Status failed
Event issue:assigned on abrander/zoo#56
Agent greg greg
Error agent loop: chat completion: status: 504: <html> <head><title>504 Gateway Time-out</title></head> <body> <center><h1>504 Gateway Time-out</h1></center> </body> </html>

Log

Thinking
Let's start by understanding the task. This issue is about git credentials in the sandbox. The concern is that the sandbox (the container in which the agent operates) is being given a Forgejo API token that can do everything on the Forgejo instance. The question is whether we can special-case git push/pull and other operations that require authentication, so that the agent can work without exposing the API key to the sandbox. First, let's explore the project to understand the codebase. The repo is `abrander/zoo` — this is the system that triggers the agent from Forgejo events. In other words, this repo itself is the "zoo" system. Let's look at the code and understand how the sandbox is set up and how git credentials are currently being provided. Let me explore.
Tool šŸ”§ bash {"command": "cd /project && ls -la && git log --oneline -10 && git branch -a"}
{"command": "cd /project && ls -la && git log --oneline -10 && git branch -a"}
total 64
drwxr-xr-x  6 user user  4096 Aug 25 22:33 .
drwxr-xr-x  1 root root  4096 Aug 25 22:33 ..
drwxr-xr-x  7 user user  4096 Aug 25 22:33 .git
-rw-r--r--  1 user user    22 Aug 25 22:33 .gitignore
-rw-r--r--  1 user user  6387 Aug 25 22:33 README.md
drwxr-xr-x  3 user user  4096 Aug 25 22:33 cmd
drwxr-xr-x  2 user user  4096 Aug 25 22:33 docker
-rw-r--r--  1 user user  2628 Aug 25 22:33 go.mod
-rw-r--r--  1 user user 16578 Aug 25 22:33 go.sum
drwxr-xr-x 11 user user  4096 Aug 25 22:33 internal
-rw-r--r--  1 user user  3092 Aug 25 22:33 zoo.hcl.example
98298f6 Merge pull request 'Fix excessive vertical space in job view blocks (#53)' (#55) from issue-53-greg into main
b75b64d Fix excessive vertical space in job view blocks
10c3dce Better Docker/git inter.
315f993 Add docker image build.
5717258 Merge pull request 'forgejo: repository allowlist with wildcard patterns' (#40) from issue-39-greg into main
823ae62 fix(forgejo): resolve test helper collision after merging main
bccf930 Merge branch 'main' into issue-39-greg
1365ea8 Merge pull request 'Pass the agent's git credential to the sandbox, clone inside it' (#49) from issue-48-greg into main
7c60789 Remove the git tool and Context.Git per review
c3d3720 Pass the agent's git credential to the sandbox, clone inside it
* issue-56-greg
  main
  remotes/origin/main
Tool šŸ”§ list_files {"path": ".", "recursive": false}
{"path": ".", "recursive": false}
drwxr-xr-x  6 user user  4096 Aug 25 22:33 .
drwxr-xr-x  1 root root  4096 Aug 25 22:33 ..
drwxr-xr-x  7 user user  4096 Aug 25 22:33 .git
-rw-r--r--  1 user user    22 Aug 25 22:33 .gitignore
-rw-r--r--  1 user user  6387 Aug 25 22:33 README.md
drwxr-xr-x  3 user user  4096 Aug 25 22:33 cmd
drwxr-xr-x  2 user user  4096 Aug 25 22:33 docker
-rw-r--r--  1 user user  2628 Aug 25 22:33 go.mod
-rw-r--r--  1 user user 16578 Aug 25 22:33 go.sum
drwxr-xr-x 11 user user  4096 Aug 25 22:33 internal
-rw-r--r--  1 user user  3092 Aug 25 22:33 zoo.hcl.example
Thinking
Let's explore the codebase to understand the architecture. I'll take a look at the internal directory and the main files.
Tool šŸ”§ list_files {"path": "internal", "recursive": true}
{"path": "internal", "recursive": true}
/project/internal/agentrun
/project/internal/agentrun/context.go
/project/internal/agentrun/docker.go
/project/internal/agentrun/docker_integration_test.go
/project/internal/agentrun/forgejo.go
/project/internal/agentrun/loop.go
/project/internal/agentrun/roster.go
/project/internal/agentrun/roster_test.go
/project/internal/agentrun/run.go
/project/internal/agentrun/sandboxgit.go
/project/internal/agentrun/sandboxgit_test.go
/project/internal/agentrun/seed_test.go
/project/internal/agentrun/system.md
/project/internal/config
/project/internal/config/config.go
/project/internal/config/config_test.go
/project/internal/forgejo
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go
/project/internal/forgejo/client_test.go
/project/internal/forgejo/event.go
/project/internal/forgejo/poll.go
/project/internal/forgejo/poll_test.go
/project/internal/forgejo/repo_filter.go
/project/internal/forgejo/repo_filter_test.go
/project/internal/forgejo/watcher.go
/project/internal/forgejo/watcher_test.go
/project/internal/forgejo/webhook.go
/project/internal/forgejo/webhook_test.go
/project/internal/livelog
/project/internal/livelog/hub.go
/project/internal/livelog/hub_test.go
/project/internal/llm
/project/internal/llm/client.go
/project/internal/llm/streamer.go
/project/internal/llm/streamer_test.go
/project/internal/llm/types.go
/project/internal/scheduler
/project/internal/scheduler/scheduler.go
/project/internal/scheduler/scheduler_test.go
/project/internal/store
/project/internal/store/schema.sql
/project/internal/store/store.go
/project/internal/store/store_test.go
/project/internal/tools
/project/internal/tools/bash.go
/project/internal/tools/context.go
/project/internal/tools/edit-file.go
/project/internal/tools/forgejo.go
/project/internal/tools/grep_search.go
/project/internal/tools/list_files.go
/project/internal/tools/move_file.go
/project/internal/tools/read_file.go
/project/internal/tools/registry.go
/project/internal/tools/remove_file.go
/project/internal/tools/shell.go
/project/internal/tools/tools_test.go
/project/internal/tools/write_file.go
/project/internal/web
/project/internal/web/templates.go
/project/internal/web/web.go
/project/internal/web/web_test.go
Tool šŸ”§ read_file {"path": "README.md", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 200}
{"path": "README.md", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 200}
{"path":"README.md","content":"# 🐾 Zoo\n\n**Autonomous AI agents that work your Forgejo issues \u0026 pull requests.**\n\nZoo watches a [Forgejo](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo) instance for issue and pull request events, then dispatches them to configured AI agents running in isolated Docker containers. Each agent has its own role, LLM model, and personality — like a menagerie working together to keep your projects moving.\n\n---\n\n## ✨ Features\n\n- **Multi-agent orchestration** — Assign different tasks to specialized agents (reviewers, managers, developers).\n- **Event-driven routing** — Configure which agent handles `issue:new`, `pr:new`, `issue:comment`, `issue:assigned`, and more.\n- **LLM flexibility** — Plug in any OpenAI-compatible API; each agent gets its own model choice.\n- **Isolated execution** — Agents run in Docker containers with full filesystem access but no persistence between runs.\n- **Live dashboard** — Real-time web UI showing active agents, logs, and job history.\n- **Webhook \u0026 polling support** — React to events instantly via webhooks, or fall back to polling.\n\n---\n\n## šŸš€ Quick Start\n\n### Prerequisites\n\n| Requirement | Version |\n|-------------|---------|\n| Go          | 1.26+   |\n| Docker      | Latest  |\n| Forgejo     | Any (self-hosted or codeberg.dk) |\n| LLM endpoint | OpenAI-compatible API |\n\n### Configuration\n\nCopy the example config and customize it:\n\n```bash\ncp zoo.hcl.example zoo.hcl\n```\n\nEdit `zoo.hcl` with your Forgejo credentials, LLM tokens, and agent definitions. See the [configuration reference](#-configuration-reference) below.\n\n### Running\n\n```bash\ngo build -o zoo ./cmd/zoo\n./zoo\n```\n\nThe daemon starts on port `:8080` by default. Open your browser to see the dashboard.\n\n---\n\n## šŸ‘„ Meet the Agents\n\nThe example configuration includes four agents, each with a distinct role:\n\n| Agent    | Role                  | Suggested LLM       | Handles                          |\n|----------|-----------------------|---------------------|----------------------------------|\n| **leon** | Engineering Manager   | Qwen 3.8            | New issues, comments             |\n| **greg** | Senior Developer      | Qwen 3.8            | Pull request reviews             |\n| **anna** | UI/UX Designer        | Qwen 3.6            | Design-related issues \u0026 PRs      |\n| **mika** | Junior Developer      | Qwen 3.6            | Assigned issues                  |\n\nYou can add, remove, or reassign agents freely in your `zoo.hcl`.\n\n---\n\n## āš™ļø Configuration Reference\n\nAll settings live in a single HCL file (`zoo.hcl`). Here's what each section controls:\n\n### LLM Definitions\n\nDefine one or more LLM endpoints. Agents reference these by name.\n\n```hcl\nllm \"Qwen 3.6\" {\n    openai = \"https://your-llm-endpoint\"\n    token  = \"YOUR_API_TOKEN\"\n    model  = \"model-name\"\n}\n```\n\n### Forgejo Connection\n\n```hcl\nforgejo {\n    url            = \"https://code.stdio.dk\"\n    token          = \"ZOO_SERVICE_TOKEN\"\n    webhook_secret = \"SHARED_SECRET\"  # optional if using polling\n}\n```\n\n### Environment\n\n```hcl\nenvironment {\n    docker_image    = \"golang:latest\"   # base image for agent containers\n    max_live_agents = 5                 # concurrent agent limit\n}\n```\n\n### Agent Definition\n\n```hcl\nagent \"anna\" {\n    llm   = \"Qwen 3.6\"\n    token = \"ANNA_FORGEJO_TOKEN\"\n}\n```\n\nThe optional `token` is the agent's own Forgejo token. When set, the\nagent acts as itself on Forgejo (comments, PRs, ...) and its sandbox's\ngit authenticates with it too — the initial clone and all remote git\noperations (pull, push, ...) run inside the container with that\ncredential. Without it, the shared `forgejo.token` is used.\n\n### Event Routing\n\nMap event types to agents with optional custom instructions:\n\n```hcl\nevent \"issue:new\" {\n    agent        = \"leon\"\n    instructions = \"Triage this issue.\"\n}\n\nevent \"issue:assigned\" {\n    // No `agent` — dynamically matches the assignee's username\n    instructions = \"Please handle this issue.\"\n}\n\nevent \"pr:new\" {\n    agent        = \"greg\"\n    instructions = \"Review this pull request.\"\n}\n```\n\n---\n\n## šŸ”§ Command-Line Flags\n\n| Flag              | Default         | Description                                  |\n|-------------------|-----------------|----------------------------------------------|\n| `-config`         | `zoo.hcl`       | Path to the configuration file               |\n| `-db`             | `zoo.db`        | SQLite database path                         |\n| `-listen`         | `:8080`         | HTTP listen address                          |\n| `-run-timeout`    | (see source)    | Max wall-clock time per agent run            |\n| `-keep-on-failure`| `false`         | Preserve container after failure for debugging |\n\n---\n\n## šŸ“ Project Structure\n\n```\nā”œā”€ā”€ cmd/zoo/main.go           # Entry point\nā”œā”€ā”€ internal/\n│   ā”œā”€ā”€ agentrun/             # Docker-based agent execution\n│   ā”œā”€ā”€ config/               # HCL config loader \u0026 validator\n│   ā”œā”€ā”€ forgejo/              # Webhook receiver \u0026 event poller\n│   ā”œā”€ā”€ livelog/              # Real-time log streaming hub\n│   ā”œā”€ā”€ llm/                  # LLM client \u0026 streaming\n│   ā”œā”€ā”€ scheduler/            # Event-to-agent dispatcher\n│   ā”œā”€ā”€ store/                # SQLite state management\n│   ā”œā”€ā”€ tools/                # Agent tool registry\n│   └── web/                  # Dashboard HTTP server\n└── zoo.hcl.example           # Configuration template\n```\n\n---\n\n## šŸ›  Development\n\n### Running Tests\n\n```bash\ngo test ./...\n```\n\n### Adding a New Agent\n\n1. Define the agent in `zoo.hcl`:\n\n   ```hcl\n   agent \"newagent\" {\n       llm   = \"Qwen 3.6\"\n       token = \"NEW_AGENT_TOKEN\"\n   }\n   ```\n\n2. Add an event route:\n\n   ```hcl\n   event \"issue:new\" {\n       agent = \"newagent\"\n   }\n   ```\n\n3. Update your Forgejo profile with the agent's role description.\n\n### Adding a New Tool","start_line":1,"end_line":200,"total_lines":223,"truncated":true}
Thinking
Let's take a look at the main files: `internal/agentrun/sandboxgit.go`, `internal/agentrun/docker.go`, `internal/agentrun/run.go`, `internal/agentrun/context.go`, and the config files.
