", "context_after": 3, "max_results": 40}
Result
/project/README.md:5:Zoo watches a [Forgejo](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo) instance for issue and pull request events, then dispatches them to configured AI agents running in isolated Docker containers. Each agent has its own role, LLM model, and personality β like a menagerie working together to keep your projects moving.
/project/README.md-6-
/project/README.md-7----
/project/README.md-8-
--
/project/README.md:14:- **Isolated execution** β Agents run in Docker containers with full filesystem access but no persistence between runs.
/project/README.md-15-- **Live dashboard** β Real-time web UI showing active agents, logs, and job history.
/project/README.md-16-- **Webhook & polling support** β React to events instantly via webhooks, or fall back to polling.
/project/README.md-17-
--
/project/README.md:27:| Docker | Latest |
/project/README.md-28-| Forgejo | Any (self-hosted or codeberg.dk) |
/project/README.md-29-| LLM endpoint | OpenAI-compatible API |
/project/README.md-30-
--
/project/README.md:97: docker_image = "golang:latest" # base image for agent containers
/project/README.md-98- max_live_agents = 5 # concurrent agent limit
/project/README.md-99-}
/project/README.md-100-```
--
/project/README.md:142:| `-keep-on-failure`| `false` | Preserve container after failure for debugging |
/project/README.md-143-
/project/README.md-144----
/project/README.md-145-
--
/project/README.md:151:β βββ agentrun/ # Docker-based agent execution
/project/README.md-152-β βββ config/ # HCL config loader & validator
/project/README.md-153-β βββ forgejo/ # Webhook receiver & event poller
/project/README.md-154-β βββ livelog/ # Real-time log streaming hub
Thinking
The README is at a high level, and there's no description regarding host-side git, so strictly speaking no changes to the README are necessary. That said, it might be worth adding a brief note about how the agent's token is passed to the sandbox. Let me check the README section on the agent's token.
Let me check the agent token section of the README and take a look at tools_test.go.
Tool
π§ grep_search
{"query": "token", "glob": "README.md", "context_after": 4, "max_results": 30}
Arguments
{"query": "token", "glob": "README.md", "context_after": 4, "max_results": 30}
Result
/project/README.md:39:Edit `zoo.hcl` with your Forgejo credentials, LLM tokens, and agent definitions. See the [configuration reference](#-configuration-reference) below.
/project/README.md-40-
/project/README.md-41-### Running
/project/README.md-42-
/project/README.md-43-```bash
--
/project/README.md:78: token = "YOUR_API_TOKEN"
/project/README.md-79- model = "model-name"
/project/README.md-80-}
/project/README.md-81-```
/project/README.md-82-
--
/project/README.md:88: token = "ZOO_SERVICE_TOKEN"
/project/README.md-89- webhook_secret = "SHARED_SECRET" # optional if using polling
/project/README.md-90-}
/project/README.md-91-```
/project/README.md-92-
--
/project/README.md:107: token = "ANNA_FORGEJO_TOKEN"
/project/README.md-108-}
/project/README.md-109-```
/project/README.md-110-
/project/README.md-111-### Event Routing
--
/project/README.md:180: token = "NEW_AGENT_TOKEN"
/project/README.md-181- }
/project/README.md-182- ```
/project/README.md-183-
/project/README.md-184-2. Add an event route:
Tool
π§ read_file
{"path": "internal/tools/tools_test.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 120}
Arguments
{"path": "internal/tools/tools_test.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 120}
Result
{"path":"internal/tools/tools_test.go","content":"package tools\r\n\r\nimport (\r\n\t\"context\"\r\n\t\"fmt\"\r\n\t\"strings\"\r\n\t\"testing\"\r\n)\r\n\r\ntype fakeForgejoActions struct {\r\n\tcomments []string\r\n\tassigned []string\r\n\treviews []string\r\n}\r\n\r\nfunc (f *fakeForgejoActions) Comment(body string) error {\r\n\tf.comments = append(f.comments, body)\r\n\treturn nil\r\n}\r\nfunc (f *fakeForgejoActions) OpenPullRequest(head, base, title, body string) error { return nil }\r\nfunc (f *fakeForgejoActions) RequestReview(reviewers []string) error { return nil }\r\nfunc (f *fakeForgejoActions) AddLabel(name string) error { return nil }\r\nfunc (f *fakeForgejoActions) RemoveLabel(name string) error { return nil }\r\nfunc (f *fakeForgejoActions) CloseIssue() error { return nil }\r\nfunc (f *fakeForgejoActions) ReopenIssue() error { return nil }\r\nfunc (f *fakeForgejoActions) AssignIssue(agentName string) error {\r\n\tf.assigned = append(f.assigned, agentName)\r\n\treturn nil\r\n}\r\nfunc (f *fakeForgejoActions) SubmitReview(state, body string) error {\r\n\tf.reviews = append(f.reviews, state)\r\n\treturn nil\r\n}\r\n\r\ntype fakeContext struct {\r\n\tlastCmd string\r\n\toutput string\r\n\terr error\r\n\tfg *fakeForgejoActions\r\n\r\n\tlastGitSubcommand string\r\n\tlastGitArgs []string\r\n}\r\n\r\nfunc (f *fakeContext) Exec(ctx context.Context, command string) (string, error) {\r\n\tf.lastCmd = command\r\n\treturn f.output, f.err\r\n}\r\n\r\nfunc (f *fakeContext) Git(ctx context.Context, subcommand string, args ...string) (string, error) {\r\n\tf.lastGitSubcommand = subcommand\r\n\tf.lastGitArgs = args\r\n\treturn f.output, f.err\r\n}\r\n\r\nfunc (f *fakeContext) Forgejo() ForgejoActions {\r\n\treturn f.fg\r\n}\r\n\r\nfunc TestShellQuote(t *testing.T) {\r\n\tcases := map[string]string{\r\n\t\t\"simple\": \"'simple'\",\r\n\t\t\"it's a dir\": `'it'\\''s a dir'`,\r\n\t}\r\n\tfor in, want := range cases {\r\n\t\tif got := shellQuote(in); got != want {\r\n\t\t\tt.Errorf(\"shellQuote(%q) = %q, want %q\", in, got, want)\r\n\t\t}\r\n\t}\r\n}\r\n\r\nfunc TestReadFileParsesMetaAndContent(t *testing.T) {\r\n\tfc := \u0026fakeContext{output: \"3\\nline one\\nline two\\nline three\\n\"}\r\n\r\n\tout, err := readFile(fc, readFileParams{Path: \"src/main.go\"})\r\n\tif err != nil {\r\n\t\tt.Fatal(err)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tif !strings.Contains(fc.lastCmd, \"/project/src/main.go\") {\r\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"expected command to reference /project/src/main.go, got %q\", fc.lastCmd)\r\n\t}\r\n\tif !strings.Contains(out, \"line one\") || !strings.Contains(out, `\"total_lines\":3`) {\r\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"unexpected result: %s\", out)\r\n\t}\r\n\tif strings.Contains(out, `\"truncated\":true`) {\r\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"full read should not be truncated: %s\", out)\r\n\t}\r\n}\r\n\r\nfunc TestGitRejectsDisallowedSubcommand(t *testing.T) {\r\n\tfc := \u0026fakeContext{}\r\n\r\n\t_, err := git(fc, gitParams{Subcommand: \"push-force\"})\r\n\tif err == nil {\r\n\t\tt.Fatal(\"expected error for disallowed subcommand\")\r\n\t}\r\n}\r\n\r\nfunc TestGitPassesSubcommandAndArgsThrough(t *testing.T) {\r\n\tfc := \u0026fakeContext{output: \"ok\"}\r\n\r\n\t_, err := git(fc, gitParams{Subcommand: \"commit\", Args: []string{\"-m\", \"fix: handle it's edge case\"}})\r\n\tif err != nil {\r\n\t\tt.Fatal(err)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tif fc.lastGitSubcommand != \"commit\" {\r\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"expected subcommand %q, got %q\", \"commit\", fc.lastGitSubcommand)\r\n\t}\r\n\tif len(fc.lastGitArgs) != 2 || fc.lastGitArgs[1] != \"fix: handle it's edge case\" {\r\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"expected args passed through unescaped, got %v\", fc.lastGitArgs)\r\n\t}\r\n}\r\n\r\nfunc TestCommentToolCallsForgejo(t *testing.T) {\r\n\tfg := \u0026fakeForgejoActions{}\r\n\tfc := \u0026fakeContext{fg: fg}\r\n\r\n\tif _, err := comment(fc, commentParams{Body: \"hello\"}); err != nil {\r","start_line":1,"end_line":120,"total_lines":216,"truncated":true}
Thinking
Now I have a grasp of the overall picture. Before writing any code, let me verify a few assumptions:
1. Can I use Docker in this environment (for running integration tests)?
2. Does `git config --system http.<url>.extraHeader` work when the URL contains dots/colons (parsing of subsections)?
Let me test both right now in my own sandbox.
Now let me verify key assumptions before designing the change. First, check if Docker is available in my sandbox and test the git config URL-subsection mechanism:
Tool
π§ bash
{"command": "docker version 2>&1 | head -5; echo \"---\"; which git; git --version"}
Arguments
{"command": "docker version 2>&1 | head -5; echo \"---\"; which git; git --version"}
Result
sh: 1: docker: not found
---
/usr/bin/git
git version 2.47.3
Tool
π§ bash
{"command": "cd /tmp && export HOME=/tmp/testhome && mkdir -p $HOME && git config --global http.\"https://code.stdio.dk/abrander/zoo.git\".extraHeader \"Authorization: Basic dGVzdA==\" && git config --global --get http.https://code.stdio.dk/abrander/zoo.git.extraHeader && echo OK-QUOTED; git config --global http.https://code.stdio.dk/abrander/zoo.git.extraHeader \"Authorization: Basic dGVzdDI=\" && git config --global --get http.https://code.stdio.dk/abrander/zoo.git.extraHeader && echo OK-UNQUOTED"}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /tmp && export HOME=/tmp/testhome && mkdir -p $HOME && git config --global http.\"https://code.stdio.dk/abrander/zoo.git\".extraHeader \"Authorization: Basic dGVzdA==\" && git config --global --get http.https://code.stdio.dk/abrander/zoo.git.extraHeader && echo OK-QUOTED; git config --global http.https://code.stdio.dk/abrander/zoo.git.extraHeader \"Authorization: Basic dGVzdDI=\" && git config --global --get http.https://code.stdio.dk/abrander/zoo.git.extraHeader && echo OK-UNQUOTED"}
Result
Authorization: Basic dGVzdA==
OK-QUOTED
Authorization: Basic dGVzdDI=
OK-UNQUOTED
Thinking
Both quoted and unquoted forms work:
- `git config --global http."https://...".extraHeader ...` β works
- `git config --global http.https://.../zoo.git.extraHeader ...` β works (dots in the URL become part of the subsection)
So `git config --system http.<cloneURL>.extraHeader "Authorization: Basic ..."` works.
Docker isn't available in my sandbox, so I can't run integration tests with the `docker` tag here. I'll write the code and unit tests, and run `go build` and `go test` (without the docker tag). I'll also write docker-tagged integration tests for CI (which has Docker).
Now, one more thing to verify: does `http.<url>.extraHeader` actually get applied to requests? Let me test with a local HTTP server that requires a header. I can stand up a small git smart HTTP server⦠that's complicated. Alternative: use `git ls-remote` against a local HTTP server that serves a git repo. I can use `git http-backend` CGI⦠that requires a web server.
Simpler approach: write a small Go or Python HTTP server that serves a git repo via the smart HTTP protocol⦠actually, the easiest is: python3 + git http-backend via CGI. Let me check if python3 is available.
Actually, there's an even simpler way to verify the header mechanism: create a bare repo, serve it with `git http-backend` behind a small CGI server, and check whether the server receives the Authorization header. Let me try with python3.
Actually β even simpler: I don't strictly need to verify that git sends the extraHeader (that's core git functionality documented and used everywhere). What I needed to verify was the *config key parsing* (which I just did) and the overall flow. The header-sending behavior is standard git.
That said, a full end-to-end test would be valuable. Let me try a quick local test with python3 + git http-backend to confirm that `http.<url>.extraHeader` authenticates a clone. This would validate the entire approach before I write the production code.
Both key formats work. Docker isn't available in this sandbox, so I'll verify the full auth mechanism end-to-end with a local git smart-HTTP server instead:
Tool
π§ bash
{"command": "which python3 && python3 --version"}
Arguments
{"command": "which python3 && python3 --version"}
Result
/usr/bin/python3
Python 3.13.5
Thinking
Let's build a local test:
1. Create a bare repository on disk.
2. Serve it with a small Python CGI server that uses `git http-backend`, requiring an `Authorization: Basic` header with a specific token.
3. Clone with `git -c http.<url>.extraHeader=...` and verify that the header is sent and authentication succeeds.
Let's write this test script.
Tool
π§ bash
{"command": "set -e\ncd /tmp && rm -rf gitauth-test && mkdir gitauth-test && cd gitauth-test\n# 1. seed repo + bare repo\ngit init -q -b main seed\ncd seed\ngit config user.name t && git config user.email t@t\necho hello > file.txt && git add . && git commit -qm init\ncd ..\ngit clone -q --bare seed bare.git\n# 2. CGI server requiring Basic auth token \"s3cr3t\"\ncat > server.py <<'EOF'\nimport os, subprocess, sys\nfrom http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer\nfrom urllib.parse import urlparse, parse_qs\n\nos.environ[\"GIT_PROJECT_ROOT\"] = \"/tmp/gitauth-test\"\nos.environ[\"GIT_HTTP_EXPORT_ALL\"] = \"1\"\n\nclass H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):\n def _handle(self):\n auth = self.headers.get(\"Authorization\", \"\")\n if auth != \"Basic c2VlZDpzM2NyZXQ=\": # base64(\"seed:s3cr3t\")\n self.send_response(401)\n self.send_header(\"WWW-Authenticate\", \"Basic\")\n self.end_headers()\n return\n path = urlparse(self.path)\n qs = parse_qs(path.query)\n length = int(self.headers.get(\"Content-Length\") or 0)\n body = self.rfile.read(length) if length else b\"\"\n env = dict(os.environ)\n env[\"REQUEST_METHOD\"] = self.command\n env[\"GIT_HTTP_EXPORT_ALL\"] = \"1\"\n env[\"PATH_INFO\"] = path.path\n env[\"QUERY_STRING\"] = path.query\n env[\"CONTENT_LENGTH\"] = str(length)\n p = subprocess.run([\"git\", \"http-backend\"], env=env, input=body, capture_output=True)\n out = p.stdout\n # parse CGI headers\n head, _, payload = out.partition(b\"\\r\\n\\r\\n\")\n status = \"200 OK\"\n hdrs = {}\n for line in head.decode().split(\"\\r\\n\"):\n if \":\" in line:\n k, v = line.split(\":\", 1)\n if k.strip().lower() == \"status\":\n status = v.strip()\n else:\n hdrs[k.strip()] = v.strip()\n code = int(status.split()[0])\n self.send_response(code)\n for k, v in hdrs.items():\n self.send_header(k, v)\n self.end_headers()\n self.wfile.write(payload)\n do_GET = _handle\n do_POST = _handle\n def log_message(self, *a): pass\n\nHTTPServer((\"127.0.0.1\", 8931), H).serve_forever()\nEOF\npython3 server.py & SERVER_PID=$!\nsleep 0.5\n# 3. clone WITHOUT auth -> must fail\nif git clone -q http://127.0.0.1:8931/bare.git noauth 2>/dev/null; then echo \"UNEXPECTED: no-auth clone succeeded\"; else echo \"OK: no-auth clone rejected\"; fi\n# 4. clone WITH http.<url>.extraHeader -> must succeed\ngit -c http.127.0.0.1:8931/bare.git.extraHeader=\"Authorization: Basic c2VlZDpzM2NyZXQ=\" clone -q http://127.0.0.1:8931/bare.git authed\necho \"OK: clone with extraHeader succeeded\"\n# 5. inside the clone: plain 'git pull' (no -c flags) must work via the header\ncd authed\ngit remote set-url origin http://127.0.0.1:8931/bare.git # ensure plain URL, no embedded creds\ngit config http.127.0.0.1:8931/bare.git.extraHeader \"Authorization: Basic c2VlZDpzM2VyZXQ=\" 2>/dev/null || true\ngit config --local http.127.0.0.1:8931/bare.git.extraHeader \"Authorization: Basic c2VlZDpzM2NyZXQ=\"\necho change >> file.txt && git add . && git commit -qm \"second\"\ngit pull 2>&1 | tail -1\ngit push origin main 2>&1 | tail -2 && echo \"OK: push worked\"\nkill $SERVER_PID", "timeout": 60}
Arguments
{"command": "set -e\ncd /tmp && rm -rf gitauth-test && mkdir gitauth-test && cd gitauth-test\n# 1. seed repo + bare repo\ngit init -q -b main seed\ncd seed\ngit config user.name t && git config user.email t@t\necho hello > file.txt && git add . && git commit -qm init\ncd ..\ngit clone -q --bare seed bare.git\n# 2. CGI server requiring Basic auth token \"s3cr3t\"\ncat > server.py <<'EOF'\nimport os, subprocess, sys\nfrom http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer\nfrom urllib.parse import urlparse, parse_qs\n\nos.environ[\"GIT_PROJECT_ROOT\"] = \"/tmp/gitauth-test\"\nos.environ[\"GIT_HTTP_EXPORT_ALL\"] = \"1\"\n\nclass H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):\n def _handle(self):\n auth = self.headers.get(\"Authorization\", \"\")\n if auth != \"Basic c2VlZDpzM2NyZXQ=\": # base64(\"seed:s3cr3t\")\n self.send_response(401)\n self.send_header(\"WWW-Authenticate\", \"Basic\")\n self.end_headers()\n return\n path = urlparse(self.path)\n qs = parse_qs(path.query)\n length = int(self.headers.get(\"Content-Length\") or 0)\n body = self.rfile.read(length) if length else b\"\"\n env = dict(os.environ)\n env[\"REQUEST_METHOD\"] = self.command\n env[\"GIT_HTTP_EXPORT_ALL\"] = \"1\"\n env[\"PATH_INFO\"] = path.path\n env[\"QUERY_STRING\"] = path.query\n env[\"CONTENT_LENGTH\"] = str(length)\n p = subprocess.run([\"git\", \"http-backend\"], env=env, input=body, capture_output=True)\n out = p.stdout\n # parse CGI headers\n head, _, payload = out.partition(b\"\\r\\n\\r\\n\")\n status = \"200 OK\"\n hdrs = {}\n for line in head.decode().split(\"\\r\\n\"):\n if \":\" in line:\n k, v = line.split(\":\", 1)\n if k.strip().lower() == \"status\":\n status = v.strip()\n else:\n hdrs[k.strip()] = v.strip()\n code = int(status.split()[0])\n self.send_response(code)\n for k, v in hdrs.items():\n self.send_header(k, v)\n self.end_headers()\n self.wfile.write(payload)\n do_GET = _handle\n do_POST = _handle\n def log_message(self, *a): pass\n\nHTTPServer((\"127.0.0.1\", 8931), H).serve_forever()\nEOF\npython3 server.py & SERVER_PID=$!\nsleep 0.5\n# 3. clone WITHOUT auth -> must fail\nif git clone -q http://127.0.0.1:8931/bare.git noauth 2>/dev/null; then echo \"UNEXPECTED: no-auth clone succeeded\"; else echo \"OK: no-auth clone rejected\"; fi\n# 4. clone WITH http.<url>.extraHeader -> must succeed\ngit -c http.127.0.0.1:8931/bare.git.extraHeader=\"Authorization: Basic c2VlZDpzM2NyZXQ=\" clone -q http://127.0.0.1:8931/bare.git authed\necho \"OK: clone with extraHeader succeeded\"\n# 5. inside the clone: plain 'git pull' (no -c flags) must work via the header\ncd authed\ngit remote set-url origin http://127.0.0.1:8931/bare.git # ensure plain URL, no embedded creds\ngit config http.127.0.0.1:8931/bare.git.extraHeader \"Authorization: Basic c2VlZDpzM2VyZXQ=\" 2>/dev/null || true\ngit config --local http.127.0.0.1:8931/bare.git.extraHeader \"Authorization: Basic c2VlZDpzM2NyZXQ=\"\necho change >> file.txt && git add . && git commit -qm \"second\"\ngit pull 2>&1 | tail -1\ngit push origin main 2>&1 | tail -2 && echo \"OK: push worked\"\nkill $SERVER_PID", "timeout": 60}
Result
ERROR CALLING TOOL: command failed: command exited with status 128
Thinking
The command failed with exit code 128. Let me debug β I'll run it step by step to see where it failed.
Tool
π§ bash
{"command": "cd /tmp/gitauth-test && ls; git clone http://127.0.0.1:8931/bare.git noauth 2>&1 | head -5; echo \"exit: $?\""}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /tmp/gitauth-test && ls; git clone http://127.0.0.1:8931/bare.git noauth 2>&1 | head -5; echo \"exit: $?\""}
Result
bare.git seed server.py
Cloning into 'noauth'...
fatal: unable to access 'http://127.0.0.1:8931/bare.git/': Failed to connect to 127.0.0.1 port 8931 after 0 ms: Could not connect to server
exit: 0
Thinking
The server isn't running β the background process from the previous bash invocation didn't survive (each bash invocation is a new shell, and the background process may have been killed when the command ended). I need to keep the server running within the same bash invocation. Let me redo this as a single script, and also add debugging for the CGI part.
The server died between tool calls. Let me run the whole thing in one invocation:
Tool
π§ bash
{"command": "set -x\ncd /tmp/gitauth-test\npython3 server.py & SERVER_PID=$!\nsleep 0.5\ncurl -s -o /dev/null -w \"%{http_code}\\n\" http://127.0.0.1:8931/bare.git/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack\ngit clone http://127.0.0.1:8931/bare.git noauth 2>&1 | tail -2\ngit -c http.127.0.0.1:8931/bare.git.extraHeader=\"Authorization: Basic c2VlZDpzM2NyZXQ=\" clone -q http://127.0.0.1:8931/bare.git authed && echo CLONE-OK\ncd authed\ngit config --local http.127.0.0.1:8931/bare.git.extraHeader \"Authorization: Basic c2VlZDpzM2NyZXQ=\"\necho change >> file.txt && git -c user.name=t -c user.email=t@t commit -qam \"second\"\ngit pull 2>&1 | tail -1\ngit push origin main 2>&1 | tail -2 && echo PUSH-OK\nkill $SERVER_PID 2>/dev/null", "timeout": 60}
Arguments
{"command": "set -x\ncd /tmp/gitauth-test\npython3 server.py & SERVER_PID=$!\nsleep 0.5\ncurl -s -o /dev/null -w \"%{http_code}\\n\" http://127.0.0.1:8931/bare.git/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack\ngit clone http://127.0.0.1:8931/bare.git noauth 2>&1 | tail -2\ngit -c http.127.0.0.1:8931/bare.git.extraHeader=\"Authorization: Basic c2VlZDpzM2NyZXQ=\" clone -q http://127.0.0.1:8931/bare.git authed && echo CLONE-OK\ncd authed\ngit config --local http.127.0.0.1:8931/bare.git.extraHeader \"Authorization: Basic c2VlZDpzM2NyZXQ=\"\necho change >> file.txt && git -c user.name=t -c user.email=t@t commit -qam \"second\"\ngit pull 2>&1 | tail -1\ngit push origin main 2>&1 | tail -2 && echo PUSH-OK\nkill $SERVER_PID 2>/dev/null", "timeout": 60}
Result
+ cd /tmp/gitauth-test
+ SERVER_PID=289
+ sleep 0.5
+ python3 server.py
+ curl -s -o /dev/null -w %{http_code}\n http://127.0.0.1:8931/bare.git/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack
401
+ git clone http://127.0.0.1:8931/bare.git noauth
+ tail -2
Cloning into 'noauth'...
fatal: could not read Username for 'http://127.0.0.1:8931': terminal prompts disabled
+ git -c http.127.0.0.1:8931/bare.git.extraHeader=Authorization: Basic c2VlZDpzM2NyZXQ= clone -q http://127.0.0.1:8931/bare.git authed
fatal: could not read Username for 'http://127.0.0.1:8931': terminal prompts disabled
+ cd authed
sh: 8: cd: can't cd to authed
+ git config --local http.127.0.0.1:8931/bare.git.extraHeader Authorization: Basic c2VlZDpzM2NyZXQ=
fatal: --local can only be used inside a git repository
+ echo change
+ git -c user.name=t -c user.email=t@t commit -qam second
fatal: not a git repository (or any of the parent directories): .git
+ git pull
+ tail -1
fatal: not a git repository (or any of the parent directories): .git
+ git push origin main
+ tail -2
fatal: not a git repository (or any of the parent directories): .git
+ echo PUSH-OK
PUSH-OK
+ kill 289
Thinking
Interesting! The server is working (401 without auth). But even with `-c http.127.0.0.1:8931/bare.git.extraHeader=...` attached, the clone failed with "could not read Username".
Why? The URL I used for the config key was `http.127.0.0.1:8931/bare.git.extraHeader` β wait, the URL is `http://127.0.0.1:8931/bare.git`. The config key should be `http.<url>.extraHeader` = `http.http://127.0.0.1:8931/bare.git.extraHeader`. I wrote `http.127.0.0.1:8931/bare.git.extraHeader` β the `//` is missing! So the section becomes `http`, the subsection becomes `127.0.0.1:8931/bare.git` β which doesn't match the request URL `http://127.0.0.1:8931/bare.git/...`.
Let me retry with the correct full URL as the subsection.
I made a typo β the URL subsection must include the `http://` scheme. Let me retry:
Tool
π§ bash
{"command": "cd /tmp/gitauth-test\npython3 server.py & SERVER_PID=$!\nsleep 0.5\ngit -c 'http.http://127.0.0.1:8931/bare.git.extraHeader=Authorization: Basic c2VlZDpzM2NyZXQ=' clone -q http://127.0.0.1:8931/bare.git authed && echo CLONE-OK\ncd authed\ngit config --local 'http.http://127.0.0.1:8931/bare.git.extraHeader' \"Authorization: Basic c2VlZDpzM2NyZXQ=\"\necho change >> file.txt && git -c user.name=t -c user.email=t@t commit -qam \"second\"\ngit pull 2>&1 | tail -1\ngit push origin main 2>&1 | tail -2 && echo PUSH-OK\nkill $SERVER_PID 2>/dev/null", "timeout": 60}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /tmp/gitauth-test\npython3 server.py & SERVER_PID=$!\nsleep 0.5\ngit -c 'http.http://127.0.0.1:8931/bare.git.extraHeader=Authorization: Basic c2VlZDpzM2NyZXQ=' clone -q http://127.0.0.1:8931/bare.git authed && echo CLONE-OK\ncd authed\ngit config --local 'http.http://127.0.0.1:8931/bare.git.extraHeader' \"Authorization: Basic c2VlZDpzM2NyZXQ=\"\necho change >> file.txt && git -c user.name=t -c user.email=t@t commit -qam \"second\"\ngit pull 2>&1 | tail -1\ngit push origin main 2>&1 | tail -2 && echo PUSH-OK\nkill $SERVER_PID 2>/dev/null", "timeout": 60}
Result
error: RPC failed; HTTP 415 curl 22 The requested URL returned error: 415
fatal: the remote end hung up unexpectedly
sh: 5: cd: can't cd to authed
fatal: --local can only be used inside a git repository
fatal: not a git repository (or any of the parent directories): .git
fatal: not a git repository (or any of the parent directories): .git
fatal: not a git repository (or any of the parent directories): .git
PUSH-OK
Thinking
Progress: The 401 is gone (auth header was accepted), but now it's 415 Unsupported Media Type β my naive CGI server isn't handling the POST body correctly (git http-backend needs the request body to be passed via stdin, and I did that, but the 415 suggests a Content-Type issue β git http-backend expects `application/x-git-upload-pack-request` on POST. My server isn't forwarding the Content-Type header to the CGI environment).
This is a test harness issue, not a git config issue. The important verification is: **the auth header is now being sent and accepted (401 β 415)**. The 415 is because my toy server isn't forwarding the Content-Type header to the CGI.
Let me fix the server to forward the Content-Type and Content-Length headers.
Auth is now working (401 β 415). The 415 is because my toy CGI server isn't forwarding `Content-Type` to `git http-backend`. Fixing the harness:
Tool
π§ bash
{"command": "cd /tmp/gitauth-test\ncat > server.py <<'EOF'\nimport os, subprocess\nfrom http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer\nfrom urllib.parse import urlparse, parse_qs\n\nclass H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):\n def _handle(self):\n auth = self.headers.get(\"Authorization\", \"\")\n if auth != \"Basic c2VlZDpzM2NyZXQ=\":\n self.send_response(401)\n self.send_header(\"WWW-Authenticate\", \"Basic\")\n self.end_headers()\n return\n path = urlparse(self.path)\n length = int(self.headers.get(\"Content-Length\") or 0)\n body = self.rfile.read(length) if length else b\"\"\n env = dict(os.environ)\n env[\"REQUEST_METHOD\"] = self.command\n env[\"GIT_PROJECT_ROOT\"] = \"/tmp/gitauth-test\"\n env[\"GIT_HTTP_EXPORT_ALL\"] = \"1\"\n env[\"PATH_INFO\"] = path.path\n env[\"QUERY_STRING\"] = path.query\n env[\"CONTENT_LENGTH\"] = str(length)\n ct = self.headers.get(\"Content-Type\")\n if ct:\n env[\"CONTENT_TYPE\"] = ct\n p = subprocess.run([\"git\", \"http-backend\"], env=env, input=body, capture_output=True)\n out = p.stdout\n head, _, payload = out.partition(b\"\\r\\n\\r\\n\")\n status = \"200 OK\"\n hdrs = {}\n for line in head.decode().split(\"\\r\\n\"):\n if \":\" in line:\n k, v = line.split(\":\", 1)\n if k.strip().lower() == \"status\":\n status = v.strip()\n else:\n hdrs[k.strip()] = v.strip()\n self.send_response(int(status.split()[0]))\n for k, v in hdrs.items():\n self.send_header(k, v)\n self.end_headers()\n self.wfile.write(payload)\n do_GET = _handle\n do_POST = _handle\n def log_message(self, *a): pass\n\nHTTPServer((\"127.0.0.1\", 8931), H).serve_forever()\nEOF\npython3 server.py & SERVER_PID=$!\nsleep 0.5\ngit -c 'http.http://127.0.0.1:8931/bare.git.extraHeader=Authorization: Basic c2VlZDpzM2NyZXQ=' clone -q http://127.0.0.1:8931/bare.git authed && echo CLONE-OK\ncd authed\ngit config --local 'http.http://127.0.0.1:8931/bare.git.extraHeader' \"Authorization: Basic c2VlZDpzM2NyZXQ=\"\necho change >> file.txt && git -c user.name=t -c user.email=t@t commit -qam \"second\"\ngit pull 2>&1 | tail -1\ngit push origin main 2>&1 | tail -2 && echo PUSH-OK\ngit ls-remote origin 2>&1 | head -2 && echo LSREMOTE-OK\nkill $SERVER_PID 2>/dev/null", "timeout": 60}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /tmp/gitauth-test\ncat > server.py <<'EOF'\nimport os, subprocess\nfrom http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer\nfrom urllib.parse import urlparse, parse_qs\n\nclass H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):\n def _handle(self):\n auth = self.headers.get(\"Authorization\", \"\")\n if auth != \"Basic c2VlZDpzM2NyZXQ=\":\n self.send_response(401)\n self.send_header(\"WWW-Authenticate\", \"Basic\")\n self.end_headers()\n return\n path = urlparse(self.path)\n length = int(self.headers.get(\"Content-Length\") or 0)\n body = self.rfile.read(length) if length else b\"\"\n env = dict(os.environ)\n env[\"REQUEST_METHOD\"] = self.command\n env[\"GIT_PROJECT_ROOT\"] = \"/tmp/gitauth-test\"\n env[\"GIT_HTTP_EXPORT_ALL\"] = \"1\"\n env[\"PATH_INFO\"] = path.path\n env[\"QUERY_STRING\"] = path.query\n env[\"CONTENT_LENGTH\"] = str(length)\n ct = self.headers.get(\"Content-Type\")\n if ct:\n env[\"CONTENT_TYPE\"] = ct\n p = subprocess.run([\"git\", \"http-backend\"], env=env, input=body, capture_output=True)\n out = p.stdout\n head, _, payload = out.partition(b\"\\r\\n\\r\\n\")\n status = \"200 OK\"\n hdrs = {}\n for line in head.decode().split(\"\\r\\n\"):\n if \":\" in line:\n k, v = line.split(\":\", 1)\n if k.strip().lower() == \"status\":\n status = v.strip()\n else:\n hdrs[k.strip()] = v.strip()\n self.send_response(int(status.split()[0]))\n for k, v in hdrs.items():\n self.send_header(k, v)\n self.end_headers()\n self.wfile.write(payload)\n do_GET = _handle\n do_POST = _handle\n def log_message(self, *a): pass\n\nHTTPServer((\"127.0.0.1\", 8931), H).serve_forever()\nEOF\npython3 server.py & SERVER_PID=$!\nsleep 0.5\ngit -c 'http.http://127.0.0.1:8931/bare.git.extraHeader=Authorization: Basic c2VlZDpzM2NyZXQ=' clone -q http://127.0.0.1:8931/bare.git authed && echo CLONE-OK\ncd authed\ngit config --local 'http.http://127.0.0.1:8931/bare.git.extraHeader' \"Authorization: Basic c2VlZDpzM2NyZXQ=\"\necho change >> file.txt && git -c user.name=t -c user.email=t@t commit -qam \"second\"\ngit pull 2>&1 | tail -1\ngit push origin main 2>&1 | tail -2 && echo PUSH-OK\ngit ls-remote origin 2>&1 | head -2 && echo LSREMOTE-OK\nkill $SERVER_PID 2>/dev/null", "timeout": 60}
Result
CLONE-OK
Already up to date.
fatal: unable to access 'http://127.0.0.1:8931/bare.git/': The requested URL returned error: 403
PUSH-OK
34060c4d8576aa5812fa303ee9d0482845525c5d HEAD
34060c4d8576aa5812fa303ee9d0482845525c5d refs/heads/main
LSREMOTE-OK
Thinking
Great progress!
- **CLONE-OK**: Clone via `http.<url>.extraHeader` works.
- **git pull works**: "Already up to date." β plain `git pull` using the local gitconfig extraHeader works.
- **ls-remote works**.
- **push β 403**: The 403 on push is because `git http-backend` requires `GIT_HTTP.receive-pack = 1` (or `http.receivepack`) in the bare repo's config to enable push. This is a limitation of the test harness, not a problem with the auth mechanism. Let's enable receive-pack on the bare repo and retest push.
Clone, pull, and ls-remote all work via the gitconfig header. The push 403 is just my test bare repo missing `http.receivepack`. Final check:
Tool
π§ bash
{"command": "cd /tmp/gitauth-test\ngit -C bare.git config http.receivepack true\npython3 server.py & SERVER_PID=$!\nsleep 0.5\ncd authed\ngit push origin main 2>&1 | tail -2 && echo PUSH-OK\nkill $SERVER_PID 2>/dev/null", "timeout": 60}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /tmp/gitauth-test\ngit -C bare.git config http.receivepack true\npython3 server.py & SERVER_PID=$!\nsleep 0.5\ncd authed\ngit push origin main 2>&1 | tail -2 && echo PUSH-OK\nkill $SERVER_PID 2>/dev/null", "timeout": 60}
Result
To http://127.0.0.1:8931/bare.git
34060c4..c74a626 main -> main
PUSH-OK
Thinking
The complete mechanism has been verified end-to-end:
1. `git clone` with `http.<url>.extraHeader` β works
2. Plain `git pull` (no flags) using `http.<url>.extraHeader` in gitconfig β works
3. `git push` with the same header β works
4. `git ls-remote` β works
**Design confirmed.** Now let's write the production code.
## Implementation Plan
### 1. `internal/agentrun/clone.go` β rewrite as sandbox git helpers
New content:
```go
package agentrun
import (
"context"
"encoding/base64"
"fmt"
"strings"
)
// gitAuthHeader returns the value of the Authorization header that
// authenticates git's smart-HTTP requests as user with token.
func gitAuthHeader(user, token string) string {
auth := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(user + ":" + token))
return "Authorization: Basic " + auth
}
// configureSandboxGit ... writes the container's system gitconfig ...
func (r *Runner) configureSandboxGit(ctx context.Context, containerID, cloneURL, user, token, name, email string) error {
...
}
```
Hmm, wait. Let me think about the structure. The functions in clone.go currently take ctx and run git on the host. New version: they run git inside the container via docker exec. Let's define:
```go
// runSandboxGit runs `git args...` inside the container via docker exec.
func runSandboxGit(ctx context.Context, rt *dockerRuntime, containerID string, args ...string) (string, error) {
out, exitCode, err := rt.exec(ctx, containerID, shellGitCmd(args...))
if err != nil {
return out, err
}
if exitCode != 0 {
return out, fmt.Errorf("git %s: exit %d", args[0], exitCode)
}
return out, nil
}
```
And `shellQuote`/`shellGitCmd` helpers. `shellQuote` already exists in `internal/tools/shell.go` (unexported, different package). We need our own in agentrun. Where? A small file `shell.go` in agentrun? Or inside clone.go. I'll put it in clone.go (which is now the "sandbox git" file) β or better, rename the file to `sandbox.go`? Hmm. The file contains: shellQuote, shellGitCmd, runSandboxGit, gitAuthHeader, configureSandboxGit, cloneAndBranch (in-sandbox), clonePRHead (in-sandbox). That's a coherent "sandbox git" module. Let's rename clone.go β sandboxgit.go. Actually, rename or keep? Renaming is cleaner semantically. `git mv clone.go sandboxgit.go`. Hmm, but the diff will show a full rewrite anyway. Let's rename β the content is different enough.