Tool šŸ”§ read_file {"path": "internal/agentrun/sandboxgit.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 400}
{"path": "internal/agentrun/sandboxgit.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 400}
{"path":"internal/agentrun/sandboxgit.go","content":"package agentrun\n\nimport (\n\t\"context\"\n\t\"encoding/base64\"\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"net/url\"\n\t\"strings\"\n)\n\n// This file makes git \"just work\" inside the agent's container: the\n// initial clone happens in the sandbox, and the sandbox's git\n// credential is written to the container's system gitconfig so every\n// subsequent remote operation (pull, fetch, push, ...) authenticates\n// without any per-invocation plumbing. Zoo itself never runs git\n// outside the sandbox.\n\n// shellQuote wraps s in single quotes for safe interpolation into a\n// `sh -c` command string, escaping any embedded single quotes.\nfunc shellQuote(s string) string {\n\treturn \"'\" + strings.ReplaceAll(s, \"'\", `'\\''`) + \"'\"\n}\n\n// shellGitCmd renders `git \u003cargs...\u003e` as one sh -c command line with\n// every argument quoted, for docker exec.\nfunc shellGitCmd(args ...string) string {\n\tparts := make([]string, 0, len(args)+1)\n\tparts = append(parts, \"git\")\n\n\tfor _, a := range args {\n\t\tparts = append(parts, shellQuote(a))\n\t}\n\n\treturn strings.Join(parts, \" \")\n}\n\n// runSandboxGit runs `git \u003cargs...\u003e` inside containerID (in its\n// working directory, /project) and returns its combined output. A\n// non-zero exit code is an error carrying the output.\nfunc runSandboxGit(ctx context.Context, rt *dockerRuntime, containerID string, args ...string) (string, error) {\n\tout, exitCode, err := rt.exec(ctx, containerID, shellGitCmd(args...))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn out, err\n\t}\n\n\tif exitCode != 0 {\n\t\treturn out, fmt.Errorf(\"git %s: exit %d: %s\", args[0], exitCode, out)\n\t}\n\n\treturn out, nil\n}\n\n// gitAuthHeader returns the value of an Authorization header that\n// authenticates git's smart-HTTP requests as user with token.\nfunc gitAuthHeader(user, token string) string {\n\tauth := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(user + \":\" + token))\n\n\treturn \"Authorization: Basic \" + auth\n}\n\n// forgeHost returns the scheme+host prefix of cloneURL, e.g.\n// \"https://code.stdio.dk\" for \"https://code.stdio.dk/abrander/zoo.git\".\n// On a parse failure it falls back to the full URL, which is a valid\n// (narrower) prefix match too.\nfunc forgeHost(cloneURL string) string {\n\tu, err := url.Parse(cloneURL)\n\tif err != nil || u.Host == \"\" {\n\t\treturn cloneURL\n\t}\n\n\treturn u.Scheme + \"://\" + u.Host\n}\n\n// configureSandboxGit writes the container's system gitconfig so git\n// works inside the sandbox without further setup:\n//\n//   - safe.directory '*', so the bind-mounted /project is accepted\n//     regardless of which UID the container runs git as;\n//   - user.name / user.email, so commits are attributed to the agent;\n//   - http.\u003chost\u003e.extraHeader carrying the run's Forgejo credential,\n//     scoped to the forge host the repository lives on, so\n//     clone/fetch/pull/push all authenticate transparently — including\n//     for submodules and other repos on the same forge. The token is\n//     only valid on that forge anyway, so the host scope grants no\n//     extra access; git never sends it anywhere else;\n//   - push.autoSetupRemote, so a bare `git push` on the fresh working\n//     branch pushes it to origin and sets the upstream — after which\n//     a bare `git pull` works too.\n//\n// The credential lives in the container's own filesystem (ephemeral,\n// torn down with the container), never in the bind-mounted working\n// tree: the origin remote keeps the plain cloneURL, so the token can't\n// leak into the repo's .git/config, into a work dir zoo keeps on\n// failure, or anywhere the host can read it back.\nfunc configureSandboxGit(ctx context.Context, rt *dockerRuntime, containerID, cloneURL, user, token, name, email string) error {\n\tif _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"config\", \"--global\", \"--add\", \"safe.directory\", \"*\"); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure safe.directory: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tif _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"config\", \"--global\", \"user.name\", name); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure user.name: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tif _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"config\", \"--global\", \"user.email\", email); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure user.email: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tif _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"config\", \"--global\", \"http.\"+forgeHost(cloneURL)+\".extraHeader\", gitAuthHeader(user, token)); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure git credential: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tif _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"config\", \"--global\", \"push.autoSetupRemote\", \"true\"); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure push.autoSetupRemote: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}\n\n// cloneAndBranch clones cloneURL into /project inside the container\n// and checks out a fresh branch off defaultBranch. The clone\n// authenticates via the http.\u003chost\u003e.extraHeader configured by\n// configureSandboxGit, and the origin remote is left with the plain\n// cloneURL: no credential ends up in the working tree.\nfunc cloneAndBranch(ctx context.Context, rt *dockerRuntime, containerID, cloneURL, defaultBranch, branch string) error {\n\tif _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"clone\", \"--branch\", defaultBranch, \"--single-branch\", cloneURL, \"/project\"); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"clone: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tif _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"checkout\", \"-b\", branch); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"checkout branch %q: %w\", branch, err)\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}\n\n// clonePRHead clones cloneURL into /project inside the container and\n// checks out the pull request's head as a local branch named headRef,\n// so commits the agent makes push straight to the PR. The head is\n// fetched via the PR's refs/pull/\u003cn\u003e/head ref rather than by branch\n// name, which also works for PRs opened from a fork, where the head\n// branch doesn't exist in the base repo.\nfunc clonePRHead(ctx context.Context, rt *dockerRuntime, containerID, cloneURL, defaultBranch, headRef string, index int64) error {\n\tif _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"clone\", \"--branch\", defaultBranch, \"--single-branch\", cloneURL, \"/project\"); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"clone: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tfetchRef := fmt.Sprintf(\"refs/pull/%d/head\", index)\n\n\tif _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"fetch\", \"--no-tags\", \"origin\", fetchRef); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"fetch PR %d head: %w\", index, err)\n\t}\n\n\tif _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"checkout\", \"-B\", headRef, \"FETCH_HEAD\"); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"checkout PR head %q: %w\", headRef, err)\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}","start_line":1,"end_line":158,"total_lines":158,"truncated":false}
Tool šŸ”§ read_file {"path": "internal/agentrun/docker.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 400}
{"path": "internal/agentrun/docker.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 400}
{"path":"internal/agentrun/docker.go","content":"package agentrun\n\nimport (\n\t\"context\"\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"io\"\n\t\"time\"\n\n\t\"github.com/docker/docker/api/types/container\"\n\t\"github.com/docker/docker/client\"\n)\n\n// containerCPUs and containerMemory bound each agent container's\n// resource usage; there's no per-agent config knob for this yet (see\n// TODO.md), so every run gets the same sane default.\nconst (\n\tcontainerNanoCPUs = 2_000_000_000 // 2 CPUs\n\tcontainerMemory   = 2 \u003c\u003c 30       // 2 GiB\n)\n\ntype dockerRuntime struct {\n\tcli *client.Client\n}\n\nfunc newDockerRuntime() (*dockerRuntime, error) {\n\tcli, err := client.NewClientWithOpts(client.FromEnv, client.WithAPIVersionNegotiation())\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"docker client: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\treturn \u0026dockerRuntime{cli: cli}, nil\n}\n\n// createContainer creates and starts a container from image with the\n// given bind mounts, kept alive with `sleep infinity` regardless of the\n// image's own entrypoint so it can be repeatedly `exec`'d into.\nfunc (d *dockerRuntime) createContainer(ctx context.Context, image string, binds []string, name string) (string, error) {\n\tresp, err := d.cli.ContainerCreate(ctx,\n\t\t\u0026container.Config{\n\t\t\tImage:      image,\n\t\t\tEntrypoint: []string{\"sleep\"},\n\t\t\tCmd:        []string{\"infinity\"},\n\t\t\tWorkingDir: \"/project\",\n\t\t},\n\t\t\u0026container.HostConfig{\n\t\t\tBinds: binds,\n\t\t\tResources: container.Resources{\n\t\t\t\tNanoCPUs: containerNanoCPUs,\n\t\t\t\tMemory:   containerMemory,\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t},\n\t\tnil, nil, name)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"create container: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tif err := d.cli.ContainerStart(ctx, resp.ID, container.StartOptions{}); err != nil {\n\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"start container: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\treturn resp.ID, nil\n}\n\n// exec runs command via `sh -c` inside containerID and returns its\n// combined stdout+stderr (a TTY is attached so the two streams merge\n// without needing to demultiplex Docker's stdcopy framing) plus its exit\n// code.\nfunc (d *dockerRuntime) exec(ctx context.Context, containerID, command string) (string, int, error) {\n\tcreated, err := d.cli.ContainerExecCreate(ctx, containerID, container.ExecOptions{\n\t\tCmd: []string{\"sh\", \"-c\", command},\n\t\t// A TTY is attached (see doc comment above), which makes git's\n\t\t// isatty-based color.ui=auto default to enabling ANSI color codes\n\t\t// that pollute the captured job log. NO_COLOR covers tools that\n\t\t// honor that convention; the GIT_CONFIG_* override forces git's\n\t\t// own color.ui to \"never\" regardless of tty detection, since git\n\t\t// does not honor NO_COLOR itself.\n\t\t//\n\t\t// The same isatty check makes git launch a pager for diff/log/show,\n\t\t// and the pager (waiting on a stdin nothing ever attaches or\n\t\t// closes) then blocks forever with no way to time it out — see\n\t\t// exec's read loop below. GIT_PAGER/PAGER=cat disable that.\n\t\t// GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT=0 closes the same class of hang for\n\t\t// credential prompts on a private remote.\n\t\tEnv: []string{\n\t\t\t\"NO_COLOR=1\",\n\t\t\t\"GIT_CONFIG_COUNT=1\",\n\t\t\t\"GIT_CONFIG_KEY_0=color.ui\",\n\t\t\t\"GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_0=never\",\n\t\t\t\"GIT_PAGER=cat\",\n\t\t\t\"PAGER=cat\",\n\t\t\t\"GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT=0\",\n\t\t},\n\t\tTty:          true,\n\t\tAttachStdout: true,\n\t\tAttachStderr: true,\n\t})\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn \"\", 0, fmt.Errorf(\"exec create: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tattached, err := d.cli.ContainerExecAttach(ctx, created.ID, container.ExecAttachOptions{Tty: true})\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn \"\", 0, fmt.Errorf(\"exec attach: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\tdefer attached.Close()\n\n\t// Once hijacked, this stream is a raw connection that ctx cancellation\n\t// no longer reaches — a wedged child process (pager, credential\n\t// prompt, anything else reading a stdin nobody attaches) would\n\t// otherwise block this read forever, past the run's deadline, with no\n\t// way to recover the job. Race the read against ctx and force-remove\n\t// the container to sever the connection if it fires.\n\ttype readResult struct {\n\t\toutput []byte\n\t\terr    error\n\t}\n\n\treadDone := make(chan readResult, 1)\n\n\tgo func() {\n\t\toutput, err := io.ReadAll(attached.Reader)\n\t\treadDone \u003c- readResult{output, err}\n\t}()\n\n\tvar output []byte\n\n\tselect {\n\tcase res := \u003c-readDone:\n\t\tif res.err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn \"\", 0, fmt.Errorf(\"exec read output: %w\", res.err)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\toutput = res.output\n\n\tcase \u003c-ctx.Done():\n\t\tkillCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second)\n\t\tdefer cancel()\n\n\t\t_ = d.cli.ContainerRemove(killCtx, containerID, container.RemoveOptions{Force: true})\n\t\t\u003c-readDone\n\n\t\treturn \"\", 0, ctx.Err()\n\t}\n\n\tinspect, err := d.cli.ContainerExecInspect(ctx, created.ID)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn string(output), 0, fmt.Errorf(\"exec inspect: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\treturn string(output), inspect.ExitCode, nil\n}\n\n// remove force-stops and removes containerID, ignoring \"already gone\"\n// errors so cleanup is safe to call unconditionally.\nfunc (d *dockerRuntime) remove(ctx context.Context, containerID string) error {\n\ttimeout := 5\n\t_ = d.cli.ContainerStop(ctx, containerID, container.StopOptions{Timeout: \u0026timeout})\n\n\tif err := d.cli.ContainerRemove(ctx, containerID, container.RemoveOptions{Force: true}); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"remove container: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}\n\nfunc (d *dockerRuntime) kill(ctx context.Context, containerID string) {\n\t_ = d.cli.ContainerKill(ctx, containerID, \"KILL\")\n}","start_line":1,"end_line":168,"total_lines":168,"truncated":false}
Thinking
Next, let's look at run.go and context.go to understand how the token is passed to the sandbox.
Tool šŸ”§ read_file {"path": "internal/agentrun/run.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 400}
{"path": "internal/agentrun/run.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 400}
{"path":"internal/agentrun/run.go","content":"// Package agentrun creates the throwaway per-job environment an agent\n// runs in: a Docker container with the agent's git working tree cloned\n// inside it (authenticated with the agent's own Forgejo token), the\n// triggering event written to /event, and the tool-calling loop\n// (internal/llm + internal/tools) driven against it.\npackage agentrun\n\nimport (\n\t\"context\"\n\t_ \"embed\"\n\t\"encoding/json\"\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"log/slog\"\n\t\"os\"\n\t\"path/filepath\"\n\t\"strings\"\n\t\"sync\"\n\t\"time\"\n\n\t\"github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/config\"\n\t\"github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/forgejo\"\n\t\"github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/livelog\"\n\t\"github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/llm\"\n\t\"github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/store\"\n)\n\n//go:embed system.md\nvar defaultSystemPrompt string\n\n// DefaultTimeout bounds a single agent run's wall-clock time if the\n// caller doesn't override it.\nconst DefaultTimeout = 120 * time.Minute\n\ntype Runner struct {\n\tdocker        *dockerRuntime\n\tforgejo       *forgejo.Client\n\tstore         *store.Store\n\thub           *livelog.Hub\n\tcfg           *config.Config\n\tlogger        *slog.Logger\n\ttimeout       time.Duration\n\tkeepOnFailure bool\n\n\tagentClientsMu sync.Mutex\n\tagentClients   map[string]*forgejo.Client\n}\n\nfunc NewRunner(cfg *config.Config, fg *forgejo.Client, st *store.Store, hub *livelog.Hub, logger *slog.Logger, timeout time.Duration, keepOnFailure bool) (*Runner, error) {\n\tdocker, err := newDockerRuntime()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tif timeout \u003c= 0 {\n\t\ttimeout = DefaultTimeout\n\t}\n\n\treturn \u0026Runner{\n\t\tdocker:        docker,\n\t\tforgejo:       fg,\n\t\tstore:         st,\n\t\thub:           hub,\n\t\tcfg:           cfg,\n\t\tlogger:        logger,\n\t\ttimeout:       timeout,\n\t\tkeepOnFailure: keepOnFailure,\n\t\tagentClients:  make(map[string]*forgejo.Client),\n\t}, nil\n}\n\n// forgejoAs returns a Forgejo client that authenticates as the given\n// agent (using the agent's own token from config). This lets each agent\n// act as themselves on Forgejo without needing a global token with sudo\n// privileges. Clients are built once per agent and cached, since\n// constructing one costs an extra API round trip.\n//\n// If the agent has no token configured, falls back to the shared zoo\n// identity so existing deployments without per-agent tokens still work.\nfunc (r *Runner) forgejoAs(agentName, token string) *forgejo.Client {\n\tr.agentClientsMu.Lock()\n\tdefer r.agentClientsMu.Unlock()\n\n\tif c, ok := r.agentClients[agentName]; ok {\n\t\treturn c\n\t}\n\n\tvar c *forgejo.Client\n\tif token != \"\" {\n\t\tc = r.forgejo.As(token)\n\t} else {\n\t\t// Fallback: use shared identity. Optionally log a warning\n\t\t// if we ever want to enforce per-agent tokens.\n\t\tc = r.forgejo\n\t}\n\n\tr.agentClients[agentName] = c\n\n\treturn c\n}\n\n// Run implements scheduler.Runner.\nfunc (r *Runner) Run(ctx context.Context, jobID string, agent config.AgentConfig, llmCfg config.LLM, dockerImage string, ev forgejo.Event) error {\n\tctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, r.timeout)\n\tdefer cancel()\n\n\tlogger := r.logger.With(\"job\", jobID, \"agent\", agent.Name)\n\n\trepoInfo, err := r.forgejo.RepositoryInfo(ev.Owner, ev.Repo)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"look up repository: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tworkDir, err := os.MkdirTemp(\"\", \"zoo-run-*\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"create work dir: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tsucceeded := false\n\n\tdefer func() {\n\t\tif succeeded || !r.keepOnFailure {\n\t\t\tos.RemoveAll(workDir)\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tlogger.Warn(\"keeping work dir after failure\", \"dir\", workDir)\n\t\t}\n\t}()\n\n\t// The container bind-mounts projectDir as /project and does the\n\t// initial clone into it, so the (empty) directory must exist on the\n\t// host before the container is created — otherwise Docker would\n\t// create it itself, root-owned.\n\tprojectDir := filepath.Join(workDir, \"project\")\n\n\tif err := os.MkdirAll(projectDir, 0o755); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"create project dir: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\t// A pr:review run works on the PR's own head branch, so the agent's\n\t// commits push straight to the PR. Every other event kind branches\n\t// off the default branch as usual.