Wait, actually, let me reconsider: keep the name `clone.go`? The file's main purpose is now "git setup + clone inside the sandbox". `sandboxgit.go` is more descriptive. Let's go with that.
Functions:
```go
// shellQuote wraps s in single quotes for safe interpolation into a
// `sh -c` command string, escaping any embedded single quotes.
func shellQuote(s string) string {
return "'" + strings.ReplaceAll(s, "'", `'\''`) + "'"
}
// shellGitCmd renders `git <args...>` as a single sh -c command line
// with every argument quoted, for docker exec.
func shellGitCmd(args ...string) string {
parts := make([]string, len(args)+1)
parts[0] = "git"
for i, a := range args {
parts[i+1] = shellQuote(a)
}
return strings.Join(parts, " ")
}
// runSandboxGit runs `git <args...>` inside containerID and returns its
// combined output. A non-zero exit is an error.
func runSandboxGit(ctx context.Context, rt *dockerRuntime, containerID string, args ...string) (string, error) {
out, exitCode, err := rt.exec(ctx, containerID, shellGitCmd(args...))
if err != nil {
return out, err
}
if exitCode != 0 {
return out, fmt.Errorf("git %s: exit %d: %s", args[0], exitCode, out)
}
return out, nil
}
// gitAuthHeader ...
func gitAuthHeader(user, token string) string { ... }
// configureSandboxGit makes git inside the container just work: ...
// - safe.directory '*'
// - user.name / user.email
// - http.<cloneURL>.extraHeader with the agent's credential
func configureSandboxGit(ctx context.Context, rt *dockerRuntime, containerID, cloneURL, user, token, name, email string) error {
if _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, "config", "--system", "--add", "safe.directory", "*"); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("configure safe.directory: %w", err)
}
if _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, "config", "--system", "user.name", name); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("configure user.name: %w", err)
}
if _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, "config", "--system", "user.email", email); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("configure user.email: %w", err)
}
header := gitAuthHeader(user, token)
if _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, "config", "--system", "http."+cloneURL+".extraHeader", header); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("configure git credential: %w", err)
}
return nil
}
```
Wait β one issue with `http.<cloneURL>.extraHeader` when the cloneURL contains characters that are problematic in a git config key. The URL is something like `https://code.stdio.dk/abrander/zoo.git`. When passed as a single argv element to `git config`, git parses the key: section `http`, subsection `https://code.stdio.dk/abrander/zoo.git`, variable `extraHeader`. Verified working above (with a URL containing dots and colons).
But wait β what if the clone URL contains a space? Git repo URLs don't contain spaces (they'd be percent-encoded). No problem.
Another consideration: `--add` for safe.directory vs. plain. `safe.directory` is a multi-value key; `--add` appends. Since it's a fresh container, plain set would also work, but `--add` is what the current code uses. Keep `--add`.
For `http.<url>.extraHeader` β also a multi-value key. Plain set is fine (fresh container).
Now, the clone function:
```go
// cloneAndBranch clones cloneURL into /project inside the container
// and checks out a fresh branch off defaultBranch. The clone
// authenticates via the http.<url>.extraHeader configured by
// configureSandboxGit, and the origin remote is left with the plain
// cloneURL β no credential is written into the working tree.
func cloneAndBranch(ctx context.Context, rt *dockerRuntime, containerID, cloneURL, defaultBranch, branch string) error {
if _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, "clone", "--branch", defaultBranch, "--single-branch", cloneURL, "/project"); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("clone: %w", err)
}
if _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, "checkout", "-b", branch); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("checkout branch %q: %w", branch, err)
}
return nil
}
```
Wait β the working directory of the exec: the container's WorkingDir is `/project`, so `git checkout -b` runs in /project β which after the clone is the repo root. Good.
But note: `git clone <url> /project` β the target directory /project exists (bind mount, empty). Git allows cloning into an existing empty directory. Good.
```go
// clonePRHead clones cloneURL into /project inside the container and
// checks out the pull request's head as a local branch named headRef...
func clonePRHead(ctx context.Context, rt *dockerRuntime, containerID, cloneURL, defaultBranch, headRef string, index int64) error {
if _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, "clone", "--branch", defaultBranch, "--single-branch", cloneURL, "/project"); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("clone: %w", err)
}
fetchRef := fmt.Sprintf("refs/pull/%d/head", index)
if _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, "fetch", "--no-tags", "origin", fetchRef); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("fetch PR %d head: %w", index, err)
}
if _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, "checkout", "-B", headRef, "FETCH_HEAD"); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("checkout PR head %q: %w", headRef, err)
}
return nil
}
```
Hmm, wait β one issue: for pr:review, the PR's head branch might be in a fork. The clone is of the base repo; fetching `refs/pull/N/head` from the base repo works in Gitea (it proxies the fork's ref). That's the existing behavior β no change.
But wait: pushing to a PR head in a fork requires access to the fork β the agent's token may not have access to the fork. That's an existing concern, not something to solve here.
### 2. Changes to `run.go`
Current flow:
```go
workDir := MkdirTemp
projectDir := workDir/project
// clone on host (cloneAndBranch or clonePRHead)
// roster, gitIdentity
// git config user.name/email on host (local scope)
// write event file
// createContainer
// git config --system safe.directory in container
// ... run loop
```
New flow:
```go
workDir := MkdirTemp
projectDir := workDir/project
os.MkdirAll(projectDir, 0o755) // bind mount source must exist
// roster, gitIdentity
// gitUser, gitToken := agent token or shared fallback
// write event file
// createContainer
// configureSandboxGit (safe.directory, identity, credential)
// clone in container (cloneAndBranch or clonePRHead)
// ... run loop
```
Ordering detail: `roster`/`gitIdentity` are computed before container creation (need the roster for the identity). Currently roster is computed after the clone. Move it before. No problem.
Also, the pr:review branch fetches PR info (headRef) and review details β these don't depend on the clone, so they can stay where they are. Let me restructure carefully:
```go
func (r *Runner) Run(ctx context.Context, jobID string, agent config.AgentConfig, llmCfg config.LLM, dockerImage string, ev forgejo.Event) error {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, r.timeout)
defer cancel()
logger := r.logger.With("job", jobID, "agent", agent.Name)
repoInfo, err := r.forgejo.RepositoryInfo(ev.Owner, ev.Repo)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("look up repository: %w", err)
}
workDir, err := os.MkdirTemp("", "zoo-run-*")
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("create work dir: %w", err)
}
succeeded := false
defer func() { ... }()
projectDir := filepath.Join(workDir, "project")
// The container bind-mounts projectDir as /project and clones into
// it, so the (empty) directory must exist on the host first β
// otherwise Docker would create it root-owned on the host.
if err := os.MkdirAll(projectDir, 0o755); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("create project dir: %w", err)
}
// A pr:review run works on the PR's own head branch...
var review *forgejo.ReviewDetail
branch := fmt.Sprintf("issue-%d-%s", ev.Index, agent.Name)
isPRReview := ev.Kind == forgejo.EventPRReview
var headRef string
if isPRReview {
... same as before, sets headRef ...
branch = headRef
review, err = ...
}
roster := buildRoster(r.forgejo, r.cfg.Agents, logger)
gitName, gitEmail := gitIdentity(agent.Name, roster)
// The sandbox's git credential: the agent's own Forgejo token if
// configured (its git activity is then attributed to its own
// account), falling back to the shared zoo identity for
// deployments without per-agent tokens.
gitUser, gitToken := "zoo", r.forgejo.Token()
if agent.Token != "" {
gitUser, gitToken = agent.Name, agent.Token
}
eventPath := filepath.Join(workDir, "event.json")
if err := os.WriteFile(eventPath, ev.Raw, 0o644); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("write event file: %w", err)
}
containerID, err := r.docker.createContainer(ctx, dockerImage, []string{
projectDir + ":/project",
eventPath + ":/event:ro",
}, fmt.Sprintf("zoo-issue-%d-%s", ev.Index, agent.Name))
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("start container: %w", err)
}
defer func() { ... remove container ... }()
// Git inside the sandbox must just work: ...
if err := configureSandboxGit(ctx, r.docker, containerID, repoInfo.CloneURL, gitUser, gitToken, gitName, gitEmail); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("configure git in container: %w", err)
}
if isPRReview {
if err := clonePRHead(ctx, r.docker, containerID, repoInfo.CloneURL, repoInfo.DefaultBranch, headRef, ev.Index); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("prepare git working tree: %w", err)
}
} else {
if err := cloneAndBranch(ctx, r.docker, containerID, repoInfo.CloneURL, repoInfo.DefaultBranch, branch); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("prepare git working tree: %w", err)
}
}
...
}
```
Wait, there's an ordering issue in the original code: for pr:review, `branch = headRef` is set after the clone (the clone needs headRef). In my restructure, I compute headRef first (the PR info fetch), then branch = headRef, and the clone happens after container creation. The PR info fetch and review fetch are API calls β they can happen before container creation. That's fine, and it's actually better (fail fast before spinning up a container).
Hmm, one consideration: the original code cloned before fetching the review details. If the review fetch fails, it's a warning, not a failure. No problem.
Also, the `runContext` construction: remove the `token` field.
### 3. `context.go` (agentrun)
```go
type runContext struct {
docker *dockerRuntime
containerID string
projectDir string
forgejo tools.ForgejoActions
}
```
Wait β is `projectDir` still used in runContext? Let me check... In context.go, `projectDir` is used in `Git` (host-side). If Git moves into the container, projectDir is no longer needed in runContext. Let me check for other uses of runContext.projectDir... grep.
```go
// Git implements tools.Context.Git by running git inside the run's
// container, where the system gitconfig (see configureSandboxGit)
// carries the run's Forgejo credential β so remote operations like
// push authenticate without any per-invocation plumbing.
func (c *runContext) Git(ctx context.Context, subcommand string, args ...string) (string, error) {
return c.Exec(ctx, shellGitCmd(append([]string{subcommand}, args...)...))
}
```
Note: `append([]string{subcommand}, args...)` β creates a new slice, no aliasing issue.
### 4. `tools/context.go` β update doc comments
- `Exec`: "The container never holds a Forgejo credential..." β now it does hold one (git credential via system gitconfig). Update the comment: the container holds a git credential scoped to the run's repository (see Git).
- `Git`: "runs a git subcommand against the run's working tree on the host, outside the container..." β now runs inside the container.
### 5. `tools/git.go` β update doc comment
The comment says "executed outside the container (see that method's doc comment for why): the container itself is never given a credential capable of authenticating against Forgejo, so pushing has to happen on the host side instead." β update: runs inside the container, where the run's git credential is configured.
### 6. `system.md` β update the Git section
Current:
```
**Git**
You may use normal git commands to manage your working tree. For remote
(pull, fetch, push, etc.) git operations, you can use the `git` tool.
```
New:
```
**Git**
You may use normal git commands to manage your working tree. Remote
operations (pull, fetch, push, ...) are authenticated for you: the
`git` tool and plain `git` in `bash` both work against the remote.
```
Hmm, let me keep it close to the original and just make it accurate. The git tool now runs inside the container, so "you can use the `git` tool" is still correct. Let me write:
```
**Git**
You may use normal git commands to manage your working tree. Remote
git operations (pull, fetch, push, ...) are authenticated for you and
simply work, both through the `git` tool and plain `git` in `bash`.
```
### 7. `docker.go` β the exec env comment mentions GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT for credential prompts. Still accurate. No change needed. Actually, wait β should I add the token to the exec's Env so the agent's shell can use it directly (e.g., for curl to the Forgejo API)? The issue says "pass the agent's token to the sandbox so the agent can do its own git operations". The purpose is git operations. The Forgejo API is covered by the forgejo tools. Let's not expose the raw token in the shell's environment β the gitconfig approach is cleaner and scoped to git. Hmm...
But wait, let me re-read the issue: "Pass the agent token to the sandbox to enable agents to make their own git operations - even on the remote." β the purpose is explicitly git operations. The gitconfig approach achieves that. I'm confident in this design.
### 8. Tests
a) **Unit tests** (new file `internal/agentrun/sandboxgit_test.go` or added to existing):
- `TestShellQuote` β but wait, `shellQuote` exists in both `internal/tools` (tested there) and now `internal/agentrun`. Test the agentrun one: simple, embedded quote, empty string, metacharacters.
- `TestShellGitCmd` β verify the command line: `git clone --branch main --single-branch 'https://x/y.git' /project`.
- `TestGitAuthHeader` β verify base64 of user:token.
b) **Integration test** (docker tag, `docker_integration_test.go`): add `TestDockerRuntimeSandboxGit` that verifies:
- Create a bare repo on the host with a commit (host git).
- Create a container with two bind mounts: the bare repo at `/bare` (ro? no β push needs rw; use rw) and an empty project dir at `/project`.
- `configureSandboxGit` with a dummy user/token (a local path remote ignores the header β but the config write itself is verified).
- `cloneAndBranch` from the local path remote...
Wait β the extraHeader key is `http.<cloneURL>.extraHeader`. A local path clone (`/bare`) doesn't use http, so the header is irrelevant. The clone works. Then:
- Verify the clone happened in the sandbox: `git -C /project log` shows the commit; the branch was created.
- Verify the identity: make a commit inside the container and check the author name/email matches what we configured (via system gitconfig).
- Verify the credential roundtrip: `git config --system --get http.<url>.extraHeader` returns the header (verifying the key parsing with a real URL).
- Verify the token is not in the working tree: `grep -r <token> /project` finds nothing.
This is a solid integration test without needing a real Forgejo.
For a real end-to-end of http auth in the container, we'd need an HTTP git server β too heavy for the test suite; my local verification above covers the mechanism, and the roundtrip config check covers the key format.
Hmm, actually β wait. Can we do better? The golang:latest image has git. We could serve git via... no, let's keep the integration test focused. The mechanism (extraHeader β auth) is core git behavior, verified above.
c) Existing test `TestDockerRuntimeGitSafeDirectory` β still valid (safe.directory is still configured in the container). Keep.
### 9. `runGit`/`runGitAuthed` β remove (no longer used). Check for other callers: grep `runGit`.
Let me also check `seed_test.go` and `roster_test.go` for anything related.
### 10. Also check: are there other places that reference the host-side clone or `projectDir` git operations? Let me grep `runGit`, `gitAuthArgs`, `cloneAndBranch`, `clonePRHead`.
Now, let me also think about **the container's git version / image**: the default image is golang:latest β has git. debian:unstable (used in one test) β has git. OK.
**Another design question**: `configureSandboxGit` writes `http.<cloneURL>.extraHeader`. What if the agent changes the origin URL (e.g., `git remote set-url`)? The git tool's allowlist doesn't include `remote`, so the agent can't do that via the git tool. Via bash, they could. Edge case, ignore.
**What about `git pull` when the origin URL has a `.git` suffix mismatch?** The clone URL from the Forgejo API: let me double-check what Gitea returns as `clone_url`. In Gitea, `Repository.CloneURL` = `fmt.Sprintf("%s/%s/%s.git", base, owner, repo)` β includes `.git`. The clone command uses that URL, and origin is set to exactly that URL, so the extraHeader prefix matches exactly.
**Security consideration** (documented in a comment): the token now lives in the container's /etc/gitconfig (system scope). The container is ephemeral and per-run; the working tree (bind-mounted, kept on failure with keepOnFailure) contains no credential. The host's temp workdir is removed after the run. This is a deliberate trade-off the issue asks for.
Also, the exec command line (visible in `docker inspect` / `ps` on the host while running) contains the base64 token during the configure step. The host is already the trust boundary (it holds the token in memory and in zoo.hcl). Acceptable; note it in a comment.
### 11. What about the `keepOnFailure` workdir?
The workdir now contains a repo cloned by the container (root-owned on the host if the container runs as root). `os.RemoveAll(workDir)` on the host β if the host user is non-root and the files are root-owned, RemoveAll may fail with EACCES!
Hmm, this is a real concern. Previously the host (running as the zoo daemon user) did the clone, so files were owned by the zoo user β cleanable. Now the container (usually root) clones into the bind mount β files are root-owned on the host β if the zoo daemon runs as non-root, `os.RemoveAll` fails.
Wait, but the bind mount: the container's root writes to the host directory. On the host, those files appear as UID 0. If the daemon runs as root (typical for a docker daemon client... not necessarily), no problem. If the daemon runs as a non-root user with docker socket access, RemoveAll fails on root-owned files.
How to handle? Options:
1. Chown the workdir back after the run: `os.Chown` requires root. No good.
2. `chmod -R +w`? Doesn't help if the parent directory is root-owned... actually, RemoveAll needs write permission on the directory to unlink files. If the directory is root-owned 0755 and the daemon is non-root, it can't unlink.
3. Run the container as the host's UID? That changes container behavior (the image may expect root).
4. Use `docker cp` to copy the result out of the container instead of a bind mount? That changes the architecture significantly (the agent's /project is inside the container's filesystem, copied out at the end). Hmm, actually, that's a bigger change than the issue asks for.
5. Keep the bind mount and accept the ownership quirk; on cleanup failure, log a warning (RemoveAll error is currently ignored? Let me check: `os.RemoveAll(workDir)` in the deferred func β the error is ignored!).
Looking at the current code:
```go
defer func() {
if succeeded || !r.keepOnFailure {
os.RemoveAll(workDir)
} else {
logger.Warn("keeping work dir after failure", "dir", workDir)
}
}()
```
The RemoveAll error is ignored. So in the worst case (non-root daemon), a root-owned temp dir lingers in /tmp. Not great, but not fatal.
Hmm, can we do better? What if the host pre-creates projectDir and the container's clone... the ownership problem is inherent to a root container writing into a bind mount.
Alternative: don't bind mount projectDir; instead, have the container clone into its own filesystem (/project is part of the container image's fs), and at the end `docker cp` the tree out to the host workdir. But then "Only /project persists" β /project is the container's own directory, no problem. And the host workdir gets a copy for... why do we need it on the host at all? In the new design, the host doesn't run git. The workdir on the host is only needed as a bind mount source. If we docker cp at the end, the host copy is only for debugging (keepOnFailure).
But wait β docker cp at the end: the agent's work is already pushed to the remote (that's how the work is saved). The host copy is purely for debugging. The current architecture keeps the workdir on failure for debugging. With docker cp, we could docker cp on failure... but the container is removed in the defer. We'd need to reorder: on failure, docker cp before removal.
Hmm, this is getting complicated. Let me reconsider: is the ownership issue real in zoo's deployment? The zoo daemon runs on a host with Docker. Typically, such daemons run as root (they manage containers). The existing code already has this pattern: the host clones (as the daemon user), the container (root) writes into the bind mount (agent commits, file writes). Wait β even in the current code, files the agent writes inside the container (via the write_file tool) are root-owned on the host! And `os.RemoveAll(workDir)` would already fail on those if the daemon is non-root. So this quirk already exists in the current architecture (agent-created files are root-owned). The clone just adds more root-owned files.
So: no regression beyond what already exists. The RemoveAll error is already ignored. Let's keep it simple and not over-engineer. Actually β hmm, wait. Let me reconsider whether we should log the RemoveAll error. Currently ignored. Leave it (surgical change).
OK, one more thought β since the host no longer runs git at all, do we even need the host workdir/projectDir? Yes: as the bind mount source for /project. The container needs a persistent (within the run) /project. A bind mount of an empty host directory is the existing mechanism. Keep it.
### 12. Check `seed_test.go` β what does it test? Let me read it. And `roster_test.go`.
Let me also double-check there are no other callers of the functions I'm changing. Let me grep.
The mechanism is fully verified: clone, pull, push, and ls-remote all authenticate via `http.<url>.extraHeader` in gitconfig. Now let me check remaining usages before writing the implementation:
Tool
π§ grep_search
{"query": "runGit|gitAuthArgs|cloneAndBranch|clonePRHead|projectDir", "glob": "*.go", "max_results": 60}
Arguments
{"query": "runGit|gitAuthArgs|cloneAndBranch|clonePRHead|projectDir", "glob": "*.go", "max_results": 60}
Result
/project/internal/agentrun/context.go:17: projectDir string
/project/internal/agentrun/context.go:37:// c.projectDir rather than via docker exec. Only push needs to
/project/internal/agentrun/context.go:40:// gitAuthArgs) β the container this same working tree is bind-mounted
/project/internal/agentrun/context.go:46: return runGitAuthed(ctx, c.projectDir, c.token, cmdArgs...)
/project/internal/agentrun/context.go:49: return runGit(ctx, c.projectDir, cmdArgs...)
/project/internal/agentrun/clone.go:11:// gitAuthArgs returns the `-c http.extraHeader=...` global git arguments
/project/internal/agentrun/clone.go:18:func gitAuthArgs(token string) []string {
/project/internal/agentrun/clone.go:24:// cloneAndBranch clones cloneURL into dir, authenticating the clone
/project/internal/agentrun/clone.go:25:// itself with token (see gitAuthArgs), and checks out a new branch off
/project/internal/agentrun/clone.go:28:func cloneAndBranch(ctx context.Context, cloneURL, token, defaultBranch, branch, dir string) error {
/project/internal/agentrun/clone.go:29: args := append(gitAuthArgs(token), "clone", "--branch", defaultBranch, "--single-branch", cloneURL, dir)
/project/internal/agentrun/clone.go:30: if out, err := runGit(ctx, "", args...); err != nil {
/project/internal/agentrun/clone.go:34: if out, err := runGit(ctx, dir, "checkout", "-b", branch); err != nil {
/project/internal/agentrun/clone.go:41:// clonePRHead clones cloneURL into dir and checks out the pull request's
/project/internal/agentrun/clone.go:46:func clonePRHead(ctx context.Context, cloneURL, token, defaultBranch, headRef string, index int64, dir string) error {
/project/internal/agentrun/clone.go:47: args := append(gitAuthArgs(token), "clone", "--branch", defaultBranch, "--single-branch", cloneURL, dir)
/project/internal/agentrun/clone.go:48: if out, err := runGit(ctx, "", args...); err != nil {
/project/internal/agentrun/clone.go:52: fetchArgs := append(gitAuthArgs(token), "fetch", "--no-tags", "origin", fmt.Sprintf("refs/pull/%d/head", index))
/project/internal/agentrun/clone.go:53: if out, err := runGit(ctx, dir, fetchArgs...); err != nil {
/project/internal/agentrun/clone.go:57: if out, err := runGit(ctx, dir, "checkout", "-B", headRef, "FETCH_HEAD"); err != nil {
/project/internal/agentrun/clone.go:64:// runGit runs a git subcommand on the host (not inside any container)
/project/internal/agentrun/clone.go:66:func runGit(ctx context.Context, dir string, args ...string) (string, error) {
/project/internal/agentrun/clone.go:77:// runGitAuthed is runGit with token attached via gitAuthArgs, for the
/project/internal/agentrun/clone.go:79:func runGitAuthed(ctx context.Context, dir, token string, args ...string) (string, error) {
/project/internal/agentrun/clone.go:80: return runGit(ctx, dir, append(gitAuthArgs(token), args...)...)
/project/internal/agentrun/docker_integration_test.go:57: projectDir := t.TempDir()
/project/internal/agentrun/docker_integration_test.go:60: {"init", "-q", projectDir},
/project/internal/agentrun/docker_integration_test.go:61: {"-C", projectDir, "commit", "-q", "--allow-empty", "-m", "init"},
/project/internal/agentrun/docker_integration_test.go:76: containerID, err := rt.createContainer(ctx, "golang:latest", []string{projectDir + ":/project"}, "zoo-test-git")
/project/internal/agentrun/run.go:127: projectDir := filepath.Join(workDir, "project")
/project/internal/agentrun/run.go:152: if err := clonePRHead(ctx, repoInfo.CloneURL, r.forgejo.Token(), repoInfo.DefaultBranch, headRef, ev.Index, projectDir); err != nil {
/project/internal/agentrun/run.go:169: if err := cloneAndBranch(ctx, repoInfo.CloneURL, r.forgejo.Token(), repoInfo.DefaultBranch, branch, projectDir); err != nil {
/project/internal/agentrun/run.go:178: // projectDir/.git/config: the one place both this host-side clone
/project/internal/agentrun/run.go:181: if out, err := runGit(ctx, projectDir, "config", "user.name", gitName); err != nil {
/project/internal/agentrun/run.go:184: if out, err := runGit(ctx, projectDir, "config", "user.email", gitEmail); err != nil {
/project/internal/agentrun/run.go:194: projectDir + ":/project",
/project/internal/agentrun/run.go:234: projectDir: projectDir,
Tool
π§ read_file
{"path": "internal/agentrun/seed_test.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 60}
Arguments
{"path": "internal/agentrun/seed_test.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 60}
Result
{"path":"internal/agentrun/seed_test.go","content":"package agentrun\r\n\r\nimport (\r\n\t\"strings\"\r\n\t\"testing\"\r\n\t\"time\"\r\n\r\n\t\"github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/forgejo\"\r\n)\r\n\r\nfunc TestSeedMessageIncludesInstructions(t *testing.T) {\r\n\tev := forgejo.Event{Kind: \"issue:comment\", Owner: \"acme\", Repo: \"widgets\", Index: 5, Title: \"t\", Body: \"b\", Raw: []byte(`{}`)}\r\n\r\n\tmsg := seedMessage(ev, \"issue-5-leon\", \"main\", \"Please review the comment and respond appropriately.\", nil, nil)\r\n\r\n\tif !strings.Contains(msg, \"Instructions for this event, from zoo.hcl:\\nPlease review the comment and respond appropriately.\") {\r\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"expected instructions section, got: %s\", msg)\r\n\t}\r\n}\r\n\r\nfunc TestSeedMessageOmitsEmptyInstructions(t *testing.T) {\r\n\tev := forgejo.Event{Kind: \"pr:new\", Owner: \"acme\", Repo: \"widgets\", Index: 9, Raw: []byte(`{}`)}\r\n\r\n\tmsg := seedMessage(ev, \"issue-9-greg\", \"main\", \"\", nil, nil)\r\n\r\n\tif strings.Contains(msg, \"Instructions for this event\") {\r\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"expected no instructions section, got: %s\", msg)\r\n\t}\r\n}\r\n\r\nfunc TestSeedMessageIncludesAllComments(t *testing.T) {\r\n\tev := forgejo.Event{Kind: \"issue:assigned\", Owner: \"acme\", Repo: \"widgets\", Index: 5, Title: \"t\", Body: \"b\", Raw: []byte(`{}`)}\r\n\r\n\tcomments := []forgejo.IssueComment{\r\n\t\t{Author: \"alice\", Body: \"Please also handle the edge case.\", Created: time.Date(2026, 8, 24, 9, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)},\r\n\t\t{Author: \"bob\", Body: \"And add a test for it.\", Created: time.Date(2026, 8, 24, 9, 5, 0, 0, time.UTC)},\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tmsg := seedMessage(ev, \"issue-5-greg\", \"main\", \"\", comments, nil)\r\n\r\n\tfor _, want := range []string{\r\n\t\t\"Comments (2):\",\r\n\t\t\"1. alice (2026-08-24T09:00:00Z):\\nPlease also handle the edge case.\",\r\n\t\t\"2. bob (2026-08-24T09:05:00Z):\\nAnd add a test for it.\",\r\n\t} {\r\n\t\tif !strings.Contains(msg, want) {\r\n\t\t\tt.Fatalf(\"expected %q in seed message, got:\\n%s\", want, msg)\r\n\t\t}\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\t// Comments come before the raw payload, so the agent reads them\r\n\t// as part of the briefing, not buried in JSON.\r\n\tif !strings.Contains(msg, \"Comments (2):\") ||\r\n\t\tstrings.Index(msg, \"Comments (2):\") \u003e strings.Index(msg, \"Full event payload:\") {\r\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"expected comments section before the raw payload, got:\\n%s\", msg)\r\n\t}\r\n}\r\n\r\nfunc TestSeedMessageOmitsEmptyComments(t *testing.T) {\r\n\tev := forgejo.Event{Kind: \"issue:new\", Owner: \"acme\", Repo: \"widgets\", Index: 5, Title: \"t\", Body: \"b\", Raw: []byte(`{}`)}\r","start_line":1,"end_line":60,"total_lines":128,"truncated":true}
Thinking
I've grasped the overall picture. Now I'll implement it.
**Files to change:**
1. `internal/agentrun/clone.go` β rename to `sandboxgit.go`, rewrite: shellQuote, shellGitCmd, runSandboxGit, gitAuthHeader, configureSandboxGit, cloneAndBranch, clonePRHead.
2. `internal/agentrun/run.go` β restructure the Run() flow.
3. `internal/agentrun/context.go` β Git runs inside the container, remove the token/projectDir fields.
4. `internal/tools/context.go` β update doc comments.
5. `internal/tools/git.go` β update doc comments.
6. `internal/agentrun/system.md` β update the Git section.
7. `internal/agentrun/sandboxgit_test.go` β new unit tests.
8. `internal/agentrun/docker_integration_test.go` β add sandbox git integration tests.
Alright, I'll write the new sandboxgit.go.
I have the full picture. Now I'll implement. The design:
1. **Clone inside the sandbox** β the container clones `/project` itself (via `docker exec`), so the repo is owned by the container's user and no host-side git is needed.
2. **Pass the agent token to the sandbox** β write it into the container's *system* gitconfig (`/etc/gitconfig`) as `http.<cloneURL>.extraHeader = Authorization: Basic β¦`, scoped to the run's repo URL. This makes `git pull`/`push`/`fetch` just work with zero per-invocation plumbing, and keeps the token out of the bind-mounted working tree (which is kept on failure and visible to the host).
3. **`git` tool runs in the sandbox** β `runContext.Git` becomes a `docker exec git β¦` with shell-quoted args.
Tool
π§ bash
{"command": "cd /project && git mv internal/agentrun/clone.go internal/agentrun/sandboxgit.go"}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /project && git mv internal/agentrun/clone.go internal/agentrun/sandboxgit.go"}
Result
Thinking
Alright, let's write the new sandboxgit.go.
Tool
π§ write_file
{"path": "internal/agentrun/sandboxgit.go", "content": "package agentrun\n\nimport (\n\t\"context\"\n\t\"encoding/base64\"\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"strings\"\n)\n\n// This file makes git \"just work\" inside the agent's container: the\n// initial clone happens in the sandbox, and the sandbox's git\n// credential is written to the container's system gitconfig so every\n// subsequent remote operation (pull, fetch, push, ...) authenticates\n// without any per-invocation plumbing. Zoo itself never runs git\n// outside the sandbox.\n\n// shellQuote wraps s in single quotes for safe interpolation into a\n// `sh -c` command string, escaping any embedded single quotes.\nfunc shellQuote(s string) string {\n\treturn \"'\" + strings.ReplaceAll(s, \"'\", `'\\''`) + \"'\"\n}\n\n// shellGitCmd renders `git <args...>` as one sh -c command line with\n// every argument quoted, for docker exec.\nfunc shellGitCmd(args ...string) string {\n\tparts := make([]string, 0, len(args)+1)\n\tparts = append(parts, \"git\")\n\n\tfor _, a := range args {\n\t\tparts = append(parts, shellQuote(a))\n\t}\n\n\treturn strings.Join(parts, \" \")\n}\n\n// runSandboxGit runs `git <args...>` inside containerID (in its\n// working directory, /project) and returns its combined output. A\n// non-zero exit code is an error carrying the output.\nfunc runSandboxGit(ctx context.Context, rt *dockerRuntime, containerID string, args ...string) (string, error) {\n\tout, exitCode, err := rt.exec(ctx, containerID, shellGitCmd(args...))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn out, err\n\t}\n\n\tif exitCode != 0 {\n\t\treturn out, fmt.Errorf(\"git %s: exit %d: %s\", args[0], exitCode, out)\n\t}\n\n\treturn out, nil\n}\n\n// gitAuthHeader returns the value of an Authorization header that\n// authenticates git's smart-HTTP requests as user with token.\nfunc gitAuthHeader(user, token string) string {\n\tauth := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(user + \":\" + token))\n\n\treturn \"Authorization: Basic \" + auth\n}\n\n// configureSandboxGit writes the container's system gitconfig so git\n// works inside the sandbox without further setup:\n//\n// - safe.directory '*', so the bind-mounted /project is accepted\n// regardless of which UID the container runs git as;\n// - user.name / user.email, so commits are attributed to the agent;\n// - http.<cloneURL>.extraHeader carrying the run's Forgejo\n// credential, scoped to this repository's URL, so clone/fetch/\n// pull/push all authenticate transparently.\n//\n// The credential lives in the container's own filesystem (ephemeral,\n// torn down with the container), never in the bind-mounted working\n// tree: the origin remote keeps the plain cloneURL, so the token can't\n// leak into the repo's .git/config, into a work dir zoo keeps on\n// failure, or anywhere the host can read it back.\nfunc configureSandboxGit(ctx context.Context, rt *dockerRuntime, containerID, cloneURL, user, token, name, email string) error {\n\tif _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"config\", \"--system\", \"--add\", \"safe.directory\", \"*\"); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure safe.directory: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tif _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"config\", \"--system\", \"user.name\", name); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure user.name: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tif _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"config\", \"--system\", \"user.email\", email); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure user.email: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tif _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"config\", \"--system\", \"http.\"+cloneURL+\".extraHeader\", gitAuthHeader(user, token)); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure git credential: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}\n\n// cloneAndBranch clones cloneURL into /project inside the container\n// and checks out a fresh branch off defaultBranch. The clone\n// authenticates via the http.<cloneURL>.extraHeader configured by\n// configureSandboxGit, and the origin remote is left with the plain\n// cloneURL: no credential ends up in the working tree.\nfunc cloneAndBranch(ctx context.Context, rt *dockerRuntime, containerID, cloneURL, defaultBranch, branch string) error {\n\tif _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"clone\", \"--branch\", defaultBranch, \"--single-branch\", cloneURL, \"/project\"); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"clone: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tif _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"checkout\", \"-b\", branch); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"checkout branch %q: %w\", branch, err)\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}\n\n// clonePRHead clones cloneURL into /project inside the container and\n// checks out the pull request's head as a local branch named headRef,\n// so commits the agent makes push straight to the PR. The head is\n// fetched via the PR's refs/pull/<n>/head ref rather than by branch\n// name, which also works for PRs opened from a fork, where the head\n// branch doesn't exist in the base repo.\nfunc clonePRHead(ctx context.Context, rt *dockerRuntime, containerID, cloneURL, defaultBranch, headRef string, index int64) error {\n\tif _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"clone\", \"--branch\", defaultBranch, \"--single-branch\", cloneURL, \"/project\"); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"clone: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tfetchRef := fmt.Sprintf(\"refs/pull/%d/head\", index)\n\n\tif _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"fetch\", \"--no-tags\", \"origin\", fetchRef); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"fetch PR %d head: %w\", index, err)\n\t}\n\n\tif _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"checkout\", \"-B\", headRef, \"FETCH_HEAD\"); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"checkout PR head %q: %w\", headRef, err)\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}\n"}
Arguments
{"path": "internal/agentrun/sandboxgit.go", "content": "package agentrun\n\nimport (\n\t\"context\"\n\t\"encoding/base64\"\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"strings\"\n)\n\n// This file makes git \"just work\" inside the agent's container: the\n// initial clone happens in the sandbox, and the sandbox's git\n// credential is written to the container's system gitconfig so every\n// subsequent remote operation (pull, fetch, push, ...) authenticates\n// without any per-invocation plumbing. Zoo itself never runs git\n// outside the sandbox.\n\n// shellQuote wraps s in single quotes for safe interpolation into a\n// `sh -c` command string, escaping any embedded single quotes.\nfunc shellQuote(s string) string {\n\treturn \"'\" + strings.ReplaceAll(s, \"'\", `'\\''`) + \"'\"\n}\n\n// shellGitCmd renders `git <args...>` as one sh -c command line with\n// every argument quoted, for docker exec.\nfunc shellGitCmd(args ...string) string {\n\tparts := make([]string, 0, len(args)+1)\n\tparts = append(parts, \"git\")\n\n\tfor _, a := range args {\n\t\tparts = append(parts, shellQuote(a))\n\t}\n\n\treturn strings.Join(parts, \" \")\n}\n\n// runSandboxGit runs `git <args...>` inside containerID (in its\n// working directory, /project) and returns its combined output. A\n// non-zero exit code is an error carrying the output.\nfunc runSandboxGit(ctx context.Context, rt *dockerRuntime, containerID string, args ...string) (string, error) {\n\tout, exitCode, err := rt.exec(ctx, containerID, shellGitCmd(args...))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn out, err\n\t}\n\n\tif exitCode != 0 {\n\t\treturn out, fmt.Errorf(\"git %s: exit %d: %s\", args[0], exitCode, out)\n\t}\n\n\treturn out, nil\n}\n\n// gitAuthHeader returns the value of an Authorization header that\n// authenticates git's smart-HTTP requests as user with token.\nfunc gitAuthHeader(user, token string) string {\n\tauth := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(user + \":\" + token))\n\n\treturn \"Authorization: Basic \" + auth\n}\n\n// configureSandboxGit writes the container's system gitconfig so git\n// works inside the sandbox without further setup:\n//\n// - safe.directory '*', so the bind-mounted /project is accepted\n// regardless of which UID the container runs git as;\n// - user.name / user.email, so commits are attributed to the agent;\n// - http.<cloneURL>.extraHeader carrying the run's Forgejo\n// credential, scoped to this repository's URL, so clone/fetch/\n// pull/push all authenticate transparently.\n//\n// The credential lives in the container's own filesystem (ephemeral,\n// torn down with the container), never in the bind-mounted working\n// tree: the origin remote keeps the plain cloneURL, so the token can't\n// leak into the repo's .git/config, into a work dir zoo keeps on\n// failure, or anywhere the host can read it back.\nfunc configureSandboxGit(ctx context.Context, rt *dockerRuntime, containerID, cloneURL, user, token, name, email string) error {\n\tif _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"config\", \"--system\", \"--add\", \"safe.directory\", \"*\"); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure safe.directory: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tif _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"config\", \"--system\", \"user.name\", name); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure user.name: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tif _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"config\", \"--system\", \"user.email\", email); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure user.email: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tif _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"config\", \"--system\", \"http.\"+cloneURL+\".extraHeader\", gitAuthHeader(user, token)); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure git credential: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}\n\n// cloneAndBranch clones cloneURL into /project inside the container\n// and checks out a fresh branch off defaultBranch. The clone\n// authenticates via the http.<cloneURL>.extraHeader configured by\n// configureSandboxGit, and the origin remote is left with the plain\n// cloneURL: no credential ends up in the working tree.\nfunc cloneAndBranch(ctx context.Context, rt *dockerRuntime, containerID, cloneURL, defaultBranch, branch string) error {\n\tif _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"clone\", \"--branch\", defaultBranch, \"--single-branch\", cloneURL, \"/project\"); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"clone: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tif _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"checkout\", \"-b\", branch); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"checkout branch %q: %w\", branch, err)\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}\n\n// clonePRHead clones cloneURL into /project inside the container and\n// checks out the pull request's head as a local branch named headRef,\n// so commits the agent makes push straight to the PR. The head is\n// fetched via the PR's refs/pull/<n>/head ref rather than by branch\n// name, which also works for PRs opened from a fork, where the head\n// branch doesn't exist in the base repo.\nfunc clonePRHead(ctx context.Context, rt *dockerRuntime, containerID, cloneURL, defaultBranch, headRef string, index int64) error {\n\tif _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"clone\", \"--branch\", defaultBranch, \"--single-branch\", cloneURL, \"/project\"); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"clone: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tfetchRef := fmt.Sprintf(\"refs/pull/%d/head\", index)\n\n\tif _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"fetch\", \"--no-tags\", \"origin\", fetchRef); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"fetch PR %d head: %w\", index, err)\n\t}\n\n\tif _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"checkout\", \"-B\", headRef, \"FETCH_HEAD\"); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"checkout PR head %q: %w\", headRef, err)\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}\n"}
Result
OK
Thinking
Next, I'll update `context.go` (agentrun) β remove the `token` and `projectDir` fields, and make Git run inside the container.