\n\tvar review *forgejo.ReviewDetail\n\tbranch := fmt.Sprintf(\"issue-%d-%s\", ev.Index, agent.Name)\n\n\tif ev.Kind == forgejo.EventPRReview {\n\t\t// Always fetch the current head ref, not just when the event\n\t\t// lacks one (the polling path doesn't carry it): the webhook's\n\t\t// copy could be stale if the PR's head branch was renamed since\n\t\t// the review, and the push target depends on it.\n\t\theadRef := ev.HeadRef\n\n\t\tif prInfo, err := r.forgejo.PullRequestInfo(ev.Owner, ev.Repo, ev.Index); err != nil {\n\t\t\tlogger.Warn(\"fetch pull request head failed; falling back to the event's head ref\", \"error\", err)\n\t\t} else if prInfo.HeadRef != \"\" {\n\t\t\theadRef = prInfo.HeadRef\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif headRef == \"\" {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"pr:review event has no pull request head branch to check out\")\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tbranch = headRef\n\n\t\t// Fetch the full review (verdict, body, inline comments) so the\n\t\t// agent sees all the feedback, not just the triggering event. A\n\t\t// failure degrades to no review detail rather than failing the\n\t\t// run: the agent can still do its job, just without the inline\n\t\t// comments.\n\t\treview, err = r.forgejo.ReviewDetail(ev.Owner, ev.Repo, ev.Index, ev.ReviewID)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tlogger.Warn(\"fetch review detail failed; agent will not see inline review comments\", \"error\", err)\n\t\t\treview = nil\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\troster := buildRoster(r.forgejo, r.cfg.Agents, logger)\n\tgitName, gitEmail := gitIdentity(agent.Name, roster)\n\n\t// The credential the sandbox's git uses for remote operations: the\n\t// agent's own Forgejo token when configured, so its git activity is\n\t// attributed to its own account, falling back to the shared zoo\n\t// identity for deployments without per-agent tokens (mirroring\n\t// forgejoAs).\n\tgitUser, gitToken := \"zoo\", r.forgejo.Token()\n\n\tif agent.Token != \"\" {\n\t\tgitUser, gitToken = agent.Name, agent.Token\n\t}\n\n\teventPath := filepath.Join(workDir, \"event.json\")\n\tif err := os.WriteFile(eventPath, ev.Raw, 0o644); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"write event file: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tcontainerID, err := r.docker.createContainer(ctx, dockerImage, []string{\n\t\tprojectDir + \":/project\",\n\t\teventPath + \":/event:ro\",\n\t}, fmt.Sprintf(\"zoo-issue-%d-%s\", ev.Index, agent.Name))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"start container: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tdefer func() {\n\t\tcleanupCtx, cleanupCancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 30*time.Second)\n\t\tdefer cleanupCancel()\n\t\tif err := r.docker.remove(cleanupCtx, containerID); err != nil {\n\t\t\tlogger.Warn(\"failed to remove container\", \"container\", containerID, \"error\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t}()\n\n\t// Git must simply work inside the sandbox: safe.directory, commit\n\t// identity, and the remote credential all go into the container's\n\t// system gitconfig (see configureSandboxGit).\n\tif err := configureSandboxGit(ctx, r.docker, containerID, repoInfo.CloneURL, gitUser, gitToken, gitName, gitEmail); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure git in container: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\t// The initial clone happens inside the sandbox, so the working tree\n\t// is owned by the container's user and git never runs on the host.\n\tif ev.Kind == forgejo.EventPRReview {\n\t\tif err := clonePRHead(ctx, r.docker, containerID, repoInfo.CloneURL, repoInfo.DefaultBranch, branch, ev.Index); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"prepare git working tree: %w\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t} else {\n\t\tif err := cloneAndBranch(ctx, r.docker, containerID, repoInfo.CloneURL, repoInfo.DefaultBranch, branch); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"prepare git working tree: %w\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tlogAppend := func(stream, line string) {\n\t\tif err := r.store.AppendLog(context.Background(), jobID, stream, line); err != nil {\n\t\t\tlogger.Warn(\"failed to append log\", \"error\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\trunCtx := \u0026runContext{\n\t\tdocker:      r.docker,\n\t\tcontainerID: containerID,\n\t\tforgejo: \u0026runForgejoActions{\n\t\t\tclient: r.forgejoAs(agent.Name, agent.Token),\n\t\t\towner:  ev.Owner,\n\t\t\trepo:   ev.Repo,\n\t\t\tindex:  ev.Index,\n\t\t\tlogger: logger,\n\t\t},\n\t}\n\n\tllmClient := llm.NewClient(llmCfg)\n\n\tsystemPrompt := defaultSystemPrompt + identitySection(agent.Name, roster)\n\n\tinstructions := r.cfg.EventInstructions(ev.Kind)\n\n\t// Fetch the full comment thread so the agent sees everything that's\n\t// been said on the issue/PR, not just the triggering event (which\n\t// only carries the latest comment, if any). A failure degrades to\n\t// no comments rather than failing the run: the agent can still do\n\t// its job, just without prior context.\n\tcomments, err := r.forgejo.ListIssueComments(ev.Owner, ev.Repo, ev.Index)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlogger.Warn(\"fetch issue comments failed; agent will not see prior comments\", \"error\", err)\n\t\tcomments = nil\n\t}\n\n\tmessages := []llm.Message{\n\t\t{Role: \"system\", Content: systemPrompt},\n\t\t{Role: \"user\", Content: seedMessage(ev, branch, repoInfo.DefaultBranch, instructions, comments, review)},\n\t}\n\n\thooks := r.streamHooks(jobID, logAppend)\n\n\t_, err = runLoop(ctx, llmClient, runCtx, messages, hooks)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"agent loop: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tsucceeded = true\n\n\treturn nil\n}\n\n// streamHooks builds the Hooks a single Run passes to runLoop: every\n// delta is published live to the hub for connected dashboard viewers,\n// and once a reasoning/content block or tool call is complete, it's\n// persisted to the store as one row and the hub's replay buffer for\n// jobID is checkpointed — so a viewer connecting from this point on\n// sees it via the persisted history instead of a live replay, and is\n// never shown it twice.\nfunc (r *Runner) streamHooks(jobID string, logAppend func(stream, line string)) Hooks {\n\tvar reasoningBuf, contentBuf strings.Builder\n\n\treasoningOpen, contentOpen := false, false\n\n\treturn Hooks{\n\t\tOnReasoningDelta: func(delta string) {\n\t\t\tif !reasoningOpen {\n\t\t\t\treasoningOpen = true\n\t\t\t\treasoningBuf.Reset()\n\t\t\t\tr.hub.Publish(jobID, livelog.Event{Type: livelog.ReasoningStart})\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\treasoningBuf.WriteString(delta)\n\t\t\tr.hub.Publish(jobID, livelog.Event{Type: livelog.ReasoningDelta, Text: delta})\n\t\t},\n\t\tOnContentDelta: func(delta string) {\n\t\t\tif !contentOpen {\n\t\t\t\tcontentOpen = true\n\t\t\t\tcontentBuf.Reset()\n\t\t\t\tr.hub.Publish(jobID, livelog.Event{Type: livelog.ContentStart})\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tcontentBuf.WriteString(delta)\n\t\t\tr.hub.Publish(jobID, livelog.Event{Type: livelog.ContentDelta, Text: delta})\n\t\t},\n\t\tOnTurnEnd: func() {\n\t\t\tif reasoningOpen {\n\t\t\t\tr.hub.Publish(jobID, livelog.Event{Type: livelog.ReasoningEnd})\n\t\t\t\tlogAppend(\"reasoning\", reasoningBuf.String())\n\t\t\t\tr.hub.Checkpoint(jobID)\n\t\t\t\treasoningOpen = false\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tif contentOpen {\n\t\t\t\tr.hub.Publish(jobID, livelog.Event{Type: livelog.ContentEnd})\n\t\t\t\tlogAppend(\"content\", contentBuf.String())\n\t\t\t\tr.hub.Checkpoint(jobID)\n\t\t\t\tcontentOpen = false\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t},\n\t\tOnTool: func(name, arguments, result string, toolErr bool) {\n\t\t\tr.hub.Publish(jobID, livelog.Event{\n\t\t\t\tType:      livelog.Tool,\n\t\t\t\tName:      name,\n\t\t\t\tArguments: arguments,\n\t\t\t\tResult:    result,\n\t\t\t\tError:     toolErr,\n\t\t\t})\n\n\t\t\tline, err := json.Marshal(store.ToolLogEntry{Name: name, Arguments: arguments, Result: result, Error: toolErr})\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tr.logger.Warn(\"failed to marshal tool log entry\", \"job\", jobID, \"error\", err)\n\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\tlogAppend(\"tool\", string(line))\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tr.hub.Checkpoint(jobID)\n\t\t},\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc seedMessage(ev forgejo.Event, branch, defaultBranch, instructions string, comments []forgejo.IssueComment, review *forgejo.ReviewDetail) string {\n\traw, _ := json.MarshalIndent(json.RawMessage(ev.Raw), \"\", \"  \")\n\n\tvar instructionsSection string\n\tif instructions != \"\" {\n\t\tinstructionsSection = fmt.Sprintf(\"Instructions for this event, from zoo.hcl:\\n%s\\n\\n\", instructions)\n\t}\n\n\t// A pr:review run works on the PR's own head branch, not a fresh\n\t// branch off the default branch.\n\tbranchLine := fmt.Sprintf(\"Your working branch is %q, checked out from the default branch %q.\\n\\n\", branch, defaultBranch)\n\tif ev.Kind == forgejo.EventPRReview {\n\t\tbranchLine = fmt.Sprintf(\"Your working branch is %q, the pull request's head branch — commits you push here update the pull request directly.\\n\\n\", branch)\n\t}\n\n\tvar reviewSection string\n\tif review != nil {\n\t\treviewSection = renderReviewSection(review)\n\t}\n\n\tvar commentsSection string\n\tif len(comments) \u003e 0 {\n\t\tvar b strings.Builder\n\t\tfmt.Fprintf(\u0026b, \"Comments (%d):\\n\\n\", len(comments))\n\n\t\tfor i, c := range comments {\n\t\t\tfmt.Fprintf(\u0026b, \"%d. %s (%s):\\n%s\\n\\n\", i+1, c.Author, c.Created.Format(time.RFC3339), c.Body)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tcommentsSection = b.String()\n\t}\n\n\treturn fmt.Sprintf(\n\t\t\"You were triggered by a %q event on %s/%s.\\n\\n\"+\n\t\t\t\"%s%s\"+\n\t\t\t\"%sTitle: %s\\n\\nBody:\\n%s\\n\\n%sFull event payload:\\n```json\\n%s\\n```\",\n\t\tev.Kind, ev.Owner, ev.Repo, instructionsSection, branchLine, reviewSection, ev.Title, ev.Body, commentsSection, raw)\n}\n\n// renderReviewSection renders the submitted review as a briefing\n// section: the verdict, the review body, and each inline comment with\n// its location and id (the id lets the agent refer to a specific\n// comment in its reply).\nfunc renderReviewSection(review *forgejo.ReviewDetail) string {\n\tvar b strings.Builder\n\n\tfmt.Fprintf(\u0026b, \"Review submitted by %s:\\n\", review.Reviewer)\n\tfmt.Fprintf(\u0026b, \"  Verdict: %s\\n\", humanReviewState(review.State))\n\n\tif review.Body != \"\" {\n\t\tb.WriteString(\"  Review body:\\n\")","start_line":1,"end_line":400,"total_lines":437,"truncated":true}
Tool šŸ”§ read_file {"path": "internal/agentrun/context.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 300}
{"path": "internal/agentrun/context.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 300}
{"path":"internal/agentrun/context.go","content":"package agentrun\n\nimport (\n\t\"context\"\n\t\"fmt\"\n\n\t\"github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/tools\"\n)\n\n// runContext implements tools.Context for a single agent run, executing\n// shell commands via docker exec against the run's container, and\n// binding Forgejo actions to the triggering issue/PR.\ntype runContext struct {\n\tdocker      *dockerRuntime\n\tcontainerID string\n\tforgejo     tools.ForgejoActions\n}\n\nfunc (c *runContext) Exec(ctx context.Context, command string) (string, error) {\n\toutput, exitCode, err := c.docker.exec(ctx, c.containerID, command)\n\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn output, err\n\t}\n\n\tif exitCode != 0 {\n\t\treturn output, fmt.Errorf(\"command exited with status %d\", exitCode)\n\t}\n\n\treturn output, nil\n}\n\nfunc (c *runContext) Forgejo() tools.ForgejoActions {\n\treturn c.forgejo\n}","start_line":1,"end_line":35,"total_lines":35,"truncated":false}
Thinking
Now I understand the current architecture: 1. Zoo (the daemon on the host) receives Forgejo events. 2. For each run, it creates a Docker container with `/project` and `/event` bind-mounted. 3. It configures the sandbox's git with the agent's Forgejo token (via `http.<host>.extraHeader` in the container's global gitconfig). 4. It clones the repository inside the sandbox. 5. The agent's tools (bash, etc.) execute commands inside the container via `docker exec`. 6. Forgejo API actions (commenting, PRs, etc.) are executed by zoo itself on the host, using the agent's token (via `forgejoAs`). The issue: the sandbox has the full Forgejo token embedded in git's global config (`http.<host>.extraHeader`). The agent (an LLM running arbitrary shell commands inside the sandbox) can read that token and use it against the Forgejo API to do anything on the instance (delete repos, change settings, etc.). The token is scoped to the Forgejo host, but it's a full-privilege API token. Issue's question: "Wouldn't it make sense to special-case git push, git pull, and other stuff that requires auth? Think of something clever that lets the agent work without exposing the API key to the sandbox." So the task is to design (and probably implement) a mechanism where: - The sandbox can do git operations (clone, fetch, pull, push) against the Forgejo instance. - But the sandbox does not hold the full API token. Options: **Option A: Git credential helper / proxy approach.** Run a small git proxy (e.g., a local HTTP server on the host, or a sidecar container) that the sandbox's git talks to. The proxy injects the auth header on the host side. The sandbox's gitconfig points `http.<proxyhost>.extraHeader` at the proxy (no token), and the proxy forwards to the actual Forgejo with the real token. But wait — the proxy needs to be reachable from the sandbox. If the sandbox is a Docker container, it can reach the host via `host.docker.internal` (on Mac/Windows) or the docker bridge gateway IP (on Linux, e.g., 172.17.0.1). This is a bit awkward but doable. **Option B: A git credential helper inside the sandbox that talks to a host-side credential service.** Git supports custom credential helpers: `git config credential.helper 'sh -c "curl http://host/creds"'`. The helper receives a URL and returns username/password. But the password returned by the helper is still visible to the sandbox process (git's child process). A malicious agent could just invoke the helper directly. So this doesn't reduce exposure unless the helper is scoped to only return credentials for the specific repo URL, and even then the agent could use the returned credentials directly against the API. Hmm — but wait: Forgejo tokens are API tokens, and if the agent can obtain the token string, it can use it against the API. So any mechanism that passes the token (even temporarily) into the sandbox is leaky. **Option C: A git smart-HTTP proxy on the host that terminates the git protocol.** The sandbox's git clones from `http://zoo-proxy:PORT/abrander/zoo.git` (a local proxy). The proxy, running on the host with the token, forwards the git smart-HTTP requests (info/refs, git-upload-pack, git-receive-pack) to the real Forgejo, injecting the Authorization header. The sandbox never sees the token. This is the "special-case git push/pull" idea — a proxy that only handles the git protocol, not the API. This is the classic solution: e.g., `git-http-backend`-style proxy, or a small Go reverse proxy that only allows the git smart-HTTP endpoints (`/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack`, `/git-upload-pack`, `/git-receive-pack`). **Option D: Use a narrowly-scoped token.** Forgejo supports fine-grained personal access tokens (PATs) with scoped permissions. If Forgejo's fine-grained tokens can be restricted to "repo: read/write" for a specific repo, the agent's token would only grant git-level access... but Forgejo's fine-grained tokens still grant API access within the scope (e.g., repo:write allows API operations on the repo). And the token is still in the sandbox. The issue specifically asks to avoid exposing the API key to the sandbox. A scoped token reduces the blast radius but doesn't eliminate the exposure. Also, the agent's token is used for Forgejo API actions (commenting, etc.) — but those actions are executed by zoo on the host, not by the sandbox. So the sandbox only needs git. Actually, let me re-read: the agent's token is used in two places: 1. `forgejoAs` — zoo's host-side Forgejo client for API actions (commenting, opening PRs, etc.). This stays on the host — no problem. 2. `configureSandboxGit` — the sandbox's git auth header. This is the leak. So the clean fix is: replace #2 with a mechanism that doesn't put the token in the sandbox. **Option E: A git credential helper that talks to a host-side "credential broker" over a Unix socket / HTTP, where the broker only accepts git protocol requests.** This is essentially the same as C. Now, how does the sandbox reach the host? Zoo runs on the host and creates containers via the Docker daemon. The containers can reach the host: - On Linux: the docker bridge's gateway IP (e.g., 172.17.0.1) — discoverable via `docker network inspect` or `ip route`. - On macOS/Windows (Docker Desktop): `host.docker.internal`. Zoo can discover the host IP at container creation time: e.g., inspect the container's network settings after creation to get the gateway, or create the container on a custom network. Simpler: zoo can inspect the container after creation (`NetworkSettings.Gateway` or the IPAM config of the default bridge) to find the gateway IP. Alternatively, zoo could run the proxy inside a sidecar container on the same user-defined network. But that adds complexity. Actually, a simpler and more robust approach: zoo runs the proxy on the host, bound to the docker bridge's gateway IP (or 127.0.0.1 + publish... no, the container can't reach the host's 127.0.0.1). Hmm, wait. Let me think about what's simplest and most robust: 1. Zoo starts an ephemeral HTTP listener on the host at `0.0.0.0:0` (ephemeral port) — no wait, the container needs to reach it via the bridge IP. Zoo can listen on the gateway IP. To find the gateway: create the container, inspect it, get `NetworkSettings.Networks[<default>].Gateway`. Then start the proxy bound to that gateway IP (or 0.0.0.0 and tell the container to use the gateway IP). Actually, the simplest is: listen on 0.0.0.0:0 (ephemeral), find the container's gateway IP, and configure the sandbox's git to use `http://<gateway>:<port>/<owner>/<repo>.git` as the remote URL. The proxy forwards to the real Forgejo with the auth header. Security considerations: - The proxy should only accept requests for the specific repo path (and possibly submodules on the same forge — hmm, submodules would need their own paths; we could allow any path under the forge host and just forward). - The proxy should only accept git smart-HTTP endpoints: `GET /info/refs?service=git-upload-pack|git-receive-pack`, `POST /git-upload-pack`, `POST /git-receive-pack`. Reject everything else (e.g., API paths like `/api/v1/...