Now update `internal/agentrun/context.go`:
Tool
π§ write_file
{"content": "package agentrun\n\nimport (\n\t\"context\"\n\t\"fmt\"\n\n\t\"github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/tools\"\n)\n\n// runContext implements tools.Context for a single agent run, executing\n// both shell commands and git commands via docker exec against the\n// run's container, and binding Forgejo actions to the triggering\n// issue/PR.\ntype runContext struct {\n\tdocker *dockerRuntime\n\tcontainerID string\n\tforgejo tools.ForgejoActions\n}\n\nfunc (c *runContext) Exec(ctx context.Context, command string) (string, error) {\n\toutput, exitCode, err := c.docker.exec(ctx, c.containerID, command)\n\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn output, err\n\t}\n\n\tif exitCode != 0 {\n\t\treturn output, fmt.Errorf(\"command exited with status %d\", exitCode)\n\t}\n\n\treturn output, nil\n}\n\n// Git implements tools.Context.Git by running git inside the run's\n// container, in its /project working directory. Remote operations\n// (fetch, pull, push, ...) authenticate via the http.<url>.extraHeader\n// credential configureSandboxGit wrote to the container's system\n// gitconfig, so no per-invocation credential plumbing is needed.\nfunc (c *runContext) Git(ctx context.Context, subcommand string, args ...string) (string, error) {\n\tcmdArgs := append([]string{subcommand}, args...)\n\n\treturn c.Exec(ctx, shellGitCmd(cmdArgs...))\n}\n\nfunc (c *runContext) Forgejo() tools.ForgejoActions {\n\treturn c.forgejo\n}\n", "path": "internal/agentrun/context.go"}
Arguments
{"content": "package agentrun\n\nimport (\n\t\"context\"\n\t\"fmt\"\n\n\t\"github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/tools\"\n)\n\n// runContext implements tools.Context for a single agent run, executing\n// both shell commands and git commands via docker exec against the\n// run's container, and binding Forgejo actions to the triggering\n// issue/PR.\ntype runContext struct {\n\tdocker *dockerRuntime\n\tcontainerID string\n\tforgejo tools.ForgejoActions\n}\n\nfunc (c *runContext) Exec(ctx context.Context, command string) (string, error) {\n\toutput, exitCode, err := c.docker.exec(ctx, c.containerID, command)\n\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn output, err\n\t}\n\n\tif exitCode != 0 {\n\t\treturn output, fmt.Errorf(\"command exited with status %d\", exitCode)\n\t}\n\n\treturn output, nil\n}\n\n// Git implements tools.Context.Git by running git inside the run's\n// container, in its /project working directory. Remote operations\n// (fetch, pull, push, ...) authenticate via the http.<url>.extraHeader\n// credential configureSandboxGit wrote to the container's system\n// gitconfig, so no per-invocation credential plumbing is needed.\nfunc (c *runContext) Git(ctx context.Context, subcommand string, args ...string) (string, error) {\n\tcmdArgs := append([]string{subcommand}, args...)\n\n\treturn c.Exec(ctx, shellGitCmd(cmdArgs...))\n}\n\nfunc (c *runContext) Forgejo() tools.ForgejoActions {\n\treturn c.forgejo\n}\n", "path": "internal/agentrun/context.go"}
Result
OK
Thinking
Next, I'll update `run.go`. I'll restructure the Run() function. To make precise edits, I'll re-read the relevant section (lines 100β250).
Now the main restructure in `run.go`:
Tool
π§ read_file
{"end_line": 250, "path": "internal/agentrun/run.go", "start_line": 100}
Arguments
{"end_line": 250, "path": "internal/agentrun/run.go", "start_line": 100}
Result
{"path":"internal/agentrun/run.go","content":"// Run implements scheduler.Runner.\r\nfunc (r *Runner) Run(ctx context.Context, jobID string, agent config.AgentConfig, llmCfg config.LLM, dockerImage string, ev forgejo.Event) error {\r\n\tctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, r.timeout)\r\n\tdefer cancel()\r\n\r\n\tlogger := r.logger.With(\"job\", jobID, \"agent\", agent.Name)\r\n\r\n\trepoInfo, err := r.forgejo.RepositoryInfo(ev.Owner, ev.Repo)\r\n\tif err != nil {\r\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"look up repository: %w\", err)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tworkDir, err := os.MkdirTemp(\"\", \"zoo-run-*\")\r\n\tif err != nil {\r\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"create work dir: %w\", err)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tsucceeded := false\r\n\r\n\tdefer func() {\r\n\t\tif succeeded || !r.keepOnFailure {\r\n\t\t\tos.RemoveAll(workDir)\r\n\t\t} else {\r\n\t\t\tlogger.Warn(\"keeping work dir after failure\", \"dir\", workDir)\r\n\t\t}\r\n\t}()\r\n\r\n\tprojectDir := filepath.Join(workDir, \"project\")\r\n\r\n\t// A pr:review run works on the PR's own head branch, so the agent's\r\n\t// commits push straight to the PR. Every other event kind branches\r\n\t// off the default branch as usual.\r\n\tvar review *forgejo.ReviewDetail\r\n\tbranch := fmt.Sprintf(\"issue-%d-%s\", ev.Index, agent.Name)\r\n\r\n\tif ev.Kind == forgejo.EventPRReview {\r\n\t\t// Always fetch the current head ref, not just when the event\r\n\t\t// lacks one (the polling path doesn't carry it): the webhook's\r\n\t\t// copy could be stale if the PR's head branch was renamed since\r\n\t\t// the review, and the push target depends on it.\r\n\t\theadRef := ev.HeadRef\r\n\r\n\t\tif prInfo, err := r.forgejo.PullRequestInfo(ev.Owner, ev.Repo, ev.Index); err != nil {\r\n\t\t\tlogger.Warn(\"fetch pull request head failed; falling back to the event's head ref\", \"error\", err)\r\n\t\t} else if prInfo.HeadRef != \"\" {\r\n\t\t\theadRef = prInfo.HeadRef\r\n\t\t}\r\n\r\n\t\tif headRef == \"\" {\r\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"pr:review event has no pull request head branch to check out\")\r\n\t\t}\r\n\r\n\t\tif err := clonePRHead(ctx, repoInfo.CloneURL, r.forgejo.Token(), repoInfo.DefaultBranch, headRef, ev.Index, projectDir); err != nil {\r\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"prepare git working tree: %w\", err)\r\n\t\t}\r\n\r\n\t\tbranch = headRef\r\n\r\n\t\t// Fetch the full review (verdict, body, inline comments) so the\r\n\t\t// agent sees all the feedback, not just the triggering event. A\r\n\t\t// failure degrades to no review detail rather than failing the\r\n\t\t// run: the agent can still do its job, just without the inline\r\n\t\t// comments.\r\n\t\treview, err = r.forgejo.ReviewDetail(ev.Owner, ev.Repo, ev.Index, ev.ReviewID)\r\n\t\tif err != nil {\r\n\t\t\tlogger.Warn(\"fetch review detail failed; agent will not see inline review comments\", \"error\", err)\r\n\t\t\treview = nil\r\n\t\t}\r\n\t} else {\r\n\t\tif err := cloneAndBranch(ctx, repoInfo.CloneURL, r.forgejo.Token(), repoInfo.DefaultBranch, branch, projectDir); err != nil {\r\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"prepare git working tree: %w\", err)\r\n\t\t}\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\troster := buildRoster(r.forgejo, r.cfg.Agents, logger)\r\n\tgitName, gitEmail := gitIdentity(agent.Name, roster)\r\n\r\n\t// Local (not --global) scope, so this identity lives in\r\n\t// projectDir/.git/config: the one place both this host-side clone\r\n\t// and the container it's bind-mounted into (as /project) actually\r\n\t// share.\r\n\tif out, err := runGit(ctx, projectDir, \"config\", \"user.name\", gitName); err != nil {\r\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure git user.name: %w: %s\", err, out)\r\n\t}\r\n\tif out, err := runGit(ctx, projectDir, \"config\", \"user.email\", gitEmail); err != nil {\r\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure git user.email: %w: %s\", err, out)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\teventPath := filepath.Join(workDir, \"event.json\")\r\n\tif err := os.WriteFile(eventPath, ev.Raw, 0o644); err != nil {\r\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"write event file: %w\", err)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tcontainerID, err := r.docker.createContainer(ctx, dockerImage, []string{\r\n\t\tprojectDir + \":/project\",\r\n\t\teventPath + \":/event:ro\",\r\n\t}, fmt.Sprintf(\"zoo-issue-%d-%s\", ev.Index, agent.Name))\r\n\tif err != nil {\r\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"start container: %w\", err)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tdefer func() {\r\n\t\tcleanupCtx, cleanupCancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 30*time.Second)\r\n\t\tdefer cleanupCancel()\r\n\t\tif err := r.docker.remove(cleanupCtx, containerID); err != nil {\r\n\t\t\tlogger.Warn(\"failed to remove container\", \"container\", containerID, \"error\", err)\r\n\t\t}\r\n\t}()\r\n\r\n\t// /project is bind-mounted from the host, so it's owned by the host\r\n\t// UID that ran the clone, not whatever UID runs inside the\r\n\t// container (usually root) β git's ownership check rejects that by\r\n\t// default (\"detected dubious ownership\") unless told otherwise.\r\n\t// --system (not --global) so this holds regardless of which user\r\n\t// subsequent `docker exec` calls run as. Commit identity is\r\n\t// configured host-side, above, with --local scope so it's visible\r\n\t// from both sides of the bind mount without needing --global here.\r\n\tout, exitCode, err := r.docker.exec(ctx, containerID, \"git config --system --add safe.directory '*'\")\r\n\tif err != nil {\r\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure git safe.directory in container: %w: %s\", err, out)\r\n\t}\r\n\tif exitCode != 0 {\r\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure git safe.directory in container: exit %d: %s\", exitCode, out)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tlogAppend := func(stream, line string) {\r\n\t\tif err := r.store.AppendLog(context.Background(), jobID, stream, line); err != nil {\r\n\t\t\tlogger.Warn(\"failed to append log\", \"error\", err)\r\n\t\t}\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\trunCtx := \u0026runContext{\r\n\t\tdocker: r.docker,\r\n\t\tcontainerID: containerID,\r\n\t\tprojectDir: projectDir,\r\n\t\ttoken: r.forgejo.Token(),\r\n\t\tforgejo: \u0026runForgejoActions{\r\n\t\t\tclient: r.forgejoAs(agent.Name, agent.Token),\r\n\t\t\towner: ev.Owner,\r\n\t\t\trepo: ev.Repo,\r\n\t\t\tindex: ev.Index,\r\n\t\t\tlogger: logger,\r\n\t\t},\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tllmClient := llm.NewClient(llmCfg)\r\n\r\n\tsystemPrompt := defaultSystemPrompt + identitySection(agent.Name, roster)\r\n\r\n\tinstructions := r.cfg.EventInstructions(ev.Kind)\r\n\r","start_line":100,"end_line":250,"total_lines":435,"truncated":true}
Thinking
Now, let's replace the entire section from `projectDir := filepath.Join(workDir, "project")` up to the safe.directory exec block with the new flow. I'll do it with a few targeted edits.
Edit 1: Replace the block from `projectDir := ...` to the end of the else branch (clone), and the git identity configuration, with the new ordering:
- MkdirAll projectDir
- pr:review head ref resolution (no clone)
- roster + gitIdentity
- git credential (agent token or shared)
- event file
- container creation
- container removal defer
- configureSandboxGit
- in-container clone
Let me carefully write the replacement for lines 127β215 (from `projectDir := filepath.Join(workDir, "project")` to the end of the safe.directory check).
Original text (from the read above):
```go
projectDir := filepath.Join(workDir, "project")
// A pr:review run works on the PR's own head branch, so the agent's
// commits push straight to the PR. Every other event kind branches
// off the default branch as usual.
var review *forgejo.ReviewDetail
branch := fmt.Sprintf("issue-%d-%s", ev.Index, agent.Name)
if ev.Kind == forgejo.EventPRReview {
// Always fetch the current head ref, not just when the event
// lacks one (the polling path doesn't carry it): the webhook's
// copy could be stale if the PR's head branch was renamed since
// the review, and the push target depends on it.
headRef := ev.HeadRef
if prInfo, err := r.forgejo.PullRequestInfo(ev.Owner, ev.Repo, ev.Index); err != nil {
logger.Warn("fetch pull request head failed; falling back to the event's head ref", "error", err)
} else if prInfo.HeadRef != "" {
headRef = prInfo.HeadRef
}
if headRef == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("pr:review event has no pull request head branch to check out")
}
if err := clonePRHead(ctx, repoInfo.CloneURL, r.forgejo.Token(), repoInfo.DefaultBranch, headRef, ev.Index, projectDir); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("prepare git working tree: %w", err)
}
branch = headRef
// Fetch the full review (verdict, body, inline comments) so the
// agent sees all the feedback, not just the triggering event. A
// failure degrades to no review detail rather than failing the
// run: the agent can still do its job, just without the inline
// comments.
review, err = r.forgejo.ReviewDetail(ev.Owner, ev.Repo, ev.Index, ev.ReviewID)
if err != nil {
logger.Warn("fetch review detail failed; agent will not see inline review comments", "error", err)
review = nil
}
} else {
if err := cloneAndBranch(ctx, repoInfo.CloneURL, r.forgejo.Token(), repoInfo.DefaultBranch, branch, projectDir); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("prepare git working tree: %w", err)
}
}
roster := buildRoster(r.forgejo, r.cfg.Agents, logger)
gitName, gitEmail := gitIdentity(agent.Name, roster)
// Local (not --global) scope, so this identity lives in
// projectDir/.git/config: the one place both this host-side clone
// and the container it's bind-mounted into (as /project) actually
// share.
if out, err := runGit(ctx, projectDir, "config", "user.name", gitName); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("configure git user.name: %w: %s", err, out)
}
if out, err := runGit(ctx, projectDir, "config", "user.email", gitEmail); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("configure git user.email: %w: %s", err, out)
}
eventPath := filepath.Join(workDir, "event.json")
if err := os.WriteFile(eventPath, ev.Raw, 0o644); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("write event file: %w", err)
}
containerID, err := r.docker.createContainer(ctx, dockerImage, []string{
projectDir + ":/project",
eventPath + ":/event:ro",
}, fmt.Sprintf("zoo-issue-%d-%s", ev.Index, agent.Name))
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("start container: %w", err)
}
defer func() {
cleanupCtx, cleanupCancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 30*time.Second)
defer cleanupCancel()
if err := r.docker.remove(cleanupCtx, containerID); err != nil {
logger.Warn("failed to remove container", "container", containerID, "error", err)
}
}()
// /project is bind-mounted from the host, so it's owned by the host
// UID that ran the clone, not whatever UID runs inside the
// container (usually root) β git's ownership check rejects that by
// default ("detected dubious ownership") unless told otherwise.
// --system (not --global) so this holds regardless of which user
// subsequent `docker exec` calls run as. Commit identity is
// configured host-side, above, with --local scope so it's visible
// from both sides of the bind mount without needing --global here.
out, exitCode, err := r.docker.exec(ctx, containerID, "git config --system --add safe.directory '*'")
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("configure git safe.directory in container: %w: %s", err, out)
}
if exitCode != 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("configure git safe.directory in container: exit %d: %s", exitCode, out)
}
```
New text:
```go
// The container bind-mounts projectDir as /project and does the
// initial clone into it, so the (empty) directory must exist on the
// host before the container is created β otherwise Docker would
// create it itself, root-owned.
projectDir := filepath.Join(workDir, "project")
if err := os.MkdirAll(projectDir, 0o755); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("create project dir: %w", err)
}
// A pr:review run works on the PR's own head branch, so the agent's
// commits push straight to the PR. Every other event kind branches
// off the default branch as usual.
var review *forgejo.ReviewDetail
branch := fmt.Sprintf("issue-%d-%s", ev.Index, agent.Name)
if ev.Kind == forgejo.EventPRReview {
// Always fetch the current head ref, not just when the event
// lacks one (the polling path doesn't carry it): the webhook's
// copy could be stale if the PR's head branch was renamed since
// the review, and the push target depends on it.
headRef := ev.HeadRef
if prInfo, err := r.forgejo.PullRequestInfo(ev.Owner, ev.Repo, ev.Index); err != nil {
logger.Warn("fetch pull request head failed; falling back to the event's head ref", "error", err)
} else if prInfo.HeadRef != "" {
headRef = prInfo.HeadRef
}
if headRef == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("pr:review event has no pull request head branch to check out")
}
branch = headRef
// Fetch the full review (verdict, body, inline comments) so the
// agent sees all the feedback, not just the triggering event. A
// failure degrades to no review detail rather than failing the
// run: the agent can still do its job, just without the inline
// comments.
review, err = r.forgejo.ReviewDetail(ev.Owner, ev.Repo, ev.Index, ev.ReviewID)
if err != nil {
logger.Warn("fetch review detail failed; agent will not see inline review comments", "error", err)
review = nil
}
}
roster := buildRoster(r.forgejo, r.cfg.Agents, logger)
gitName, gitEmail := gitIdentity(agent.Name, roster)
// The credential the sandbox's git uses for remote operations: the
// agent's own Forgejo token when configured, so its git activity is
// attributed to its own account, falling back to the shared zoo
// identity for deployments without per-agent tokens (mirroring
// forgejoAs).
gitUser, gitToken := "zoo", r.forgejo.Token()
if agent.Token != "" {
gitUser, gitToken = agent.Name, agent.Token
}
eventPath := filepath.Join(workDir, "event.json")
if err := os.WriteFile(eventPath, ev.Raw, 0o644); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("write event file: %w", err)
}
containerID, err := r.docker.createContainer(ctx, dockerImage, []string{
projectDir + ":/project",
eventPath + ":/event:ro",
}, fmt.Sprintf("zoo-issue-%d-%s", ev.Index, agent.Name))
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("start container: %w", err)
}
defer func() {
cleanupCtx, cleanupCancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 30*time.Second)
defer cleanupCancel()
if err := r.docker.remove(cleanupCtx, containerID); err != nil {
logger.Warn("failed to remove container", "container", containerID, "error", err)
}
}()
// Git must simply work inside the sandbox: safe.directory, commit
// identity, and the remote credential all go into the container's
// system gitconfig (see configureSandboxGit).
if err := configureSandboxGit(ctx, r.docker, containerID, repoInfo.CloneURL, gitUser, gitToken, gitName, gitEmail); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("configure git in container: %w", err)
}
// The initial clone happens inside the sandbox, so the working tree
// is owned by the container's user and no git ever runs on the host.
if ev.Kind == forgejo.EventPRReview {
if err := clonePRHead(ctx, r.docker, containerID, repoInfo.CloneURL, repoInfo.DefaultBranch, branch, ev.Index); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("prepare git working tree: %w", err)
}
} else {
if err := cloneAndBranch(ctx, r.docker, containerID, repoInfo.CloneURL, repoInfo.DefaultBranch, branch); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("prepare git working tree: %w", err)
}
}
```
Wait a sec β in the pr:review case, `branch = headRef`, and clonePRHead takes headRef as its argument. So I can just pass `branch` directly. That's fine.
Also, I'll update the runContext construction to remove projectDir and token.
Furthermore, I'll update the package doc comment at the top of run.go: "a git clone + branch bind-mounted into a Docker container" β the clone now happens inside the container.
Alright, let's apply the edits.
Tool
π§ edit_file
{"path": "internal/agentrun/run.go", "find": "\tprojectDir := filepath.Join(workDir, \"project\")\n\n\t// A pr:review run works on the PR's own head branch, so the agent's\n\t// commits push straight to the PR. Every other event kind branches\n\t// off the default branch as usual.\n\tvar review *forgejo.ReviewDetail\n\tbranch := fmt.Sprintf(\"issue-%d-%s\", ev.Index, agent.Name)\n\n\tif ev.Kind == forgejo.EventPRReview {\n\t\t// Always fetch the current head ref, not just when the event\n\t\t// lacks one (the polling path doesn't carry it): the webhook's\n\t\t// copy could be stale if the PR's head branch was renamed since\n\t\t// the review, and the push target depends on it.\n\t\theadRef := ev.HeadRef\n\n\t\tif prInfo, err := r.forgejo.PullRequestInfo(ev.Owner, ev.Repo, ev.Index); err != nil {\n\t\t\tlogger.Warn(\"fetch pull request head failed; falling back to the event's head ref\", \"error\", err)\n\t\t} else if prInfo.HeadRef != \"\" {\n\t\t\theadRef = prInfo.HeadRef\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif headRef == \"\" {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"pr:review event has no pull request head branch to check out\")\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif err := clonePRHead(ctx, repoInfo.CloneURL, r.forgejo.Token(), repoInfo.DefaultBranch, headRef, ev.Index, projectDir); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"prepare git working tree: %w\", err)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tbranch = headRef\n\n\t\t// Fetch the full review (verdict, body, inline comments) so the\n\t\t// agent sees all the feedback, not just the triggering event. A\n\t\t// failure degrades to no review detail rather than failing the\n\t\t// run: the agent can still do its job, just without the inline\n\t\t// comments.\n\t\treview, err = r.forgejo.ReviewDetail(ev.Owner, ev.Repo, ev.Index, ev.ReviewID)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tlogger.Warn(\"fetch review detail failed; agent will not see inline review comments\", \"error\", err)\n\t\t\treview = nil\n\t\t}\n\t} else {\n\t\tif err := cloneAndBranch(ctx, repoInfo.CloneURL, r.forgejo.Token(), repoInfo.DefaultBranch, branch, projectDir); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"prepare git working tree: %w\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\troster := buildRoster(r.forgejo, r.cfg.Agents, logger)\n\tgitName, gitEmail := gitIdentity(agent.Name, roster)\n\n\t// Local (not --global) scope, so this identity lives in\n\t// projectDir/.git/config: the one place both this host-side clone\n\t// and the container it's bind-mounted into (as /project) actually\n\t// share.\n\tif out, err := runGit(ctx, projectDir, \"config\", \"user.name\", gitName); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure git user.name: %w: %s\", err, out)\n\t}\n\tif out, err := runGit(ctx, projectDir, \"config\", \"user.email\", gitEmail); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure git user.email: %w: %s\", err, out)\n\t}\n\n\teventPath := filepath.Join(workDir, \"event.json\")\n\tif err := os.WriteFile(eventPath, ev.Raw, 0o644); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"write event file: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tcontainerID, err := r.docker.createContainer(ctx, dockerImage, []string{\n\t\tprojectDir + \":/project\",\n\t\teventPath + \":/event:ro\",\n\t}, fmt.Sprintf(\"zoo-issue-%d-%s\", ev.Index, agent.Name))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"start container: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tdefer func() {\n\t\tcleanupCtx, cleanupCancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 30*time.Second)\n\t\tdefer cleanupCancel()\n\t\tif err := r.docker.remove(cleanupCtx, containerID); err != nil {\n\t\t\tlogger.Warn(\"failed to remove container\", \"container\", containerID, \"error\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t}()\n\n\t// /project is bind-mounted from the host, so it's owned by the host\n\t// UID that ran the clone, not whatever UID runs inside the\n\t// container (usually root) β git's ownership check rejects that by\n\t// default (\"detected dubious ownership\") unless told otherwise.\n\t// --system (not --global) so this holds regardless of which user\n\t// subsequent `docker exec` calls run as. Commit identity is\n\t// configured host-side, above, with --local scope so it's visible\n\t// from both sides of the bind mount without needing --global here.\n\tout, exitCode, err := r.docker.exec(ctx, containerID, \"git config --system --add safe.directory '*'\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure git safe.directory in container: %w: %s\", err, out)\n\t}\n\tif exitCode != 0 {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure git safe.directory in container: exit %d: %s\", exitCode, out)\n\t}", "replace": "\t// The container bind-mounts projectDir as /project and does the\n\t// initial clone into it, so the (empty) directory must exist on the\n\t// host before the container is created β otherwise Docker would\n\t// create it itself, root-owned.\n\tprojectDir := filepath.Join(workDir, \"project\")\n\n\tif err := os.MkdirAll(projectDir, 0o755); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"create project dir: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\t// A pr:review run works on the PR's own head branch, so the agent's\n\t// commits push straight to the PR. Every other event kind branches\n\t// off the default branch as usual.\n\tvar review *forgejo.ReviewDetail\n\tbranch := fmt.Sprintf(\"issue-%d-%s\", ev.Index, agent.Name)\n\n\tif ev.Kind == forgejo.EventPRReview {\n\t\t// Always fetch the current head ref, not just when the event\n\t\t// lacks one (the polling path doesn't carry it): the webhook's\n\t\t// copy could be stale if the PR's head branch was renamed since\n\t\t// the review, and the push target depends on it.\n\t\theadRef := ev.HeadRef\n\n\t\tif prInfo, err := r.forgejo.PullRequestInfo(ev.Owner, ev.Repo, ev.Index); err != nil {\n\t\t\tlogger.Warn(\"fetch pull request head failed; falling back to the event's head ref\", \"error\", err)\n\t\t} else if prInfo.HeadRef != \"\" {\n\t\t\theadRef = prInfo.HeadRef\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif headRef == \"\" {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"pr:review event has no pull request head branch to check out\")\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tbranch = headRef\n\n\t\t// Fetch the full review (verdict, body, inline comments) so the\n\t\t// agent sees all the feedback, not just the triggering event. A\n\t\t// failure degrades to no review detail rather than failing the\n\t\t// run: the agent can still do its job, just without the inline\n\t\t// comments.\n\t\treview, err = r.forgejo.ReviewDetail(ev.Owner, ev.Repo, ev.Index, ev.ReviewID)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tlogger.Warn(\"fetch review detail failed; agent will not see inline review comments\", \"error\", err)\n\t\t\treview = nil\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\troster := buildRoster(r.forgejo, r.cfg.Agents, logger)\n\tgitName, gitEmail := gitIdentity(agent.Name, roster)\n\n\t// The credential the sandbox's git uses for remote operations: the\n\t// agent's own Forgejo token when configured, so its git activity is\n\t// attributed to its own account, falling back to the shared zoo\n\t// identity for deployments without per-agent tokens (mirroring\n\t// forgejoAs).\n\tgitUser, gitToken := \"zoo\", r.forgejo.Token()\n\n\tif agent.Token != \"\" {\n\t\tgitUser, gitToken = agent.Name, agent.Token\n\t}\n\n\teventPath := filepath.Join(workDir, \"event.json\")\n\tif err := os.WriteFile(eventPath, ev.Raw, 0o644); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"write event file: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tcontainerID, err := r.docker.createContainer(ctx, dockerImage, []string{\n\t\tprojectDir + \":/project\",\n\t\teventPath + \":/event:ro\",\n\t}, fmt.Sprintf(\"zoo-issue-%d-%s\", ev.Index, agent.Name))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"start container: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tdefer func() {\n\t\tcleanupCtx, cleanupCancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 30*time.Second)\n\t\tdefer cleanupCancel()\n\t\tif err := r.docker.remove(cleanupCtx, containerID); err != nil {\n\t\t\tlogger.Warn(\"failed to remove container\", \"container\", containerID, \"error\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t}()\n\n\t// Git must simply work inside the sandbox: safe.directory, commit\n\t// identity, and the remote credential all go into the container's\n\t// system gitconfig (see configureSandboxGit).\n\tif err := configureSandboxGit(ctx, r.docker, containerID, repoInfo.CloneURL, gitUser, gitToken, gitName, gitEmail); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure git in container: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\t// The initial clone happens inside the sandbox, so the working tree\n\t// is owned by the container's user and git never runs on the host.\n\tif ev.Kind == forgejo.EventPRReview {\n\t\tif err := clonePRHead(ctx, r.docker, containerID, repoInfo.CloneURL, repoInfo.DefaultBranch, branch, ev.Index); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"prepare git working tree: %w\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t} else {\n\t\tif err := cloneAndBranch(ctx, r.docker, containerID, repoInfo.CloneURL, repoInfo.DefaultBranch, branch); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"prepare git working tree: %w\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t}"}
Arguments
{"path": "internal/agentrun/run.go", "find": "\tprojectDir := filepath.Join(workDir, \"project\")\n\n\t// A pr:review run works on the PR's own head branch, so the agent's\n\t// commits push straight to the PR. Every other event kind branches\n\t// off the default branch as usual.\n\tvar review *forgejo.ReviewDetail\n\tbranch := fmt.Sprintf(\"issue-%d-%s\", ev.Index, agent.Name)\n\n\tif ev.Kind == forgejo.EventPRReview {\n\t\t// Always fetch the current head ref, not just when the event\n\t\t// lacks one (the polling path doesn't carry it): the webhook's\n\t\t// copy could be stale if the PR's head branch was renamed since\n\t\t// the review, and the push target depends on it.\n\t\theadRef := ev.HeadRef\n\n\t\tif prInfo, err := r.forgejo.PullRequestInfo(ev.Owner, ev.Repo, ev.Index); err != nil {\n\t\t\tlogger.Warn(\"fetch pull request head failed; falling back to the event's head ref\", \"error\", err)\n\t\t} else if prInfo.HeadRef != \"\" {\n\t\t\theadRef = prInfo.HeadRef\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif headRef == \"\" {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"pr:review event has no pull request head branch to check out\")\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif err := clonePRHead(ctx, repoInfo.CloneURL, r.forgejo.Token(), repoInfo.DefaultBranch, headRef, ev.Index, projectDir); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"prepare git working tree: %w\", err)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tbranch = headRef\n\n\t\t// Fetch the full review (verdict, body, inline comments) so the\n\t\t// agent sees all the feedback, not just the triggering event. A\n\t\t// failure degrades to no review detail rather than failing the\n\t\t// run: the agent can still do its job, just without the inline\n\t\t// comments.\n\t\treview, err = r.forgejo.ReviewDetail(ev.Owner, ev.Repo, ev.Index, ev.ReviewID)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tlogger.Warn(\"fetch review detail failed; agent will not see inline review comments\", \"error\", err)\n\t\t\treview = nil\n\t\t}\n\t} else {\n\t\tif err := cloneAndBranch(ctx, repoInfo.CloneURL, r.forgejo.Token(), repoInfo.DefaultBranch, branch, projectDir); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"prepare git working tree: %w\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\troster := buildRoster(r.forgejo, r.cfg.Agents, logger)\n\tgitName, gitEmail := gitIdentity(agent.Name, roster)\n\n\t// Local (not --global) scope, so this identity lives in\n\t// projectDir/.git/config: the one place both this host-side clone\n\t// and the container it's bind-mounted into (as /project) actually\n\t// share.\n\tif out, err := runGit(ctx, projectDir, \"config\", \"user.name\", gitName); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure git user.name: %w: %s\", err, out)\n\t}\n\tif out, err := runGit(ctx, projectDir, \"config\", \"user.email\", gitEmail); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure git user.email: %w: %s\", err, out)\n\t}\n\n\teventPath := filepath.Join(workDir, \"event.json\")\n\tif err := os.WriteFile(eventPath, ev.Raw, 0o644); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"write event file: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tcontainerID, err := r.docker.createContainer(ctx, dockerImage, []string{\n\t\tprojectDir + \":/project\",\n\t\teventPath + \":/event:ro\",\n\t}, fmt.Sprintf(\"zoo-issue-%d-%s\", ev.Index, agent.Name))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"start container: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tdefer func() {\n\t\tcleanupCtx, cleanupCancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 30*time.Second)\n\t\tdefer cleanupCancel()\n\t\tif err := r.docker.remove(cleanupCtx, containerID); err != nil {\n\t\t\tlogger.Warn(\"failed to remove container\", \"container\", containerID, \"error\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t}()\n\n\t// /project is bind-mounted from the host, so it's owned by the host\n\t// UID that ran the clone, not whatever UID runs inside the\n\t// container (usually root) β git's ownership check rejects that by\n\t// default (\"detected dubious ownership\") unless told otherwise.\n\t// --system (not --global) so this holds regardless of which user\n\t// subsequent `docker exec` calls run as. Commit identity is\n\t// configured host-side, above, with --local scope so it's visible\n\t// from both sides of the bind mount without needing --global here.\n\tout, exitCode, err := r.docker.exec(ctx, containerID, \"git config --system --add safe.directory '*'\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure git safe.directory in container: %w: %s\", err, out)\n\t}\n\tif exitCode != 0 {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure git safe.directory in container: exit %d: %s\", exitCode, out)\n\t}", "replace": "\t// The container bind-mounts projectDir as /project and does the\n\t// initial clone into it, so the (empty) directory must exist on the\n\t// host before the container is created β otherwise Docker would\n\t// create it itself, root-owned.\n\tprojectDir := filepath.Join(workDir, \"project\")\n\n\tif err := os.MkdirAll(projectDir, 0o755); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"create project dir: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\t// A pr:review run works on the PR's own head branch, so the agent's\n\t// commits push straight to the PR. Every other event kind branches\n\t// off the default branch as usual.\n\tvar review *forgejo.ReviewDetail\n\tbranch := fmt.Sprintf(\"issue-%d-%s\", ev.Index, agent.Name)\n\n\tif ev.Kind == forgejo.EventPRReview {\n\t\t// Always fetch the current head ref, not just when the event\n\t\t// lacks one (the polling path doesn't carry it): the webhook's\n\t\t// copy could be stale if the PR's head branch was renamed since\n\t\t// the review, and the push target depends on it.\n\t\theadRef := ev.HeadRef\n\n\t\tif prInfo, err := r.forgejo.PullRequestInfo(ev.Owner, ev.Repo, ev.Index); err != nil {\n\t\t\tlogger.Warn(\"fetch pull request head failed; falling back to the event's head ref\", \"error\", err)\n\t\t} else if prInfo.HeadRef != \"\" {\n\t\t\theadRef = prInfo.HeadRef\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif headRef == \"\" {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"pr:review event has no pull request head branch to check out\")\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tbranch = headRef\n\n\t\t// Fetch the full review (verdict, body, inline comments) so the\n\t\t// agent sees all the feedback, not just the triggering event. A\n\t\t// failure degrades to no review detail rather than failing the\n\t\t// run: the agent can still do its job, just without the inline\n\t\t// comments.\n\t\treview, err = r.forgejo.ReviewDetail(ev.Owner, ev.Repo, ev.Index, ev.ReviewID)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tlogger.Warn(\"fetch review detail failed; agent will not see inline review comments\", \"error\", err)\n\t\t\treview = nil\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\troster := buildRoster(r.forgejo, r.cfg.Agents, logger)\n\tgitName, gitEmail := gitIdentity(agent.Name, roster)\n\n\t// The credential the sandbox's git uses for remote operations: the\n\t// agent's own Forgejo token when configured, so its git activity is\n\t// attributed to its own account, falling back to the shared zoo\n\t// identity for deployments without per-agent tokens (mirroring\n\t// forgejoAs).\n\tgitUser, gitToken := \"zoo\", r.forgejo.Token()\n\n\tif agent.Token != \"\" {\n\t\tgitUser, gitToken = agent.Name, agent.Token\n\t}\n\n\teventPath := filepath.Join(workDir, \"event.json\")\n\tif err := os.WriteFile(eventPath, ev.Raw, 0o644); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"write event file: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tcontainerID, err := r.docker.createContainer(ctx, dockerImage, []string{\n\t\tprojectDir + \":/project\",\n\t\teventPath + \":/event:ro\",\n\t}, fmt.Sprintf(\"zoo-issue-%d-%s\", ev.Index, agent.Name))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"start container: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tdefer func() {\n\t\tcleanupCtx, cleanupCancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 30*time.Second)\n\t\tdefer cleanupCancel()\n\t\tif err := r.docker.remove(cleanupCtx, containerID); err != nil {\n\t\t\tlogger.Warn(\"failed to remove container\", \"container\", containerID, \"error\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t}()\n\n\t// Git must simply work inside the sandbox: safe.directory, commit\n\t// identity, and the remote credential all go into the container's\n\t// system gitconfig (see configureSandboxGit).\n\tif err := configureSandboxGit(ctx, r.docker, containerID, repoInfo.CloneURL, gitUser, gitToken, gitName, gitEmail); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure git in container: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\t// The initial clone happens inside the sandbox, so the working tree\n\t// is owned by the container's user and git never runs on the host.\n\tif ev.Kind == forgejo.EventPRReview {\n\t\tif err := clonePRHead(ctx, r.docker, containerID, repoInfo.CloneURL, repoInfo.DefaultBranch, branch, ev.Index); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"prepare git working tree: %w\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t} else {\n\t\tif err := cloneAndBranch(ctx, r.docker, containerID, repoInfo.CloneURL, repoInfo.DefaultBranch, branch); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"prepare git working tree: %w\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t}"}
Result
1 occurrences replaced
Thinking
Next, I'll update the construction of runContext (removing projectDir and token), as well as the package's documentation comment.
Tool
π§ edit_file
{"path": "internal/agentrun/run.go", "find": "\trunCtx := &runContext{\n\t\tdocker: r.docker,\n\t\tcontainerID: containerID,\n\t\tprojectDir: projectDir,\n\t\ttoken: r.forgejo.Token(),\n\t\tforgejo: &runForgejoActions{", "replace": "\trunCtx := &runContext{\n\t\tdocker: r.docker,\n\t\tcontainerID: containerID,\n\t\tforgejo: &runForgejoActions{"}
Arguments
{"path": "internal/agentrun/run.go", "find": "\trunCtx := &runContext{\n\t\tdocker: r.docker,\n\t\tcontainerID: containerID,\n\t\tprojectDir: projectDir,\n\t\ttoken: r.forgejo.Token(),\n\t\tforgejo: &runForgejoActions{", "replace": "\trunCtx := &runContext{\n\t\tdocker: r.docker,\n\t\tcontainerID: containerID,\n\t\tforgejo: &runForgejoActions{"}
Result
ERROR CALLING TOOL: "\trunCtx := &runContext{\n\t\tdocker: r.docker,\n\t\tcontainerID: containerID,\n\t\tprojectDir: projectDir,\n\t\ttoken: r.forgejo.Token(),\n\t\tforgejo: &runForgejoActions{" not found in "internal/agentrun/run.go"
Tool
π§ edit_file
{"path": "internal/agentrun/run.go", "find": "// Package agentrun creates the throwaway per-job environment an agent\n// runs in: a git clone + branch bind-mounted into a Docker container,\n// the triggering event written to /event, and the tool-calling loop\n// (internal/llm + internal/tools) driven against it.", "replace": "// Package agentrun creates the throwaway per-job environment an agent\n// runs in: a Docker container with the agent's git working tree cloned\n// inside it (authenticated with the agent's own Forgejo token), the\n// triggering event written to /event, and the tool-calling loop\n// (internal/llm + internal/tools) driven against it."}
Arguments
{"path": "internal/agentrun/run.go", "find": "// Package agentrun creates the throwaway per-job environment an agent\n// runs in: a git clone + branch bind-mounted into a Docker container,\n// the triggering event written to /event, and the tool-calling loop\n// (internal/llm + internal/tools) driven against it.", "replace": "// Package agentrun creates the throwaway per-job environment an agent\n// runs in: a Docker container with the agent's git working tree cloned\n// inside it (authenticated with the agent's own Forgejo token), the\n// triggering event written to /event, and the tool-calling loop\n// (internal/llm + internal/tools) driven against it."}
Result
1 occurrences replaced
Thinking
The first edit failed β probably due to a whitespace mismatch. Let me try reading the current runContext construction section.
Tool
π§ grep_search
{"context_after": 10, "query": "runCtx := &runContext"}
Arguments
{"context_after": 10, "query": "runCtx := &runContext"}
Result
/project/internal/agentrun/run.go:235: runCtx := &runContext{
/project/internal/agentrun/run.go-236- docker: r.docker,
/project/internal/agentrun/run.go-237- containerID: containerID,
/project/internal/agentrun/run.go-238- projectDir: projectDir,
/project/internal/agentrun/run.go-239- token: r.forgejo.Token(),
/project/internal/agentrun/run.go-240- forgejo: &runForgejoActions{
/project/internal/agentrun/run.go-241- client: r.forgejoAs(agent.Name, agent.Token),
/project/internal/agentrun/run.go-242- owner: ev.Owner,
/project/internal/agentrun/run.go-243- repo: ev.Repo,
/project/internal/agentrun/run.go-244- index: ev.Index,
/project/internal/agentrun/run.go-245- logger: logger,
Thinking
The `forgejo:` line isn't aligned the way I was assuming (there's no padding to match the alignment of the other fields β actually, in gofmt, `forgejo: &runForgejoActions{` should be aligned with the other fields, but... in the file it shows `forgejo: &runForgejoActions{` with just a single space). Let me fix it with the exact text.
Tool
π§ edit_file
{"path": "internal/agentrun/run.go", "find": "\trunCtx := &runContext{\n\t\tdocker: r.docker,\n\t\tcontainerID: containerID,\n\t\tprojectDir: projectDir,\n\t\ttoken: r.forgejo.Token(),\n\t\tforgejo: &runForgejoActions{", "replace": "\trunCtx := &runContext{\n\t\tdocker: r.docker,\n\t\tcontainerID: containerID,\n\t\tforgejo: &runForgejoActions{"}
Arguments
{"path": "internal/agentrun/run.go", "find": "\trunCtx := &runContext{\n\t\tdocker: r.docker,\n\t\tcontainerID: containerID,\n\t\tprojectDir: projectDir,\n\t\ttoken: r.forgejo.Token(),\n\t\tforgejo: &runForgejoActions{", "replace": "\trunCtx := &runContext{\n\t\tdocker: r.docker,\n\t\tcontainerID: containerID,\n\t\tforgejo: &runForgejoActions{"}
Result
1 occurrences replaced
Thinking
Next, I'll update the documentation comments in `internal/tools/context.go` and `internal/tools/git.go`.
Now update the `tools` package doc comments that describe the old host-side design:
Tool
π§ edit_file
{"path": "internal/tools/context.go", "find": "// Context is bound to a single agent run (job), unlike ../a's single\n// global Context, since multiple agents run concurrently in zoo.\ntype Context interface {\n\t// Exec runs command inside the run's container via `sh -c` and\n\t// returns combined stdout+stderr. The container never holds a\n\t// Forgejo credential, so this cannot reach the Forgejo API or\n\t// authenticate git operations against it β see Git.\n\tExec(ctx context.Context, command string) (string, error)\n\n\t// Git runs a git subcommand against the run's working tree on the\n\t// host, outside the container, so that operations needing a Forgejo\n\t// credential (currently just push) can authenticate without that\n\t// credential ever being written to disk where the container (and\n\t// anything run inside it via Exec) could read it.\n\tGit(ctx context.Context, subcommand string, args ...string) (string, error)", "replace": "// Context is bound to a single agent run (job), unlike ../a's single\n// global Context, since multiple agents run concurrently in zoo.\ntype Context interface {\n\t// Exec runs command inside the run's container via `sh -c` and\n\t// returns combined stdout+stderr.\n\tExec(ctx context.Context, command string) (string, error)\n\n\t// Git runs a git subcommand against the run's working tree inside\n\t// the run's container. Remote operations (fetch, pull, push, ...)\n\t// authenticate via the Forgejo credential the run's setup wrote to\n\t// the container's system gitconfig, so they work without any\n\t// per-invocation plumbing.\n\tGit(ctx context.Context, subcommand string, args ...string) (string, error)"}
Arguments
{"path": "internal/tools/context.go", "find": "// Context is bound to a single agent run (job), unlike ../a's single\n// global Context, since multiple agents run concurrently in zoo.\ntype Context interface {\n\t// Exec runs command inside the run's container via `sh -c` and\n\t// returns combined stdout+stderr. The container never holds a\n\t// Forgejo credential, so this cannot reach the Forgejo API or\n\t// authenticate git operations against it β see Git.\n\tExec(ctx context.Context, command string) (string, error)\n\n\t// Git runs a git subcommand against the run's working tree on the\n\t// host, outside the container, so that operations needing a Forgejo\n\t// credential (currently just push) can authenticate without that\n\t// credential ever being written to disk where the container (and\n\t// anything run inside it via Exec) could read it.\n\tGit(ctx context.Context, subcommand string, args ...string) (string, error)", "replace": "// Context is bound to a single agent run (job), unlike ../a's single\n// global Context, since multiple agents run concurrently in zoo.\ntype Context interface {\n\t// Exec runs command inside the run's container via `sh -c` and\n\t// returns combined stdout+stderr.\n\tExec(ctx context.Context, command string) (string, error)\n\n\t// Git runs a git subcommand against the run's working tree inside\n\t// the run's container. Remote operations (fetch, pull, push, ...)\n\t// authenticate via the Forgejo credential the run's setup wrote to\n\t// the container's system gitconfig, so they work without any\n\t// per-invocation plumbing.\n\tGit(ctx context.Context, subcommand string, args ...string) (string, error)"}
Result
1 occurrences replaced
Tool
π§ edit_file
{"path": "internal/tools/git.go", "find": "// git runs subcommand via Context.Git, which executes it outside the\n// container (see that method's doc comment for why): the container\n// itself is never given a credential capable of authenticating against\n// Forgejo, so pushing has to happen on the host side instead.", "replace": "// git runs subcommand via Context.Git, which executes it inside the\n// run's container, where the run's Forgejo credential is configured\n// for git (see that method's doc comment) β remote operations like\n// push simply work."}
Arguments
{"path": "internal/tools/git.go", "find": "// git runs subcommand via Context.Git, which executes it outside the\n// container (see that method's doc comment for why): the container\n// itself is never given a credential capable of authenticating against\n// Forgejo, so pushing has to happen on the host side instead.", "replace": "// git runs subcommand via Context.Git, which executes it inside the\n// run's container, where the run's Forgejo credential is configured\n// for git (see that method's doc comment) β remote operations like\n// push simply work."}
Result
1 occurrences replaced
Thinking
Next, I'll update the Git section of system.md. Current text:
```
**Git**
You can use normal git commands to manage the working tree. For remote
(pull, fetch, push, etc.) git operations, you can use the `git` tool.
```
New text β since git now fully works inside the sandbox, both the `git` tool and plain `git` via bash can access the remote:
```
**Git**
You can use normal git commands to manage the working tree. Remote
(pull, fetch, push, etc.) git operations are already authenticated
for you, so they work as-is β either via the `git` tool or plain
`git` inside `bash`.
```
Tool
π§ edit_file
{"path": "internal/agentrun/system.md", "find": "**Git**\n\nYou may use normal git commands to manage your working tree. For remote\n(pull, fetch, push, etc.) git operations, you can use the `git` tool.", "replace": "**Git**\n\nYou may use normal git commands to manage your working tree. Remote\n(pull, fetch, push, etc.) git operations are authenticated for you and\nsimply work β through the `git` tool or plain `git` in `bash`."}
Arguments
{"path": "internal/agentrun/system.md", "find": "**Git**\n\nYou may use normal git commands to manage your working tree. For remote\n(pull, fetch, push, etc.) git operations, you can use the `git` tool.", "replace": "**Git**\n\nYou may use normal git commands to manage your working tree. Remote\n(pull, fetch, push, etc.) git operations are authenticated for you and\nsimply work β through the `git` tool or plain `git` in `bash`."}
Result
1 occurrences replaced
Thinking
Alright, let's build it to detect compile errors:
Tool
π§ bash
{"command": "cd /project && go build ./... && go vet ./... 2>&1 | head -20", "timeout": 180}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /project && go build ./... && go vet ./... 2>&1 | head -20", "timeout": 180}
Result
go: downloading github.com/docker/docker v28.5.2+incompatible
go: downloading github.com/hashicorp/hcl/v2 v2.24.0
go: downloading codeberg.org/mvdkleijn/forgejo-sdk/forgejo/v2 v2.2.0
go: downloading github.com/google/uuid v1.6.0
go: downloading modernc.org/sqlite v1.56.0
go: downloading github.com/docker/go-connections v0.8.1
go: downloading github.com/docker/go-units v0.5.0
go: downloading github.com/moby/docker-image-spec v1.3.1
go: downloading github.com/opencontainers/image-spec v1.1.1
go: downloading github.com/containerd/errdefs v1.0.0
go: downloading github.com/containerd/errdefs/pkg v0.3.0
go: downloading github.com/distribution/reference v0.6.0
go: downloading github.com/opencontainers/go-digest v1.0.0
go: downloading github.com/pkg/errors v0.9.1
go: downloading go.opentelemetry.io/contrib/instrumentation/net/http/otelhttp v0.70.0
go: downloading go.opentelemetry.io/otel/trace v1.45.0
go: downloading go.opentelemetry.io/otel v1.45.0
go: downloading github.com/42wim/httpsig v1.2.3
go: downloading github.com/go-fed/httpsig v1.1.0
go: downloading github.com/hashicorp/go-version v1.7.0
go: downloading golang.org/x/crypto v0.39.0
go: downloading github.com/felixge/httpsnoop v1.1.0
go: downloading go.opentelemetry.io/otel/metric v1.45.0
go: downloading github.com/agext/levenshtein v1.2.1
go: downloading github.com/apparentlymart/go-textseg/v15 v15.0.0
go: downloading github.com/mitchellh/go-wordwrap v1.0.1
go: downloading github.com/zclconf/go-cty v1.16.3
go: downloading github.com/go-logr/logr v1.4.4
go: downloading golang.org/x/sys v0.47.0
go: downloading github.com/google/go-cmp v0.7.0
go: downloading github.com/go-logr/stdr v1.2.2
go: downloading go.opentelemetry.io/auto/sdk v1.2.1
go: downloading github.com/cespare/xxhash/v2 v2.3.0
go: downloading golang.org/x/text v0.40.0
go: downloading modernc.org/libc v1.74.4
go: downloading github.com/dustin/go-humanize v1.0.1
go: downloading modernc.org/mathutil v1.7.1
go: downloading modernc.org/memory v1.11.0
go: downloading github.com/remyoudompheng/bigfft v0.0.0-20230129092748-24d4a6f8daec
Thinking
The build is downloading dependencies. Let's check the final result.
Tool
π§ bash
{"command": "cd /project && go build ./... && echo BUILD-OK && go vet ./... && echo VET-OK", "timeout": 300}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /project && go build ./... && echo BUILD-OK && go vet ./... && echo VET-OK", "timeout": 300}
Result
BUILD-OK
VET-OK
Thinking
The build and verification passed. Next, I'll add unit tests for the new helpers, and integration tests for the sandbox git flow.
First, the unit test file `internal/agentrun/sandboxgit_test.go`:
- TestShellQuote (agentrun's own copy)
- TestShellGitCmd
- TestGitAuthHeader
Next, I'll add `TestDockerRuntimeSandboxGit` to `docker_integration_test.go`:
- Create a bare repository on the host with a commit.
- Create a container (golang:latest) with bind mounts: bare repo β /bare, empty directory β /project.
- Run configureSandboxGit with a dummy user/token and an http URL (e.g., https://example.invalid/acme/widgets.git) β the URL is only used for the config key.
- Verify the credential round-trip: `git config --system --get http.<url>.extraHeader` returns the expected header (verifying key parsing with a URL containing dots and colons).
- Run cloneAndBranch from the local path /bare...
Wait β cloneAndBranch clones `cloneURL` into /project. If cloneURL is `/bare` (a local path), the clone works without http. But configureSandboxGit was called with a different URL for the header β that's fine. The header just won't be used for the local path.
Hmm, but that means the integration test isn't testing the clone URL and the header URL being the same. That's OK β the http auth mechanism is core git behavior (verified locally above). What the integration test verifies is:
1. configureSandboxGit writes all four config entries correctly (round-trip via git config --get).
2. cloneAndBranch clones inside the container and creates a branch.
3. Commits inside the container use the configured identity.
4. The token doesn't leak into the working tree.
For (3): after cloneAndBranch, run `echo x > f && git add f && git commit -m x` and then check `git log -1 --format=%an %ae`.
For (4): `grep -r <token> /project` should find nothing. Note: the token is in /etc/gitconfig, not in /project.
Additionally, verify that the clone was done inside the sandbox: check that the branch exists: `git branch --show-current` = the new branch.
One more check for the integration test: the container's working directory is /project, so `git checkout -b` after the clone runs at the repo root. Good.
Now, let me also think about `runSandboxGit`'s error message: `fmt.Errorf("git %s: exit %d: %s", args[0], exitCode, out)` β if args is empty, args[0] will panic. In practice args won't be empty (subcommand is always present). No problem.
Alright, let me write the unit tests.
Build and vet pass. Now the unit tests for the new helpers:
Tool
π§ write_file
{"content": "package agentrun\n\nimport (\n\t\"encoding/base64\"\n\t\"strings\"\n\t\"testing\"\n)\n\nfunc TestSandboxShellQuote(t *testing.T) {\n\tcases := map[string]string{\n\t\t\"simple\": \"'simple'\",\n\t\t\"it's a branch\": `'it'\\''s a branch'`,\n\t\t\"with space\": \"'with space'\",\n\t\t\"$(rm -rf /)\": \"'$(rm -rf /)'\",\n\t\t\"a\\\"b\\\\c\": \"'a\\\"b\\\\c'\",\n\t\t\"\": \"''\",\n\t\t\"HEAD~1\": \"'HEAD~1'\",\n\t\t\"https://h/a/b.git\": \"'https://h/a/b.git'\",\n\t}\n\n\tfor in, want := range cases {\n\t\tif got := shellQuote(in); got != want {\n\t\t\tt.Errorf(\"shellQuote(%q) = %q, want %q\", in, got, want)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc TestShellGitCmdQuotesEveryArg(t *testing.T) {\n\tgot := shellGitCmd(\"clone\", \"--branch\", \"main\", \"--single-branch\", \"https://h/a/b.git\", \"/project\")\n\n\twant := \"git 'clone' '--branch' 'main' '--single-branch' 'https://h/a/b.git' '/project'\"\n\n\tif got != want {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"shellGitCmd = %q, want %q\", got, want)\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc TestShellGitCmdSubcommandWithArgs(t *testing.T) {\n\tgot := shellGitCmd(\"commit\", \"-m\", \"fix: handle it's edge case\")\n\n\tif !strings.HasPrefix(got, \"git 'commit' '-m' \") {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"shellGitCmd = %q, want prefix git 'commit' '-m' \", got)\n\t}\n\n\t// The message must be one quoted word with the embedded quote\n\t// escaped, so sh passes it through verbatim.\n\tif want := `'fix: handle it'\\''s edge case'`; !strings.HasSuffix(got, want) {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"shellGitCmd = %q, want suffix %q\", got, want)\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc TestGitAuthHeader(t *testing.T) {\n\tgot := gitAuthHeader(\"greg\", \"s3cr3t\")\n\n\twant := \"Authorization: Basic \" + base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(\"greg:s3cr3t\"))\n\n\tif got != want {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"gitAuthHeader = %q, want %q\", got, want)\n\t}\n}\n", "path": "internal/agentrun/sandboxgit_test.go"}
Arguments
{"content": "package agentrun\n\nimport (\n\t\"encoding/base64\"\n\t\"strings\"\n\t\"testing\"\n)\n\nfunc TestSandboxShellQuote(t *testing.T) {\n\tcases := map[string]string{\n\t\t\"simple\": \"'simple'\",\n\t\t\"it's a branch\": `'it'\\''s a branch'`,\n\t\t\"with space\": \"'with space'\",\n\t\t\"$(rm -rf /)\": \"'$(rm -rf /)'\",\n\t\t\"a\\\"b\\\\c\": \"'a\\\"b\\\\c'\",\n\t\t\"\": \"''\",\n\t\t\"HEAD~1\": \"'HEAD~1'\",\n\t\t\"https://h/a/b.git\": \"'https://h/a/b.git'\",\n\t}\n\n\tfor in, want := range cases {\n\t\tif got := shellQuote(in); got != want {\n\t\t\tt.Errorf(\"shellQuote(%q) = %q, want %q\", in, got, want)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc TestShellGitCmdQuotesEveryArg(t *testing.T) {\n\tgot := shellGitCmd(\"clone\", \"--branch\", \"main\", \"--single-branch\", \"https://h/a/b.git\", \"/project\")\n\n\twant := \"git 'clone' '--branch' 'main' '--single-branch' 'https://h/a/b.git' '/project'\"\n\n\tif got != want {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"shellGitCmd = %q, want %q\", got, want)\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc TestShellGitCmdSubcommandWithArgs(t *testing.T) {\n\tgot := shellGitCmd(\"commit\", \"-m\", \"fix: handle it's edge case\")\n\n\tif !strings.HasPrefix(got, \"git 'commit' '-m' \") {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"shellGitCmd = %q, want prefix git 'commit' '-m' \", got)\n\t}\n\n\t// The message must be one quoted word with the embedded quote\n\t// escaped, so sh passes it through verbatim.\n\tif want := `'fix: handle it'\\''s edge case'`; !strings.HasSuffix(got, want) {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"shellGitCmd = %q, want suffix %q\", got, want)\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc TestGitAuthHeader(t *testing.T) {\n\tgot := gitAuthHeader(\"greg\", \"s3cr3t\")\n\n\twant := \"Authorization: Basic \" + base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(\"greg:s3cr3t\"))\n\n\tif got != want {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"gitAuthHeader = %q, want %q\", got, want)\n\t}\n}\n", "path": "internal/agentrun/sandboxgit_test.go"}
Result
OK
Thinking
Next, I'll add an integration test to docker_integration_test.go. I'll append a new test function:
```go
// TestDockerRuntimeSandboxGit verifies the sandbox git setup that
// Run() performs (see sandboxgit.go): the system gitconfig round-trip
// (including the http.<url>.extraHeader key whose subsection is a URL
// containing dots and colons), the in-sandbox clone + branch, the
// commit identity taken from the system gitconfig, and that the
// credential doesn't leak into the bind-mounted working tree.
func TestDockerRuntimeSandboxGit(t *testing.T) {
// A bare "remote" on the host, bind-mounted into the container.
// A local-path clone doesn't use the http credential, but it
// exercises the same in-sandbox clone path Run() uses for a real
// URL.
bareDir := t.TempDir() + ".git" // hmm, t.TempDir() returns a directory; I want a subdirectory
...
}
```
Let me try writing it carefully:
```go
func TestDockerRuntimeSandboxGit(t *testing.T) {
// A bare "remote" on the host, bind-mounted into the container.
// A local-path clone doesn't use the http credential, but it
// exercises the same in-sandbox clone path Run() uses for a real
// URL.
bareDir := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "remote.git")
for _, args := range [][]string{
{"init", "-q", "-b", "main", bareDir},
} {
...
}
```
Hmm, to create a bare repo with an initial commit, I need a working repo first:
```go
tmp := t.TempDir()
seedDir := filepath.Join(tmp, "seed")
bareDir := filepath.Join(tmp, "remote.git")
run := func(dir string, args ...string) {
cmd := exec.Command("git", args...)
cmd.Dir = dir
if out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("git %v: %v: %s", args, err, out)
}
}
run("", "init", "-q", "-b", "main", seedDir)
run(seedDir, "config", "user.name", "zoo-test")
run(seedDir, "config", "user.email", "zoo@test")
// create a file
os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(seedDir, "file.txt"), []byte("hello\n"), 0o644)
run(seedDir, "add", ".")
run(seedDir, "commit", "-q", "-m", "init")
run("", "clone", "-q", "--bare", seedDir, bareDir)
// The empty directory the container will clone into.
projectDir := filepath.Join(tmp, "project")
os.MkdirAll(projectDir, 0o755)
rt, err := newDockerRuntime()
...
containerID, err := rt.createContainer(ctx, "golang:latest", []string{
bareDir + ":/bare",
projectDir + ":/project",
}, "zoo-test-sandbox-git")
...
defer rt.remove(...)
const (
cloneURL = "https://forgejo.example/acme/widgets.git"
user = "greg"
token = "super-secret-token"
)
if err := configureSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, cloneURL, user, token, "Greg Coolio", "greg@noreply.localhost"); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("configureSandboxGit: %v", err)
}
// The credential must round-trip through the system gitconfig,
// including the http.<url>.extraHeader key whose subsection is a
// URL full of dots and colons.
header := gitAuthHeader(user, token)
out, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, "config", "--system", "--get", "http."+cloneURL+".extraHeader")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("read back credential: %v", err)
}
if strings.TrimSpace(out) != header {
t.Fatalf("credential round-trip = %q, want %q", strings.TrimSpace(out), header)
}
if err := cloneAndBranch(ctx, rt, containerID, "/bare", "main", "issue-1-greg"); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("cloneAndBranch: %v", err)
}
// The clone must have happened inside the container: the fresh
// branch is checked out in /project.
out, err = runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, "branch", "--show-current")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("branch --show-current: %v", err)
}
if strings.TrimSpace(out) != "issue-1-greg" {
t.Fatalf("branch = %q, want issue-1-greg", strings.TrimSpace(out))
}
// Commits must pick up the identity from the system gitconfig.
if _, err := rt.exec(ctx, containerID, "echo more >> file.txt && git add file.txt && git commit -qm 'from sandbox'"); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("commit in sandbox: %v", err)
}
out, err = runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, "log", "-1", "--format=%an %ae")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("log: %v", err)
}
if got := strings.TrimSpace(out); got != "Greg Coolio greg@noreply.localhost" {
t.Fatalf("commit author = %q, want %q", got, "Greg Coolio greg@noreply.localhost")
}
// The token must not leak into the bind-mounted working tree.
out, _ = rt.exec(ctx, containerID, "grep -r 'super-secret-token' /project || true")
if strings.Contains(out, "super-secret-token") {
t.Fatalf("token leaked into working tree: %s", out)
}
}
```
Wait β `echo more >> file.txt && git add file.txt && git commit -qm 'from sandbox'` β this is a raw exec (sh -c), not runSandboxGit. The working directory is /project. OK.
Hmm, one issue: `git commit` inside the container β the container runs as root, and the repo was just cloned by root, so there's no dubious ownership issue. Also, safe.directory is set anyway.
Another consideration: `configureSandboxGit` uses `--add` for safe.directory, and plain set for the rest. On a fresh golang:latest container, /etc/gitconfig doesn't exist β `git config --system` will create it. Good.
One more point: `runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, "config", "--system", "--get", "http."+cloneURL+".extraHeader")` β the key is passed as a single argv element; git parses section http, subsection cloneURL, variable extraHeader. Verified to work earlier.
Also note: the `exec` in docker.go sets `GIT_CONFIG_COUNT=1 GIT_CONFIG_KEY_0=color.ui GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_0=never` β this is an env-var-based config overlay, and it doesn't interfere with --system reads.
Wait, one more important check: `git config --system --get http.https://forgejo.example/acme/widgets.git.extraHeader` β the key contains `//` and `:`. As a single argv element, git's key parser: section = "http", then the subsection isβ¦ let me re-verify the parsing rule. From the git docs (git-config):
"section.subsection.var" β subsections are allowed in specific sectionsβ¦ actually, the git-config man page says:
"The subsection itself must not contain any . or ] characters."
Hmm! Let me check: git config subsections β from the man page:
```
section.subsection
...
The subsection is...
```
Let me recall the exact text of the git-config(1) man page:
"Each section of the configuration file is divided into separate sections⦠A section name is⦠A subsection name is⦠"
Actually, the relevant text from the git-config man page is:
```
config files ... are divided into sections, and each variable setting is a variable in a particular section. ... section names are case-insensitive...
subsection: ... The subsection is...
```
Hmm, I don't remember whether there's a restriction on subsection characters. But empirically I tested exactly this earlier:
```
git config --global http.https://code.stdio.dk/abrander/zoo.git.extraHeader "Authorization: Basic dGVzdDI="
git config --global --get http.https://code.stdio.dk/abrander/zoo.git.extraHeader
```
β it worked and returned the value. So the CLI accepts it.
And the full end-to-end test with the local HTTP server also worked with `http.http://127.0.0.1:8931/bare.git.extraHeader`.
So this mechanism is solid.
Now β one more thing to double-check: in `configureSandboxGit`, we pass the key `http."+cloneURL+".extraHeader` as a single argument to `git config --system`. In the shell command, it's quoted as a single word by shellQuote. Git receives argv[2] = `http.https://forgejo.example/acme/widgets.git.extraHeader`. Good.
But wait β there's a subtlety in git's key parsing I should double-check: for a key with three or more dot-separated parts, git decides the split point between section/subsection/variable. The rule (from git's source, `git_config_parse_key`):
```c
/*
* The key is case-insensitive, allows only alphanumeric
* characters and - and must start with an alphanumeric
* character. In addition, dot-separated keys are allowed,
* where the last component is the variable name, the first
* is the section name, and the middle components form the
* subsection name.
*/
```
Hmm, wait, that says "allows only alphanumeric characters and -" β but that can't be right for the subsection, since we've demonstrated that `:` and `/` work. Let me look at the actual sourceβ¦ from git's config.c:
```c
int git_config_parse_key(const char *var, struct strbuf *sec, struct strbuf *sub, char **var_name)
{
char *p, *q, *r;
int len;
/*
* The key is case-insensitive, allows only alphanumeric
* characters and - and must start with an alphanumeric
* character. In addition, dot-separated keys are allowed,
* where the last component is the variable name, the first
* is the section name, and the middle components form the
* subsection name.
*/
if (var[0] == '.')
return error(_("config: variable '%s' is invalid"), var);
if (!isalnum((unsigned char)var[0]))
return error(_("config: variable '%s' is invalid"), var);
p = strchr(var, '.');
if (!p)
return error(_("config: variable '%s' is invalid"), var);
...
```
Hmm, I don't really remember the exact algorithm. But empirically it works (tested twice, including an actual auth round-trip). That's enough β the integration test will re-verify in CI.
Alright, let me write the integration test. I need to add imports: `os`, `path/filepath`. The current imports in docker_integration_test.go are: context, os/exec, strings, testing, time.
Now add the sandbox-git integration test to `docker_integration_test.go`:
Tool
π§ edit_file
{"path": "internal/agentrun/docker_integration_test.go", "find": "import (\n\t\"context\"\n\t\"os/exec\"\n\t\"strings\"\n\t\"testing\"\n\t\"time\"\n)", "replace": "import (\n\t\"context\"\n\t\"os\"\n\t\"os/exec\"\n\t\"path/filepath\"\n\t\"strings\"\n\t\"testing\"\n\t\"time\"\n)"}
Arguments
{"path": "internal/agentrun/docker_integration_test.go", "find": "import (\n\t\"context\"\n\t\"os/exec\"\n\t\"strings\"\n\t\"testing\"\n\t\"time\"\n)", "replace": "import (\n\t\"context\"\n\t\"os\"\n\t\"os/exec\"\n\t\"path/filepath\"\n\t\"strings\"\n\t\"testing\"\n\t\"time\"\n)"}
Result
1 occurrences replaced
Thinking
Next, I'll add a new integration test at the end of the file.
Tool
π§ read_file
{"end_line": 104, "path": "internal/agentrun/docker_integration_test.go", "start_line": 90}
Arguments
{"end_line": 104, "path": "internal/agentrun/docker_integration_test.go", "start_line": 90}
Result
{"path":"internal/agentrun/docker_integration_test.go","content":"\t}\r\n\r\n\toutput, exitCode, err := rt.exec(ctx, containerID, \"git config --system --add safe.directory '*'\")\r\n\tif err != nil || exitCode != 0 {\r\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"configure safe.directory: err=%v exit=%d: %s\", err, exitCode, output)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\toutput, exitCode, err = rt.exec(ctx, containerID, \"git status\")\r\n\tif err != nil {\r\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"exec: %v\", err)\r\n\t}\r\n\tif exitCode != 0 || strings.Contains(output, \"dubious ownership\") {\r\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"expected git status to succeed after the fix, got exit=%d: %s\", exitCode, output)\r\n\t}\r\n}\r","start_line":90,"end_line":104,"total_lines":104,"truncated":false}
Thinking
Next, I'll add a new integration test at the end of the file.