`). - The proxy should use a per-run token (the agent's token) and be bound to the run's lifetime (stopped when the run ends). - Optionally, the proxy could use a scoped token if available. But wait — there's a subtlety with push: `git-receive-pack` requires write permission, and Forgejo may require the push to go to a branch that the token can push to. The agent's token (its own account) has push access to repos the agent can push to. Fine. Another subtlety: the proxy forwards `git-receive-pack` POSTs — the body is the pack data. A reverse proxy can handle this. Also, `git clone` from the proxy URL: the proxy URL's path must match what git expects: `http://<host>:<port>/<owner>/<repo>.git/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack`. So the proxy should forward the request path as-is (preserving the path) to the forge URL. What about submodules? If a repo has submodules pointing to `https://code.stdio.dk/owner/sub.git`, git inside the sandbox will try to fetch directly from the forge without auth (the extraHeader is scoped to the proxy host). To support submodules, we'd need to rewrite submodule URLs... that's more complex. The current design (extraHeader scoped to the forge host) supports submodules transparently. With the proxy, submodules would break unless we rewrite their URLs to go through the proxy. Hmm, but is that a real concern for this project? Let me check if there are submodules in the repo. Probably not. But as a design, we could handle it: after clone, rewrite `.git/config` submodule URLs to go through the proxy. Or more simply: the proxy could also serve as a generic git proxy for any repo on the same forge host — but submodules are fetched from their own URLs, which point to the forge host, not the proxy. Actually, let me think about the approach of rewriting the remote URL and submodule URLs to go through the proxy: - `git clone` from the proxy URL. - After clone, `git config --global url.<proxyBase>/insteadOf <forgeBase>` — this rewrites any URL starting with the forge base (including submodule URLs) to go through the proxy. This is clean! `url.<base>.insteadOf` is a standard git feature. So: - `git config --global url.http://<gateway>:<port>/.insteadOf https://code.stdio.dk/` — wait, insteadOf replaces the prefix: URLs starting with `https://code.stdio.dk/` get rewritten to `http://<gateway>:<port>/...`. So a submodule at `https://code.stdio.dk/owner/sub.git` becomes `http://<gateway>:<port>/owner/sub.git`. But careful: insteadOf with a trailing slash — the replacement is prefix-based: `url.<base>.insteadOf = <prefix>` means any URL starting with `<prefix>` is replaced with `<base>` + the rest. So `url.http://gw:port/.insteadOf = https://code.stdio.dk/` rewrites `https://code.stdio.dk/owner/repo.git` → `http://gw:port/owner/repo.git`. And the origin remote keeps the plain forge URL (or the proxy URL — either works). Now, the proxy needs to forward to `https://code.stdio.dk` + the path. The path in the git request is `/owner/repo.git/info/refs?service=...`. So the proxy: takes the incoming request path, prepends the forge base URL, adds the Authorization header, and forwards. **Where should the proxy live?** Zoo is a Go daemon. We can add an `internal/gitproxy` package: an `http.Server` that starts on an ephemeral port when a run begins and stops when the run ends. Each run gets its own proxy instance (with its own token and allowed forge host), so a compromised sandbox can only reach its own run's proxy on its own ephemeral port. Hmm, but one concern: the proxy is reachable from any container on the host (any other zoo run's container, or any other Docker container on the host) via the bridge IP. The port is ephemeral and unknown to other containers (unless they scan). The proxy authenticates... hmm, should the proxy require some kind of client auth? If another container on the same host guesses the port, it could use the proxy to push with this run's token. The risk is low (ephemeral port, short-lived, same host), but we could add a per-run shared secret: the sandbox's git sends a custom header (e.g., `X-Zoo-Run-Token: <random>`) via `http.<proxyhost>.extraHeader`, and the proxy verifies it. This is a nice touch: the sandbox has a per-run random secret (not a Forgejo token), and the proxy verifies it. If the secret leaks, the damage is limited to that run's git operations during that run's lifetime. Actually, even better: we could make the per-run secret the only thing in the sandbox's gitconfig. The proxy verifies the secret and injects the real Forgejo token. Let me also consider: **should the proxy be a separate process or in-process?** In-process (an http.Server in zoo) is simplest — no extra binary needed. Zoo already runs on the host. **How does the sandbox know the proxy's address?** Zoo creates the container, inspects it to find the gateway IP (e.g., `172.17.0.1` on the default bridge), starts the proxy on the host (bound to 0.0.0.0 or the gateway IP), and configures the sandbox's git with: - `url.http://<gateway>:<port>/.insteadOf <forgeBase>` - `http.<gateway>:<port>.extraHeader = X-Zoo-Run-Token: <secret>` — wait, extraHeader is per host. The host here is `gateway:port`. OK. Hmm wait, actually there's a subtlety: `http.<host>.extraHeader` matches on the URL's host. If insteadOf rewrites to `http://172.17.0.1:39211/owner/repo.git`, then the host is `172.17.0.1:39211`, and `http.172.17.0.1:39211.extraHeader` applies. Good. Alternatively, we could avoid the gateway IP discovery by using `host.docker.internal`. But that doesn't resolve on Linux by default (Docker Desktop adds it; on Linux you need `--add-host=host.docker.internal:host-gateway`). Zoo can add `ExtraHosts: ["host.docker.internal:host-gateway"]` to the container config — that works on Linux, macOS, and Windows (Docker Desktop also supports host-gateway since 20.10). This is cleaner and more portable! Let's use `host.docker.internal`. So: 1. Container created with `ExtraHosts: ["host.docker.internal:host-gateway"]`. 2. Zoo starts the git proxy on the host, bound to... hmm, `host-gateway` maps to the host's IP on the bridge (e.g., 172.17.0.1). If the proxy listens on 0.0.0.0, it's reachable via 172.17.0.1:port. Good. 3. Sandbox gitconfig: - `url.http://host.docker.internal:<port>/.insteadOf <forgeBase>` - `http.host.docker.internal:<port>.extraHeader: X-Zoo-Run-Token: <secret>` 4. The proxy verifies the secret, allows only git smart-HTTP endpoints, and forwards to the forge with the real token. Wait, but do we even need the per-run secret? The proxy is per-run (ephemeral port). Without a secret, any container on the host that discovers the port can use it. With a secret, only this run's container can. The secret is a random 32-byte value. The cost is small, so let's include it. Hmm, actually, let me reconsider. Is there an even simpler approach that the issue is hinting at? "Wouldn't it make sense to special-case git push, git pull, and other stuff that requires auth?" Another interpretation: intercept git commands in the sandbox — e.g., the agent's `bash` tool runs commands via docker exec; zoo could detect `git push`/`git pull` commands and run them with injected credentials (e.g., via GIT_ASKPASS or a temporary credential) while other commands run without credentials. But that's fragile: the agent might run git via scripts, aliases, submodules, `git -c ...`, etc. And the agent could still read the token from the environment if it's there. The proxy approach is more robust: the token never enters the sandbox at all, and all git traffic (from any process, any script) goes through the proxy transparently via URL rewriting. I'm fairly confident the proxy approach is the right architecture. Let me also consider: **Option F: A git credential helper that talks to a host-side credential broker over a Unix socket / HTTP, where the broker only accepts git protocol requests.** Same as C. **Option G: Run git operations entirely on the host.** That is, the sandbox has no network access to the forge at all; the agent asks zoo to do git operations (a `git` tool). But the agent needs fine-grained git control (commit, branch, push specific refs, fetch PR heads, etc.). A `git` tool with arbitrary args would be a huge surface area and would require the host to run git in the bind-mounted workdir — which the current design deliberately avoids ("Zoo itself never runs git outside the sandbox", "git never runs on the host"). Also, the agent's system prompt says "git remote operations (pull, push, ...) work inside the container with that credential." Changing that would break the agent's workflow (e.g., `git push` in bash). The proxy keeps "git just works inside the sandbox." So: **a per-run git smart-HTTP proxy on the host, with a per-run client secret, URL rewriting via insteadOf, and the real token held only on the host side.** Now, let me check the rest of the codebase to understand the pieces I need to touch: 1. `internal/agentrun/docker.go` — add `ExtraHosts` to the container config. 2. `internal/agentrun/sandboxgit.go` — change `configureSandboxGit` to use insteadOf + secret header instead of the forge token header. 3. New `internal/gitproxy` package — the proxy server. 4. `internal/agentrun/run.go` — start the proxy before container setup, stop it after. 5. `internal/forgejo/client.go` — check `Token()` and how the client is constructed; the proxy needs the forge base URL and token. 6. Tests. Let me look at the forgejo client, config, and the rest of run.go (lines 400-437), plus the tests for sandboxgit to see what's covered. Also, let me check `zoo.hcl.example` and the `docker/` directory.
Let me look at the rest of the relevant code — the Forgejo client, config, and the remaining parts of run.go.
Tool šŸ”§ read_file {"path": "internal/forgejo/client.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 200}
{"path": "internal/forgejo/client.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 200}
{"path":"internal/forgejo/client.go","content":"// Package forgejo wraps the Forgejo SDK and turns webhook deliveries and\n// polling results into a common Event stream for the scheduler.\npackage forgejo\n\nimport (\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"time\"\n\n\tsdk \"codeberg.org/mvdkleijn/forgejo-sdk/forgejo/v2\"\n\n\t\"github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/config\"\n)\n\n// Client is zoo's single shared Forgejo identity, used both for the\n// event sources (webhook/poll) and for actions agents/scheduler take\n// (comments, labels, PRs).\ntype Client struct {\n\tsdk *sdk.Client\n\n\tbaseURL string\n\ttoken   string\n}\n\nfunc NewClient(cfg config.Forgejo) (*Client, error) {\n\tc, err := sdk.NewClient(cfg.URL, sdk.SetToken(cfg.Token))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"forgejo client: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\treturn \u0026Client{sdk: c, baseURL: cfg.URL, token: cfg.Token}, nil\n}\n\n// Token returns the shared zoo Forgejo identity's token, e.g. for\n// authenticating a host-side git clone/push against Forgejo (see\n// internal/agentrun) without ever writing the credential into a working\n// tree an agent's container can read.\nfunc (c *Client) Token() string {\n\treturn c.token\n}\n\n// As returns a new Client that authenticates as the given token.\n// This is used to create per-agent clients so each agent acts as\n// themselves on Forgejo, without needing a global token with sudo\n// privileges.\nfunc (c *Client) As(token string) *Client {\n\tclient, _ := sdk.NewClient(c.baseURL, sdk.SetToken(token))\n\treturn \u0026Client{sdk: client, baseURL: c.baseURL, token: token}\n}\n\n// Sudo returns a new Client that impersonates username (via Forgejo's\n// \"Sudo:\" header) on every API call it makes, using the same underlying\n// token. Actions an agent takes through it — comments, labels, PRs,\n// assignment — are attributed to that agent's own Forgejo account\n// instead of the shared zoo identity. The token must belong to a user\n// with sudo scope/admin rights for this to work; Forgejo rejects the\n// header otherwise.\n//\n// Deprecated: use As(token) with a per-agent token instead. Kept for\n// backward compatibility during migration.\nfunc (c *Client) Sudo(username string) (*Client, error) {\n\tsudoClient, err := sdk.NewClient(c.baseURL, sdk.SetToken(c.token), sdk.SetSudo(username))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"forgejo client sudo %q: %w\", username, err)\n\t}\n\n\treturn \u0026Client{sdk: sudoClient, baseURL: c.baseURL, token: c.token}, nil\n}\n\n// CreateIssueComment posts a comment on the given issue or pull request\n// (Forgejo/Gitea treat PRs as issues for commenting purposes).\nfunc (c *Client) CreateIssueComment(owner, repo string, index int64, body string) error {\n\t_, _, err := c.sdk.CreateIssueComment(owner, repo, index, sdk.CreateIssueCommentOption{Body: body})\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"comment on %s/%s#%d: %w\", owner, repo, index, err)\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}\n\n// IssueComment is one comment on an issue or pull request, in the\n// shape zoo needs when briefing an agent: who said what, and when.\ntype IssueComment struct {\n\tAuthor  string\n\tBody    string\n\tCreated time.Time\n}\n\n// ListIssueComments fetches every comment on the given issue or pull\n// request, oldest first. PRs are issues under the hood in Forgejo, so\n// the same endpoint serves both. Pages are walked until exhausted so\n// the result isn't capped by the server's default page size.\nfunc (c *Client) ListIssueComments(owner, repo string, index int64) ([]IssueComment, error) {\n\tconst pageSize = 50\n\n\tvar all []*sdk.Comment\n\n\tfor page := 1; ; page++ {\n\t\tbatch, _, err := c.sdk.ListIssueComments(owner, repo, index, sdk.ListIssueCommentOptions{\n\t\t\tListOptions: sdk.ListOptions{Page: page, PageSize: pageSize},\n\t\t})\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"list comments on %s/%s#%d (page %d): %w\", owner, repo, index, page, err)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tall = append(all, batch...)\n\n\t\tif len(batch) \u003c pageSize {\n\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tout := make([]IssueComment, 0, len(all))\n\tfor _, cm := range all {\n\t\tauthor := \"\"\n\t\tif cm.Poster != nil {\n\t\t\tauthor = cm.Poster.UserName\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tout = append(out, IssueComment{Author: author, Body: cm.Body, Created: cm.Created})\n\t}\n\n\treturn out, nil\n}\n\n// AddLabel attaches the label with the given name to an issue/PR,\n// creating the label (with a default color) on the repo first if it\n// doesn't already exist.\nfunc (c *Client) AddLabel(owner, repo string, index int64, name string) error {\n\tid, err := c.labelID(owner, repo, name)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\t_, _, err = c.sdk.AddIssueLabels(owner, repo, index, sdk.IssueLabelsOption{Labels: []int64{id}})\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"add label %q to %s/%s#%d: %w\", name, owner, repo, index, err)\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}\n\n// RemoveLabel detaches the label with the given name from an issue/PR, if\n// both the label and the attachment exist.\nfunc (c *Client) RemoveLabel(owner, repo string, index int64, name string) error {\n\tlabels, _, err := c.sdk.GetIssueLabels(owner, repo, index, sdk.ListLabelsOptions{})\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"list labels on %s/%s#%d: %w\", owner, repo, index, err)\n\t}\n\n\tfor _, l := range labels {\n\t\tif l.Name == name {\n\t\t\t_, err := c.sdk.DeleteIssueLabel(owner, repo, index, l.ID)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"remove label %q from %s/%s#%d: %w\", name, owner, repo, index, err)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\treturn nil\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}\n\nfunc (c *Client) labelID(owner, repo, name string) (int64, error) {\n\tlabels, _, err := c.sdk.ListRepoLabels(owner, repo, sdk.ListLabelsOptions{})\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn 0, fmt.Errorf(\"list labels on %s/%s: %w\", owner, repo, err)\n\t}\n\n\tfor _, l := range labels {\n\t\tif l.Name == name {\n\t\t\treturn l.ID, nil\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tcreated, _, err := c.sdk.CreateLabel(owner, repo, sdk.CreateLabelOption{\n\t\tName:  name,\n\t\tColor: \"#ee0000\",\n\t})\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn 0, fmt.Errorf(\"create label %q on %s/%s: %w\", name, owner, repo, err)\n\t}\n\n\treturn created.ID, nil\n}\n\n// CreatePullRequest opens a PR from head into base.\nfunc (c *Client) CreatePullRequest(owner, repo, head, base, title, body string) error {\n\t_, _, err := c.sdk.CreatePullRequest(owner, repo, sdk.CreatePullRequestOption{\n\t\tHead:  head,\n\t\tBase:  base,\n\t\tTitle: title,\n\t\tBody:  body,\n\t})\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"create pull request %s/%s %s-\u003e%s: %w\", owner, repo, head, base, err)\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}\n","start_line":1,"end_line":200,"total_lines":432,"truncated":true}
Tool šŸ”§ read_file {"path": "internal/agentrun/run.go", "start_line": 400, "end_line": 437}
{"path": "internal/agentrun/run.go", "start_line": 400, "end_line": 437}
{"path":"internal/agentrun/run.go","content":"\t\tb.WriteString(\"  Review body:\\n\")\n\t\tfor _, line := range strings.Split(review.Body, \"\\n\") {\n\t\t\tfmt.Fprintf(\u0026b, \"  %s\\n\", line)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif len(review.Comments) \u003e 0 {\n\t\tfmt.Fprintf(\u0026b, \"  Inline comments (%d):\\n\", len(review.Comments))\n\n\t\tfor i, c := range review.Comments {\n\t\t\twhere := c.Path\n\t\t\tif c.Line \u003e 0 {\n\t\t\t\twhere = fmt.Sprintf(\"%s:%d\", c.Path, c.Line)\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tfmt.Fprintf(\u0026b, \"  %d. [%s] %s (comment id %d):\\n\", i+1, where, c.Author, c.ID)\n\t\t\tfor _, line := range strings.Split(c.Body, \"\\n\") {\n\t\t\t\tfmt.Fprintf(\u0026b, \"     %s\\n\", line)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn b.String() + \"\\n\"\n}\n\n// humanReviewState maps a Forgejo review state to a readable verdict.\nfunc humanReviewState(state string) string {\n\tswitch state {\n\tcase \"APPROVED\":\n\t\treturn \"approved\"\n\tcase \"REQUEST_CHANGES\":\n\t\treturn \"changes requested\"\n\tcase \"COMMENT\":\n\t\treturn \"comment\"\n\tdefault:\n\t\treturn state\n\t}\n}","start_line":400,"end_line":437,"total_lines":437,"truncated":false}
Thinking
Next, let's look at the rest of the forgejo client (RepositoryInfo, CloneURL), the sandboxgit tests, and the docker integration tests to understand the test patterns.
Tool šŸ”§ read_file {"path": "internal/forgejo/client.go", "start_line": 200, "end_line": 432}
{"path": "internal/forgejo/client.go", "start_line": 200, "end_line": 432}
{"path":"internal/forgejo/client.go","content":"\n// RequestReview asks the given users to review the pull request.\nfunc (c *Client) RequestReview(owner, repo string, index int64, reviewers []string) error {\n\t_, err := c.sdk.CreateReviewRequests(owner, repo, index, sdk.PullReviewRequestOptions{Reviewers: reviewers})\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"request review on %s/%s#%d: %w\", owner, repo, index, err)\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}\n\n// Review states an agent can submit, in the friendly names the tools\n// expose. SubmitReview maps them onto the SDK's ReviewStateType.\nconst (\n\tReviewStateApproved       = \"approved\"\n\tReviewStateChangesRequest = \"changes_requested\"\n\tReviewStateComment        = \"comment\"\n)\n\n// SubmitReview submits a review on the pull request with the given\n// verdict and body. state is one of ReviewStateApproved,\n// ReviewStateChangesRequest, or ReviewStateComment. A body is required\n// for anything other than an approval (Forgejo enforces this too).\nfunc (c *Client) SubmitReview(owner, repo string, index int64, state, body string) error {\n\tvar sdkState sdk.ReviewStateType\n\n\tswitch state {\n\tcase ReviewStateApproved:\n\t\tsdkState = sdk.ReviewStateApproved\n\tcase ReviewStateChangesRequest:\n\t\tsdkState = sdk.ReviewStateRequestChanges\n\tcase ReviewStateComment:\n\t\tsdkState = sdk.ReviewStateComment\n\tdefault:\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"submit review on %s/%s#%d: unknown review state %q\", owner, repo, index, state)\n\t}\n\n\tif _, _, err := c.sdk.CreatePullReview(owner, repo, index, sdk.CreatePullReviewOptions{State: sdkState, Body: body}); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"submit review on %s/%s#%d: %w\", owner, repo, index, err)\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}\n\n// ReviewCommentDetail is one inline comment on a pull request review,\n// in the shape zoo needs when briefing an agent: where it points, what\n// it says, and its id (so the agent can refer to it in its reply).\ntype ReviewCommentDetail struct {\n\tID     int64\n\tPath   string\n\tLine   int\n\tBody   string\n\tAuthor string\n}\n\n// ReviewDetail is the review context zoo briefs an agent with when a\n// pr:review event fires: the review's verdict and body, plus its inline\n// comments.\ntype ReviewDetail struct {\n\tID       int64\n\tState    string\n\tBody     string\n\tReviewer string\n\tComments []ReviewCommentDetail\n}\n\n// ReviewDetail fetches a pull request review and its inline comments.\n// The webhook payload carries the review but not its inline comments,\n// so this is how a reacting agent gets the full feedback.\nfunc (c *Client) ReviewDetail(owner, repo string, index, reviewID int64) (*ReviewDetail, error) {\n\treview, _, err := c.sdk.GetPullReview(owner, repo, index, reviewID)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"get review %d on %s/%s#%d: %w\", reviewID, owner, repo, index, err)\n\t}\n\n\tcomments, _, err := c.sdk.ListPullReviewComments(owner, repo, index, reviewID)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"list comments on review %d of %s/%s#%d: %w\", reviewID, owner, repo, index, err)\n\t}\n\n\tdetail := \u0026ReviewDetail{\n\t\tID:    review.ID,\n\t\tState: string(review.State),\n\t\tBody:  review.Body,\n\t}\n\n\tif review.Reviewer != nil {\n\t\tdetail.Reviewer = review.Reviewer.UserName\n\t}\n\n\tfor _, cm := range comments {\n\t\tauthor := \"\"\n\t\tif cm.Reviewer != nil {\n\t\t\tauthor = cm.Reviewer.UserName\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tline := int(cm.LineNum)\n\t\tif cm.OldLineNum != 0 \u0026\u0026 cm.LineNum == 0 {\n\t\t\tline = int(cm.OldLineNum)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tdetail.Comments = append(detail.Comments, ReviewCommentDetail{\n\t\t\tID:     cm.ID,\n\t\t\tPath:   cm.Path,\n\t\t\tLine:   line,\n\t\t\tBody:   cm.Body,\n\t\t\tAuthor: author,\n\t\t})\n\t}\n\n\treturn detail, nil\n}\n\n// PullRequestInfo is the branch metadata agentrun needs to check out a\n// pull request's head.\ntype PullRequestInfo struct {\n\tHeadRef string\n\tBaseRef string\n}\n\n// PullRequestInfo returns the pull request's head and base branch refs.\nfunc (c *Client) PullRequestInfo(owner, repo string, index int64) (PullRequestInfo, error) {\n\tpr, _, err := c.sdk.GetPullRequest(owner, repo, index)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn PullRequestInfo{}, fmt.Errorf(\"get pull request %s/%s#%d: %w\", owner, repo, index, err)\n\t}\n\n\tinfo := PullRequestInfo{}\n\tif pr.Head != nil {\n\t\tinfo.HeadRef = pr.Head.Ref\n\t}\n\tif pr.Base != nil {\n\t\tinfo.BaseRef = pr.Base.Ref\n\t}\n\n\treturn info, nil\n}\n\n// CloseIssue closes the given issue or pull request.\nfunc (c *Client) CloseIssue(owner, repo string, index int64) error {\n\treturn c.setIssueState(owner, repo, index, sdk.StateClosed)\n}\n\n// ReopenIssue reopens the given issue or pull request.\nfunc (c *Client) ReopenIssue(owner, repo string, index int64) error {\n\treturn c.setIssueState(owner, repo, index, sdk.StateOpen)\n}\n\n// RepositoryInfo returns the pieces of repo metadata agentrun needs to\n// clone and branch off of the right place.\ntype RepositoryInfo struct {\n\tDefaultBranch string\n\tCloneURL      string\n}\n\nfunc (c *Client) RepositoryInfo(owner, repo string) (RepositoryInfo, error) {\n\tr, _, err := c.sdk.GetRepo(owner, repo)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn RepositoryInfo{}, fmt.Errorf(\"get repo %s/%s: %w\", owner, repo, err)\n\t}\n\n\treturn RepositoryInfo{DefaultBranch: r.DefaultBranch, CloneURL: r.CloneURL}, nil\n}\n\nfunc (c *Client) setIssueState(owner, repo string, index int64, state sdk.StateType) error {\n\t_, _, err := c.sdk.EditIssue(owner, repo, index, sdk.EditIssueOption{State: \u0026state})\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"set state %q on %s/%s#%d: %w\", state, owner, repo, index, err)\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}\n\n// AgentProfile is what zoo reads off an agent's Forgejo account: its bio\n// (surfaced in the system prompt), the name/email used to set git commit\n// authorship inside that agent's container, and its avatar URL (surfaced\n// on the dashboard).\ntype AgentProfile struct {\n\tDescription string\n\tFullName    string\n\tEmail       string\n\tAvatarURL   string\n}\n\n// AgentProfile fetches the Forgejo profile of the user account named\n// username. Agent config labels double as their Forgejo usernames (see\n// issue:assigned resolution), so this is how an agent's \"what it does\"\n// text, and its commit identity, are authored: by editing that account's\n// profile on Forgejo, not in zoo.hcl.\nfunc (c *Client) AgentProfile(username string) (AgentProfile, error) {\n\tu, _, err := c.sdk.GetUserInfo(username)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn AgentProfile{}, fmt.Errorf(\"get user %q: %w\", username, err)\n\t}\n\n\tp := AgentProfile{\n\t\tDescription: u.Description,\n\t\tFullName:    u.FullName,\n\t\tEmail:       u.Email,\n\t\tAvatarURL:   u.AvatarURL,\n\t}\n\n\treturn p, nil\n}\n\n// AssignIssue sets the sole assignee of an issue/PR to username. Used by\n// the assign_issue tool so agents can hand work off to each other: the\n// resulting issue:assigned event (webhook or poll) triggers whichever\n// agent's config label matches username.\nfunc (c *Client) AssignIssue(owner, repo string, index int64, username string) error {\n\t_, _, err := c.sdk.EditIssue(owner, repo, index, sdk.EditIssueOption{Assignees: []string{username}})\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"assign %s/%s#%d to %q: %w\", owner, repo, index, username, err)\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}\n\n// IssueTitle fetches the title of an issue or pull request from Forgejo.\n// Returns an empty string (not an error) if the client is nil or the\n// issue cannot be fetched — the caller should degrade gracefully.\nfunc (c *Client) IssueTitle(owner, repo string, index int64) string {\n\tif c == nil || c.sdk == nil {\n\t\treturn \"\"\n\t}\n\n\tissue, _, err := c.sdk.GetIssue(owner, repo, index)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn \"\"\n\t}\n\n\treturn issue.Title\n}","start_line":200,"end_line":432,"total_lines":432,"truncated":false}
Tool šŸ”§ read_file {"path": "internal/agentrun/sandboxgit_test.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 200}
{"path": "internal/agentrun/sandboxgit_test.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 200}
{"path":"internal/agentrun/sandboxgit_test.go","content":"package agentrun\n\nimport (\n\t\"encoding/base64\"\n\t\"strings\"\n\t\"testing\"\n)\n\nfunc TestSandboxShellQuote(t *testing.T) {\n\tcases := map[string]string{\n\t\t\"simple\":            \"'simple'\",\n\t\t\"it's a branch\":     `'it'\\''s a branch'`,\n\t\t\"with space\":        \"'with space'\",\n\t\t\"$(rm -rf /)\":       \"'$(rm -rf /)'\",\n\t\t\"a\\\"b\\\\c\":           \"'a\\\"b\\\\c'\",\n\t\t\"\":                  \"''\",\n\t\t\"HEAD~1\":            \"'HEAD~1'\",\n\t\t\"https://h/a/b.git\": \"'https://h/a/b.git'\",\n\t}\n\n\tfor in, want := range cases {\n\t\tif got := shellQuote(in); got != want {\n\t\t\tt.Errorf(\"shellQuote(%q) = %q, want %q\", in, got, want)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc TestShellGitCmdQuotesEveryArg(t *testing.T) {\n\tgot := shellGitCmd(\"clone\", \"--branch\", \"main\", \"--single-branch\", \"https://h/a/b.git\", \"/project\")\n\n\twant := \"git 'clone' '--branch' 'main' '--single-branch' 'https://h/a/b.git' '/project'\"\n\n\tif got != want {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"shellGitCmd = %q, want %q\", got, want)\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc TestShellGitCmdSubcommandWithArgs(t *testing.T) {\n\tgot := shellGitCmd(\"commit\", \"-m\", \"fix: handle it's edge case\")\n\n\tif !strings.HasPrefix(got, \"git 'commit' '-m' \") {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"shellGitCmd = %q, want prefix git 'commit' '-m' \", got)\n\t}\n\n\t// The message must be one quoted word with the embedded quote\n\t// escaped, so sh passes it through verbatim.\n\tif want := `'fix: handle it'\\''s edge case'`; !strings.HasSuffix(got, want) {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"shellGitCmd = %q, want suffix %q\", got, want)\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc TestForgeHost(t *testing.T) {\n\tcases := map[string]string{\n\t\t\"https://code.stdio.dk/abrander/zoo.git\": \"https://code.stdio.dk\",\n\t\t\"http://forgejo.local:3000/acme/widgets\": \"http://forgejo.local:3000\",\n\t\t\"https://h/a/b.git?x=1\":                  \"https://h\",\n\t\t// Not a URL with a host: fall back to the full string, which is\n\t\t// still a valid (narrower) prefix match.\n\t\t\"/bare\":     \"/bare\",\n\t\t\"not a url\": \"not a url\",\n\t}\n\n\tfor in, want := range cases {\n\t\tif got := forgeHost(in); got != want {\n\t\t\tt.Errorf(\"forgeHost(%q) = %q, want %q\", in, got, want)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc TestGitAuthHeader(t *testing.T) {\n\tgot := gitAuthHeader(\"greg\", \"s3cr3t\")\n\n\twant := \"Authorization: Basic \" + base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(\"greg:s3cr3t\"))\n\n\tif got != want {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"gitAuthHeader = %q, want %q\", got, want)\n\t}\n}","start_line":1,"end_line":78,"total_lines":78,"truncated":false}
Thinking
Next, let's look at the Docker integration tests to understand how the tests are run, and check `zoo.hcl.example` and the `docker/` directory.