Tool
π§ edit_file
{"path": "internal/agentrun/docker_integration_test.go", "find": "\toutput, exitCode, err = rt.exec(ctx, containerID, \"git status\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"exec: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tif exitCode != 0 || strings.Contains(output, \"dubious ownership\") {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"expected git status to succeed after the fix, got exit=%d: %s\", exitCode, output)\n\t}\n}", "replace": "\toutput, exitCode, err = rt.exec(ctx, containerID, \"git status\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"exec: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tif exitCode != 0 || strings.Contains(output, \"dubious ownership\") {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"expected git status to succeed after the fix, got exit=%d: %s\", exitCode, output)\n\t}\n}\n\n// TestDockerRuntimeSandboxGit exercises the in-sandbox git setup\n// Run() performs (see sandboxgit.go): the system gitconfig round-trip\n// (including the http.<url>.extraHeader key whose subsection is a URL\n// full of dots and colons), the initial clone + branch done inside the\n// container, the commit identity taken from the system gitconfig, and\n// that the credential never lands in the bind-mounted working tree.\n// The clone uses a local path remote (no http involved), so the test\n// needs no reachable Forgejo; the header mechanism itself is core git\n// behavior.\nfunc TestDockerRuntimeSandboxGit(t *testing.T) {\n\ttmp := t.TempDir()\n\n\t// A bare \"remote\" on the host, plus the empty directory the\n\t// container will clone into (Run() creates it before the container\n\t// exists, for the same reason).\n\tseedDir := filepath.Join(tmp, \"seed\")\n\tbareDir := filepath.Join(tmp, \"remote.git\")\n\tprojectDir := filepath.Join(tmp, \"project\")\n\n\trun := func(dir string, args ...string) {\n\t\tcmd := exec.Command(\"git\", args...)\n\t\tcmd.Dir = dir\n\n\t\tif out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput(); err != nil {\n\t\t\tt.Fatalf(\"git %v: %v: %s\", args, err, out)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\trun(\"\", \"init\", \"-q\", \"-b\", \"main\", seedDir)\n\trun(seedDir, \"config\", \"user.name\", \"zoo-test\")\n\trun(seedDir, \"config\", \"user.email\", \"zoo@test\")\n\n\tif err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(seedDir, \"file.txt\"), []byte(\"hello\\n\"), 0o644); err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"write seed file: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\n\trun(seedDir, \"add\", \".\")\n\trun(seedDir, \"commit\", \"-q\", \"-m\", \"init\")\n\trun(\"\", \"clone\", \"-q\", \"--bare\", seedDir, bareDir)\n\n\tif err := os.MkdirAll(projectDir, 0o755); err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"create project dir: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\n\trt, err := newDockerRuntime()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"docker client: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 120*time.Second)\n\tdefer cancel()\n\n\tcontainerID, err := rt.createContainer(ctx, \"golang:latest\", []string{\n\t\tbareDir + \":/bare\",\n\t\tprojectDir + \":/project\",\n\t}, \"zoo-test-sandbox-git\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"create container: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tdefer rt.remove(context.Background(), containerID)\n\n\tconst (\n\t\tcloneURL = \"https://forgejo.example/acme/widgets.git\"\n\t\tuser = \"greg\"\n\t\ttoken = \"super-secret-token\"\n\t)\n\n\tif err := configureSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, cloneURL, user, token, \"Greg Coolio\", \"greg@noreply.localhost\"); err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"configureSandboxGit: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\n\t// The credential must round-trip through the system gitconfig,\n\t// which is what makes plain `git pull`/`git push` authenticate.\n\twantHeader := gitAuthHeader(user, token)\n\n\tout, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"config\", \"--system\", \"--get\", \"http.\"+cloneURL+\".extraHeader\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"read back credential: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tif got := strings.TrimSpace(out); got != wantHeader {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"credential round-trip = %q, want %q\", got, wantHeader)\n\t}\n\n\tif err := cloneAndBranch(ctx, rt, containerID, \"/bare\", \"main\", \"issue-1-greg\"); err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"cloneAndBranch: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\n\t// The clone happened inside the container: the fresh branch is\n\t// checked out in /project.\n\tout, err = runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"branch\", \"--show-current\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"branch --show-current: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tif got := strings.TrimSpace(out); got != \"issue-1-greg\" {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"branch = %q, want issue-1-greg\", got)\n\t}\n\n\t// Commits must pick up the identity from the system gitconfig.\n\tif _, exitCode, err := rt.exec(ctx, containerID, \"echo more >> file.txt && git add file.txt && git commit -qm 'from sandbox'\"); err != nil || exitCode != 0 {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"commit in sandbox: err=%v exit=%d\", err, exitCode)\n\t}\n\n\tout, err = runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"log\", \"-1\", \"--format=%an %ae\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"log: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tif got := strings.TrimSpace(out); got != \"Greg Coolio greg@noreply.localhost\" {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"commit author = %q, want %q\", got, \"Greg Coolio greg@noreply.localhost\")\n\t}\n\n\t// The token must not leak into the bind-mounted working tree.\n\tout, _, err = rt.exec(ctx, containerID, \"grep -r super-secret-token /project || true\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"grep: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tif strings.Contains(out, \"super-secret-token\") {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"token leaked into the working tree: %s\", out)\n\t}\n}"}
Arguments
{"path": "internal/agentrun/docker_integration_test.go", "find": "\toutput, exitCode, err = rt.exec(ctx, containerID, \"git status\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"exec: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tif exitCode != 0 || strings.Contains(output, \"dubious ownership\") {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"expected git status to succeed after the fix, got exit=%d: %s\", exitCode, output)\n\t}\n}", "replace": "\toutput, exitCode, err = rt.exec(ctx, containerID, \"git status\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"exec: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tif exitCode != 0 || strings.Contains(output, \"dubious ownership\") {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"expected git status to succeed after the fix, got exit=%d: %s\", exitCode, output)\n\t}\n}\n\n// TestDockerRuntimeSandboxGit exercises the in-sandbox git setup\n// Run() performs (see sandboxgit.go): the system gitconfig round-trip\n// (including the http.<url>.extraHeader key whose subsection is a URL\n// full of dots and colons), the initial clone + branch done inside the\n// container, the commit identity taken from the system gitconfig, and\n// that the credential never lands in the bind-mounted working tree.\n// The clone uses a local path remote (no http involved), so the test\n// needs no reachable Forgejo; the header mechanism itself is core git\n// behavior.\nfunc TestDockerRuntimeSandboxGit(t *testing.T) {\n\ttmp := t.TempDir()\n\n\t// A bare \"remote\" on the host, plus the empty directory the\n\t// container will clone into (Run() creates it before the container\n\t// exists, for the same reason).\n\tseedDir := filepath.Join(tmp, \"seed\")\n\tbareDir := filepath.Join(tmp, \"remote.git\")\n\tprojectDir := filepath.Join(tmp, \"project\")\n\n\trun := func(dir string, args ...string) {\n\t\tcmd := exec.Command(\"git\", args...)\n\t\tcmd.Dir = dir\n\n\t\tif out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput(); err != nil {\n\t\t\tt.Fatalf(\"git %v: %v: %s\", args, err, out)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\trun(\"\", \"init\", \"-q\", \"-b\", \"main\", seedDir)\n\trun(seedDir, \"config\", \"user.name\", \"zoo-test\")\n\trun(seedDir, \"config\", \"user.email\", \"zoo@test\")\n\n\tif err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(seedDir, \"file.txt\"), []byte(\"hello\\n\"), 0o644); err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"write seed file: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\n\trun(seedDir, \"add\", \".\")\n\trun(seedDir, \"commit\", \"-q\", \"-m\", \"init\")\n\trun(\"\", \"clone\", \"-q\", \"--bare\", seedDir, bareDir)\n\n\tif err := os.MkdirAll(projectDir, 0o755); err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"create project dir: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\n\trt, err := newDockerRuntime()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"docker client: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 120*time.Second)\n\tdefer cancel()\n\n\tcontainerID, err := rt.createContainer(ctx, \"golang:latest\", []string{\n\t\tbareDir + \":/bare\",\n\t\tprojectDir + \":/project\",\n\t}, \"zoo-test-sandbox-git\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"create container: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tdefer rt.remove(context.Background(), containerID)\n\n\tconst (\n\t\tcloneURL = \"https://forgejo.example/acme/widgets.git\"\n\t\tuser = \"greg\"\n\t\ttoken = \"super-secret-token\"\n\t)\n\n\tif err := configureSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, cloneURL, user, token, \"Greg Coolio\", \"greg@noreply.localhost\"); err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"configureSandboxGit: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\n\t// The credential must round-trip through the system gitconfig,\n\t// which is what makes plain `git pull`/`git push` authenticate.\n\twantHeader := gitAuthHeader(user, token)\n\n\tout, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"config\", \"--system\", \"--get\", \"http.\"+cloneURL+\".extraHeader\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"read back credential: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tif got := strings.TrimSpace(out); got != wantHeader {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"credential round-trip = %q, want %q\", got, wantHeader)\n\t}\n\n\tif err := cloneAndBranch(ctx, rt, containerID, \"/bare\", \"main\", \"issue-1-greg\"); err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"cloneAndBranch: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\n\t// The clone happened inside the container: the fresh branch is\n\t// checked out in /project.\n\tout, err = runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"branch\", \"--show-current\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"branch --show-current: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tif got := strings.TrimSpace(out); got != \"issue-1-greg\" {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"branch = %q, want issue-1-greg\", got)\n\t}\n\n\t// Commits must pick up the identity from the system gitconfig.\n\tif _, exitCode, err := rt.exec(ctx, containerID, \"echo more >> file.txt && git add file.txt && git commit -qm 'from sandbox'\"); err != nil || exitCode != 0 {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"commit in sandbox: err=%v exit=%d\", err, exitCode)\n\t}\n\n\tout, err = runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"log\", \"-1\", \"--format=%an %ae\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"log: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tif got := strings.TrimSpace(out); got != \"Greg Coolio greg@noreply.localhost\" {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"commit author = %q, want %q\", got, \"Greg Coolio greg@noreply.localhost\")\n\t}\n\n\t// The token must not leak into the bind-mounted working tree.\n\tout, _, err = rt.exec(ctx, containerID, \"grep -r super-secret-token /project || true\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"grep: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tif strings.Contains(out, \"super-secret-token\") {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"token leaked into the working tree: %s\", out)\n\t}\n}"}
Result
1 occurrences replaced
Thinking
Alright, let's run the unit tests (without the docker tag) and build the docker-tagged tests to verify that they compile:
Tool
π§ bash
{"command": "cd /project && go test ./... 2>&1 | tail -15 && go vet -tags docker ./internal/agentrun/ && echo VET-DOCKER-OK", "timeout": 300}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /project && go test ./... 2>&1 | tail -15 && go vet -tags docker ./internal/agentrun/ && echo VET-DOCKER-OK", "timeout": 300}
Result
? github.com/abrander/zoo/cmd/zoo [no test files]
ok github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/agentrun 0.024s
ok github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/config 0.024s
ok github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/forgejo 0.466s
ok github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/livelog 0.052s
ok github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/llm 0.003s
ok github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/scheduler 2.718s
ok github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/store 1.953s
ok github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/tools 0.003s
ok github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/web 0.795s
VET-DOCKER-OK
Thinking
All tests pass, and the docker-tagged tests compile.
Now, I can't run docker integration tests here (no docker daemon), but let me simulate the critical parts of the flow locally to double-check the exact shell commands that get generated. Specifically:
1. The output of `shellGitCmd` for each operation β verify by actually running it through `sh -c` locally.
2. The full `configureSandboxGit` + `cloneAndBranch` sequence against a local path remote β I can simulate it by calling the same shell commands via `sh -c` on this machine (I have git).
Let me write a simple local simulation: reproduce what the container would execute:
- `git config --system --add safe.directory '*'` β hmm, --system writes to /etc/gitconfig, but in my sandbox I'm probably root. Let me check who I am. Actually, to avoid touching /etc/gitconfig, I can use the GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL / GIT_CONFIG_SYSTEM environment variables to point to a temporary file. Git supports the `GIT_CONFIG_SYSTEM` environment variable (git 2.32+). I have git 2.47.3.
Let me simulate:
```
export GIT_CONFIG_SYSTEM=/tmp/sim/gitconfig
sh -c "git 'config' '--system' '--add' 'safe.directory' '*'"
sh -c "git 'config' '--system' 'user.name' 'Greg Coolio'"
sh -c "git 'config' '--system' 'user.email' 'greg@noreply.localhost'"
sh -c "git 'config' '--system' 'http.https://forgejo.example/acme/widgets.git.extraHeader' 'Authorization: Basic ...'"
sh -c "git 'clone' '--branch' 'main' '--single-branch' '/tmp/sim/remote.git' '/project'" # /project doesn't exist here... use a temp dir
```
Wait, in the actual container the target is /project. In my simulation I'll use a different directory, but the command shape is the same.
Let me run this simulation to verify that the quoted commands work through sh -c exactly as docker exec would run them.
All tests passed. Since there's no Docker daemon here, I'll simulate the exact shell command that `docker exec` will run (via `sh -c`) against a local git, and verify the quoting end-to-end:
Tool
π§ bash
{"command": "set -e\ncd /tmp && rm -rf sim && mkdir -p sim/project && cd sim\n# seed a bare remote\ngit init -q -b main seed && cd seed\ngit config user.name t && git config user.email t@t\necho hello > f.txt && git add . && git commit -qm init && cd ..\ngit clone -q --bare seed remote.git\ncd /tmp/sim\nexport GIT_CONFIG_SYSTEM=/tmp/sim/gitconfig\n# exact commands shellGitCmd produces (single-quoted args), run via sh -c like docker exec\nsh -c \"git 'config' '--system' '--add' 'safe.directory' '*'\"\nsh -c \"git 'config' '--system' 'user.name' 'Greg Coolio'\"\nsh -c \"git 'config' '--system' 'user.email' 'greg@noreply.localhost'\"\nsh -c \"git 'config' '--system' 'http.https://forgejo.example/acme/widgets.git.extraHeader' 'Authorization: Basic c3VwZXItc2VjcmV0LXRva2Vu'\"\nsh -c \"git 'config' '--system' '--get' 'http.https://forgejo.example/acme/widgets.git.extraHeader'\"\nsh -c \"git 'clone' '--branch' 'main' '--single-branch' '/tmp/sim/remote.git' '/tmp/sim/project'\"\nsh -c \"git 'checkout' '-b' 'issue-1-greg'\"\nsh -c \"git 'branch' '--show-current'\"\necho more >> f.txt\nsh -c \"git 'add' 'f.txt'\"\nsh -c \"git 'commit' '-qm' 'from sandbox'\"\nsh -c \"git 'log' '-1' '--format=%an %ae'\"\nsh -c \"git 'pull' 2>&1\" || true\necho \"=== gitconfig ===\"\ncat /tmp/sim/gitconfig\necho \"=== token in project? ===\"\ngrep -r super-secret-token /tmp/sim/project || echo \"no leak\"", "timeout": 60}
Arguments
{"command": "set -e\ncd /tmp && rm -rf sim && mkdir -p sim/project && cd sim\n# seed a bare remote\ngit init -q -b main seed && cd seed\ngit config user.name t && git config user.email t@t\necho hello > f.txt && git add . && git commit -qm init && cd ..\ngit clone -q --bare seed remote.git\ncd /tmp/sim\nexport GIT_CONFIG_SYSTEM=/tmp/sim/gitconfig\n# exact commands shellGitCmd produces (single-quoted args), run via sh -c like docker exec\nsh -c \"git 'config' '--system' '--add' 'safe.directory' '*'\"\nsh -c \"git 'config' '--system' 'user.name' 'Greg Coolio'\"\nsh -c \"git 'config' '--system' 'user.email' 'greg@noreply.localhost'\"\nsh -c \"git 'config' '--system' 'http.https://forgejo.example/acme/widgets.git.extraHeader' 'Authorization: Basic c3VwZXItc2VjcmV0LXRva2Vu'\"\nsh -c \"git 'config' '--system' '--get' 'http.https://forgejo.example/acme/widgets.git.extraHeader'\"\nsh -c \"git 'clone' '--branch' 'main' '--single-branch' '/tmp/sim/remote.git' '/tmp/sim/project'\"\nsh -c \"git 'checkout' '-b' 'issue-1-greg'\"\nsh -c \"git 'branch' '--show-current'\"\necho more >> f.txt\nsh -c \"git 'add' 'f.txt'\"\nsh -c \"git 'commit' '-qm' 'from sandbox'\"\nsh -c \"git 'log' '-1' '--format=%an %ae'\"\nsh -c \"git 'pull' 2>&1\" || true\necho \"=== gitconfig ===\"\ncat /tmp/sim/gitconfig\necho \"=== token in project? ===\"\ngrep -r super-secret-token /tmp/sim/project || echo \"no leak\"", "timeout": 60}
Result
ERROR CALLING TOOL: command failed: command exited with status 128
Thinking
Something failed. Let's debug step by step without `set -e` to pinpoint where it's failing.
Tool
π§ bash
{"command": "cd /tmp/sim 2>/dev/null || { mkdir -p /tmp/sim/project && cd /tmp/sim; }\ncd /tmp/sim\nexport GIT_CONFIG_SYSTEM=/tmp/sim/gitconfig\nsh -c \"git 'config' '--system' '--add' 'safe.directory' '*'\" ; echo \"1: $?\"\nsh -c \"git 'config' '--system' 'user.name' 'Greg Coolio'\" ; echo \"2: $?\"\nsh -c \"git 'config' '--system' 'user.email' 'greg@noreply.localhost'\" ; echo \"3: $?\"\nsh -c \"git 'config' '--system' 'http.https://forgejo.example/acme/widgets.git.extraHeader' 'Authorization: Basic c3VwZXItc2VjcmV0LXRva2Vu'\" ; echo \"4: $?\"\nsh -c \"git 'config' '--system' '--get' 'http.https://forgejo.example/acme/widgets.git.extraHeader'\" ; echo \"5: $?\"", "timeout": 60}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /tmp/sim 2>/dev/null || { mkdir -p /tmp/sim/project && cd /tmp/sim; }\ncd /tmp/sim\nexport GIT_CONFIG_SYSTEM=/tmp/sim/gitconfig\nsh -c \"git 'config' '--system' '--add' 'safe.directory' '*'\" ; echo \"1: $?\"\nsh -c \"git 'config' '--system' 'user.name' 'Greg Coolio'\" ; echo \"2: $?\"\nsh -c \"git 'config' '--system' 'user.email' 'greg@noreply.localhost'\" ; echo \"3: $?\"\nsh -c \"git 'config' '--system' 'http.https://forgejo.example/acme/widgets.git.extraHeader' 'Authorization: Basic c3VwZXItc2VjcmV0LXRva2Vu'\" ; echo \"4: $?\"\nsh -c \"git 'config' '--system' '--get' 'http.https://forgejo.example/acme/widgets.git.extraHeader'\" ; echo \"5: $?\"", "timeout": 60}
Result
1: 0
2: 0
3: 0
4: 0
Authorization: Basic c3VwZXItc2VjcmV0LXRva2Vu
5: 0
Thinking
The gitconfig step works. The failure must be in the clone step β probably because /tmp/sim/remote.git doesn't exist (the previous run failed at an earlier stage, before the bare clone was created). Let's create the bare remote and continue.
Config steps work. The earlier failure was the missing bare remote (first run died before creating it). Continuing:
Tool
π§ bash
{"command": "cd /tmp/sim\ngit init -q -b main seed\ncd seed && git config user.name t && git config user.email t@t && echo hello > f.txt && git add . && git commit -qm init && cd ..\ngit clone -q --bare seed remote.git\nexport GIT_CONFIG_SYSTEM=/tmp/sim/gitconfig\nsh -c \"git 'clone' '--branch' 'main' '--single-branch' '/tmp/sim/remote.git' '/tmp/sim/project'\" ; echo \"clone: $?\"\ncd /tmp/sim/project\nsh -c \"git 'checkout' '-b' 'issue-1-greg'\" ; echo \"checkout: $?\"\nsh -c \"git 'branch' '--show-current'\"\necho more >> f.txt\nsh -c \"git 'add' 'f.txt'\" && sh -c \"git 'commit' '-qm' 'from sandbox'\" ; echo \"commit: $?\"\nsh -c \"git 'log' '-1' '--format=%an %ae'\"\nsh -c \"git 'pull'\" ; echo \"pull: $?\"\necho \"=== gitconfig ===\" && cat /tmp/sim/gitconfig\necho \"=== token in project? ===\" && (grep -r super-secret-token /tmp/sim/project || echo \"no leak\")", "timeout": 60}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /tmp/sim\ngit init -q -b main seed\ncd seed && git config user.name t && git config user.email t@t && echo hello > f.txt && git add . && git commit -qm init && cd ..\ngit clone -q --bare seed remote.git\nexport GIT_CONFIG_SYSTEM=/tmp/sim/gitconfig\nsh -c \"git 'clone' '--branch' 'main' '--single-branch' '/tmp/sim/remote.git' '/tmp/sim/project'\" ; echo \"clone: $?\"\ncd /tmp/sim/project\nsh -c \"git 'checkout' '-b' 'issue-1-greg'\" ; echo \"checkout: $?\"\nsh -c \"git 'branch' '--show-current'\"\necho more >> f.txt\nsh -c \"git 'add' 'f.txt'\" && sh -c \"git 'commit' '-qm' 'from sandbox'\" ; echo \"commit: $?\"\nsh -c \"git 'log' '-1' '--format=%an %ae'\"\nsh -c \"git 'pull'\" ; echo \"pull: $?\"\necho \"=== gitconfig ===\" && cat /tmp/sim/gitconfig\necho \"=== token in project? ===\" && (grep -r super-secret-token /tmp/sim/project || echo \"no leak\")", "timeout": 60}
Result
warning: re-init: ignored --initial-branch=main
On branch main
nothing to commit, working tree clean
fatal: repository 'seed' does not exist
fatal: destination path '/tmp/sim/project' already exists and is not an empty directory.
clone: 128
Switched to a new branch 'issue-1-greg'
checkout: 0
issue-1-greg
commit: 0
Greg Coolio greg@noreply.localhost
Already up to date.
pull: 0
=== gitconfig ===
[safe]
directory = *
directory = *
[user]
name = Greg Coolio
email = greg@noreply.localhost
[http "https://forgejo.example/acme/widgets.git"]
extraHeader = Authorization: Basic c3VwZXItc2VjcmV0LXRva2Vu
=== token in project? ===
no leak
Thinking
Interesting results:
1. The reason the seed re-init failed is that the first failed run had already partially created `seed` (it had the commit, but the bare clone wasn't created). "fatal: repository 'seed' does not exist" β hmm, that's odd. It says `git clone --bare seed remote.git` failed with "repository 'seed' does not exist"β¦ wait, actually looking at the output: "warning: re-init: ignored --initial-branch=main", "On branch main, nothing to commit" β so seed already existed from the first run. Then `git clone -q --bare seed remote.git` β wait, the error "fatal: repository 'seed' does not exist" isβ¦ hmm, the cwd. After `cd seed && ... && cd ..` we're in /tmp/sim. `git clone -q --bare seed remote.git` should work, butβ¦
Wait, looking more carefully: the output order is jumbled. "fatal: repository 'seed' does not exist" β hmm. But then the clone into /project failed with "destination path '/tmp/sim/project' already exists and is not an empty directory" β so /tmp/sim/project was not empty! From the first runβ¦ no wait, the first run failed at the clone step (before that, only gitconfig). Hmm, no β the first run: `git init -q -b main seed && cd seed && ... git commit && cd .. && git clone -q --bare seed remote.git` β that run failed with exit 128 somewhere. Then in the second run I only did the gitconfig step. So in this third run: seed already existed (from run 1, with the commit). `git clone -q --bare seed remote.git` β "fatal: repository 'seed' does not exist"??
Ah, wait. I got it β `git clone -q --bare seed remote.git`: when you pass two arguments, the first is the source URL and the second is the destination. "repository 'seed' does not exist" β is it becauseβ¦ hmm, `seed` is a relative path from cwd /tmp/sim. It should exist. Unless cwd wasn't /tmp/sim. `cd /tmp/sim` at the top β that succeeded. Hmm, wait, actually looking at the output again: "warning: re-init: ignored --initial-branch=main" appears first β that's from `git init -q -b main seed` (seed already exists). Then "On branch main / nothing to commit" β that's the commit step (nothing to commit, but -qβ¦ no, it printed "nothing to commit, working tree clean", which is what git commit prints when there's nothing to commit, and it exits with 1!).
Wait, `git commit -qm init` with nothing to commit exits with 1, and the `&&` chainβ¦ I used `&&` between steps within `cd seed && git config ... && echo > f.txt && git add . && git commit -qm init && cd ..`. If commit exits with 1 (nothing to commit), the `cd ..` doesn't execute! So we stayed in /tmp/sim/seed. Then `git clone -q --bare seed remote.git` was executed from inside /tmp/sim/seed, where the `seed` subdirectory doesn't exist β "repository 'seed' does not exist". And `remote.git` was created inside /tmp/sim/seed/remote.git.
Then the clone into /tmp/sim/project failed: "already exists and is not an empty directory" β becauseβ¦ /tmp/sim/project was created in run 1 (mkdir -p sim/project). But it should be emptyβ¦ unless the failed clone in run 1 left something behind? In run 1, the clone step: `sh -c "git 'clone' ... '/tmp/sim/project'"` β wait, run 1 failed at exit 128 β which step? Run 1 had `set -e`, and the steps were: gitconfig (4 commands), then clone. Hmm, but in run 1 the bare remote didn't exist (the clone of seedβremote.git was in the same run, before the gitconfig step? No wait β run 1's order was: seed init/commit, bare clone, gitconfig, clone into project. Run 1's exit 128 wasβ¦ hmm, if `git clone -q --bare seed remote.git` succeeded in run 1, then remote.git exists. But in run 3, the clone from seed failed with "repository does not exist" β because cwd was seed (due to the broken && chain).
So then, why is /tmp/sim/project not empty? Let's check: maybe run 1's clone into project actually started and created something? "destination path already exists and is not an empty directory" β git clone into a non-empty directory. What's in /tmp/sim/project? Let's take a look.
Actually, wait β in run 1, with `set -e`, the command that failed with 128 wasβ¦ let me retrace run 1:
```
cd /tmp && rm -rf sim && mkdir -p sim/project && cd sim
git init -q -b main seed && cd seed
git config user.name t && git config user.email t@t
echo hello > f.txt && git add . && git commit -qm init && cd ..
git clone -q --bare seed remote.git
export GIT_CONFIG_SYSTEM=...
sh -c git config --system --add safe.directory '*'
... (4 config commands)
sh -c "git 'clone' '--branch' 'main' '--single-branch' '/tmp/sim/remote.git' '/tmp/sim/project'"
```
Hmm, wait, run 1 was `set -e` and multi-line (not a single && chain). `git commit -qm init && cd ..` β the commit succeeded (fresh repo), cd .. also succeeded. `git clone -q --bare seed remote.git` β should have succeededβ¦ unless it didn't. Exit 128 is a git error. Which git command in run 1 returned 128?
Ah, wait. I got it. In run 1: `git init -q -b main seed && cd seed` β no problem. Then `git config user.name t` β no problem. `echo hello > f.txt && git add . && git commit -qm init && cd ..` β no problem. `git clone -q --bare seed remote.git` β no problem?
Hmm, but then the gitconfig step, and then the clone into /tmp/sim/project. /tmp/sim/project was created empty by mkdir -p. Clone into an empty directory β works.
So why did run 1 fail with 128? And why is /tmp/sim/project not empty now?
Hmm β maybe run 1's clone into project actually succeeded, and the failure was later: `sh -c "git 'checkout' '-b' 'issue-1-greg'"` β no wait, that's not in run 1β¦ let me re-read run 1's script:
```
sh -c "git 'clone' '--branch' 'main' '--single-branch' '/tmp/sim/remote.git' '/tmp/sim/project'"
sh -c "git 'checkout' '-b' 'issue-1-greg'"
sh -c "git 'branch' '--show-current'"
echo more >> f.txt
sh -c "git 'add' 'f.txt'"
sh -c "git 'commit' '-qm' 'from sandbox'"
sh -c "git 'log' '-1' '--format=%an %ae'"
sh -c "git 'pull' 2>&1" || true
```
`sh -c "git 'checkout' '-b' 'issue-1-greg'"` β cwd is /tmp/sim (not /tmp/sim/project!). So `git checkout -b` in /tmp/sim β not a git repository β exit 128 β `set -e` β run 1 died there. That's it! In the real container, the exec's working directory is /project (the container's WorkingDir), so checkout runs at the repo root. In my simulation, I forgot to cd into project.
So /tmp/sim/project contains a complete clone (from run 1) β that's why run 3's clone said "not an empty directory".
Everything is consistent. The simulation confirmed the following:
- The gitconfig system file is exactly correct: safe.directory, user.name/email, and `[http "https://forgejo.example/acme/widgets.git"] extraHeader = Authorization: Basic ...`.
- The token is not in the project tree.
- The identity from the system gitconfig is applied to commits (run 3's commit showed "Greg Coolio greg@noreply.localhost" β wait, that commit was made in /tmp/sim/project, which was the clone from run 1, on branch issue-1-gregβ¦ and the author was Greg Coolio β yes, from the system gitconfig).
- `git pull` works ("Already up to date").
The only "failure" was a bug in my simulation script (cwd), not a bug in the code. In the real container, WorkingDir=/project so all commands run at the repo root.
Let me redo a clean full simulation with the correct cwd to be 100% sure.
The simulation confirmed that the gitconfig contents, identity, pull, and no-leak are all correct. The only failure was a bug in my simulation script (I forgot that the container's working directory is `/project`, so I didn't `cd` into the project). I'll do one clean full simulation with the correct working directory:
Tool
π§ bash
{"command": "set -e\nrm -rf /tmp/sim2 && mkdir -p /tmp/sim2/project && cd /tmp/sim2\ngit init -q -b main seed\n(cd seed && git config user.name t && git config user.email t@t && echo hello > f.txt && git add . && git commit -qm init)\ngit clone -q --bare seed remote.git\nexport GIT_CONFIG_SYSTEM=/tmp/sim2/gitconfig\n# simulate docker exec: every command via sh -c, cwd = /project (container WorkingDir)\nsh -c \"git 'config' '--system' '--add' 'safe.directory' '*'\"\nsh -c \"git 'config' '--system' 'user.name' 'Greg Coolio'\"\nsh -c \"git 'config' '--system' 'user.email' 'greg@noreply.localhost'\"\nsh -c \"git 'config' '--system' 'http.https://forgejo.example/acme/widgets.git.extraHeader' 'Authorization: Basic c3VwZXItc2VjcmV0LXRva2Vu'\"\ncd /tmp/sim2/project\nsh -c \"git 'clone' '--branch' 'main' '--single-branch' '/tmp/sim2/remote.git' '/tmp/sim2/project'\"\nsh -c \"git 'checkout' '-b' 'issue-1-greg'\"\necho \"branch: $(sh -c \"git 'branch' '--show-current'\")\"\necho more >> f.txt\nsh -c \"git 'add' 'f.txt'\"\nsh -c \"git 'commit' '-qm' 'from sandbox'\"\necho \"author: $(sh -c \"git 'log' '-1' '--format=%an %ae'\")\"\nsh -c \"git 'pull'\"\necho \"token leak: $(grep -r super-secret-token /tmp/sim2/project || echo none)\"\necho ALL-OK", "timeout": 60}
Arguments
{"command": "set -e\nrm -rf /tmp/sim2 && mkdir -p /tmp/sim2/project && cd /tmp/sim2\ngit init -q -b main seed\n(cd seed && git config user.name t && git config user.email t@t && echo hello > f.txt && git add . && git commit -qm init)\ngit clone -q --bare seed remote.git\nexport GIT_CONFIG_SYSTEM=/tmp/sim2/gitconfig\n# simulate docker exec: every command via sh -c, cwd = /project (container WorkingDir)\nsh -c \"git 'config' '--system' '--add' 'safe.directory' '*'\"\nsh -c \"git 'config' '--system' 'user.name' 'Greg Coolio'\"\nsh -c \"git 'config' '--system' 'user.email' 'greg@noreply.localhost'\"\nsh -c \"git 'config' '--system' 'http.https://forgejo.example/acme/widgets.git.extraHeader' 'Authorization: Basic c3VwZXItc2VjcmV0LXRva2Vu'\"\ncd /tmp/sim2/project\nsh -c \"git 'clone' '--branch' 'main' '--single-branch' '/tmp/sim2/remote.git' '/tmp/sim2/project'\"\nsh -c \"git 'checkout' '-b' 'issue-1-greg'\"\necho \"branch: $(sh -c \"git 'branch' '--show-current'\")\"\necho more >> f.txt\nsh -c \"git 'add' 'f.txt'\"\nsh -c \"git 'commit' '-qm' 'from sandbox'\"\necho \"author: $(sh -c \"git 'log' '-1' '--format=%an %ae'\")\"\nsh -c \"git 'pull'\"\necho \"token leak: $(grep -r super-secret-token /tmp/sim2/project || echo none)\"\necho ALL-OK", "timeout": 60}
Result
Cloning into '/tmp/sim2/project'...
done.
Switched to a new branch 'issue-1-greg'
branch: issue-1-greg
author: Greg Coolio greg@noreply.localhost
Already up to date.
token leak: none
ALL-OK
Thinking
The complete sandbox git flow works exactly as designed:
1. `git config --system` writes safe.directory, identity, and credentials β all with proper quoting via sh -c.
2. Cloning inside the sandbox works.
3. Branch creation works (cwd = /project, same as the container's WorkingDir).
4. Commits pick up the identity from the system gitconfig.
5. `git pull` works as-is.
6. No token leakage into the working tree.
And from the earlier HTTP server test: when the extraHeader is present, clone/pull/push/ls-remote are authenticated against the actual smart HTTP remote.
Now, let me re-read the final state of run.go and review the entire modified file to make sure everything is consistent. Also, I'll re-check whether there are any lingering references to deleted functions or fields.
The full flow works exactly as designed. Let me review the final state of the changed files:
Tool
π§ read_file
{"end_line": 240, "path": "internal/agentrun/run.go", "start_line": 98}
Arguments
{"end_line": 240, "path": "internal/agentrun/run.go", "start_line": 98}
Result
{"path":"internal/agentrun/run.go","content":"\treturn c\r\n}\r\n\r\n// Run implements scheduler.Runner.\r\nfunc (r *Runner) Run(ctx context.Context, jobID string, agent config.AgentConfig, llmCfg config.LLM, dockerImage string, ev forgejo.Event) error {\r\n\tctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, r.timeout)\r\n\tdefer cancel()\r\n\r\n\tlogger := r.logger.With(\"job\", jobID, \"agent\", agent.Name)\r\n\r\n\trepoInfo, err := r.forgejo.RepositoryInfo(ev.Owner, ev.Repo)\r\n\tif err != nil {\r\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"look up repository: %w\", err)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tworkDir, err := os.MkdirTemp(\"\", \"zoo-run-*\")\r\n\tif err != nil {\r\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"create work dir: %w\", err)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tsucceeded := false\r\n\r\n\tdefer func() {\r\n\t\tif succeeded || !r.keepOnFailure {\r\n\t\t\tos.RemoveAll(workDir)\r\n\t\t} else {\r\n\t\t\tlogger.Warn(\"keeping work dir after failure\", \"dir\", workDir)\r\n\t\t}\r\n\t}()\r\n\r\n\t// The container bind-mounts projectDir as /project and does the\r\n\t// initial clone into it, so the (empty) directory must exist on the\r\n\t// host before the container is created β otherwise Docker would\r\n\t// create it itself, root-owned.\r\n\tprojectDir := filepath.Join(workDir, \"project\")\r\n\r\n\tif err := os.MkdirAll(projectDir, 0o755); err != nil {\r\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"create project dir: %w\", err)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\t// A pr:review run works on the PR's own head branch, so the agent's\r\n\t// commits push straight to the PR. Every other event kind branches\r\n\t// off the default branch as usual.\r\n\tvar review *forgejo.ReviewDetail\r\n\tbranch := fmt.Sprintf(\"issue-%d-%s\", ev.Index, agent.Name)\r\n\r\n\tif ev.Kind == forgejo.EventPRReview {\r\n\t\t// Always fetch the current head ref, not just when the event\r\n\t\t// lacks one (the polling path doesn't carry it): the webhook's\r\n\t\t// copy could be stale if the PR's head branch was renamed since\r\n\t\t// the review, and the push target depends on it.\r\n\t\theadRef := ev.HeadRef\r\n\r\n\t\tif prInfo, err := r.forgejo.PullRequestInfo(ev.Owner, ev.Repo, ev.Index); err != nil {\r\n\t\t\tlogger.Warn(\"fetch pull request head failed; falling back to the event's head ref\", \"error\", err)\r\n\t\t} else if prInfo.HeadRef != \"\" {\r\n\t\t\theadRef = prInfo.HeadRef\r\n\t\t}\r\n\r\n\t\tif headRef == \"\" {\r\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"pr:review event has no pull request head branch to check out\")\r\n\t\t}\r\n\r\n\t\tbranch = headRef\r\n\r\n\t\t// Fetch the full review (verdict, body, inline comments) so the\r\n\t\t// agent sees all the feedback, not just the triggering event. A\r\n\t\t// failure degrades to no review detail rather than failing the\r\n\t\t// run: the agent can still do its job, just without the inline\r\n\t\t// comments.\r\n\t\treview, err = r.forgejo.ReviewDetail(ev.Owner, ev.Repo, ev.Index, ev.ReviewID)\r\n\t\tif err != nil {\r\n\t\t\tlogger.Warn(\"fetch review detail failed; agent will not see inline review comments\", \"error\", err)\r\n\t\t\treview = nil\r\n\t\t}\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\troster := buildRoster(r.forgejo, r.cfg.Agents, logger)\r\n\tgitName, gitEmail := gitIdentity(agent.Name, roster)\r\n\r\n\t// The credential the sandbox's git uses for remote operations: the\r\n\t// agent's own Forgejo token when configured, so its git activity is\r\n\t// attributed to its own account, falling back to the shared zoo\r\n\t// identity for deployments without per-agent tokens (mirroring\r\n\t// forgejoAs).\r\n\tgitUser, gitToken := \"zoo\", r.forgejo.Token()\r\n\r\n\tif agent.Token != \"\" {\r\n\t\tgitUser, gitToken = agent.Name, agent.Token\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\teventPath := filepath.Join(workDir, \"event.json\")\r\n\tif err := os.WriteFile(eventPath, ev.Raw, 0o644); err != nil {\r\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"write event file: %w\", err)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tcontainerID, err := r.docker.createContainer(ctx, dockerImage, []string{\r\n\t\tprojectDir + \":/project\",\r\n\t\teventPath + \":/event:ro\",\r\n\t}, fmt.Sprintf(\"zoo-issue-%d-%s\", ev.Index, agent.Name))\r\n\tif err != nil {\r\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"start container: %w\", err)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tdefer func() {\r\n\t\tcleanupCtx, cleanupCancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 30*time.Second)\r\n\t\tdefer cleanupCancel()\r\n\t\tif err := r.docker.remove(cleanupCtx, containerID); err != nil {\r\n\t\t\tlogger.Warn(\"failed to remove container\", \"container\", containerID, \"error\", err)\r\n\t\t}\r\n\t}()\r\n\r\n\t// Git must simply work inside the sandbox: safe.directory, commit\r\n\t// identity, and the remote credential all go into the container's\r\n\t// system gitconfig (see configureSandboxGit).\r\n\tif err := configureSandboxGit(ctx, r.docker, containerID, repoInfo.CloneURL, gitUser, gitToken, gitName, gitEmail); err != nil {\r\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure git in container: %w\", err)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\t// The initial clone happens inside the sandbox, so the working tree\r\n\t// is owned by the container's user and git never runs on the host.\r\n\tif ev.Kind == forgejo.EventPRReview {\r\n\t\tif err := clonePRHead(ctx, r.docker, containerID, repoInfo.CloneURL, repoInfo.DefaultBranch, branch, ev.Index); err != nil {\r\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"prepare git working tree: %w\", err)\r\n\t\t}\r\n\t} else {\r\n\t\tif err := cloneAndBranch(ctx, r.docker, containerID, repoInfo.CloneURL, repoInfo.DefaultBranch, branch); err != nil {\r\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"prepare git working tree: %w\", err)\r\n\t\t}\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tlogAppend := func(stream, line string) {\r\n\t\tif err := r.store.AppendLog(context.Background(), jobID, stream, line); err != nil {\r\n\t\t\tlogger.Warn(\"failed to append log\", \"error\", err)\r\n\t\t}\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\trunCtx := \u0026runContext{\r\n\t\tdocker: r.docker,\r\n\t\tcontainerID: containerID,\r\n\t\tforgejo: \u0026runForgejoActions{\r\n\t\t\tclient: r.forgejoAs(agent.Name, agent.Token),\r\n\t\t\towner: ev.Owner,\r","start_line":98,"end_line":240,"total_lines":437,"truncated":true}
Thinking
The flow in run.go looks good. One thing I want to double-check: the `forgejo:` field alignment inside runContext β gofmt. Let me run gofmt on all the files I changed.
Also, I should double-check the `docker.go` exec environment variables β the exec's Env list includes `GIT_CONFIG_COUNT=1` and such. This is an environment variable-based config overlay that gets applied on top of the file-based config. It doesn't conflict with the system gitconfig. Good.
Another consideration: the `exec` function in `docker.go` has a comment about `GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT=0` β still relevant.
Now, let me think about edge cases:
1. **`git pull` when the remote has moved**: works β fetch uses the extraHeader.
2. **What if the agent runs `git clone <another-url>` via bash?** No credentials for other URLs (scoped to the clone URL). This is by design (surgical).
3. **What if the agent's token is invalid / expired?** The clone fails with an auth error, and the run fails with a clear error. Good β fail-fast before the LLM loop.
4. **`--single-branch` clone**: only fetches the default branch. Then `git pull` on the working branch (issue-N-agent) β the branch doesn't exist on the remote yet, so `git pull` will say "There is no tracking information for the current branch" β hmm! Wait.
Let me think about this. The agent's workflow:
- Clone (single-branch, default branch) β checkout -b issue-48-greg
- Agent commits on issue-48-greg
- Agent pushes: `git push origin issue-48-greg` (or `git push -u origin issue-48-greg`)
The system prompt says "git add/git commit/git push your branch." If the agent runs `git push origin <branch>` β works (push doesn't need tracking info). If the agent runs `git push -u origin HEAD` β works.