Tool šŸ”§ read_file {"path": "internal/agentrun/docker_integration_test.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 250}
{"path": "internal/agentrun/docker_integration_test.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 250}
{"path":"internal/agentrun/docker_integration_test.go","content":"//go:build docker\n\n// Run with: go test -tags docker ./internal/agentrun/...\n// Requires a reachable Docker daemon (DOCKER_HOST or the default socket).\npackage agentrun\n\nimport (\n\t\"context\"\n\t\"os\"\n\t\"os/exec\"\n\t\"path/filepath\"\n\t\"strings\"\n\t\"testing\"\n\t\"time\"\n)\n\nfunc TestDockerRuntimeExecRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {\n\trt, err := newDockerRuntime()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"docker client: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 60*time.Second)\n\tdefer cancel()\n\n\tcontainerID, err := rt.createContainer(ctx, \"debian:unstable\", nil, \"zoo-test-run\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"create container: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tdefer rt.remove(context.Background(), containerID)\n\n\toutput, exitCode, err := rt.exec(ctx, containerID, \"echo hello-from-zoo\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"exec: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tif exitCode != 0 {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"expected exit code 0, got %d\", exitCode)\n\t}\n\tif !strings.Contains(output, \"hello-from-zoo\") {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"unexpected output: %q\", output)\n\t}\n\n\t_, exitCode, err = rt.exec(ctx, containerID, \"exit 3\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"exec: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tif exitCode != 3 {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"expected exit code 3, got %d\", exitCode)\n\t}\n}\n\n// TestDockerRuntimeGitSafeDirectory reproduces the \"detected dubious\n// ownership\" error git raises against a bind-mounted repo owned by a\n// different UID than the container runs as, and confirms the `git\n// config --system --add safe.directory '*'` fix Run() applies (see\n// run.go) actually clears it, against the same golang:latest image\n// zoo.hcl now defaults to.\nfunc TestDockerRuntimeGitSafeDirectory(t *testing.T) {\n\tprojectDir := t.TempDir()\n\n\tfor _, args := range [][]string{\n\t\t{\"init\", \"-q\", projectDir},\n\t\t{\"-C\", projectDir, \"commit\", \"-q\", \"--allow-empty\", \"-m\", \"init\"},\n\t} {\n\t\tif out, err := exec.Command(\"git\", args...).CombinedOutput(); err != nil {\n\t\t\tt.Fatalf(\"git %v: %v: %s\", args, err, out)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\trt, err := newDockerRuntime()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"docker client: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 60*time.Second)\n\tdefer cancel()\n\n\tcontainerID, err := rt.createContainer(ctx, \"golang:latest\", []string{projectDir + \":/project\"}, \"zoo-test-git\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"create container: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tdefer rt.remove(context.Background(), containerID)\n\n\toutput, _, err := rt.exec(ctx, containerID, \"git status\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"exec: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tif !strings.Contains(output, \"dubious ownership\") {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"expected the bind mount to reproduce dubious ownership before the fix, got: %s\", output)\n\t}\n\n\toutput, exitCode, err := rt.exec(ctx, containerID, \"git config --system --add safe.directory '*'\")\n\tif err != nil || exitCode != 0 {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"configure safe.directory: err=%v exit=%d: %s\", err, exitCode, output)\n\t}\n\n\toutput, exitCode, err = rt.exec(ctx, containerID, \"git status\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"exec: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tif exitCode != 0 || strings.Contains(output, \"dubious ownership\") {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"expected git status to succeed after the fix, got exit=%d: %s\", exitCode, output)\n\t}\n}\n\n// TestDockerRuntimeSandboxGit exercises the in-sandbox git setup\n// Run() performs (see sandboxgit.go): the system gitconfig round-trip\n// (including the http.\u003curl\u003e.extraHeader key whose subsection is a URL\n// full of dots and colons), the initial clone + branch done inside the\n// container, the commit identity taken from the system gitconfig, and\n// that the credential never lands in the bind-mounted working tree.\n// The clone uses a local path remote (no http involved), so the test\n// needs no reachable Forgejo; the header mechanism itself is core git\n// behavior.\nfunc TestDockerRuntimeSandboxGit(t *testing.T) {\n\ttmp := t.TempDir()\n\n\t// A bare \"remote\" on the host, plus the empty directory the\n\t// container will clone into (Run() creates it before the container\n\t// exists, for the same reason).\n\tseedDir := filepath.Join(tmp, \"seed\")\n\tbareDir := filepath.Join(tmp, \"remote.git\")\n\tprojectDir := filepath.Join(tmp, \"project\")\n\n\trun := func(dir string, args ...string) {\n\t\tcmd := exec.Command(\"git\", args...)\n\t\tcmd.Dir = dir\n\n\t\tif out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput(); err != nil {\n\t\t\tt.Fatalf(\"git %v: %v: %s\", args, err, out)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\trun(\"\", \"init\", \"-q\", \"-b\", \"main\", seedDir)\n\trun(seedDir, \"config\", \"user.name\", \"zoo-test\")\n\trun(seedDir, \"config\", \"user.email\", \"zoo@test\")\n\n\tif err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(seedDir, \"file.txt\"), []byte(\"hello\\n\"), 0o644); err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"write seed file: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\n\trun(seedDir, \"add\", \".\")\n\trun(seedDir, \"commit\", \"-q\", \"-m\", \"init\")\n\trun(\"\", \"clone\", \"-q\", \"--bare\", seedDir, bareDir)\n\n\tif err := os.MkdirAll(projectDir, 0o755); err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"create project dir: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\n\trt, err := newDockerRuntime()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"docker client: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 120*time.Second)\n\tdefer cancel()\n\n\tcontainerID, err := rt.createContainer(ctx, \"golang:latest\", []string{\n\t\tbareDir + \":/bare\",\n\t\tprojectDir + \":/project\",\n\t}, \"zoo-test-sandbox-git\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"create container: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tdefer rt.remove(context.Background(), containerID)\n\n\tconst (\n\t\tcloneURL = \"https://forgejo.example/acme/widgets.git\"\n\t\tuser     = \"greg\"\n\t\ttoken    = \"super-secret-token\"\n\t)\n\n\tif err := configureSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, cloneURL, user, token, \"Greg Coolio\", \"greg@noreply.localhost\"); err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"configureSandboxGit: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\n\t// The credential must round-trip through the system gitconfig,\n\t// which is what makes plain `git pull`/`git push` authenticate.\n\twantHeader := gitAuthHeader(user, token)\n\n\tout, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"config\", \"--system\", \"--get\", \"http.\"+forgeHost(cloneURL)+\".extraHeader\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"read back credential: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tif got := strings.TrimSpace(out); got != wantHeader {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"credential round-trip = %q, want %q\", got, wantHeader)\n\t}\n\n\tif err := cloneAndBranch(ctx, rt, containerID, \"/bare\", \"main\", \"issue-1-greg\"); err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"cloneAndBranch: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\n\t// The clone happened inside the container: the fresh branch is\n\t// checked out in /project.\n\tout, err = runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"branch\", \"--show-current\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"branch --show-current: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tif got := strings.TrimSpace(out); got != \"issue-1-greg\" {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"branch = %q, want issue-1-greg\", got)\n\t}\n\n\t// Commits must pick up the identity from the system gitconfig.\n\tif _, exitCode, err := rt.exec(ctx, containerID, \"echo more \u003e\u003e file.txt \u0026\u0026 git add file.txt \u0026\u0026 git commit -qm 'from sandbox'\"); err != nil || exitCode != 0 {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"commit in sandbox: err=%v exit=%d\", err, exitCode)\n\t}\n\n\tout, err = runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"log\", \"-1\", \"--format=%an %ae\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"log: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tif got := strings.TrimSpace(out); got != \"Greg Coolio greg@noreply.localhost\" {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"commit author = %q, want %q\", got, \"Greg Coolio greg@noreply.localhost\")\n\t}\n\n\t// The token must not leak into the bind-mounted working tree.\n\tout, _, err = rt.exec(ctx, containerID, \"grep -r super-secret-token /project || true\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"grep: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tif strings.Contains(out, \"super-secret-token\") {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"token leaked into the working tree: %s\", out)\n\t}\n}","start_line":1,"end_line":224,"total_lines":224,"truncated":false}
Tool šŸ”§ read_file {"path": "zoo.hcl.example", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 100}
{"path": "zoo.hcl.example", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 100}
{"path":"zoo.hcl.example","content":"# zoo.hcl - Configuration for the zoo daemon.\n#\n# Copy this file to zoo.hcl (gitignored) and fill in real values.\n\nllm \"Qwen 3.6\" {\n    openai = \"https://code.stdio.dk\"\n    token  = \"TOKEN\"\n    model  = \"Qwen3.6\"\n}\n\nllm \"Qwen 3.8\" {\n    openai = \"https://code.stdio.dk\"\n    token  = \"TOKEN\"\n    model  = \"Qwen3.8\"\n}\n\nforgejo {\n    url            = \"https://code.stdio.dk\"\n    token          = \"ZOO_SERVICE_TOKEN\"\n    # Shared secret configured on the Forgejo webhook. Required to accept\n    # webhook deliveries; polling works without it.\n    webhook_secret = \"EXAMPLE_WEBHOOK_SECRET\"\n\n    # Which repositories to watch. Events from every other repository\n    # are ignored. Each entry is an \"owner/repo\" pair with glob\n    # wildcards:\n    #\n    #   repos = [\"acme/*\"]          # everything in the acme org\n    #   repos = [\"acme/widgets\"]    # just that one repository\n    #   repos = [\"acme/web*\"]       # repos in acme whose name starts with \"web\"\n    #   repos = [\"acme\", \"bob\"]     # bare names mean \"everything in that org\"\n    #   repos = [\"*\"]               # everything on the instance\n    #\n    # Owner names match case-insensitively (like Forgejo usernames);\n    # repository names match case-sensitively. Leave the list out (or\n    # empty) to watch everything the token can see.\n    # repos = [\"abrander/*\", \"acme/widgets\"]\n}\n\nenvironment {\n    docker_image   = \"golang:latest\"\n    max_live_agents = 5\n}\n\nagent \"anna\" {\n    llm   = \"Qwen 3.6\"\n    token = \"ANNA_FORGEJO_TOKEN\"\n}\n\nagent \"greg\" {\n    llm   = \"Qwen 3.8\"\n    token = \"GREG_FORGEJO_TOKEN\"\n}\n\n# \"leon\" doubles as the expected Forgejo assignee username for\n# issue:assigned events - see the event block below.\nagent \"leon\" {\n    llm   = \"Qwen 3.8\"\n    token = \"LEON_FORGEJO_TOKEN\"\n}\n\nagent \"mika\" {\n    llm   = \"Qwen 3.6\"\n    token = \"MIKA_FORGEJO_TOKEN\"\n}\n\nevent \"issue:new\" {\n    agent = \"leon\"\n}\n\nevent \"issue:assigned\" {\n    // No `agent` here: the agent whose name matches the Forgejo\n    // assignee's username is triggered.\n    instructions = \"Please handle this issue.\"\n}\n\nevent \"issue:comment\" {\n    agent        = \"leon\"\n    instructions = \"Please review what this comment says and respond appropriately.\"\n}\n\nevent \"pr:new\" {\n    agent        = \"greg\"\n    instructions = \"Please review this pull request and respond appropriately.\"\n}\n\n# A review was submitted on a pull request (approved, changes requested,\n# or comment). The agent that opened the PR is triggered to handle it,\n# like issue:assigned: its working tree is checked out on the PR's head\n# branch, so changes it pushes update the PR directly. It should address\n# the feedback and reply to the review with a summary of what it\n# addressed. (Forgejo has no API to mark review comments resolved, so\n# that stays with the reviewer.)\nevent \"pr:review\" {\n    // No `agent` here: the agent whose name matches the pull request\n    // author's username is triggered.\n    instructions = \"A review was submitted on this pull request. Address the feedback, push your changes to the PR branch, and reply to the review with a summary of what you addressed.\"\n}","start_line":1,"end_line":98,"total_lines":98,"truncated":false}
Thinking
Now I have a solid understanding of the codebase. Let me also check the following: 1. `internal/agentrun/system.md` — the system prompt that mentions git credentials. 2. `internal/agentrun/loop.go` — the tool loop. 3. `internal/config/config.go` — configuration. 4. `cmd/zoo/main.go` — the entry point. I'll check these to get the full picture.