But `git pull` on a fresh branch with no upstream: `git pull` fails with "There is no tracking information for the current branch." Hmm. The issue says "git pull must just work for the agent inside the sandbox."
Hmm β what does the agent pull? On a fresh branch off the default branch, what would the agent pull? Probably to update the default branch (e.g., `git pull origin main`). That works with the credentials.
But a bare `git pull` on the working branch: the working branch has no upstream. In the old host-side flow, the agent's `git` tool `pull` had the same problem β no upstream. So this isn't a regression. But the issue explicitly says "git pull must just work."
Options:
a. Set the upstream of the working branch to the default branch: after `checkout -b <branch>`, run `git branch --set-upstream-to=origin/<defaultBranch> <branch>`. Then `git pull` fetches the default branch and merges it into the working branch. This is actually a sensible default: pulling updates the working branch with the latest default-branch content. And `git push` still needs an explicit refspec (push.default simple requires the same-named branch to exist on the remoteβ¦ hmm, actually, with upstream set to origin/main and push.default=simple, `git push` on branch issue-48-greg will fail with "The current branch has no upstream branch" β no wait, that's for pull. For push with push.default=simple: "push to the upstream branch only if the upstream branch has the same name as the local branch." If the upstream name differs, `git push` (no args) fails with "fatal: The current branch issue-48-greg has no upstream branch"? No wait β
Let me recall git push.default=simple exactly: "Push the current branch to a branch of the same name on the remote. If you are working on a centralized workflow (i.e., the branch you are from is the same as the branch you are pushing to), you can mark the upstream branch (aka HEAD) using git branch --set-upstream. If no upstream branch is set, push will not automatically set one⦠Actually, with push.default set to simple, when you push to a remote that is different from the remote you normally pull from, git will abort unless you specify a simple refspec to push. This is the default since Git 2.0, and it prevents pushing to the wrong remote due to use of interactive rebase."
Hmm, more precisely: push.default=simple β behaves like `current` when pushing to the same remote you pull from (i.e., when the branch has an upstream on that remote), and like `upstream` when pushing to a different remote. If the current branch has no upstream at all, `git push` (no args) fails with "The current branch has no upstream branch."
So if we set the upstream to origin/main (a different name), a bare `git push` will fail (the current branch issue-48-greg has no upstream branch of the same name⦠let me think. push.default=simple: "when pushing to a remote different from the remote you normally pull from, behaves as upstream; when pushing to the same remote you pull from, behaves as current."
Hmm, "current" = push to a branch of the same name on the remote. So `git push` on issue-48-greg (upstream = origin/main, same remote origin) β behaves as "current" β pushes to origin/issue-48-greg.
Wait, I need to be careful. Let me recall the git docs for push.default:
- `current`: Push the current branch to a branch of the same name on the remote.
- `upstream`: Push the current branch to the same-named branch on the remote to which the current branch is set to build or merge⦠i.e., push to the upstream branch (origin/main in our case).
- `simple`: "Push the current branch to a branch of the same name on the remote. If you are working on a centralized workflow (i.e., the branch you are from is the same as the branch you are pushing to), you can mark the upstream branch (aka HEAD) using git branch --set-upstream. If no upstream branch is set, push will not automatically set one. This mode is the same as current, except that it will refuse to push if the upstream branch's name is different from the local branch's name. This is probably what you want in most cases."
So with simple: if the upstream branch name (main) differs from the local branch name (issue-48-greg) β **refuses to push** ("refuse to push if the upstream branch's name is different from the local branch's name")!
So setting upstream to origin/main breaks a bare `git push`. That's bad β the agent's main workflow is `git push` (or `git push -u origin <branch>`).
Hmm. So option (a) has a drawback: a bare `git push` breaks.
b. Don't set the upstream. A bare `git pull` on the working branch fails with "no tracking information" β but `git pull origin main` works. A bare `git push` also fails ("no upstream branch") β the agent has to use `git push -u origin <branch>` or `git push origin <branch>`. This is the current behavior (no change from the old host-side flow).
The issue says "git pull must just work for the agent inside the sandbox. I'm not sure how, but it must work. Maybe we need to put something in .gitconfig, but it must work."
I think the intent is: **git operations against the remote must authenticate and work** β i.e., the agent doesn't have to fight with credentials. The "how" the issue author is guessing at is .gitconfig (which is exactly what we did). A bare `git pull` on a branch with no upstream is a git semantics issue, not an authentication issue.
But, hmm, "git pull must just work" β let me think about what the agent actually does. Typical agent flow per the system prompt:
1. Work on a branch, commit.
2. `git push` the branch β then open a PR.
When does the agent `git pull`? Maybe to sync with the latest default branch before pushing, or to pull in changes. The most common form: `git pull origin <default>` or `git pull` after setting upstream.
Actually, wait β let me reconsider. What if we set the upstream to origin/<branch> (same name) before the branch exists on the remote? `git branch --set-upstream-to=origin/issue-48-greg` β fails, because origin/issue-48-greg doesn't exist yet (the remote-tracking ref doesn't exist).
Alternative: after the first push, the upstream gets set (with -u). But the agent controls the push command.
Hmm, what about `push.autoSetupRemote`? That's for push, not pull.
Let me think about what "just work" pragmatically means for the agent:
- `git pull origin main` β works (authenticates).
- `git pull` on a branch with upstream set β works.
- `git push origin issue-48-greg` β works.
- `git push -u origin issue-48-greg` β works, and sets the upstream.
- Bare `git push` β fails until the upstream is set (same as before this change).
- Bare `git pull` on a fresh branch β "no tracking information" (same as before this change).
The old system prompt said "for remote (pull, fetch, push, etc.) git operations, you can use the `git` tool" β the agent knows to use explicit refspecs. The git tool's description: "run a git subcommand with optional arguments." The agent passes args like ['origin', 'main'].
I think the right call is: **don't set a misleading upstream**. Setting upstream to origin/main would break bare `git push` (a more common operation than bare `git pull` in this workflow). The authentication is what "must work," and it does.
Hmm, but wait β let me reconsider once more. Is there a way to make both bare `git pull` and bare `git push` work?
- Bare `git push` needs upstream = origin/issue-48-greg (same name).
- Bare `git pull` needs an upstream.
If the upstream is origin/issue-48-greg, then `git pull` fetches origin/issue-48-greg β which doesn't exist on the remote until the first push. After the first push, it exists, and pull works (fetches the agent's own branch). Before the first push, `git pull` fails with "couldn't find remote ref issue-48-greg."
So there's no single upstream setting that makes both bare commands work at all times. The workflow is: the agent pushes first (that's how work is saved), so after the first `git push -u`, both bare commands work. Before that, bare `git pull` is meaningless anyway (there's nothing to pull for a brand-new branch).
Decision: don't set the upstream. Document in the system prompt that remote operations are authenticated. This matches the issue's core requirement: credentials work transparently, and `git pull` (with a refspec, or after the upstream is set) just works.
Hmm, actually, wait. Let me re-read the issue once more:
"Pass the agent's token to the sandbox so the agent can do its own git operations β even against the remote. Also do the initial git clone inside the sandbox. There should be no need to run git outside the sandbox.
'git pull' must just work for the agent inside the sandbox. I'm not sure how, but it must work. Maybe we need to put something in .gitconfig, but it must work."
Yes β "I'm not sure how, but it must work. Maybe we need to put something in .gitconfig" β the author is asking for a mechanism (the .gitconfig approach) that makes remote git operations work without the agent having to think about credentials. That's exactly what we built. The bare-`git pull`-on-a-fresh-branch semantics is orthogonal to that.
OK β one more thing to consider: **`git pull` with `pull.rebase` or merge** β the default merge behavior is fine.
Now, let me also reconsider **whether to scope the extraHeader to the clone URL or to the forge host**. One more scenario: the agent runs `git fetch origin <something>` β origin is the clone URL β works. `git ls-remote origin` β works.
What about **submodules**? If a repo has submodules pointing to other repos on the same forge, `git submodule update --init` will clone those other URLs β no credentials β fails. Scoping to the host would fix that. Hmm. Is that a realistic concern for zoo's repos? Possibly. The agent's token is a personal token for the agent's Forgejo account β it can access any repo that account can access.
Trade-off:
- Clone-URL scope: surgical, least privilege. Submodules to other repos break.
- Host scope: covers all repos on the forge (including submodules, and the agent cloning other repos for reference).
The issue says "so the agent can do its own git operations β even against the remote." The agent's git operations are about its own repo. But submodules are a realistic git operation that touches other remotesβ¦
Hmm. Let me think about which is more likely to be wanted. The issue author (abrander) says "git pull must just work." For a repo with submodules, `git pull` triggers submodule updates (if configured) β needs credentials for the submodule URLs.
I'm leaning toward scoping to the forge host (the URL's scheme+host) rather than the full repo path. Reasons:
1. The token is the agent's own account token β it only grants what that account can access anyway. Scoping the header to the host doesn't grant more access than the token itself.
2. It makes submodule / multi-repo operations work.
3. It's still scoped to the forge (not `http.extraHeader` globally, which would leak the header to any URL git talks to β e.g., a malicious repo could point a submodule at an attacker's hostβ¦ well, with host scope, the header only goes to the forge host, so it's fine).
Wait, actually, let me reconsider the security angle: `http.<host>.extraHeader` sends the agent's token to that host on every git request. The host is the forge itself β the token is for that forge. No leakage to third parties. Good.
Whereas clone-URL scope: the token only goes to that repo's URL. Slightly more surgical, but breaks submodules.
Hmm, hmm. Which to pick? Let me look at it from the "what will the maintainer want" angle. The issue title: "pass the token to the sandbox." Body: "so the agent can do its own git operations β even against the remote."
I think host scope is the more robust choice, and it's still principled: "the sandbox can talk to the forge as the agent." Let me implement host scope: extract scheme+host from the clone URL.
Clone URL format: `https://code.stdio.dk/abrander/zoo.git`. scheme+host = `https://code.stdio.dk`. Config key: `http.https://code.stdio.dk/.extraHeader`? Or `http.https://code.stdio.dk.extraHeader`?
Git's URL matching for `http.<base>.extraHeader`: the base is matched as a prefix of the request URL, and the docs say the base should end with `/`β¦ let me check the git docs for http.<url>.extraHeader:
"extraHeader: Extra header to send on HTTP requests to the <url> prefix. β¦ The <url> prefix must match the request URLβ¦"
From git's docs (http.<base>.*): "These configuration settings are useful only when combined withβ¦ The <base> must be a URL prefixβ¦"
The actual matching: git's `http_config` lookup β for `http.<url>.extraHeader`, git checks `url_match_match` β the configured URL must be a prefix of the actual URL, and the match must be on a path boundary? Let me recall `url_match_match` in http.c:
```c
static int url_match_match(const struct url_match *match, const char *url)
{
const char *p = match->url;
const char *q = url;
...
while (*p && *q == *p) {
p++;
q++;
}
if (!*p)
return 1;
/*
* If the match URL ends with '/', the next character in the URL
* can be anything. Otherwise, the next character in the URL must
* be '/' or the end of the string.
*/
if (p[-1] == '/')
return 1;
return *q == '/' || *q == '\0';
}
```
So `http.https://code.stdio.dk.extraHeader` (no trailing slash) matches `https://code.stdio.dk/abrander/zoo.git/...` (next char is `/`). It also matches `https://code.stdio.dk` itself. And it does not match `https://code.stdio.dk.evil.com/...` (next char is `.`, not `/` or end).
So `http.https://code.stdio.dk.extraHeader` is safe and correct.
Hmm, OK, wait, but now I'm going back and forth. Let me decide definitively.
Arguments for host scope:
- Submodules / other repos on the same forge work.
- The token is already scoped to the forge by its nature.
- "git pull just works" even for repos with submodules.
Arguments for repo scope:
- Least privilege.
- If the forge host is shared⦠no, the token is for that forge.
The least-privilege argument is weak here, because the token itself is the privilege boundary (a Forgejo PAT for the agent's account, valid only on that forge). The header scope doesn't add privilege beyond the token's validity.
Decision: **host scope** (scheme + host from the clone URL). This maximizes "just works."
Implementation: parse the clone URL to get scheme+host:
```go
// forgeHost returns the scheme+host prefix of cloneURL, e.g.
// "https://code.stdio.dk" for "https://code.stdio.dk/abrander/zoo.git".
func forgeHost(cloneURL string) string {
u, err := url.Parse(cloneURL)
if err != nil || u.Host == "" {
return cloneURL // fall back to the full URL
}
return u.Scheme + "://" + u.Host
}
```
And the config key: `http.` + host + `.extraHeader` β `http.https://code.stdio.dk.extraHeader`.
Wait β but a subtle point: the key `http.https://code.stdio.dk.extraHeader` β git parses section=http, subsection=`https://code.stdio.dk`, variable=extraHeader. The subsection contains `:` and `//` β verified to work earlier.
Hmm, but wait β what if the clone URL is not http(s)? E.g., ssh:// or git@β¦? Forgejo's CloneURL from the API is always http(s) (the web clone URL). If someone configured an ssh URLβ¦ RepositoryInfo comes from the Forgejo API's `clone_url`, which is http(s). If parsing fails or there's no host, fall back to the full URL as the prefix (the old behavior). Good.
Also, for the integration test: the credential round-trip check must use the same key. Let me update the test to use `forgeHost(cloneURL)`.
Hmm, wait, actually β let me reconsider once more. Is there a downside to host scope in terms of the token being sent to the forge on requests the agent makes to other repos? E.g., the agent clones a public repo on the forge β the request carries the agent's token. That's fine (it's the agent's own token, and the forge is the intended recipient).
OK, going with host scope. Actually, hmm, one more angle: **testability**. In the integration test, the clone URL is a local path (`/bare`), and the credential URL is a fake https URL. With host scope, the key becomes `http.https://forgejo.example.extraHeader`. The round-trip check reads that key back. Fine.
Let me also reconsider: should `configureSandboxGit` take a host, or compute it internally? Compute it internally from the cloneURL β keeps the caller simple.
Now, let me also reconsider the **username in the Basic auth**. For the agent's token, the username = the agent's name (Forgejo username). For the shared fallback, "zoo". Gitea/Forgejo Basic auth: the username is checked against the token's owner? Let me thinkβ¦ in Gitea's `BasicAuthenticator` (models/auth.go or auth/oauth2.goβ¦): for Basic auth, Gitea tries: if the password looks like a token (starts with "goc" or is a long hex), look up the token; the token's owner is the authenticated user, and the username isβ¦ let me recall the actual code:
```go
// BasicAuthenticator ...
func (b *BasicAuthenticator) Authenticate(ctx context.Context, w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) (*session.Session, error) {
userName, password, ok := r.BasicAuth()
if !ok {
return nil, nil
}
if strings.HasPrefix(userName, "oauth2:") {
...
}
// Try to find the user by token
if token, err := auth.GetTokenByToken(ctx, password); err == nil {
// The token's owner is the user
...
}
// Otherwise, look up the user by name and check the password
...
}
```
Roughly: if the password is a valid token, the token's owner is authenticated (the username is mostly ignored β or it's checked that the username matches the token's owner?). In Gitea's `auth.GetTokenByToken` β `CheckToken`β¦ I believe the username is ignored when a token is used (that's why "zoo" + the shared token works today β the shared token's owner is the zoo service account, not a user named "zoo"β¦ wait, is there a user named "zoo"? The existing code uses "zoo:" + the shared token and it works in production (that's the current code). So the username is not strictly checked.
For the agent's token, using the agent's username is the most correct (matches the token's owner). Good.
Now β one more important detail I should double-check: **does `git config --system` work on the golang:latest image?** The existing code already runs `git config --system --add safe.directory '*'` on golang:latest (per the integration test comment "against the same golang:latest image that zoo.hcl now defaults to"). So yes.
**What if the container runs as non-root?** `git config --system` writes to /etc/gitconfig β needs write permission. If the container runs as non-root, that fails. The current code has the same constraint (it already runs --system). Not a new problem.
OK, let me also reconsider whether to keep the **`--single-branch`** clone. With single-branch, only the default branch is fetched. Then `git pull origin <other-branch>`β¦ the agent might want other branches (e.g., to see another agent's branch). Hmm, the old behavior was also --single-branch. Keep it (surgical). Actually, wait β with single-branch, the remote.origin.fetch refspec is only for the default branch. `git fetch origin other-branch` works anyway (explicit refspec). No problem, keep as-is.
Now, let me update sandboxgit.go for host scope.
The flow is solid. One improvement before finalizing: the credential header is currently scoped to the exact clone URL. If we scope it to the **forge host** (scheme+host) instead, the agent's token will also cover submodules and other repos on the same forge, while still never leaking to any other host (the token itself is only valid on that forge anyway). This makes `git pull` work even in repos that have submodules:
Tool
π§ edit_file
{"path": "internal/agentrun/sandboxgit.go", "find": "import (\n\t\"context\"\n\t\"encoding/base64\"\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"strings\"\n)", "replace": "import (\n\t\"context\"\n\t\"encoding/base64\"\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"net/url\"\n\t\"strings\"\n)"}
Arguments
{"path": "internal/agentrun/sandboxgit.go", "find": "import (\n\t\"context\"\n\t\"encoding/base64\"\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"strings\"\n)", "replace": "import (\n\t\"context\"\n\t\"encoding/base64\"\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"net/url\"\n\t\"strings\"\n)"}
Result
1 occurrences replaced
Tool
π§ edit_file
{"path": "internal/agentrun/sandboxgit.go", "find": "// gitAuthHeader returns the value of an Authorization header that\n// authenticates git's smart-HTTP requests as user with token.\nfunc gitAuthHeader(user, token string) string {\n\tauth := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(user + \":\" + token))\n\n\treturn \"Authorization: Basic \" + auth\n}", "replace": "// gitAuthHeader returns the value of an Authorization header that\n// authenticates git's smart-HTTP requests as user with token.\nfunc gitAuthHeader(user, token string) string {\n\tauth := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(user + \":\" + token))\n\n\treturn \"Authorization: Basic \" + auth\n}\n\n// forgeHost returns the scheme+host prefix of cloneURL, e.g.\n// \"https://code.stdio.dk\" for \"https://code.stdio.dk/abrander/zoo.git\".\n// On a parse failure it falls back to the full URL, which is a valid\n// (narrower) prefix match too.\nfunc forgeHost(cloneURL string) string {\n\tu, err := url.Parse(cloneURL)\n\tif err != nil || u.Host == \"\" {\n\t\treturn cloneURL\n\t}\n\n\treturn u.Scheme + \"://\" + u.Host\n}"}
Arguments
{"path": "internal/agentrun/sandboxgit.go", "find": "// gitAuthHeader returns the value of an Authorization header that\n// authenticates git's smart-HTTP requests as user with token.\nfunc gitAuthHeader(user, token string) string {\n\tauth := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(user + \":\" + token))\n\n\treturn \"Authorization: Basic \" + auth\n}", "replace": "// gitAuthHeader returns the value of an Authorization header that\n// authenticates git's smart-HTTP requests as user with token.\nfunc gitAuthHeader(user, token string) string {\n\tauth := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(user + \":\" + token))\n\n\treturn \"Authorization: Basic \" + auth\n}\n\n// forgeHost returns the scheme+host prefix of cloneURL, e.g.\n// \"https://code.stdio.dk\" for \"https://code.stdio.dk/abrander/zoo.git\".\n// On a parse failure it falls back to the full URL, which is a valid\n// (narrower) prefix match too.\nfunc forgeHost(cloneURL string) string {\n\tu, err := url.Parse(cloneURL)\n\tif err != nil || u.Host == \"\" {\n\t\treturn cloneURL\n\t}\n\n\treturn u.Scheme + \"://\" + u.Host\n}"}
Result
1 occurrences replaced
Thinking
Next, I'll update `configureSandboxGit` to use `forgeHost(cloneURL)` for the extraHeader key, and update its doc comment.
Tool
π§ edit_file
{"path": "internal/agentrun/sandboxgit.go", "find": "// - http.<cloneURL>.extraHeader carrying the run's Forgejo\n// credential, scoped to this repository's URL, so clone/fetch/\n// pull/push all authenticate transparently.", "replace": "// - http.<host>.extraHeader carrying the run's Forgejo credential,\n// scoped to the forge host the repository lives on, so\n// clone/fetch/pull/push all authenticate transparently β including\n// for submodules and other repos on the same forge. The token is\n// only valid on that forge anyway, so the host scope grants no\n// extra access; git never sends it anywhere else."}
Arguments
{"path": "internal/agentrun/sandboxgit.go", "find": "// - http.<cloneURL>.extraHeader carrying the run's Forgejo\n// credential, scoped to this repository's URL, so clone/fetch/\n// pull/push all authenticate transparently.", "replace": "// - http.<host>.extraHeader carrying the run's Forgejo credential,\n// scoped to the forge host the repository lives on, so\n// clone/fetch/pull/push all authenticate transparently β including\n// for submodules and other repos on the same forge. The token is\n// only valid on that forge anyway, so the host scope grants no\n// extra access; git never sends it anywhere else."}
Result
1 occurrences replaced
Tool
π§ edit_file
{"path": "internal/agentrun/sandboxgit.go", "find": "\tif _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"config\", \"--system\", \"http.\"+cloneURL+\".extraHeader\", gitAuthHeader(user, token)); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure git credential: %w\", err)\n\t}", "replace": "\tif _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"config\", \"--system\", \"http.\"+forgeHost(cloneURL)+\".extraHeader\", gitAuthHeader(user, token)); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure git credential: %w\", err)\n\t}"}
Arguments
{"path": "internal/agentrun/sandboxgit.go", "find": "\tif _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"config\", \"--system\", \"http.\"+cloneURL+\".extraHeader\", gitAuthHeader(user, token)); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure git credential: %w\", err)\n\t}", "replace": "\tif _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"config\", \"--system\", \"http.\"+forgeHost(cloneURL)+\".extraHeader\", gitAuthHeader(user, token)); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure git credential: %w\", err)\n\t}"}
Result
1 occurrences replaced
Thinking
Also, I'll update the doc comment for `cloneAndBranch` that references `http.<cloneURL>.extraHeader`:
"The clone is authenticated via the http.<cloneURL>.extraHeader set by configureSandboxGit" β change it to http.<host>.extraHeader.
Next, I'll update the integration tests to use forgeHost in the round-trip check, and add unit tests for forgeHost.
Tool
π§ edit_file
{"path": "internal/agentrun/sandboxgit.go", "find": "// cloneAndBranch clones cloneURL into /project inside the container\n// and checks out a fresh branch off defaultBranch. The clone\n// authenticates via the http.<cloneURL>.extraHeader configured by\n// configureSandboxGit, and the origin remote is left with the plain\n// cloneURL: no credential ends up in the working tree.", "replace": "// cloneAndBranch clones cloneURL into /project inside the container\n// and checks out a fresh branch off defaultBranch. The clone\n// authenticates via the http.<host>.extraHeader configured by\n// configureSandboxGit, and the origin remote is left with the plain\n// cloneURL: no credential ends up in the working tree."}
Arguments
{"path": "internal/agentrun/sandboxgit.go", "find": "// cloneAndBranch clones cloneURL into /project inside the container\n// and checks out a fresh branch off defaultBranch. The clone\n// authenticates via the http.<cloneURL>.extraHeader configured by\n// configureSandboxGit, and the origin remote is left with the plain\n// cloneURL: no credential ends up in the working tree.", "replace": "// cloneAndBranch clones cloneURL into /project inside the container\n// and checks out a fresh branch off defaultBranch. The clone\n// authenticates via the http.<host>.extraHeader configured by\n// configureSandboxGit, and the origin remote is left with the plain\n// cloneURL: no credential ends up in the working tree."}
Result
1 occurrences replaced
Tool
π§ edit_file
{"path": "internal/agentrun/docker_integration_test.go", "find": "\t// The credential must round-trip through the system gitconfig,\n\t// which is what makes plain `git pull`/`git push` authenticate.\n\twantHeader := gitAuthHeader(user, token)\n\n\tout, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"config\", \"--system\", \"--get\", \"http.\"+cloneURL+\".extraHeader\")", "replace": "\t// The credential must round-trip through the system gitconfig,\n\t// which is what makes plain `git pull`/`git push` authenticate.\n\twantHeader := gitAuthHeader(user, token)\n\n\tout, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"config\", \"--system\", \"--get\", \"http.\"+forgeHost(cloneURL)+\".extraHeader\")"}
Arguments
{"path": "internal/agentrun/docker_integration_test.go", "find": "\t// The credential must round-trip through the system gitconfig,\n\t// which is what makes plain `git pull`/`git push` authenticate.\n\twantHeader := gitAuthHeader(user, token)\n\n\tout, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"config\", \"--system\", \"--get\", \"http.\"+cloneURL+\".extraHeader\")", "replace": "\t// The credential must round-trip through the system gitconfig,\n\t// which is what makes plain `git pull`/`git push` authenticate.\n\twantHeader := gitAuthHeader(user, token)\n\n\tout, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"config\", \"--system\", \"--get\", \"http.\"+forgeHost(cloneURL)+\".extraHeader\")"}
Result
1 occurrences replaced
Thinking
Next, I'll add unit tests for forgeHost to sandboxgit_test.go:
Tool
π§ edit_file
{"path": "internal/agentrun/sandboxgit_test.go", "find": "func TestGitAuthHeader(t *testing.T) {", "replace": "func TestForgeHost(t *testing.T) {\n\tcases := map[string]string{\n\t\t\"https://code.stdio.dk/abrander/zoo.git\": \"https://code.stdio.dk\",\n\t\t\"http://forgejo.local:3000/acme/widgets\": \"http://forgejo.local:3000\",\n\t\t\"https://h/a/b.git?x=1\": \"https://h\",\n\t\t// Not a URL with a host: fall back to the full string, which is\n\t\t// still a valid (narrower) prefix match.\n\t\t\"/bare\": \"/bare\",\n\t\t\"not a url\": \"not a url\",\n\t}\n\n\tfor in, want := range cases {\n\t\tif got := forgeHost(in); got != want {\n\t\t\tt.Errorf(\"forgeHost(%q) = %q, want %q\", in, got, want)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc TestGitAuthHeader(t *testing.T) {"}
Arguments
{"path": "internal/agentrun/sandboxgit_test.go", "find": "func TestGitAuthHeader(t *testing.T) {", "replace": "func TestForgeHost(t *testing.T) {\n\tcases := map[string]string{\n\t\t\"https://code.stdio.dk/abrander/zoo.git\": \"https://code.stdio.dk\",\n\t\t\"http://forgejo.local:3000/acme/widgets\": \"http://forgejo.local:3000\",\n\t\t\"https://h/a/b.git?x=1\": \"https://h\",\n\t\t// Not a URL with a host: fall back to the full string, which is\n\t\t// still a valid (narrower) prefix match.\n\t\t\"/bare\": \"/bare\",\n\t\t\"not a url\": \"not a url\",\n\t}\n\n\tfor in, want := range cases {\n\t\tif got := forgeHost(in); got != want {\n\t\t\tt.Errorf(\"forgeHost(%q) = %q, want %q\", in, got, want)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc TestGitAuthHeader(t *testing.T) {"}
Result
1 occurrences replaced
Thinking
Wait, `url.Parse("not a url")` β let me think about what this returns. `url.Parse("not a url")` β a space in the URLβ¦ url.Parse is lenient. "not a url" gets parsed as Path="not a url" (no scheme, no host) β u.Host == "" β returns the full string. OK.
`url.Parse("/bare")` β Path="/bare", Host="" β returns "/bare". OK.
`url.Parse("https://h/a/b.git?x=1")` β Scheme=https, Host=h β "https://h". OK.
Alright, let me rebuild, run the tests, and then run gofmt.
Tool
π§ bash
{"command": "cd /project && gofmt -l . && go build ./... && go test ./... 2>&1 | tail -12 && go vet -tags docker ./internal/agentrun/ && echo ALL-OK", "timeout": 300}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /project && gofmt -l . && go build ./... && go test ./... 2>&1 | tail -12 && go vet -tags docker ./internal/agentrun/ && echo ALL-OK", "timeout": 300}
Result
internal/agentrun/sandboxgit_test.go
? github.com/abrander/zoo/cmd/zoo [no test files]
ok github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/agentrun 0.004s
ok github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/config (cached)
ok github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/forgejo (cached)
ok github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/livelog (cached)
ok github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/llm (cached)
ok github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/scheduler (cached)
ok github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/store (cached)
ok github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/tools (cached)
ok github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/web (cached)
ALL-OK
Thinking
gofmt flagged `internal/agentrun/sandboxgit_test.go` (my map literal alignment). Let's run gofmt -w on it.
Tool
π§ bash
{"command": "cd /project && gofmt -w internal/agentrun/sandboxgit_test.go && gofmt -l . ; go test ./internal/agentrun/ && echo OK", "timeout": 120}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /project && gofmt -w internal/agentrun/sandboxgit_test.go && gofmt -l . ; go test ./internal/agentrun/ && echo OK", "timeout": 120}
Result
ok github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/agentrun (cached)
OK
Thinking
Everything's formatted and tests pass. Next, let me re-verify the host-scoped config key mechanism with a local HTTP server test β specifically, that `http.https://host.extraHeader` (host without path) matches requests to `https://host/repo.git/...`. My earlier test used a full-path URL as the prefix. Let me verify that host-only prefix matching works (the `url_match_match` boundary rule: if the prefix doesn't end with '/', the next character in the URL must be '/' or the end of the string).
In the local test, the URL is `http://127.0.0.1:8931/bare.git`. Host prefix = `http://127.0.0.1:8931`. Key = `http.http://127.0.0.1:8931.extraHeader`. Request URL = `http://127.0.0.1:8931/bare.git/info/refs?...`. Prefix match: `http://127.0.0.1:8931` matches, and the next character is `/` β match. Let me verify this empirically.
Let me verify the host-scoped prefix matching empirically against the local HTTP git server (the key difference from my earlier test):
Tool
π§ bash
{"command": "cd /tmp/gitauth-test\npython3 server.py & SERVER_PID=$!\nsleep 0.5\nrm -rf hostscoped\n# host-scoped key: http.http://127.0.0.1:8931.extraHeader (no path)\ngit -c 'http.http://127.0.0.1:8931.extraHeader=Authorization: Basic c2VlZDpzM2NyZXQ=' clone -q http://127.0.0.1:8931/bare.git hostscoped && echo HOST-SCOPED-CLONE-OK\ncd hostscoped\ngit config --local 'http.http://127.0.0.1:8931.extraHeader' \"Authorization: Basic c2VlZDpzM2NyZXQ=\"\ngit pull 2>&1 | tail -1\ngit ls-remote origin >/dev/null 2>&1 && echo HOST-SCOPED-LSREMOTE-OK\nkill $SERVER_PID 2>/dev/null", "timeout": 60}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /tmp/gitauth-test\npython3 server.py & SERVER_PID=$!\nsleep 0.5\nrm -rf hostscoped\n# host-scoped key: http.http://127.0.0.1:8931.extraHeader (no path)\ngit -c 'http.http://127.0.0.1:8931.extraHeader=Authorization: Basic c2VlZDpzM2NyZXQ=' clone -q http://127.0.0.1:8931/bare.git hostscoped && echo HOST-SCOPED-CLONE-OK\ncd hostscoped\ngit config --local 'http.http://127.0.0.1:8931.extraHeader' \"Authorization: Basic c2VlZDpzM2NyZXQ=\"\ngit pull 2>&1 | tail -1\ngit ls-remote origin >/dev/null 2>&1 && echo HOST-SCOPED-LSREMOTE-OK\nkill $SERVER_PID 2>/dev/null", "timeout": 60}
Result
HOST-SCOPED-CLONE-OK
Already up to date.
HOST-SCOPED-LSREMOTE-OK
Thinking
Host-scoped prefix matching works: clone, pull, and ls-remote all authenticate with `http.<scheme://host>.extraHeader`.
Now, let's do a final review of all the changes. Let me check the complete diff.
Host-scoped matching works for clone, pull, and ls-remote. Now a full review of the diff:
Tool
π§ bash
{"command": "cd /project && git add -A && git diff --cached --stat && echo ================= && git diff --cached"}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /project && git add -A && git diff --cached --stat && echo ================= && git diff --cached"}
Result
internal/agentrun/clone.go | 81 --------------
internal/agentrun/context.go | 25 ++---
internal/agentrun/docker_integration_test.go | 122 ++++++++++++++++++++++
internal/agentrun/run.go | 70 +++++++------
internal/agentrun/sandboxgit.go | 151 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
internal/agentrun/sandboxgit_test.go | 78 ++++++++++++++
internal/agentrun/system.md | 5 +-
internal/tools/context.go | 14 ++-
internal/tools/git.go | 8 +-
9 files changed, 409 insertions(+), 145 deletions(-)
=================
diff --git a/internal/agentrun/clone.go b/internal/agentrun/clone.go
deleted file mode 100644
index 2ae1adf..0000000
--- a/internal/agentrun/clone.go
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,81 +0,0 @@
-package agentrun
-
-import (
- "context"
- "encoding/base64"
- "fmt"
- "os/exec"
- "strings"
-)
-
-// gitAuthArgs returns the `-c http.extraHeader=...` global git arguments
-// that authenticate a single invocation as the shared zoo Forgejo
-// identity. Unlike embedding the token in the remote URL, a `-c`
-// override lives only for the lifetime of that one process and is never
-// written to .git/config on disk β where the container bind-mounting
-// this working tree (and any command an agent runs inside it via the
-// bash tool) could otherwise read it straight back out.
-func gitAuthArgs(token string) []string {
- auth := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte("zoo:" + token))
-
- return []string{"-c", "http.extraHeader=Authorization: Basic " + auth}
-}
-
-// cloneAndBranch clones cloneURL into dir, authenticating the clone
-// itself with token (see gitAuthArgs), and checks out a new branch off
-// of defaultBranch. token never ends up in the resulting working tree:
-// the origin remote is left with the plain cloneURL.
-func cloneAndBranch(ctx context.Context, cloneURL, token, defaultBranch, branch, dir string) error {
- args := append(gitAuthArgs(token), "clone", "--branch", defaultBranch, "--single-branch", cloneURL, dir)
- if out, err := runGit(ctx, "", args...); err != nil {
- return fmt.Errorf("clone: %w: %s", err, out)
- }
-
- if out, err := runGit(ctx, dir, "checkout", "-b", branch); err != nil {
- return fmt.Errorf("checkout branch %q: %w: %s", branch, err, out)
- }
-
- return nil
-}
-
-// clonePRHead clones cloneURL into dir and checks out the pull request's
-// head as a local branch named headRef, so commits the agent makes push
-// straight to the PR. The head is fetched via the PR's refs/pull/<n>/head
-// ref rather than by branch name, which also works for PRs opened from a
-// fork, where the head branch doesn't exist in the base repo.
-func clonePRHead(ctx context.Context, cloneURL, token, defaultBranch, headRef string, index int64, dir string) error {
- args := append(gitAuthArgs(token), "clone", "--branch", defaultBranch, "--single-branch", cloneURL, dir)
- if out, err := runGit(ctx, "", args...); err != nil {
- return fmt.Errorf("clone: %w: %s", err, out)
- }
-
- fetchArgs := append(gitAuthArgs(token), "fetch", "--no-tags", "origin", fmt.Sprintf("refs/pull/%d/head", index))
- if out, err := runGit(ctx, dir, fetchArgs...); err != nil {
- return fmt.Errorf("fetch PR %d head: %w: %s", index, err, out)
- }
-
- if out, err := runGit(ctx, dir, "checkout", "-B", headRef, "FETCH_HEAD"); err != nil {
- return fmt.Errorf("checkout PR head %q: %w: %s", headRef, err, out)
- }
-
- return nil
-}
-
-// runGit runs a git subcommand on the host (not inside any container)
-// with no Forgejo credential attached.
-func runGit(ctx context.Context, dir string, args ...string) (string, error) {
- cmd := exec.CommandContext(ctx, "git", args...)
- if dir != "" {
- cmd.Dir = dir
- }
-
- out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
-
- return strings.TrimSpace(string(out)), err
-}
-
-// runGitAuthed is runGit with token attached via gitAuthArgs, for the
-// one subcommand (push) that needs to authenticate against Forgejo.
-func runGitAuthed(ctx context.Context, dir, token string, args ...string) (string, error) {
- return runGit(ctx, dir, append(gitAuthArgs(token), args...)...)
-}
diff --git a/internal/agentrun/context.go b/internal/agentrun/context.go
index 8d886fc..abf82bb 100644
--- a/internal/agentrun/context.go
+++ b/internal/agentrun/context.go
@@ -8,14 +8,12 @@ import (
)
// runContext implements tools.Context for a single agent run, executing
-// shell commands via docker exec against the run's container, git
-// commands as the host process against the run's working tree (see
-// Git), and binding Forgejo actions to the triggering issue/PR.
+// both shell commands and git commands via docker exec against the
+// run's container, and binding Forgejo actions to the triggering
+// issue/PR.
type runContext struct {
docker *dockerRuntime
containerID string
- projectDir string
- token string
forgejo tools.ForgejoActions
}
@@ -33,20 +31,15 @@ func (c *runContext) Exec(ctx context.Context, command string) (string, error) {
return output, nil
}
-// Git implements tools.Context.Git by running git on the host against
-// c.projectDir rather than via docker exec. Only push needs to
-// authenticate against Forgejo, so only it carries the token, via a
-// per-invocation -c override that never touches .git/config (see
-// gitAuthArgs) β the container this same working tree is bind-mounted
-// into has no way to read it out.
+// Git implements tools.Context.Git by running git inside the run's
+// container, in its /project working directory. Remote operations
+// (fetch, pull, push, ...) authenticate via the http.<url>.extraHeader
+// credential configureSandboxGit wrote to the container's system
+// gitconfig, so no per-invocation credential plumbing is needed.
func (c *runContext) Git(ctx context.Context, subcommand string, args ...string) (string, error) {
cmdArgs := append([]string{subcommand}, args...)
- if subcommand == "push" {
- return runGitAuthed(ctx, c.projectDir, c.token, cmdArgs...)
- }
-
- return runGit(ctx, c.projectDir, cmdArgs...)
+ return c.Exec(ctx, shellGitCmd(cmdArgs...))
}
func (c *runContext) Forgejo() tools.ForgejoActions {
diff --git a/internal/agentrun/docker_integration_test.go b/internal/agentrun/docker_integration_test.go
index 781528e..99102a8 100644
--- a/internal/agentrun/docker_integration_test.go
+++ b/internal/agentrun/docker_integration_test.go
@@ -6,7 +6,9 @@ package agentrun
import (
"context"
+ "os"
"os/exec"
+ "path/filepath"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
@@ -100,3 +102,123 @@ func TestDockerRuntimeGitSafeDirectory(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatalf("expected git status to succeed after the fix, got exit=%d: %s", exitCode, output)
}
}
+
+// TestDockerRuntimeSandboxGit exercises the in-sandbox git setup
+// Run() performs (see sandboxgit.go): the system gitconfig round-trip
+// (including the http.<url>.extraHeader key whose subsection is a URL
+// full of dots and colons), the initial clone + branch done inside the
+// container, the commit identity taken from the system gitconfig, and
+// that the credential never lands in the bind-mounted working tree.
+// The clone uses a local path remote (no http involved), so the test
+// needs no reachable Forgejo; the header mechanism itself is core git
+// behavior.
+func TestDockerRuntimeSandboxGit(t *testing.T) {
+ tmp := t.TempDir()
+
+ // A bare "remote" on the host, plus the empty directory the
+ // container will clone into (Run() creates it before the container
+ // exists, for the same reason).
+ seedDir := filepath.Join(tmp, "seed")
+ bareDir := filepath.Join(tmp, "remote.git")
+ projectDir := filepath.Join(tmp, "project")
+
+ run := func(dir string, args ...string) {
+ cmd := exec.Command("git", args...)
+ cmd.Dir = dir
+
+ if out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput(); err != nil {
+ t.Fatalf("git %v: %v: %s", args, err, out)
+ }
+ }
+
+ run("", "init", "-q", "-b", "main", seedDir)
+ run(seedDir, "config", "user.name", "zoo-test")
+ run(seedDir, "config", "user.email", "zoo@test")
+
+ if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(seedDir, "file.txt"), []byte("hello\n"), 0o644); err != nil {
+ t.Fatalf("write seed file: %v", err)
+ }
+
+ run(seedDir, "add", ".")
+ run(seedDir, "commit", "-q", "-m", "init")
+ run("", "clone", "-q", "--bare", seedDir, bareDir)
+
+ if err := os.MkdirAll(projectDir, 0o755); err != nil {
+ t.Fatalf("create project dir: %v", err)
+ }
+
+ rt, err := newDockerRuntime()
+ if err != nil {
+ t.Fatalf("docker client: %v", err)
+ }
+
+ ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 120*time.Second)
+ defer cancel()
+
+ containerID, err := rt.createContainer(ctx, "golang:latest", []string{
+ bareDir + ":/bare",
+ projectDir + ":/project",
+ }, "zoo-test-sandbox-git")
+ if err != nil {
+ t.Fatalf("create container: %v", err)
+ }
+ defer rt.remove(context.Background(), containerID)
+
+ const (
+ cloneURL = "https://forgejo.example/acme/widgets.git"
+ user = "greg"
+ token = "super-secret-token"
+ )
+
+ if err := configureSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, cloneURL, user, token, "Greg Coolio", "greg@noreply.localhost"); err != nil {
+ t.Fatalf("configureSandboxGit: %v", err)
+ }
+
+ // The credential must round-trip through the system gitconfig,
+ // which is what makes plain `git pull`/`git push` authenticate.
+ wantHeader := gitAuthHeader(user, token)
+
+ out, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, "config", "--system", "--get", "http."+forgeHost(cloneURL)+".extraHeader")
+ if err != nil {
+ t.Fatalf("read back credential: %v", err)
+ }
+ if got := strings.TrimSpace(out); got != wantHeader {
+ t.Fatalf("credential round-trip = %q, want %q", got, wantHeader)
+ }
+
+ if err := cloneAndBranch(ctx, rt, containerID, "/bare", "main", "issue-1-greg"); err != nil {
+ t.Fatalf("cloneAndBranch: %v", err)
+ }
+
+ // The clone happened inside the container: the fresh branch is
+ // checked out in /project.
+ out, err = runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, "branch", "--show-current")
+ if err != nil {
+ t.Fatalf("branch --show-current: %v", err)
+ }
+ if got := strings.TrimSpace(out); got != "issue-1-greg" {
+ t.Fatalf("branch = %q, want issue-1-greg", got)
+ }
+
+ // Commits must pick up the identity from the system gitconfig.
+ if _, exitCode, err := rt.exec(ctx, containerID, "echo more >> file.txt && git add file.txt && git commit -qm 'from sandbox'"); err != nil || exitCode != 0 {
+ t.Fatalf("commit in sandbox: err=%v exit=%d", err, exitCode)
+ }
+
+ out, err = runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, "log", "-1", "--format=%an %ae")
+ if err != nil {
+ t.Fatalf("log: %v", err)
+ }
+ if got := strings.TrimSpace(out); got != "Greg Coolio greg@noreply.localhost" {
+ t.Fatalf("commit author = %q, want %q", got, "Greg Coolio greg@noreply.localhost")
+ }
+
+ // The token must not leak into the bind-mounted working tree.
+ out, _, err = rt.exec(ctx, containerID, "grep -r super-secret-token /project || true")
+ if err != nil {
+ t.Fatalf("grep: %v", err)
+ }
+ if strings.Contains(out, "super-secret-token") {
+ t.Fatalf("token leaked into the working tree: %s", out)
+ }
+}
diff --git a/internal/agentrun/run.go b/internal/agentrun/run.go
index 1e525b6..7d4dd9f 100644
--- a/internal/agentrun/run.go
+++ b/internal/agentrun/run.go
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
// Package agentrun creates the throwaway per-job environment an agent
-// runs in: a git clone + branch bind-mounted into a Docker container,
-// the triggering event written to /event, and the tool-calling loop
+// runs in: a Docker container with the agent's git working tree cloned
+// inside it (authenticated with the agent's own Forgejo token), the
+// triggering event written to /event, and the tool-calling loop
// (internal/llm + internal/tools) driven against it.
package agentrun
@@ -124,8 +125,16 @@ func (r *Runner) Run(ctx context.Context, jobID string, agent config.AgentConfig
}
}()
+ // The container bind-mounts projectDir as /project and does the
+ // initial clone into it, so the (empty) directory must exist on the
+ // host before the container is created β otherwise Docker would
+ // create it itself, root-owned.
projectDir := filepath.Join(workDir, "project")
+ if err := os.MkdirAll(projectDir, 0o755); err != nil {
+ return fmt.Errorf("create project dir: %w", err)
+ }
+
// A pr:review run works on the PR's own head branch, so the agent's
// commits push straight to the PR. Every other event kind branches
// off the default branch as usual.
@@ -149,10 +158,6 @@ func (r *Runner) Run(ctx context.Context, jobID string, agent config.AgentConfig
return fmt.Errorf("pr:review event has no pull request head branch to check out")
}
- if err := clonePRHead(ctx, repoInfo.CloneURL, r.forgejo.Token(), repoInfo.DefaultBranch, headRef, ev.Index, projectDir); err != nil {
- return fmt.Errorf("prepare git working tree: %w", err)
- }
-
branch = headRef
// Fetch the full review (verdict, body, inline comments) so the
@@ -165,24 +170,20 @@ func (r *Runner) Run(ctx context.Context, jobID string, agent config.AgentConfig
logger.Warn("fetch review detail failed; agent will not see inline review comments", "error", err)
review = nil
}
- } else {
- if err := cloneAndBranch(ctx, repoInfo.CloneURL, r.forgejo.Token(), repoInfo.DefaultBranch, branch, projectDir); err != nil {
- return fmt.Errorf("prepare git working tree: %w", err)
- }
}
roster := buildRoster(r.forgejo, r.cfg.Agents, logger)
gitName, gitEmail := gitIdentity(agent.Name, roster)
- // Local (not --global) scope, so this identity lives in
- // projectDir/.git/config: the one place both this host-side clone
- // and the container it's bind-mounted into (as /project) actually
- // share.
- if out, err := runGit(ctx, projectDir, "config", "user.name", gitName); err != nil {
- return fmt.Errorf("configure git user.name: %w: %s", err, out)
- }
- if out, err := runGit(ctx, projectDir, "config", "user.email", gitEmail); err != nil {
- return fmt.Errorf("configure git user.email: %w: %s", err, out)
+ // The credential the sandbox's git uses for remote operations: the
+ // agent's own Forgejo token when configured, so its git activity is
+ // attributed to its own account, falling back to the shared zoo
+ // identity for deployments without per-agent tokens (mirroring
+ // forgejoAs).
+ gitUser, gitToken := "zoo", r.forgejo.Token()
+
+ if agent.Token != "" {
+ gitUser, gitToken = agent.Name, agent.Token
}
eventPath := filepath.Join(workDir, "event.json")
@@ -206,20 +207,23 @@ func (r *Runner) Run(ctx context.Context, jobID string, agent config.AgentConfig
}
}()
- // /project is bind-mounted from the host, so it's owned by the host
- // UID that ran the clone, not whatever UID runs inside the
- // container (usually root) β git's ownership check rejects that by
- // default ("detected dubious ownership") unless told otherwise.
- // --system (not --global) so this holds regardless of which user
- // subsequent `docker exec` calls run as. Commit identity is
- // configured host-side, above, with --local scope so it's visible
- // from both sides of the bind mount without needing --global here.
- out, exitCode, err := r.docker.exec(ctx, containerID, "git config --system --add safe.directory '*'")
- if err != nil {
- return fmt.Errorf("configure git safe.directory in container: %w: %s", err, out)
+ // Git must simply work inside the sandbox: safe.directory, commit
+ // identity, and the remote credential all go into the container's
+ // system gitconfig (see configureSandboxGit).
+ if err := configureSandboxGit(ctx, r.docker, containerID, repoInfo.CloneURL, gitUser, gitToken, gitName, gitEmail); err != nil {
+ return fmt.Errorf("configure git in container: %w", err)
}
- if exitCode != 0 {
- return fmt.Errorf("configure git safe.directory in container: exit %d: %s", exitCode, out)
+
+ // The initial clone happens inside the sandbox, so the working tree
+ // is owned by the container's user and git never runs on the host.
+ if ev.Kind == forgejo.EventPRReview {
+ if err := clonePRHead(ctx, r.docker, containerID, repoInfo.CloneURL, repoInfo.DefaultBranch, branch, ev.Index); err != nil {
+ return fmt.Errorf("prepare git working tree: %w", err)
+ }
+ } else {
+ if err := cloneAndBranch(ctx, r.docker, containerID, repoInfo.CloneURL, repoInfo.DefaultBranch, branch); err != nil {
+ return fmt.Errorf("prepare git working tree: %w", err)
+ }
}
logAppend := func(stream, line string) {
@@ -231,8 +235,6 @@ func (r *Runner) Run(ctx context.Context, jobID string, agent config.AgentConfig
runCtx := &runContext{
docker: r.docker,
containerID: containerID,
- projectDir: projectDir,
- token: r.forgejo.Token(),
forgejo: &runForgejoActions{
client: r.forgejoAs(agent.Name, agent.Token),
owner: ev.Owner,
diff --git a/internal/agentrun/sandboxgit.go b/internal/agentrun/sandboxgit.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..015a805
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/agentrun/sandboxgit.go
@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
+package agentrun
+
+import (
+ "context"
+ "encoding/base64"
+ "fmt"
+ "net/url"
+ "strings"
+)
+
+// This file makes git "just work" inside the agent's container: the
+// initial clone happens in the sandbox, and the sandbox's git
+// credential is written to the container's system gitconfig so every
+// subsequent remote operation (pull, fetch, push, ...) authenticates
+// without any per-invocation plumbing. Zoo itself never runs git
+// outside the sandbox.
+
+// shellQuote wraps s in single quotes for safe interpolation into a
+// `sh -c` command string, escaping any embedded single quotes.
+func shellQuote(s string) string {
+ return "'" + strings.ReplaceAll(s, "'", `'\''`) + "'"
+}
+
+// shellGitCmd renders `git <args...>` as one sh -c command line with
+// every argument quoted, for docker exec.
+func shellGitCmd(args ...string) string {
+ parts := make([]string, 0, len(args)+1)
+ parts = append(parts, "git")
+
+ for _, a := range args {
+ parts = append(parts, shellQuote(a))
+ }
+
+ return strings.Join(parts, " ")
+}
+
+// runSandboxGit runs `git <args...>` inside containerID (in its
+// working directory, /project) and returns its combined output. A
+// non-zero exit code is an error carrying the output.
+func runSandboxGit(ctx context.Context, rt *dockerRuntime, containerID string, args ...string) (string, error) {
+ out, exitCode, err := rt.exec(ctx, containerID, shellGitCmd(args...))
+ if err != nil {
+ return out, err
+ }
+
+ if exitCode != 0 {
+ return out, fmt.Errorf("git %s: exit %d: %s", args[0], exitCode, out)
+ }
+
+ return out, nil
+}
+
+// gitAuthHeader returns the value of an Authorization header that
+// authenticates git's smart-HTTP requests as user with token.
+func gitAuthHeader(user, token string) string {
+ auth := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(user + ":" + token))
+
+ return "Authorization: Basic " + auth
+}
+
+// forgeHost returns the scheme+host prefix of cloneURL, e.g.
+// "https://code.stdio.dk" for "https://code.stdio.dk/abrander/zoo.git".
+// On a parse failure it falls back to the full URL, which is a valid
+// (narrower) prefix match too.
+func forgeHost(cloneURL string) string {
+ u, err := url.Parse(cloneURL)
+ if err != nil || u.Host == "" {
+ return cloneURL
+ }
+
+ return u.Scheme + "://" + u.Host
+}
+
+// configureSandboxGit writes the container's system gitconfig so git
+// works inside the sandbox without further setup:
+//
+// - safe.directory '*', so the bind-mounted /project is accepted
+// regardless of which UID the container runs git as;
+// - user.name / user.email, so commits are attributed to the agent;
+// - http.<host>.extraHeader carrying the run's Forgejo credential,
+// scoped to the forge host the repository lives on, so
+// clone/fetch/pull/push all authenticate transparently β including
+// for submodules and other repos on the same forge. The token is
+// only valid on that forge anyway, so the host scope grants no
+// extra access; git never sends it anywhere else.
+//
+// The credential lives in the container's own filesystem (ephemeral,
+// torn down with the container), never in the bind-mounted working
+// tree: the origin remote keeps the plain cloneURL, so the token can't
+// leak into the repo's .git/config, into a work dir zoo keeps on
+// failure, or anywhere the host can read it back.
+func configureSandboxGit(ctx context.Context, rt *dockerRuntime, containerID, cloneURL, user, token, name, email string) error {
+ if _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, "config", "--system", "--add", "safe.directory", "*"); err != nil {
+ return fmt.Errorf("configure safe.directory: %w", err)
+ }
+
+ if _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, "config", "--system", "user.name", name); err != nil {
+ return fmt.Errorf("configure user.name: %w", err)
+ }
+
+ if _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, "config", "--system", "user.email", email); err != nil {
+ return fmt.Errorf("configure user.email: %w", err)
+ }
+
+ if _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, "config", "--system", "http."+forgeHost(cloneURL)+".extraHeader", gitAuthHeader(user, token)); err != nil {
+ return fmt.Errorf("configure git credential: %w", err)
+ }
+
+ return nil
+}
+
+// cloneAndBranch clones cloneURL into /project inside the container
+// and checks out a fresh branch off defaultBranch. The clone
+// authenticates via the http.<host>.extraHeader configured by
+// configureSandboxGit, and the origin remote is left with the plain
+// cloneURL: no credential ends up in the working tree.
+func cloneAndBranch(ctx context.Context, rt *dockerRuntime, containerID, cloneURL, defaultBranch, branch string) error {
+ if _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, "clone", "--branch", defaultBranch, "--single-branch", cloneURL, "/project"); err != nil {
+ return fmt.Errorf("clone: %w", err)
+ }
+
+ if _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, "checkout", "-b", branch); err != nil {
+ return fmt.Errorf("checkout branch %q: %w", branch, err)
+ }
+
+ return nil
+}
+
+// clonePRHead clones cloneURL into /project inside the container and
+// checks out the pull request's head as a local branch named headRef,
+// so commits the agent makes push straight to the PR. The head is
+// fetched via the PR's refs/pull/<n>/head ref rather than by branch
+// name, which also works for PRs opened from a fork, where the head
+// branch doesn't exist in the base repo.
+func clonePRHead(ctx context.Context, rt *dockerRuntime, containerID, cloneURL, defaultBranch, headRef string, index int64) error {
+ if _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, "clone", "--branch", defaultBranch, "--single-branch", cloneURL, "/project"); err != nil {
+ return fmt.Errorf("clone: %w", err)
+ }
+
+ fetchRef := fmt.Sprintf("refs/pull/%d/head", index)
+
+ if _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, "fetch", "--no-tags", "origin", fetchRef); err != nil {
+ return fmt.Errorf("fetch PR %d head: %w", index, err)
+ }
+
+ if _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, "checkout", "-B", headRef, "FETCH_HEAD"); err != nil {
+ return fmt.Errorf("checkout PR head %q: %w", headRef, err)
+ }
+
+ return nil
+}
diff --git a/internal/agentrun/sandboxgit_test.go b/internal/agentrun/sandboxgit_test.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cbf2e2e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/agentrun/sandboxgit_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+package agentrun
+
+import (
+ "encoding/base64"
+ "strings"
+ "testing"
+)
+
+func TestSandboxShellQuote(t *testing.T) {
+ cases := map[string]string{
+ "simple": "'simple'",
+ "it's a branch": `'it'\''s a branch'`,
+ "with space": "'with space'",
+ "$(rm -rf /)": "'$(rm -rf /)'",
+ "a\"b\\c": "'a\"b\\c'",
+ "": "''",
+ "HEAD~1": "'HEAD~1'",
+ "https://h/a/b.git": "'https://h/a/b.git'",
+ }
+
+ for in, want := range cases {
+ if got := shellQuote(in); got != want {
+ t.Errorf("shellQuote(%q) = %q, want %q", in, got, want)
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+func TestShellGitCmdQuotesEveryArg(t *testing.T) {
+ got := shellGitCmd("clone", "--branch", "main", "--single-branch", "https://h/a/b.git", "/project")
+
+ want := "git 'clone' '--branch' 'main' '--single-branch' 'https://h/a/b.git' '/project'"
+
+ if got != want {
+ t.Fatalf("shellGitCmd = %q, want %q", got, want)
+ }
+}
+
+func TestShellGitCmdSubcommandWithArgs(t *testing.T) {
+ got := shellGitCmd("commit", "-m", "fix: handle it's edge case")
+
+ if !strings.HasPrefix(got, "git 'commit' '-m' ") {
+ t.Fatalf("shellGitCmd = %q, want prefix git 'commit' '-m' ", got)
+ }
+
+ // The message must be one quoted word with the embedded quote
+ // escaped, so sh passes it through verbatim.
+ if want := `'fix: handle it'\''s edge case'`; !strings.HasSuffix(got, want) {
+ t.Fatalf("shellGitCmd = %q, want suffix %q", got, want)
+ }
+}
+
+func TestForgeHost(t *testing.T) {
+ cases := map[string]string{
+ "https://code.stdio.dk/abrander/zoo.git": "https://code.stdio.dk",
+ "http://forgejo.local:3000/acme/widgets": "http://forgejo.local:3000",
+ "https://h/a/b.git?x=1": "https://h",
+ // Not a URL with a host: fall back to the full string, which is
+ // still a valid (narrower) prefix match.
+ "/bare": "/bare",
+ "not a url": "not a url",
+ }
+
+ for in, want := range cases {
+ if got := forgeHost(in); got != want {
+ t.Errorf("forgeHost(%q) = %q, want %q", in, got, want)
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+func TestGitAuthHeader(t *testing.T) {
+ got := gitAuthHeader("greg", "s3cr3t")
+
+ want := "Authorization: Basic " + base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte("greg:s3cr3t"))
+
+ if got != want {
+ t.Fatalf("gitAuthHeader = %q, want %q", got, want)
+ }
+}
diff --git a/internal/agentrun/system.md b/internal/agentrun/system.md
index 9de0799..1fe763a 100644
--- a/internal/agentrun/system.md
+++ b/internal/agentrun/system.md
@@ -34,8 +34,9 @@ doing it yourself.
**Git**
-You may use normal git commands to manage your working tree. For remote
-(pull, fetch, push, etc.) git operations, you can use the `git` tool.
+You may use normal git commands to manage your working tree. Remote
+(pull, fetch, push, etc.) git operations are authenticated for you and
+simply work β through the `git` tool or plain `git` in `bash`.
**Guidelines**
diff --git a/internal/tools/context.go b/internal/tools/context.go
index aea7030..30b5dd3 100644
--- a/internal/tools/context.go
+++ b/internal/tools/context.go
@@ -10,16 +10,14 @@ import "context"
// global Context, since multiple agents run concurrently in zoo.
type Context interface {
// Exec runs command inside the run's container via `sh -c` and
- // returns combined stdout+stderr. The container never holds a
- // Forgejo credential, so this cannot reach the Forgejo API or
- // authenticate git operations against it β see Git.
+ // returns combined stdout+stderr.
Exec(ctx context.Context, command string) (string, error)
- // Git runs a git subcommand against the run's working tree on the
- // host, outside the container, so that operations needing a Forgejo
- // credential (currently just push) can authenticate without that
- // credential ever being written to disk where the container (and
- // anything run inside it via Exec) could read it.
+ // Git runs a git subcommand against the run's working tree inside
+ // the run's container. Remote operations (fetch, pull, push, ...)
+ // authenticate via the Forgejo credential the run's setup wrote to
+ // the container's system gitconfig, so they work without any
+ // per-invocation plumbing.
Git(ctx context.Context, subcommand string, args ...string) (string, error)
// Forgejo returns the actions bound to the issue/PR that triggered
diff --git a/internal/tools/git.go b/internal/tools/git.go
index 0563788..5c38591 100644
--- a/internal/tools/git.go
+++ b/internal/tools/git.go
@@ -44,10 +44,10 @@ func init() {
Register(tool, git)
}
-// git runs subcommand via Context.Git, which executes it outside the
-// container (see that method's doc comment for why): the container
-// itself is never given a credential capable of authenticating against
-// Forgejo, so pushing has to happen on the host side instead.
+// git runs subcommand via Context.Git, which executes it inside the
+// run's container, where the run's Forgejo credential is configured
+// for git (see that method's doc comment) β remote operations like
+// push simply work.
func git(ctx Context, params gitParams) (string, error) {
if !slices.Contains(gitAllowed, params.Subcommand) {
return "", fmt.Errorf("git subcommand '%s' is not allowed. Only %s are permitted", params.Subcommand, strings.Join(gitAllowed, ", "))
Thinking
The diff looks complete and clean. A few remaining considerations:
1. **The `forgejo:` field alignment in run.go** β `docker: r.docker,` / `containerID: containerID,` / `forgejo: &runForgejoActions{` β gofmt didn't flag run.go, so it's fine. Wait, actually, gofmt should align the values of consecutive struct fields... `docker:` (6 chars + colon = 7), `containerID:` (12), `forgejo:` (8). gofmt aligns the values: `docker: r.docker` β docker: is 7 chars, then spaces up to the column. `containerID: containerID` β 12+1=13. `forgejo: &runForgejoActions{` β 8+1=9... hmm, that's not aligned to column 14. But gofmt -l didn't flag run.go, so whatever gofmt does is satisfied. Actually, wait β gofmt aligns consecutive single-line fields. `forgejo: &runForgejoActions{` is the start of a multi-line nested struct, so it's excluded from alignment. That's why it's fine.
2. **One issue I want to reconsider**: in `run.go`, the `gitUser, gitToken` variable names β `gitUser` is used as the Basic auth username. Good.
3. **The `os` import in run.go** β still used (MkdirTemp, MkdirAll, WriteFile, RemoveAll). Yes.
4. **`context.go` (agentrun)** β the `fmt` import is still used (Exec's error). Yes.
5. **What about the `git` tool's description in the LLM's tool schema?** "Run a git subcommand with optional arguments against the project's working tree" β still accurate.
6. **The `Exec` doc comment in `tools/context.go`** β I removed the sentence "The container never holds a Forgejo credential...". Good, since it's now false.
7. **README** β should I document this? The README has a config reference. The behavior change (agent token is used for git) is worth a line. Let me check the README's agent section... The README has an agent example with a `token` field. Let me look at that section and see if the token's purpose is documented.
Let me check around lines 100β110 of the README.
The diff is clean. Let me check whether the README documents what the agent `token` is used for, since its purpose has broadened:
Tool
π§ read_file
{"end_line": 130, "path": "README.md", "start_line": 96}
Arguments
{"end_line": 130, "path": "README.md", "start_line": 96}
Result
{"path":"README.md","content":"environment {\r\n docker_image = \"golang:latest\" # base image for agent containers\r\n max_live_agents = 5 # concurrent agent limit\r\n}\r\n```\r\n\r\n### Agent Definition\r\n\r\n```hcl\r\nagent \"anna\" {\r\n llm = \"Qwen 3.6\"\r\n token = \"ANNA_FORGEJO_TOKEN\"\r\n}\r\n```\r\n\r\n### Event Routing\r\n\r\nMap event types to agents with optional custom instructions:\r\n\r\n```hcl\r\nevent \"issue:new\" {\r\n agent = \"leon\"\r\n instructions = \"Triage this issue.\"\r\n}\r\n\r\nevent \"issue:assigned\" {\r\n // No `agent` β dynamically matches the assignee's username\r\n instructions = \"Please handle this issue.\"\r\n}\r\n\r\nevent \"pr:new\" {\r\n agent = \"greg\"\r\n instructions = \"Review this pull request.\"\r\n}\r\n```\r","start_line":96,"end_line":130,"total_lines":217,"truncated":true}
Thinking
The README shows an agent block containing `token`, but there's no explanation of what it's used for. Let me add a brief note to the Agent Definition section explaining that the token is the agent's Forgejo token, used both for Forgejo API actions and for git operations inside the sandbox. I'll keep it concise.
Tool
π§ edit_file
{"path": "README.md", "find": "### Agent Definition\n\n```hcl\nagent \"anna\" {\n llm = \"Qwen 3.6\"\n token = \"ANNA_FORGEJO_TOKEN\"\n}\n```", "replace": "### Agent Definition\n\n```hcl\nagent \"anna\" {\n llm = \"Qwen 3.6\"\n token = \"ANNA_FORGEJO_TOKEN\"\n}\n```\n\nThe optional `token` is the agent's own Forgejo token. When set, the\nagent acts as itself on Forgejo (comments, PRs, ...) and its sandbox's\ngit authenticates with it too β the initial clone and all remote git\noperations (pull, push, ...) run inside the container with that\ncredential. Without it, the shared `forgejo.token` is used."}
Arguments
{"path": "README.md", "find": "### Agent Definition\n\n```hcl\nagent \"anna\" {\n llm = \"Qwen 3.6\"\n token = \"ANNA_FORGEJO_TOKEN\"\n}\n```", "replace": "### Agent Definition\n\n```hcl\nagent \"anna\" {\n llm = \"Qwen 3.6\"\n token = \"ANNA_FORGEJO_TOKEN\"\n}\n```\n\nThe optional `token` is the agent's own Forgejo token. When set, the\nagent acts as itself on Forgejo (comments, PRs, ...) and its sandbox's\ngit authenticates with it too β the initial clone and all remote git\noperations (pull, push, ...) run inside the container with that\ncredential. Without it, the shared `forgejo.token` is used."}
Result
1 occurrences replaced
Thinking
Alright, let's run the full test suite one more time, and also run the build with the docker tag, to make sure everything compiles:
Also, there's one more edge case I want to reconsider: **`git pull` on the agent's new branch**. As I analyzed, a plain `git pull` on a new branch without an upstream will fail with "There is no tracking information for the current branch." The issue says "git pull must just work."
Hmm, let me think about this again. What is the agent most likely to run?
- `git pull` β expecting to update from the remote.
- `git pull origin main` β explicit.
In the old design (host-side git), `git pull` via the git tool would hit the same "no tracking information" problem. So this isn't a regression. But the issue explicitly demands that "git pull just works."
Option: set the working branch's upstream to `origin/<defaultBranch>` at clone time. Then:
- `git pull` β fetches origin/main and merges into the working branch. Works.
- `git push` (plain) β push.default=simple: upstream name (main) β local branch name (issue-48-greg) β **refuses to push**. This breaks the most important operation!
No wait, let me double-check the semantics of push.default=simple. From the git docs:
> simple - Push the current branch to a branch of the same name on the remote. If you are working on a centralized workflow (i.e. the branch you are from is the same as the branch you are pushing to), you can mark the upstream branch (aka HEAD) using git branch --set-upstream. If no upstream branch is set, push will not automatically set one. **This mode is the same as current, except that it will refuse to push if the upstream branch's name is different from the local branch's name.** This is probably what you want in most cases.
So, if upstream = origin/main and local = issue-48-greg, then plain `git push` is refused: "The upstream branch of the current branch does not match the name of the current branch" β something like that. This breaks the agent's push workflow. Bad idea.
Alternative: set upstream to `origin/<branch>` (same name) β but that ref doesn't exist on the remote yet, so `git branch --set-upstream-to=origin/issue-48-greg` will fail ("couldn't find remote ref").
So there's no way to make both plain `git pull` and plain `git push` work from the start. The push-first workflow (which is what zoo's system prompt prescribes: "git add/git commit/git push your branch") works fine with explicit refspecs or `-u`. After the first `git push -u origin <branch>`, both plain commands work.
The issue's "git pull must just work" is about **authentication** β the author's guess ("maybe we need to put something in .gitconfig") backs this up: they're worried about credentials, not about upstream tracking. Our solution makes `git pull origin main` (and plain `git pull` once upstream is set) work transparently.
I'm confident in this design. The system prompt tells the agent that remote operations "just work" β with explicit refspecs, that's literally true.
Hmm, one more thought β should I add `push.autoSetupRemote = true` to the system gitconfig? With this, `git push` (plain, no args, no upstream) pushes to a same-named branch on origin and sets the upstream. This makes plain `git push` work from the start! This is a nice touch: the agent's most common operation (plain `git push` after committing) will just work.
Wait, but is this in scope? "git pull must just work" β the issue is about pull. But making plain push work too is in the same spirit ("so the agent can do its own git operations β even against the remote").
`push.autoSetupRemote` (git 2.37+): "When pushing to a remote without a refspec, git push will automatically create the upstream branch on the remote with the same name as the local branch." The golang:latest image has a recent git (2.4x). debian:unstable is also recent. This is safe.
Hmm, but wait β with autoSetupRemote, plain `git push` on the working branch pushes to origin/issue-48-greg and sets the upstream. Then plain `git pull` also works (upstream is set, same name β fetches the agent's own branchβ¦ which is identical to local after the push, so "Already up to date").
This makes the whole plain-command story consistent:
1. `git commit`
2. `git push` β pushes the branch, sets upstream
3. `git pull` β works (upstream is set)
Without autoSetupRemote:
1. `git commit`
2. `git push` β fails ("no upstream branch") β agent has to figure out `git push -u origin <branch>`
3. `git pull` β works after step 2
I think adding `push.autoSetupRemote = true` is a small, high-value addition that aligns with the spirit of the issue. Git version compatibility: push.autoSetupRemote was added in git 2.37 (2022). golang:latest (Debian bookworm/trixie based) has git 2.39+. No problem.
Hmm, but wait β is there a risk that autoSetupRemote pushes to the wrong place? It only activates on plain `git push` (no args, no refspec), and pushes to a same-named branch on the remote you're pushing to. The agent is in /project where origin = its own forge repo. Same as `git push -u origin HEAD`. Safe.
Let me add it to configureSandboxGit. Actuallyβ¦ hmm, let me reconsider scope creep. The issue says: "pass the agent's token to the sandbox so the agent can do its own git operations β even against the remote." β autoSetupRemote directly serves "the agent can do its own git operations β even against the remote." OK, adding it.
Actually, wait, let me also consider `pull.rebase` β no, that changes merge semantics. Out of scope. Just autoSetupRemote.
Let me update configureSandboxGit and the integration test (add a round-trip check for push.autoSetupRemoteβ¦ or maybe not necessary. The test checks the important credential. I'll add a simple check for completeness β actually, let's keep the test focused. I'll just add the config write).
Hmm, wait β one more consideration. If `push.autoSetupRemote` is enabled and the agent runs plain `git push` on the PR review branch (headRef, e.g. `issue-36-greg` which already exists on the remote as the PR head), it pushes to the same-named branch β which is exactly the PR head. Correct behavior.
OK, adding it.
Another improvement in line with the intent of the issue: if we set `push.autoSetupRemote = true` in the sandbox's gitconfig, then a bare `git push` (no arguments) will work from the very start, and the upstream will also be set β as a result, subsequent bare `git pull` calls will also work:
Tool
π§ edit_file
{"path": "internal/agentrun/sandboxgit.go", "find": "// - http.<host>.extraHeader carrying the run's Forgejo credential,\n// scoped to the forge host the repository lives on, so\n// clone/fetch/pull/push all authenticate transparently β including\n// for submodules and other repos on the same forge. The token is\n// only valid on that forge anyway, so the host scope grants no\n// extra access; git never sends it anywhere else.", "replace": "// - http.<host>.extraHeader carrying the run's Forgejo credential,\n// scoped to the forge host the repository lives on, so\n// clone/fetch/pull/push all authenticate transparently β including\n// for submodules and other repos on the same forge. The token is\n// only valid on that forge anyway, so the host scope grants no\n// extra access; git never sends it anywhere else;\n// - push.autoSetupRemote, so a bare `git push` on the fresh working\n// branch pushes it to origin and sets the upstream β after which\n// a bare `git pull` works too."}
Arguments
{"path": "internal/agentrun/sandboxgit.go", "find": "// - http.<host>.extraHeader carrying the run's Forgejo credential,\n// scoped to the forge host the repository lives on, so\n// clone/fetch/pull/push all authenticate transparently β including\n// for submodules and other repos on the same forge. The token is\n// only valid on that forge anyway, so the host scope grants no\n// extra access; git never sends it anywhere else.", "replace": "// - http.<host>.extraHeader carrying the run's Forgejo credential,\n// scoped to the forge host the repository lives on, so\n// clone/fetch/pull/push all authenticate transparently β including\n// for submodules and other repos on the same forge. The token is\n// only valid on that forge anyway, so the host scope grants no\n// extra access; git never sends it anywhere else;\n// - push.autoSetupRemote, so a bare `git push` on the fresh working\n// branch pushes it to origin and sets the upstream β after which\n// a bare `git pull` works too."}
Result
1 occurrences replaced
Tool
π§ edit_file
{"path": "internal/agentrun/sandboxgit.go", "find": "\tif _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"config\", \"--system\", \"http.\"+forgeHost(cloneURL)+\".extraHeader\", gitAuthHeader(user, token)); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure git credential: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}", "replace": "\tif _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"config\", \"--system\", \"http.\"+forgeHost(cloneURL)+\".extraHeader\", gitAuthHeader(user, token)); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure git credential: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tif _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"config\", \"--system\", \"push.autoSetupRemote\", \"true\"); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure push.autoSetupRemote: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}"}
Arguments
{"path": "internal/agentrun/sandboxgit.go", "find": "\tif _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"config\", \"--system\", \"http.\"+forgeHost(cloneURL)+\".extraHeader\", gitAuthHeader(user, token)); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure git credential: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}", "replace": "\tif _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"config\", \"--system\", \"http.\"+forgeHost(cloneURL)+\".extraHeader\", gitAuthHeader(user, token)); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure git credential: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tif _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"config\", \"--system\", \"push.autoSetupRemote\", \"true\"); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure push.autoSetupRemote: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}"}
Result
1 occurrences replaced
Thinking
Let's verify that `push.autoSetupRemote` behaves as expected in a local simulation (bare push on a new branch with no upstream):
Verify `push.autoSetupRemote` behavior in the local simulation:
Tool
π§ bash
{"command": "set -e\nrm -rf /tmp/sim3 && mkdir -p /tmp/sim3/project && cd /tmp/sim3\ngit init -q -b main seed\n(cd seed && git config user.name t && git config user.email t@t && echo hello > f.txt && git add . && git commit -qm init)\ngit clone -q --bare seed remote.git\nexport GIT_CONFIG_SYSTEM=/tmp/sim3/gitconfig\nsh -c \"git 'config' '--system' 'push.autoSetupRemote' 'true'\"\ncd /tmp/sim3/project\ngit clone -q --branch main --single-branch /tmp/sim3/remote.git /tmp/sim3/project\ngit checkout -qb issue-1-greg\necho more >> f.txt && git add f.txt && git -c user.name=t -c user.email=t@t commit -qm wip\n# bare push, no upstream set:\ngit push 2>&1 | tail -2\necho \"upstream: $(git rev-parse --abbrev-ref --symbolic-full-name @{u})\"\ngit pull 2>&1 | tail -1\necho ALL-OK", "timeout": 60}
Arguments
{"command": "set -e\nrm -rf /tmp/sim3 && mkdir -p /tmp/sim3/project && cd /tmp/sim3\ngit init -q -b main seed\n(cd seed && git config user.name t && git config user.email t@t && echo hello > f.txt && git add . && git commit -qm init)\ngit clone -q --bare seed remote.git\nexport GIT_CONFIG_SYSTEM=/tmp/sim3/gitconfig\nsh -c \"git 'config' '--system' 'push.autoSetupRemote' 'true'\"\ncd /tmp/sim3/project\ngit clone -q --branch main --single-branch /tmp/sim3/remote.git /tmp/sim3/project\ngit checkout -qb issue-1-greg\necho more >> f.txt && git add f.txt && git -c user.name=t -c user.email=t@t commit -qm wip\n# bare push, no upstream set:\ngit push 2>&1 | tail -2\necho \"upstream: $(git rev-parse --abbrev-ref --symbolic-full-name @{u})\"\ngit pull 2>&1 | tail -1\necho ALL-OK", "timeout": 60}
Result
* [new branch] issue-1-greg -> issue-1-greg
branch 'issue-1-greg' set up to track 'origin/issue-1-greg'.
fatal: upstream branch 'refs/heads/issue-1-greg' not stored as a remote-tracking branch
upstream:
Already up to date.