Tool šŸ”§ read_file {"path": "internal/agentrun/system.md", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 120}
{"path": "internal/agentrun/system.md", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 120}
{"path":"internal/agentrun/system.md","content":"You are an autonomous coding agent working inside `zoo`, a system that\ntriggers you from Forgejo (a Gitea-family forge) issue/PR events.\n\n**Your environment**\n\n- Your working tree is at `/project`, checked out on the working branch\n  named in your briefing below. For most events that's a fresh branch\n  off the repository's default branch; for a PR review event it's the\n  pull request's own head branch, so commits you push update the PR\n  directly. Only `/project` persists; nothing outside it survives\n  between tool calls.\n- The event that triggered you (issue or pull request JSON) is available\n  at `/event` inside the container, and is also included below.\n- You have a real git remote configured with push access. When you're\n  done, `git add`/`git commit`/`git push` your branch — that's how your\n  work gets saved. Nothing is persisted automatically.\n\n**Tools**\n\n- `bash`, `read_file`, `write_file`, `list_files`, `grep_search`,\n  `move_file`, `remove_file` operate on the project container.\n- `comment`, `open_pull_request`, `request_review`, `submit_review`,\n  `add_label`, `remove_label`, `close_issue`, `reopen_issue`,\n  `assign_issue` act directly on the Forgejo issue/PR that triggered\n  this run — use `comment` to report back to the person who filed it,\n  `open_pull_request` once you've pushed a branch with your changes,\n  and `submit_review` to leave a review verdict.\n\nBelow, in \"Your identity\" and \"Other agents\", you'll find your own role\n(from your Forgejo profile) and a roster of the other agents zoo runs,\neach with their own role. If a task in front of you clearly belongs to\nsomeone else's role, use `assign_issue` to hand it off rather than\ndoing it yourself.\n\n**Git**\n\nYou may use normal git commands in `bash` to manage your working tree.\nRemote (pull, fetch, push, etc.) git operations are authenticated for\nyou and simply work.\n\n**Guidelines**\n\n- Make surgical changes: modify only what's necessary for the task in\n  the triggering event.\n- Before finishing, verify your changes (re-read the file, run tests or\n  a build if the project has them).\n- Always leave a `comment` summarizing what you did (or why you couldn't\n  finish), and use `open_pull_request` when you have a change ready for\n  review. Don't leave the issue without a response.","start_line":1,"end_line":49,"total_lines":49,"truncated":false}
Tool šŸ”§ read_file {"path": "cmd/zoo/main.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 150}
{"path": "cmd/zoo/main.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 150}
{"path":"cmd/zoo/main.go","content":"// Command zoo runs the daemon: it watches a Forgejo instance for\n// issue/PR events, dispatches them to configured AI agents running in\n// Docker containers, and serves a small dashboard over the result.\npackage main\n\nimport (\n\t\"context\"\n\t\"flag\"\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"log/slog\"\n\t\"net/http\"\n\t\"os\"\n\t\"os/signal\"\n\t\"syscall\"\n\t\"time\"\n\n\t\"github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/agentrun\"\n\t\"github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/config\"\n\t\"github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/forgejo\"\n\t\"github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/livelog\"\n\t\"github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/scheduler\"\n\t\"github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/store\"\n\t\"github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/web\"\n)\n\nfunc main() {\n\tif err := run(); err != nil {\n\t\tfmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, \"zoo:\", err)\n\n\t\tos.Exit(1)\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc run() error {\n\tvar (\n\t\tconfigPath    = flag.String(\"config\", \"zoo.hcl\", \"path to the zoo.hcl config file\")\n\t\tdbPath        = flag.String(\"db\", \"zoo.db\", \"path to the sqlite state database\")\n\t\tlisten        = flag.String(\"listen\", \":8080\", \"address to serve webhooks and the dashboard on\")\n\t\trunTimeout    = flag.Duration(\"run-timeout\", agentrun.DefaultTimeout, \"wall-clock timeout for a single agent run\")\n\t\tkeepOnFailure = flag.Bool(\"keep-on-failure\", false, \"keep the container and clone around after a failed run, for debugging\")\n\t)\n\n\tflag.Parse()\n\n\tlogger := slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(os.Stderr, nil))\n\n\tcfg, err := config.Load(*configPath)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"load config: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tst, err := store.Open(*dbPath)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"open store: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\tdefer st.Close()\n\n\tif n, err := st.ReapOrphanedJobs(context.Background()); err != nil {\n\t\tlogger.Warn(\"failed to reap orphaned jobs\", \"error\", err)\n\t} else if n \u003e 0 {\n\t\tlogger.Warn(\"reaped jobs left running by a previous process instance\", \"count\", n)\n\t}\n\n\tfgClient, err := forgejo.NewClient(cfg.Forgejo)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"forgejo client: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\trepoFilter, err := forgejo.NewRepoFilter(cfg.Forgejo.Repos)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"forgejo repos: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\twatcher := forgejo.NewWatcher(fgClient, st, cfg.Forgejo.WebhookSecret, repoFilter, logger.With(\"component\", \"forgejo\"))\n\n\thub := livelog.NewHub()\n\n\trunner, err := agentrun.NewRunner(cfg, fgClient, st, hub, logger.With(\"component\", \"agentrun\"), *runTimeout, *keepOnFailure)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"agent runner: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tsched := scheduler.New(cfg, st, fgClient, runner, hub, logger.With(\"component\", \"scheduler\"))\n\tdashboard := web.New(cfg, st, hub, fgClient)\n\n\tmux := http.NewServeMux()\n\n\tmux.Handle(\"/webhooks/forgejo\", watcher.Handler())\n\n\tmux.HandleFunc(\"/healthz\", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\tw.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)\n\t\tw.Write([]byte(\"ok\"))\n\t})\n\n\tmux.Handle(\"/\", dashboard.Handler())\n\n\tserver := \u0026http.Server{Addr: *listen, Handler: mux}\n\n\tctx, stop := signal.NotifyContext(context.Background(), os.Interrupt, syscall.SIGTERM)\n\tdefer stop()\n\n\tgo watcher.Run(ctx)\n\tgo sched.Run(ctx, watcher.Events())\n\n\tserveErr := make(chan error, 1)\n\n\tgo func() {\n\t\tlogger.Info(\"listening\", \"addr\", *listen)\n\t\tif err := server.ListenAndServe(); err != nil \u0026\u0026 err != http.ErrServerClosed {\n\t\t\tserveErr \u003c- err\n\t\t}\n\t}()\n\n\tselect {\n\tcase \u003c-ctx.Done():\n\t\tlogger.Info(\"shutting down\")\n\n\tcase err := \u003c-serveErr:\n\t\tstop()\n\n\t\tlogger.Error(\"http server failed\", \"error\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tshutdownCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 30*time.Second)\n\tdefer cancel()\n\n\tif err := server.Shutdown(shutdownCtx); err != nil {\n\t\tlogger.Warn(\"http server shutdown\", \"error\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tif err := sched.Shutdown(shutdownCtx); err != nil {\n\t\tlogger.Warn(\"scheduler did not drain in time\", \"error\", err)\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}","start_line":1,"end_line":136,"total_lines":136,"truncated":false}
Thinking
Now I have a grasp of the whole picture. Let me design the solution. ## Problem The sandbox container currently holds the agent's **full Forgejo API token** inside the container's system gitconfig (`http.<forgehost>.extraHeader`). The agent (an LLM that can run arbitrary shell commands) can read this and use it against the Forgejo REST API to do anything the token can do — delete repositories, change instance settings, read other repositories, etc. ## Design: a per-run git smart-HTTP proxy on the host **Core idea:** the sandbox never holds the Forgejo token. Instead, all git remote traffic from the sandbox goes through a small HTTP proxy that zoo runs on the host, scoped to the run. The proxy: 1. Only speaks git smart-HTTP (the `info/refs?service=git-upload-pack|git-receive-pack`, `git-upload-pack`, `git-receive-pack` endpoints). 2. Requires a per-run random client secret (a header the sandbox's git sends via `http.<proxyhost>.extraHeader`). 3. Forwards the request to the real Forgejo, injecting the actual `Authorization` header on the host side. The sandbox's git is configured with: - `url.http://host.docker.internal:<port>/.insteadOf <forgeBase>` — rewrites every git URL pointing at the forge (the origin remote, submodules, fetches of PR refs) to go through the proxy. - `http.host.docker.internal:<port>.extraHeader = X-Zoo-Run: <per-run secret>` — the only "credential" the sandbox holds, and it's only valid for this run's proxy port. The real token stays on the host, inside the proxy. When the run ends, the proxy stops and the secret becomes worthless. **Why a proxy rather than alternatives:** - *Credential helper*: the helper's output (username/password) is visible to the sandbox process tree — the agent can just run the helper directly and grab the token. Doesn't help. - *Intercepting `git push` in the bash tool*: fragile (scripts, aliases, submodules, `git -c`, direct HTTP calls to the API with a token found somewhere) and changes the agent's git workflow. - *Scoped Forgejo token*: reduces the blast radius, but the token is still in the sandbox and still usable against the API within its scope. Also, the agent's token is used for API actions (commenting, etc.) and needs broader scope… no wait, actually API actions are done by zoo on the host side via `forgejoAs`. Only git needs the token in the sandbox. But even a repo-scoped token in the sandbox is an exposed API key. The issue explicitly asks to avoid exposing the API key to the sandbox. - *Host-side git (a git tool)*: breaks the "git just works in the sandbox" model, requires zoo to run git on the host against a bind-mounted tree (which the current design deliberately avoids), and gives the agent a coarse tool surface. The proxy is the "clever" answer: git just works (clone/fetch/pull/push/submodules/PR refs all transparent), and the only secret in the sandbox is a per-run, per-port, git-only nonce. **Reachability:** the container reaches the host via `host.docker.internal`, which zoo adds with `ExtraHosts: ["host.docker.internal:host-gateway"]` (works on Linux, macOS, Windows). The proxy listens on `127.0.0.1`… no wait — `host-gateway` resolves to the host's bridge IP (e.g., 172.17.0.1), not 127.0.0.1. So the proxy must listen on an interface reachable from the bridge: either bind to `0.0.0.0` (or the bridge IP). Binding to 0.0.0.0 on an ephemeral port is slightly broader than needed, but the per-run secret gates access. Alternatively, we could discover the bridge IP and bind to it. Hmm. Actually, let me think about whether we can avoid 0.0.0.0. Options: - Bind to `0.0.0.0:0` — reachable from the LAN too (if the host has a public IP, anyone on the network could reach it, but they'd need the per-run secret, which is random 256 bits; also the port is ephemeral). Acceptable, but not great. - Discover the docker bridge gateway IP (e.g., via `docker network inspect bridge` or by inspecting the created container's `NetworkSettings.Gateway`) and bind the proxy to that IP only. That's cleaner: only containers on that bridge can reach it. We can inspect the container after creation: `NetworkSettings.Networks["bridge"].Gateway`. That gives us the host-side IP of the bridge. Bind the proxy to that IP. If the container is on a user-defined network… zoo creates the container without specifying a network, so it goes on the default `bridge` network. So `NetworkSettings.Gateway` on the bridge network is the right IP. Hmm, but wait — do we even need to bind to the gateway? If we bind to 0.0.0.0, the container can reach it via the gateway IP. Binding to the gateway IP is more precise. Let's go with: inspect the container, get the gateway IP, and bind the proxy to that IP on an ephemeral port. If the gateway is empty (weird setup), fall back to 127.0.0.1? No — if there's no gateway, host.docker.internal won't resolve usefully anyway. Let's keep it simple: use the gateway from the container inspect; if missing, error out (or fall back to 0.0.0.0). Hmm, actually, let me reconsider: is `host.docker.internal` + `host-gateway` reliable? `ExtraHosts: ["host.docker.internal:host-gateway"]` — Docker supports the `host-gateway` special value in `extra_hosts` since 20.10. On Linux it maps to the bridge gateway IP; on Docker Desktop it maps to the host. This is the documented portable way. Good. **Proxy request handling details:** Git smart-HTTP over HTTPS: - `GET /owner/repo.git/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack` (or `git-receive-pack`) - `POST /owner/repo.git/git-upload-pack` - `POST /owner/repo.git/git-receive-pack` The proxy: - Verifies the `X-Zoo-Run` header matches the per-run secret (constant-time compare). - Verifies the request is a git smart-HTTP request: path ends in `/info/refs` with `service` query in {git-upload-pack, git-receive-pack}, or path ends in `/git-upload-pack` or `/git-receive-pack` (POST). Reject everything else with 404 (so the proxy can't be used as a general API proxy). - Forwards to `forgeBase + path?query` with the `Authorization: Basic base64(user:token)` header (or `token` — Forgejo accepts `Authorization: token <t>`; the existing code uses Basic with user:token; keep consistent). - Streams the response back (pack data can be large; use `io.Copy` and set the content-type). - Should we strip hop-by-hop headers? For simplicity, forward the request body and key headers. Actually, the simplest and most robust approach: build a new request to the forge with the method, URL, body (streamed), and headers: `Authorization`, `Content-Type`, `Content-Length` (or chunked), `Git-Protocol` (if present, for protocol v2), `Accept`… hmm, git sends `Accept: application/x-git-upload-pack-result` etc. Let's forward a whitelist: Content-Type, Git-Protocol, Accept, User-Agent. And forward the response status, content-type, and body. Actually, a cleaner approach: use `httputil.ReverseProxy` with a Director that rewrites the URL to the forge and sets the auth header, plus a ModifyResponse to strip anything sensitive. ReverseProxy handles streaming, chunked encoding, and connection reuse. But ReverseProxy has quirks with the `X-Forwarded-For` header (adds it) — fine. Also it adds `X-Forwarded-Host`. Forgejo won't care. But ReverseProxy with a per-run target: we can build a ReverseProxy per proxy instance with a Director that sets `req.URL.Scheme/Host` to the forge's and adds the auth header. And an ErrorHandler for 404s. The endpoint allowlist check can be done in the handler wrapping the ReverseProxy. One gotcha: `httputil.ReverseProxy` rewrites `req.Host` and such. Also, for POST bodies, ReverseProxy handles streaming via `req.Body`. Good. Another gotcha: Forgejo might redirect (e.g., http→https). The forge URL is already https. If there's a redirect, ReverseProxy follows redirects for GETs (the client-side http.Client default follows up to 10 redirects; ReverseProxy uses its own transport and follows redirects). Fine. **Per-run proxy lifecycle:** - `Run()` starts the proxy before `configureSandboxGit` (needs the port for the gitconfig) and stops it in a deferred cleanup after the container is removed (or at least when the run ends). - The proxy is a small struct with `Start() (addr string, err error)` and `Stop()`. **What the sandbox's gitconfig looks like now:** ``` safe.directory * user.name / user.email url.http://host.docker.internal:<port>/.insteadOf <forgeBase>/ http.host.docker.internal:<port>.extraHeader = X-Zoo-Run: <secret> push.autoSetupRemote true ``` Wait — `insteadOf` prefix semantics: `url.<base>.insteadOf = <prefix>` — any URL starting with `<prefix>` is rewritten to `<base>` + the remainder. If prefix is `https://code.stdio.dk` (no trailing slash), then `https://code.stdio.dk/abrander/zoo.git` → `http://host.docker.internal:PORT/abrander/zoo.git`. But it would also rewrite `https://code.stdio.dk.evil.com/...`? No wait — the prefix match is string-based: `https://code.stdio.dk.evil.com` starts with `https://code.stdio.dk`! So it would rewrite to `http://host.docker.internal:PORT/.evil.com/...` — which would fail (404 from the proxy → forwarded to forge as `/.evil.com/...` → 404). Not a security issue (the proxy only forwards git endpoints, and the token is only sent to the real forge host), just a correctness edge case. To be safe, use a trailing-slash prefix: `insteadOf = https://code.stdio.dk/` and base `http://host.docker.internal:<port>/`. Then `https://code.stdio.dk/abrander/zoo.git` → `http://host.docker.internal:PORT/abrander/zoo.git`. And `https://code.stdio.dk.evil.com/...