ALL-OK
Thinking
Interesting results:
1. Bare `git push` with `push.autoSetupRemote=true`: **works** β pushes the new branch and sets the upstream.
2. `git rev-parse --abbrev-ref --symbolic-full-name @{u}` output "fatal: upstream branch 'refs/heads/issue-1-greg' not stored as a remote-tracking branch" β hmm, this is because a bare push with autoSetupRemote sets the upstream, but the remote-tracking ref `refs/remotes/origin/issue-1-greg` isβ¦ wait, it says "not stored as a remote-tracking branch". That's because the clone was `--single-branch`, so the refspec for remote.origin.fetch is only `refs/heads/main:refs/remotes/origin/main`. The push created the remote branch, but the local remote-tracking ref origin/issue-1-greg was not created (pushes don't update remote-tracking refsβ¦ actually, does a push with autoSetupRemote create the remote-tracking ref? Apparently not here).
3. Bare `git pull` after that: "Already up to date." β wait, it worked?! Even though rev-parse said the upstream is "not stored as a remote-tracking branch", `git pull` succeeded with "Already up to date".
Hmm, interesting. Let me think about why `git pull` worked. `git pull` = fetch + merge. With upstream set to origin/issue-1-greg, fetch runs `git fetch origin issue-1-greg`β¦ actually, when the upstream is origin/issue-1-greg, pull fetches that ref. The single-branch fetch refspec shouldn't prevent an explicit fetch of that refβ¦ it fetched (the branch exists on the remote, and the local is identical) β "Already up to date".
Hmm wait, but did it actually fetch? "Already up to date" could also mean the merge step found nothing to merge. Let me check more carefully β let me look at the full output of git pull, and also verify that the remote-tracking ref situation doesn't cause `git pull` to fail in other cases (e.g., when the remote has new commits).
Actually, let me test a scenario where the remote branch has new commits (simulating another agent pushing to the same branch, or a PR head being updated):
Bare `git push` works and sets the upstream, and bare `git pull` also works. Let's verify that pull actually fetches when the remote is ahead (the single-branch refspec could potentially interfere):
Tool
π§ bash
{"command": "set -e\ncd /tmp/sim3/project\n# simulate the remote branch moving ahead (e.g. another push to the same branch)\ncd /tmp/sim3\ngit clone -q remote.git ahead\ncd ahead\ngit config user.name t && git config user.email t@t\necho remote-change > remote.txt && git add . && git commit -qm \"remote change\"\ngit push -q origin issue-1-greg\ncd /tmp/sim3/project\necho \"--- remote is now ahead; bare git pull: ---\"\ngit pull 2>&1 | tail -3\nls remote.txt && echo PULL-FETCHED-OK\ngit log --oneline -2", "timeout": 60}
Arguments
{"command": "set -e\ncd /tmp/sim3/project\n# simulate the remote branch moving ahead (e.g. another push to the same branch)\ncd /tmp/sim3\ngit clone -q remote.git ahead\ncd ahead\ngit config user.name t && git config user.email t@t\necho remote-change > remote.txt && git add . && git commit -qm \"remote change\"\ngit push -q origin issue-1-greg\ncd /tmp/sim3/project\necho \"--- remote is now ahead; bare git pull: ---\"\ngit pull 2>&1 | tail -3\nls remote.txt && echo PULL-FETCHED-OK\ngit log --oneline -2", "timeout": 60}
Result
ERROR CALLING TOOL: command failed: command exited with status 1
Thinking
Something failed. Let's debug without `set -e`.
Tool
π§ bash
{"command": "cd /tmp/sim3/project && git status | head -3; git log --oneline -2; git branch -vv"}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /tmp/sim3/project && git status | head -3; git log --oneline -2; git branch -vv"}
Result
On branch issue-1-greg
nothing to commit, working tree clean
c0a00f4 (HEAD -> issue-1-greg) wip
a0e4d42 (origin/main, origin/HEAD, main) init
* issue-1-greg c0a00f4 wip
main a0e4d42 [origin/main] init
Thinking
The working branch `issue-1-greg` has no upstream displayed in `branch -vv` β interesting. The earlier `git push` with autoSetupRemote displayed "branch 'issue-1-greg' set up to track 'origin/issue-1-greg'", but `branch -vv` doesn't show the upstream. And `rev-parse @{u}` failed with "not stored as a remote-tracking branch".
Wait β but `git pull` earlier displayed "Already up to date." Hmm, if there's no upstream, `git pull` should fail with "There is no tracking information for the current branch". Could it be that... pull used the default `origin/HEAD`? No...
Hmm, wait, let me actually re-read the earlier output:
```
* [new branch] issue-1-greg -> issue-1-greg
branch 'issue-1-greg' set up to track 'origin/issue-1-greg'.
fatal: upstream branch 'refs/heads/issue-1-greg' not stored as a remote-tracking branch
upstream:
Already up to date.
```
So `git push` set the upstream to origin/issue-1-greg. Then `rev-parse @{u}` failed with "not stored as a remote-tracking branch" β this is because the remote-tracking ref refs/remotes/origin/issue-1-greg doesn't exist locally (single-branch clone + push doesn't create remote-tracking refs).
Then `git pull` β "Already up to date." β how? If the upstream is set but the remote-tracking ref is missing... `git pull` with upstream origin/issue-1-greg: fetch step β git fetches the upstream ref. Even with the single-branch fetch refspec (`+refs/heads/main:refs/remotes/origin/main`), when pulling with an explicit upstream, git fetches `refs/heads/issue-1-greg` from origin into FETCH_HEAD (pull fetches the upstream branch into FETCH_HEAD, not into a remote-tracking ref). So the fetch succeeded, and the merge found nothing new β "Already up to date".
OK, so pull works. But in the earlier failed test β let me see what failed. The command:
```
cd /tmp/sim3
git clone -q remote.git ahead
```
Hmm, wait β /tmp/sim3/remote.git is a bare repo. `git clone -q remote.git ahead` from /tmp/sim3 β should work... unless it failed because... let me run it step by step.
Tool
π§ bash
{"command": "cd /tmp/sim3\ngit clone remote.git ahead 2>&1 | tail -2; echo \"clone: $?\"\ncd ahead 2>/dev/null && { git config user.name t; git config user.email t@t; echo remote-change > remote.txt; git add .; git commit -qm \"remote change\"; git push origin issue-1-greg 2>&1 | tail -2; echo \"push: $?\"; }", "timeout": 60}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /tmp/sim3\ngit clone remote.git ahead 2>&1 | tail -2; echo \"clone: $?\"\ncd ahead 2>/dev/null && { git config user.name t; git config user.email t@t; echo remote-change > remote.txt; git add .; git commit -qm \"remote change\"; git push origin issue-1-greg 2>&1 | tail -2; echo \"push: $?\"; }", "timeout": 60}
Result
fatal: destination path 'ahead' already exists and is not an empty directory.
clone: 0
On branch main
Your branch is ahead of 'origin/main' by 1 commit.
(use "git push" to publish your local commits)
nothing to commit, working tree clean
error: src refspec issue-1-greg does not match any
error: failed to push some refs to '/tmp/sim3/remote.git'
push: 0
Thinking
The `ahead` directory already exists (from the failed run β the clone succeeded, but then something failed afterward). The clone checked out `main` (the default), not `issue-1-greg`. Let me redo this properly: check out the issue-1-greg branch in the `ahead` clone, commit, and push.
Tool
π§ bash
{"command": "cd /tmp/sim3/ahead\ngit fetch -q origin issue-1-greg\ngit checkout -qb issue-1-greg FETCH_HEAD\ngit config user.name t && git config user.email t@t\necho remote-change > remote.txt && git add . && git commit -qm \"remote change\"\ngit push -q origin issue-1-greg && echo REMOTE-AHEAD-SETUP-OK\ncd /tmp/sim3/project\necho \"--- bare git pull with remote ahead: ---\"\ngit pull 2>&1 | tail -3\nls remote.txt && echo PULL-FETCHED-OK\ngit log --oneline -2", "timeout": 60}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /tmp/sim3/ahead\ngit fetch -q origin issue-1-greg\ngit checkout -qb issue-1-greg FETCH_HEAD\ngit config user.name t && git config user.email t@t\necho remote-change > remote.txt && git add . && git commit -qm \"remote change\"\ngit push -q origin issue-1-greg && echo REMOTE-AHEAD-SETUP-OK\ncd /tmp/sim3/project\necho \"--- bare git pull with remote ahead: ---\"\ngit pull 2>&1 | tail -3\nls remote.txt && echo PULL-FETCHED-OK\ngit log --oneline -2", "timeout": 60}
Result
REMOTE-AHEAD-SETUP-OK
--- bare git pull with remote ahead: ---
remote.txt | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
create mode 100644 remote.txt
remote.txt
PULL-FETCHED-OK
06f6a79 (HEAD -> issue-1-greg) remote change
c0a00f4 wip
Thinking
The complete workflow works end-to-end:
1. `git clone` inside the sandbox (authenticated)
2. `git commit`
3. Plain `git push` (autoSetupRemote) β pushes the branch and sets the upstream
4. Plain `git pull` β actually fetches and merges new remote commits
"git pull just works" β verified.
Alright, let me run the full test suite one more time, and also do a compile check with the docker tag. After that, I'll re-read the final version of sandboxgit.go to confirm it's clean.
The complete workflow has been verified: authenticated clone β commit β bare `git push` (autoSetupRemote) β bare `git pull` fetches and merges. Final verification pass:
Tool
π§ bash
{"command": "cd /project && gofmt -l . ; go build ./... && go test ./... 2>&1 | grep -v \"no test files\" && go vet -tags docker ./... && echo ALL-OK", "timeout": 300}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /project && gofmt -l . ; go build ./... && go test ./... 2>&1 | grep -v \"no test files\" && go vet -tags docker ./... && echo ALL-OK", "timeout": 300}
Result
ok github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/agentrun (cached)
ok github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/config (cached)
ok github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/forgejo (cached)
ok github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/livelog (cached)
ok github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/llm (cached)
ok github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/scheduler (cached)
ok github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/store (cached)
ok github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/tools (cached)
ok github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/web (cached)
ALL-OK
Thinking
Everything's passing. Let me do a final re-read of the new sandboxgit.go to confirm it's clean, and then commit + push + open a PR.
Actually, there's one more thing I want to double-check: the `exec` environment in `docker.go` β the exec's Env list. The exec command for `configureSandboxGit` contains the token (base64) in the command line. This is visible in the container's process list while it's running, and in the docker exec API call. This is inherent to the approach of "passing the token to the sandbox" β the issue explicitly asks for it. The container is ephemeral, and the host is a trust boundary. No problem.
Another consideration: **the `git` tool's allowed subcommands** β should I re-check whether there are any subcommands that could be abused to exfiltrate the token? For example, `git config --system --list` via bash (the bash tool allows arbitrary commands!). The agent can already run arbitrary bash inside the container, so they can read /etc/gitconfig directly. This is inherent to the issue's requirements (the agent has the token inside the sandbox). No problem.
Also, let me double-check that the `git` tool's `ls-remote` works inside the sandbox (it's in the allow list) β it runs `git ls-remote <args>` in /project. No problem.
Let me re-read the final version of sandboxgit.go in full.
Tool
π§ read_file
{"path": "internal/agentrun/sandboxgit.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 160}
Arguments
{"path": "internal/agentrun/sandboxgit.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 160}
Result
{"path":"internal/agentrun/sandboxgit.go","content":"package agentrun\r\n\r\nimport (\r\n\t\"context\"\r\n\t\"encoding/base64\"\r\n\t\"fmt\"\r\n\t\"net/url\"\r\n\t\"strings\"\r\n)\r\n\r\n// This file makes git \"just work\" inside the agent's container: the\r\n// initial clone happens in the sandbox, and the sandbox's git\r\n// credential is written to the container's system gitconfig so every\r\n// subsequent remote operation (pull, fetch, push, ...) authenticates\r\n// without any per-invocation plumbing. Zoo itself never runs git\r\n// outside the sandbox.\r\n\r\n// shellQuote wraps s in single quotes for safe interpolation into a\r\n// `sh -c` command string, escaping any embedded single quotes.\r\nfunc shellQuote(s string) string {\r\n\treturn \"'\" + strings.ReplaceAll(s, \"'\", `'\\''`) + \"'\"\r\n}\r\n\r\n// shellGitCmd renders `git \u003cargs...\u003e` as one sh -c command line with\r\n// every argument quoted, for docker exec.\r\nfunc shellGitCmd(args ...string) string {\r\n\tparts := make([]string, 0, len(args)+1)\r\n\tparts = append(parts, \"git\")\r\n\r\n\tfor _, a := range args {\r\n\t\tparts = append(parts, shellQuote(a))\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\treturn strings.Join(parts, \" \")\r\n}\r\n\r\n// runSandboxGit runs `git \u003cargs...\u003e` inside containerID (in its\r\n// working directory, /project) and returns its combined output. A\r\n// non-zero exit code is an error carrying the output.\r\nfunc runSandboxGit(ctx context.Context, rt *dockerRuntime, containerID string, args ...string) (string, error) {\r\n\tout, exitCode, err := rt.exec(ctx, containerID, shellGitCmd(args...))\r\n\tif err != nil {\r\n\t\treturn out, err\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tif exitCode != 0 {\r\n\t\treturn out, fmt.Errorf(\"git %s: exit %d: %s\", args[0], exitCode, out)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\treturn out, nil\r\n}\r\n\r\n// gitAuthHeader returns the value of an Authorization header that\r\n// authenticates git's smart-HTTP requests as user with token.\r\nfunc gitAuthHeader(user, token string) string {\r\n\tauth := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(user + \":\" + token))\r\n\r\n\treturn \"Authorization: Basic \" + auth\r\n}\r\n\r\n// forgeHost returns the scheme+host prefix of cloneURL, e.g.\r\n// \"https://code.stdio.dk\" for \"https://code.stdio.dk/abrander/zoo.git\".\r\n// On a parse failure it falls back to the full URL, which is a valid\r\n// (narrower) prefix match too.\r\nfunc forgeHost(cloneURL string) string {\r\n\tu, err := url.Parse(cloneURL)\r\n\tif err != nil || u.Host == \"\" {\r\n\t\treturn cloneURL\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\treturn u.Scheme + \"://\" + u.Host\r\n}\r\n\r\n// configureSandboxGit writes the container's system gitconfig so git\r\n// works inside the sandbox without further setup:\r\n//\r\n// - safe.directory '*', so the bind-mounted /project is accepted\r\n// regardless of which UID the container runs git as;\r\n// - user.name / user.email, so commits are attributed to the agent;\r\n// - http.\u003chost\u003e.extraHeader carrying the run's Forgejo credential,\r\n// scoped to the forge host the repository lives on, so\r\n// clone/fetch/pull/push all authenticate transparently β including\r\n// for submodules and other repos on the same forge. The token is\r\n// only valid on that forge anyway, so the host scope grants no\r\n// extra access; git never sends it anywhere else;\r\n// - push.autoSetupRemote, so a bare `git push` on the fresh working\r\n// branch pushes it to origin and sets the upstream β after which\r\n// a bare `git pull` works too.\r\n//\r\n// The credential lives in the container's own filesystem (ephemeral,\r\n// torn down with the container), never in the bind-mounted working\r\n// tree: the origin remote keeps the plain cloneURL, so the token can't\r\n// leak into the repo's .git/config, into a work dir zoo keeps on\r\n// failure, or anywhere the host can read it back.\r\nfunc configureSandboxGit(ctx context.Context, rt *dockerRuntime, containerID, cloneURL, user, token, name, email string) error {\r\n\tif _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"config\", \"--system\", \"--add\", \"safe.directory\", \"*\"); err != nil {\r\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure safe.directory: %w\", err)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tif _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"config\", \"--system\", \"user.name\", name); err != nil {\r\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure user.name: %w\", err)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tif _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"config\", \"--system\", \"user.email\", email); err != nil {\r\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure user.email: %w\", err)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tif _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"config\", \"--system\", \"http.\"+forgeHost(cloneURL)+\".extraHeader\", gitAuthHeader(user, token)); err != nil {\r\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure git credential: %w\", err)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tif _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"config\", \"--system\", \"push.autoSetupRemote\", \"true\"); err != nil {\r\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure push.autoSetupRemote: %w\", err)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\treturn nil\r\n}\r\n\r\n// cloneAndBranch clones cloneURL into /project inside the container\r\n// and checks out a fresh branch off defaultBranch. The clone\r\n// authenticates via the http.\u003chost\u003e.extraHeader configured by\r\n// configureSandboxGit, and the origin remote is left with the plain\r\n// cloneURL: no credential ends up in the working tree.\r\nfunc cloneAndBranch(ctx context.Context, rt *dockerRuntime, containerID, cloneURL, defaultBranch, branch string) error {\r\n\tif _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"clone\", \"--branch\", defaultBranch, \"--single-branch\", cloneURL, \"/project\"); err != nil {\r\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"clone: %w\", err)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tif _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"checkout\", \"-b\", branch); err != nil {\r\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"checkout branch %q: %w\", branch, err)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\treturn nil\r\n}\r\n\r\n// clonePRHead clones cloneURL into /project inside the container and\r\n// checks out the pull request's head as a local branch named headRef,\r\n// so commits the agent makes push straight to the PR. The head is\r\n// fetched via the PR's refs/pull/\u003cn\u003e/head ref rather than by branch\r\n// name, which also works for PRs opened from a fork, where the head\r\n// branch doesn't exist in the base repo.\r\nfunc clonePRHead(ctx context.Context, rt *dockerRuntime, containerID, cloneURL, defaultBranch, headRef string, index int64) error {\r\n\tif _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"clone\", \"--branch\", defaultBranch, \"--single-branch\", cloneURL, \"/project\"); err != nil {\r\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"clone: %w\", err)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tfetchRef := fmt.Sprintf(\"refs/pull/%d/head\", index)\r\n\r\n\tif _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"fetch\", \"--no-tags\", \"origin\", fetchRef); err != nil {\r\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"fetch PR %d head: %w\", index, err)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tif _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"checkout\", \"-B\", headRef, \"FETCH_HEAD\"); err != nil {\r\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"checkout PR head %q: %w\", headRef, err)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\treturn nil\r\n}\r","start_line":1,"end_line":158,"total_lines":158,"truncated":false}
Thinking
The code looks clean. One last thing to consider: the integration test `TestDockerRuntimeSandboxGit` β should we also verify `push.autoSetupRemote`? We could add a simple round-trip check, but the test is already long. The critical credential round-trip is covered. I think it's fine as is.
Wait β one more thing to double-check in the integration test: `cloneAndBranch(ctx, rt, containerID, "/bare", "main", "issue-1-greg")` β the clone URL is `/bare`. `forgeHost("/bare")` β url.Parse("/bare") β Path="/bare", Host="" β returns "/bare". So the credential key becomes `http./bare.extraHeader` β a weird key, but it's only written, and the round-trip check uses `forgeHost(cloneURL)` = "/bare" β same key `http./bare.extraHeader`. Consistent. OK.
Hmm, wait, actually β in the integration test, the credential is written with the key `http.https://forgejo.example.extraHeader` (forgeHost of the fake cloneURL "https://forgejo.example/acme/widgets.git"). And the round-trip reads `http.` + forgeHost(cloneURL) + `.extraHeader` = the same thing. Good.
Alright, let's commit and push. After that, open a PR and comment on the issue.
Commit message: follow the repo's style. Looking at recent commits: "Add pr:review event so agents react to PR reviews", "docs: clarify agents are in example config, not pre-configured". Let's write something like:
"Pass the agent's git credential to the sandbox and clone inside it"
Body:
- The sandbox's git now authenticates via http.<host>.extraHeader in the container's system gitconfig, using the agent's own Forgejo token (falling back to the shared zoo identity).
- The initial clone (and PR head fetch) now runs inside the container; zoo no longer runs git on the host.
- The git tool now runs inside the container; push.autoSetupRemote makes bare git push/pull work.
- The token never touches the bind-mounted working tree.
Let's commit and push.
The implementation is complete and verified. Let me commit and push:
Tool
π§ bash
{"command": "cd /project && git add -A && git commit -m \"Pass the agent's git credential to the sandbox, clone inside it\n\nGit now simply works inside the agent's container:\n\n- The sandbox's git authenticates via an http.<host>.extraHeader entry\n in the container's system gitconfig, scoped to the forge host. It\n carries the agent's own Forgejo token when configured (so git\n activity is attributed to the agent's account), falling back to the\n shared zoo identity. Clone, fetch, pull, push, and ls-remote all\n authenticate transparently β no per-invocation plumbing.\n- The initial clone (and the PR-head fetch for pr:review runs) now\n happens inside the container, so the working tree is owned by the\n container's user and zoo never runs git on the host.\n- The git tool now executes inside the container (shell-quoted args),\n and push.autoSetupRemote makes a bare 'git push' β and the 'git\n pull' that follows it β work on the fresh working branch.\n- The credential lives only in the container's ephemeral filesystem;\n the origin remote keeps the plain clone URL, so the token never\n lands in the bind-mounted working tree or the host's work dir.\n\nVerified against a local smart-HTTP git server: clone/pull/push/\nls-remote all authenticate via the gitconfig header.\" && git log --oneline -2"}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /project && git add -A && git commit -m \"Pass the agent's git credential to the sandbox, clone inside it\n\nGit now simply works inside the agent's container:\n\n- The sandbox's git authenticates via an http.<host>.extraHeader entry\n in the container's system gitconfig, scoped to the forge host. It\n carries the agent's own Forgejo token when configured (so git\n activity is attributed to the agent's account), falling back to the\n shared zoo identity. Clone, fetch, pull, push, and ls-remote all\n authenticate transparently β no per-invocation plumbing.\n- The initial clone (and the PR-head fetch for pr:review runs) now\n happens inside the container, so the working tree is owned by the\n container's user and zoo never runs git on the host.\n- The git tool now executes inside the container (shell-quoted args),\n and push.autoSetupRemote makes a bare 'git push' β and the 'git\n pull' that follows it β work on the fresh working branch.\n- The credential lives only in the container's ephemeral filesystem;\n the origin remote keeps the plain clone URL, so the token never\n lands in the bind-mounted working tree or the host's work dir.\n\nVerified against a local smart-HTTP git server: clone/pull/push/\nls-remote all authenticate via the gitconfig header.\" && git log --oneline -2"}
Result
[issue-48-greg c3d3720] Pass the agent's git credential to the sandbox, clone inside it
10 files changed, 422 insertions(+), 145 deletions(-)
delete mode 100644 internal/agentrun/clone.go
create mode 100644 internal/agentrun/sandboxgit.go
create mode 100644 internal/agentrun/sandboxgit_test.go
c3d3720 (HEAD -> issue-48-greg) Pass the agent's git credential to the sandbox, clone inside it
f083eae (origin/main, origin/HEAD, main) Merge pull request 'Add pr:review event so agents react to PR reviews' (#37) from issue-36-greg into main
Thinking
Wait, 10 files changed β I was expecting 9 + README = 10. Let me verify: clone.go (deleted), context.go, docker_integration_test.go, run.go, sandboxgit.go, sandboxgit_test.go, system.md, tools/context.go, tools/git.go, README.md = 10. Correct.
Alright, let's push and open the PR.
Tool
π§ bash
{"command": "cd /project && git push -u origin issue-48-greg 2>&1 | tail -3"}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /project && git push -u origin issue-48-greg 2>&1 | tail -3"}
Result
fatal: could not read Username for 'https://code.stdio.dk': terminal prompts disabled
Thinking
The push failed β my own sandbox doesn't have credentials for the remote. Interesting β this is exactly the situation this issue is describing! The git tool in my environment is... wait, in my environment, the `git` tool is supposed to run on the host side using the token (the old design). Let me use the `git` tool instead of bash for the push.
Wait, actually β my system prompt says "for remote (pull, fetch, push, etc.) git operations, you can use the `git` tool." The `git` tool is the one that handles authentication. Let me use it.
My own sandbox push needs the `git` tool (which carries the credential). Let me use it:
Tool
π§ git
{"subcommand": "push", "args": ["-u", "origin", "issue-48-greg"]}
Arguments
{"subcommand": "push", "args": ["-u", "origin", "issue-48-greg"]}
Result
To https://code.stdio.dk/abrander/zoo.git
* [new branch] issue-48-greg -> issue-48-greg
branch 'issue-48-greg' set up to track 'origin/issue-48-greg'.
Thinking
The push succeeded via the git tool (the old host-side design is still in effect in my own environment β the new code will take effect on the next deployment).
Next, I'll open a PR and leave a comment on the issue.
Tool
π§ open_pull_request
{"head": "issue-48-greg", "base": "main", "title": "Pass the agent's git credential to the sandbox, clone inside it", "body": "Closes #48.\n\nGit now simply works inside the agent's container β zoo no longer runs git on the host at all.\n\n## How\n\n**Credential in the sandbox's gitconfig.** When the container is created, zoo writes the container's *system* gitconfig (`/etc/gitconfig`) via `docker exec`:\n\n- `safe.directory *` (as before),\n- `user.name` / `user.email` (the agent's Forgejo identity, previously set host-side in `.git/config`),\n- `http.<host>.extraHeader = Authorization: Basic base64(user:token)` β the run's Forgejo credential, scoped to the forge host (scheme+host of the clone URL), so it covers the repo, its submodules, and any other repo on the same forge, but is never sent to any other host,\n- `push.autoSetupRemote = true`, so a bare `git push` on the fresh working branch pushes to origin and sets the upstream β after which a bare `git pull` works too.\n\nThe token used is **the agent's own Forgejo token** when configured (so its git activity is attributed to its own account), falling back to the shared zoo identity β mirroring the existing `forgejoAs` fallback.\n\n**Clone inside the sandbox.** The host only creates the empty bind-mount source; the container does `git clone` (+ branch checkout, or the `refs/pull/<n>/head` fetch for pr:review runs) itself. The working tree is owned by the container's user, and the origin remote keeps the plain clone URL β **no credential ever lands in the bind-mounted working tree** or the host's work dir. The credential lives only in the container's ephemeral filesystem, torn down with the container.\n\n**`git` tool runs in the sandbox.** `runContext.Git` now executes via `docker exec` with shell-quoted args (new `shellQuote`/`shellGitCmd` helpers), instead of on the host with per-invocation `-c http.extraHeader` for push.\n\n## Verification\n\n- `go build`, `go vet` (incl. `-tags docker`), `gofmt`, and the full unit test suite pass; new unit tests cover the quoting, header construction, and host extraction.\n- The auth mechanism was verified end-to-end against a local smart-HTTP git server (CGI `git http-backend` requiring Basic auth): clone, `git pull`, `git push`, and `git ls-remote` all authenticate via the gitconfig header; host-scoped prefix matching confirmed; bare `git push` β bare `git pull` round-trip confirmed.\n- New `docker`-tagged integration test `TestDockerRuntimeSandboxGit` covers the container flow: gitconfig round-trip (including the URL-subsection key), in-sandbox clone + branch, commit identity from the system gitconfig, and no token leak into the working tree. (No Docker daemon in this sandbox, so it runs in CI.)\n\n## Notes\n\n- `push.autoSetupRemote` requires git β₯ 2.37 β fine for the `golang:latest`/Debian-based images zoo uses.\n- The system prompt and README were updated to match (remote git ops are authenticated for the agent; the agent `token` now also authenticates its sandbox's git)."}
Arguments
{"head": "issue-48-greg", "base": "main", "title": "Pass the agent's git credential to the sandbox, clone inside it", "body": "Closes #48.\n\nGit now simply works inside the agent's container β zoo no longer runs git on the host at all.\n\n## How\n\n**Credential in the sandbox's gitconfig.** When the container is created, zoo writes the container's *system* gitconfig (`/etc/gitconfig`) via `docker exec`:\n\n- `safe.directory *` (as before),\n- `user.name` / `user.email` (the agent's Forgejo identity, previously set host-side in `.git/config`),\n- `http.<host>.extraHeader = Authorization: Basic base64(user:token)` β the run's Forgejo credential, scoped to the forge host (scheme+host of the clone URL), so it covers the repo, its submodules, and any other repo on the same forge, but is never sent to any other host,\n- `push.autoSetupRemote = true`, so a bare `git push` on the fresh working branch pushes to origin and sets the upstream β after which a bare `git pull` works too.\n\nThe token used is **the agent's own Forgejo token** when configured (so its git activity is attributed to its own account), falling back to the shared zoo identity β mirroring the existing `forgejoAs` fallback.\n\n**Clone inside the sandbox.** The host only creates the empty bind-mount source; the container does `git clone` (+ branch checkout, or the `refs/pull/<n>/head` fetch for pr:review runs) itself. The working tree is owned by the container's user, and the origin remote keeps the plain clone URL β **no credential ever lands in the bind-mounted working tree** or the host's work dir. The credential lives only in the container's ephemeral filesystem, torn down with the container.\n\n**`git` tool runs in the sandbox.** `runContext.Git` now executes via `docker exec` with shell-quoted args (new `shellQuote`/`shellGitCmd` helpers), instead of on the host with per-invocation `-c http.extraHeader` for push.\n\n## Verification\n\n- `go build`, `go vet` (incl. `-tags docker`), `gofmt`, and the full unit test suite pass; new unit tests cover the quoting, header construction, and host extraction.\n- The auth mechanism was verified end-to-end against a local smart-HTTP git server (CGI `git http-backend` requiring Basic auth): clone, `git pull`, `git push`, and `git ls-remote` all authenticate via the gitconfig header; host-scoped prefix matching confirmed; bare `git push` β bare `git pull` round-trip confirmed.\n- New `docker`-tagged integration test `TestDockerRuntimeSandboxGit` covers the container flow: gitconfig round-trip (including the URL-subsection key), in-sandbox clone + branch, commit identity from the system gitconfig, and no token leak into the working tree. (No Docker daemon in this sandbox, so it runs in CI.)\n\n## Notes\n\n- `push.autoSetupRemote` requires git β₯ 2.37 β fine for the `golang:latest`/Debian-based images zoo uses.\n- The system prompt and README were updated to match (remote git ops are authenticated for the agent; the agent `token` now also authenticates its sandbox's git)."}
Result
Pull request opened
Thinking
The PR has been opened. Next, I'll leave a comment on the issue summarizing what was done.
Tool
π§ comment
{"body": "Done β PR opened against `main`. Git now simply works inside the sandbox, and zoo no longer runs git on the host at all.\n\n**What changed**\n\n1. **The agent's token is passed to the sandbox** β when the container starts, zoo writes the container's *system* gitconfig (`/etc/gitconfig`) with `http.<forge-host>.extraHeader = Authorization: Basic β¦`, carrying the agent's own Forgejo token (falling back to the shared zoo identity when the agent has no token, same fallback as the Forgejo API client). Scoped to the forge host, so it covers the repo, submodules, and any other repo on that forge β and is never sent anywhere else.\n2. **The initial clone happens inside the sandbox** β the host only creates the empty bind-mount source; the container clones (and, for pr:review, fetches `refs/pull/<n>/head`) itself. The working tree is owned by the container's user, and the origin remote keeps the plain clone URL, so the token never lands in the working tree or the host's work dir β only in the container's ephemeral filesystem.\n3. **`git pull` just works** β that's the `.gitconfig` approach you suspected: with the extraHeader in place, `git pull`/`push`/`fetch`/`ls-remote` authenticate transparently. As a bonus, `push.autoSetupRemote = true` makes a bare `git push` set the upstream, so the bare `git pull` that follows works too. The `git` tool now also executes inside the container (shell-quoted args) instead of on the host.\n\n**Verification** β I stood up a local smart-HTTP git server requiring Basic auth and confirmed clone, pull, push, and ls-remote all authenticate via the gitconfig header (including host-scoped prefix matching and the bare-push β bare-pull round-trip). Unit tests cover the quoting/header/host helpers, and a new `docker`-tagged integration test covers the full container flow (gitconfig round-trip, in-sandbox clone + branch, commit identity, no token leak into the working tree) for CI."}
Arguments
{"body": "Done β PR opened against `main`. Git now simply works inside the sandbox, and zoo no longer runs git on the host at all.\n\n**What changed**\n\n1. **The agent's token is passed to the sandbox** β when the container starts, zoo writes the container's *system* gitconfig (`/etc/gitconfig`) with `http.<forge-host>.extraHeader = Authorization: Basic β¦`, carrying the agent's own Forgejo token (falling back to the shared zoo identity when the agent has no token, same fallback as the Forgejo API client). Scoped to the forge host, so it covers the repo, submodules, and any other repo on that forge β and is never sent anywhere else.\n2. **The initial clone happens inside the sandbox** β the host only creates the empty bind-mount source; the container clones (and, for pr:review, fetches `refs/pull/<n>/head`) itself. The working tree is owned by the container's user, and the origin remote keeps the plain clone URL, so the token never lands in the working tree or the host's work dir β only in the container's ephemeral filesystem.\n3. **`git pull` just works** β that's the `.gitconfig` approach you suspected: with the extraHeader in place, `git pull`/`push`/`fetch`/`ls-remote` authenticate transparently. As a bonus, `push.autoSetupRemote = true` makes a bare `git push` set the upstream, so the bare `git pull` that follows works too. The `git` tool now also executes inside the container (shell-quoted args) instead of on the host.\n\n**Verification** β I stood up a local smart-HTTP git server requiring Basic auth and confirmed clone, pull, push, and ls-remote all authenticate via the gitconfig header (including host-scoped prefix matching and the bare-push β bare-pull round-trip). Unit tests cover the quoting/header/host helpers, and a new `docker`-tagged integration test covers the full container flow (gitconfig round-trip, in-sandbox clone + branch, commit identity, no token leak into the working tree) for CI."}
Result
Comment posted
Thinking
Everything is complete:
1. β
Implementation complete: pass the token to the sandbox, clone inside the sandbox, git pull works.
2. β
All tests pass, build passes, vet passes, gofmt is clean.
3. β
Verified the mechanism end-to-end with a local HTTP git server.
4. β
Committed and pushed the branch.
5. β
Opened a PR with a detailed description.
6. β
Posted a comment on the issue.
Let me do one final check on the PR state... Actually, the open_pull_request tool succeeded, and the comment was posted too. Done.
Let me write the final summary for the user.
The issue is handled. Here's a summary of what was done:
## Issue #48: Pass the token to the sandbox β complete
**PR opened** against `main` (branch `issue-48-greg`), with a comment posted on the issue.
### Design
The key insight was the issue author's own hunch β *"maybe we must populate .gitconfig"*:
1. **Token β sandbox gitconfig**: When the container starts, zoo writes the container's **system** gitconfig (`/etc/gitconfig`) via `docker exec` with `http.<forge-host>.extraHeader = Authorization: Basic base64(user:token)`. The credential is the **agent's own Forgejo token** when configured (git activity attributed to the agent's account), falling back to the shared zoo identity β mirroring the existing `forgejoAs` fallback. Host-scoped so it covers submodules and other repos on the same forge, but is never sent to any other host.
2. **Clone inside the sandbox**: The host only creates the empty bind-mount source; the container does `git clone` itself (plus the `refs/pull/<n>/head` fetch for pr:review runs). The working tree is owned by the container's user, and origin keeps the plain clone URL β **the token never lands in the bind-mounted working tree** or the host's work dir, only in the container's ephemeral filesystem.
3. **`git pull` simply works**: With the extraHeader in place, pull/push/fetch/ls-remote authenticate transparently. `push.autoSetupRemote = true` makes bare `git push` set the upstream, so the bare `git pull` that follows works too. The `git` tool now executes inside the container (shell-quoted args) instead of on the host β zoo no longer runs git outside the sandbox at all.
### Verification
- Built a local smart-HTTP git server (CGI `git http-backend` requiring Basic auth) and confirmed **clone, pull, push, and ls-remote all authenticate via the gitconfig header**, including host-scoped prefix matching and the bare-push β bare-pull round-trip.
- Full test suite, `go vet` (incl. `-tags docker`), and gofmt pass; new unit tests for quoting/header/host helpers, plus a new docker-tagged integration test covering the full container flow (gitconfig round-trip, in-sandbox clone+branch, commit identity, no token leak) for CI.
- Updated `system.md`, `tools` doc comments, and the README to match.