` doesn't match (the prefix includes the trailing slash). But wait — what if the clone URL has no trailing path (e.g., `https://code.stdio.dk` alone)? That's not a valid repo URL; ignore. Also, what about a forge base with a path prefix, e.g., Forgejo behind a reverse proxy at `https://example.com/forge`? `forgeHost()` returns `https://example.com` (scheme+host only) — the current code already has this limitation (extraHeader scoped to the host would still work since it's host-based). For the proxy, the insteadOf prefix should be `https://example.com/forge/`… hmm, the current `forgeHost` strips the path. For the proxy rewrite, we need the full base including any path prefix. Let me write a `forgeBase` function that returns scheme://host/path (with trailing slash) from the clone URL… actually, simpler: the proxy forwards `path` as-is to the forge base. The clone URL is `<forgeBase>/<owner>/<repo>.git`. The proxy sees `/owner/repo.git/info/refs`. If the forge base has a path prefix `/forge`, the proxy must forward to `https://example.com/forge/owner/repo.git/info/refs`. So the proxy needs the full forge base (scheme+host+path). Let me define: `forgeBaseURL(cloneURL)` = the clone URL with the `<owner>/<repo>[.git]` part stripped. How to know where the owner/repo starts? The clone URL is `scheme://host[:port][/prefix]/owner/repo(.git)`. The last two path segments are owner and repo. So: parse the URL, take the path, strip the last two segments (and a `.git` suffix on the last). Example: - `https://code.stdio.dk/abrander/zoo.git` → path `/abrander/zoo.git` → strip `zoo.git` and `abrander` → base `https://code.stdio.dk` (empty path). - `https://example.com/forge/abrander/zoo.git` → base `https://example.com/forge`. Edge: a repo path with fewer than two segments — malformed; fall back to the scheme+host base. Hmm, wait. But do we want the proxy to only serve that one repo, or any repo on the forge (for submodules)? Submodules can point at any repo on the same forge (or even other forges). The current design (host-scoped extraHeader) allows any repo on the same forge host. To preserve that behavior, the proxy should forward any git smart-HTTP path to the forge (not just the one repo). The per-run secret + git-endpoint allowlist + host-side token is the security boundary. The token's own permissions (per-agent token, or the shared zoo token) limit what can actually be accessed. That matches today's behavior exactly (today, any repo on the forge host is reachable with the token). So the proxy: allowlist = git smart-HTTP endpoints on any path; forward to the forge base + path. **Which token does the proxy use?** The same one the sandbox's git uses today: the agent's token if configured, otherwise the shared zoo token. The proxy just needs `user` and `token` for the Basic auth header. Note: the proxy uses the same credential as before, so no change in permissions — just no longer visible from the sandbox. **The per-run secret:** generated with `crypto/rand`, 32 bytes, hex or base64. Sent as `X-Zoo-Run: <secret>` via `http.<proxyhost>.extraHeader`. The proxy compares with `subtle.ConstantTimeCompare`. Wait, one issue: `http.<host>.extraHeader` — the host here is `host.docker.internal:PORT`. Git's http config matching: `http.<url>.extraHeader` matches on the URL prefix of the remote URL… let me recall: `http.<url>` config matches when the URL starts with `<url>`. For a remote `http://host.docker.internal:39211/owner/repo.git`, the config key `http.host.docker.internal:39211.extraHeader` — hmm, does git match the `http.<url>` section by prefix of the full URL including scheme? The docs say: "http.<url>.extraHeader — pass a custom header to the remote… <url> is matched as a prefix of the remote URL." Hmm, actually for `http.<url>.*` options, git matches if the URL starts with `<url>`… let me think. The existing code uses `http.<scheme>://<host>.extraHeader` (e.g., `http.https://code.stdio.dk.extraHeader`) and it works (per the code comments and the integration test that round-trips the value). The match is: the config URL `https://code.stdio.dk` is a prefix of the remote URL `https://code.stdio.dk/abrander/zoo.git`. So for our proxy remote `http://host.docker.internal:39211/owner/repo.git`, the config key `http.http://host.docker.internal:39211.extraHeader` would work (with the full scheme://host as the prefix). Hmm wait, in the existing code: `forgeHost` returns `u.Scheme + "://" + u.Host`, and the key is `http.` + that + `.extraHeader`, i.e., `http.https://code.stdio.dk.extraHeader`. Yes. So the new key: `http.http://host.docker.internal:PORT.extraHeader`. The value: `X-Zoo-Run: <secret>`. **Also**: the `insteadOf` rewrite happens before the http config matching, so the remote URL after rewriting is the proxy URL and the extraHeader for the proxy host applies. **What about the origin remote's URL?** `cloneAndBranch` clones from `cloneURL` (the plain forge URL). With insteadOf, the clone transparently goes through the proxy. The origin remote in `.git/config` will be the plain forge URL (the URL as given to clone, before rewriting? or after?). Git stores the URL as given on the command line… actually, `git clone <url>` stores `<url>` in `.git/config` as the origin URL — the URL as typed, not the rewritten one. The insteadOf rewrite applies at use time (fetch/push) for any URL matching the prefix, including the stored origin URL. So the origin stays plain (no secret in the working tree) and all fetches/pushes are rewritten to the proxy. **Push flow:** `git push` → origin URL rewritten to proxy → `POST /owner/repo.git/git-receive-pack` with the `X-Zoo-Run` header → proxy verifies the secret, forwards to the forge with the real token → Forgejo authorizes the push as the agent user. **PR head fetch (clonePRHead):** `git fetch origin refs/pull/N/head` → goes through the proxy → forge serves the PR ref. Works. **Submodules:** `git submodule update` fetches submodule URLs (forge URLs) → rewritten to the proxy → works. (Same as today.) **What about git operations to other hosts (e.g., a GitHub dependency)?** No insteadOf match → direct, no auth → same as today (today, the extraHeader is scoped to the forge host, so non-forge hosts are also direct). Same behavior. **Security review of the design:** 1. The sandbox holds: a per-run random secret (256 bits), valid only against one ephemeral port on the host, and only for git smart-HTTP endpoints. No Forgejo API access possible through it (non-git paths are rejected). 2. If the agent exfiltrates the secret: worst case, an attacker with the secret + knowledge of the port (which is only discoverable by scanning the host's bridge IP) can do git clone/fetch/push on the forge as the agent's identity, for the remaining lifetime of the run. Much smaller than full API access. 3. The proxy is bound to the docker bridge gateway IP (not 0.0.0.0), so only containers on the host's docker network can reach it. 4. The token never enters the sandbox's filesystem, environment, or any process's arguments… wait — the token is in the proxy's memory on the host and in the Authorization header of requests the proxy makes to the forge. The sandbox's git processes never see it. 5. The `/event` file, the working tree, the container's gitconfig — none contain the token. One more consideration: **the `X-Zoo-Run` header value in the sandbox's system gitconfig** — it's readable by the agent (it's in the container's /etc/gitconfig). That's fine; it's only the per-run nonce, not the API key. The issue asks to avoid exposing the API key; a per-run nonce that only works for git operations on this run is exactly the "clever" compromise. We should document this in a comment and in the reply to the issue. **Alternative: no secret at all** (relying on the ephemeral port + bridge-only binding). The secret adds defense in depth at trivial cost. Keep it. **Implementation plan:** 1. **New package `internal/gitproxy`:** - `type Server struct` with fields: forgeBase (a *url.URL), user, token, secret, listenAddr (IP to bind), logger. - `New(...)` or a constructor. - `Start(ctx) (addr string, err error)`: listens on `ip:0`, starts serving in a goroutine, returns the actual address (`host:port`). - `Stop()`: closes the listener/server. - Handler: - Check the `X-Zoo-Run` header (constant-time). - Check the git endpoint allowlist: - `GET` + path ends in `/info/refs` + query `service` ∈ {git-upload-pack, git-receive-pack} - `POST` + path ends in `/git-upload-pack` - `POST` + path ends in `/git-receive-pack` - (Also allow `GET /info/refs` without a service? Dumb HTTP protocol — Forgejo is smart; allow only smart. Hmm, git can fall back to dumb if the smart request fails… if we reject non-service info/refs, git might try dumb and fail. Forgejo always serves smart HTTP for git over HTTP. Allow only smart; that's what git uses first and Forgejo supports.) - ReverseProxy to the forge base + path + query, injecting `Authorization: Basic base64(user:token)`. - Also handle `HEAD`? Git doesn't use HEAD for smart HTTP. Skip. - Response: pass through status, Content-Type, Content-Length, body. ReverseProxy does this. - Strip `Authorization` from incoming requests (the sandbox shouldn't send one; if it does, ignore it — the proxy sets its own). 2. **`internal/agentrun/docker.go`:** add `ExtraHosts: []string{"host.docker.internal:host-gateway"}` to the container config. Also, we need a way to get the container's gateway IP: add a method `gatewayIP(ctx, containerID) (string, error)` that inspects the container and returns `NetworkSettings.Networks[...].Gateway`. Hmm — which network? The default bridge. `NetworkSettings.Networks` is a map keyed by network name; the container is on `bridge`. Iterate and take the first non-empty Gateway. 3. **`internal/agentrun/sandboxgit.go`:** - Replace `configureSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, cloneURL, user, token, name, email)` with a version that takes the proxy address + secret + forge base instead of user/token: ```go configureSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, cloneURL, proxyAddr, secret, name, email) ``` which writes: - safe.directory, user.name, user.email (unchanged) - `url.http://<proxyAddr>/.insteadOf <forgeBase>/` - `http.http://<proxyAddr>.extraHeader = X-Zoo-Run: <secret>` - push.autoSetupRemote (unchanged) - Remove `gitAuthHeader` (no longer needed in the sandbox) — move the Basic auth construction into gitproxy. - `forgeHost` is still used… actually, with the new design, we need `forgeBase` (scheme://host[/prefix]) for the insteadOf prefix and for the proxy's target. Let me rework: `forgeBaseURL(cloneURL) (string, error)` returns e.g. `https://code.stdio.dk` (no trailing slash) — and the insteadOf prefix is base + "/", the proxy target is base + reqPath. Wait, be careful with the insteadOf base: `url.<base>.insteadOf`. If the clone URL is `https://code.stdio.dk/abrander/zoo.git`: - base = `https://code.stdio.dk` - insteadOf prefix = `https://code.stdio.dk/` - url base = `http://host.docker.internal:PORT/` - rewritten: `http://host.docker.internal:PORT/abrander/zoo.git` āœ“ For a forge with a path prefix, `https://example.com/forge/abrander/zoo.git`: - base = `https://example.com/forge` - prefix = `https://example.com/forge/` - url base = `http://host.docker.internal:PORT/` - rewritten: `http://host.docker.internal:PORT/abrander/zoo.git` - proxy forwards to `https://example.com/forge` + `/abrander/zoo.git/info/refs` āœ“ Computing the base: parse the clone URL; path segments; if there are 2+ segments, drop the last two (the last one with a `.git` suffix stripped); base = scheme://host + remaining path. If fewer than 2 segments, base = scheme://host. Hmm wait, but is it always owner/repo? Forgejo clone URLs: `https://host/owner/repo.git`. Yes, always exactly two segments after any install prefix. 4. **`internal/agentrun/run.go`:** - After creating the container (we need the container ID to get the gateway IP… actually, the gateway IP is a property of the network, not the container — but inspecting the container is the easiest way to get it): - Get the gateway IP from the container inspect. - Start the gitproxy bound to the gateway IP, with the forge base, user, token, and a fresh random secret. - `defer proxy.Stop()`. - Call the new `configureSandboxGit` with the proxy address + secret. - Ordering: the proxy must be up before the clone. The container must exist before the proxy (to get the gateway). So: createContainer → gatewayIP → proxy.Start → configureSandboxGit → clone. 5. **Tests:** - Unit tests for `gitproxy`: spin up a fake forge (an httptest server that serves a minimal git smart-HTTP response — or just verifies forwarding of headers/paths and rejects non-git paths), start the proxy on 127.0.0.1:0, and: - A request with the wrong secret → 401/403. - A request to a non-git path (`/api/v1/...`) → 404. - A git request with the right secret → forwarded to the fake forge with the Authorization header, and the response passes through. - The `service` query validation for info/refs. - Unit tests for the new `forgeBaseURL` / insteadOf rendering. - Update `sandboxgit_test.go`: remove the `gitAuthHeader` test (moved to gitproxy), update `forgeHost` tests → `forgeBase`. - Update `docker_integration_test.go`: the `configureSandboxGit` signature changed; the test should now verify the insteadOf + secret header round-trip, and that the token never enters the container. We can also do a full end-to-end: start the proxy against a local "forge"… the integration test uses a local path remote (`/bare`) for the clone, which doesn't go through HTTP. With insteadOf, a local path remote is unaffected (insteadOf only rewrites matching URL prefixes — `/bare` doesn't match the https prefix). So the clone still works. The test can verify the gitconfig contents (insteadOf + secret header) and that the token string appears nowhere in the container (grep the system gitconfig, the environment, etc.). Actually, a better integration test: run a real git smart-HTTP server on the host (git http-backend? the golang image has git; `git http-backend` needs CGI setup — complicated). Alternative: the proxy test in `gitproxy` with an httptest "forge" that actually serves git smart-HTTP… we could implement a minimal smart-HTTP responder in the test: serve `info/refs` with a pkt-line ref advertisement, and `git-upload-pack`… that's a lot. Simpler: verify the proxy forwards correctly (path, query, auth header, method, body) and passes the response through — the actual git protocol correctness is Forgejo's job, and the existing behavior (git talking to Forgejo over smart HTTP) is unchanged; we're just adding a transparent hop. The integration test can verify the sandbox's gitconfig and that the token is absent. Hmm, but can we do a real end-to-end git clone through the proxy in the integration test? We could stand up a small smart-HTTP server in Go that serves a real repository… actually, git can serve over HTTP via `git http-backend` (CGI). The golang image doesn't have apache. Too heavy. Alternative: implement a minimal smart-HTTP server in the test using `os/exec git upload-pack`? There's a trick: `git upload-pack <path>` speaks the pkt-line protocol on stdin/stdout. A smart-HTTP server can: - `GET /info/refs?service=git-upload-pack` → run `git upload-pack --http-backend-info-refs <repo>`? Hmm, `git http-backend` is exactly a CGI wrapper around upload-pack/receive-pack. We can emulate it: for info/refs, run `git upload-pack --advertise-refs <repo>` (the pkt-line advertisement) and wrap it with the `# service=git-upload-pack\n001e# service=git-upload-pack\n0000` prefix. For POST git-upload-pack, pipe the request body into `git upload-pack <repo>` and stream stdout. That's ~40 lines and gives a real end-to-end: the sandbox's `git clone http://host.docker.internal:PORT/...` through the proxy to the local git server. That's a compelling test: it proves the whole chain (insteadOf rewrite, secret header, proxy forwarding, real git protocol, real token injection) works. Let's try it in the docker-tagged integration test. Actually — wait, we can do it even without docker: the gitproxy unit test can use a real local bare repo + a minimal smart-HTTP server + `git clone` from the test process (the host's git) through the proxy. That's a pure Go test (no docker needed) that exercises the proxy end-to-end with real git! Let me design the minimal smart-HTTP server for the tests: ```go // testForge serves a bare repo over git smart-HTTP, just enough for clone/fetch. type testForge struct { repoDir string t *testing.T } func (f *testForge) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { // record the auth header for assertions switch { case r.URL.Path == "/acme/widgets.git/info/refs" && r.URL.Query().Get("service") == "git-upload-pack": w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/x-git-upload-pack-advertisement") fmt.Fprint(w, "001e# service=git-upload-pack\n0000") f.runUploadPack(w, "--advertise-refs") case r.URL.Path == "/acme/widgets.git/git-upload-pack" && r.Method == http.MethodPost: w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/x-git-upload-pack-result") // pipe r.Body into `git upload-pack <repo>` } } ``` `git upload-pack --advertise-refs <repo>` outputs the ref advertisement (pkt-lines). The smart-HTTP info/refs response is: the pkt-line `# service=git-upload-pack\n`, a flush, then the advertisement. The `001e# service=git-upload-pack\n0000` literal: "001e" is the pkt-len for `# service=git-upload-pack\n` (4+22=26=0x1a? let me compute: `# service=git-upload-pack\n` = 24 chars + \n = 25… hmm: "# service=git-upload-pack" is 25 chars, +\n = 26 = 0x1a, pkt-len = 26+4 = 30 = 0x1e. Yes, `001e` is correct.) For the POST: `git upload-pack <repo>` reads the request (want/have lines) from stdin and writes the pack to stdout. So: ```go cmd := exec.Command("git", "upload-pack", f.repoDir) cmd.Stdin = r.Body cmd.Stdout = w cmd.Stderr = w // or a buffer cmd.Start(); cmd.Wait() ``` Does `git upload-pack` need `--http-backend-info-refs`? No — for the POST it's plain `git upload-pack <path>`. In the CGI, http-backend sets GIT_PROJECT_ROOT, GIT_HTTP_EXPORT_ALL=1, and runs `git upload-pack "$GIT_PROJECT_ROOT/$PATH_INFO"`. The `--http-backend-info-refs` flag is only for the info-refs variant (used when `GIT_PROTOCOL` is set… actually it's for protocol v2 advertise). Plain `--advertise-refs` works for v0/v1 advertise. Git clients use protocol v2 by default now: they send `Git-Protocol: version=2` and the info/refs response must include the v2 advertisement… hmm, protocol v2: the client requests `GET /info/refs?service=git-upload-pack` with header `Git-Protocol: version=2`, and the server responds with the v2 capability advertisement (the `# service=...` line, then the v2 lsrefs response). `git upload-pack --http-backend-info-refs <repo>` handles both: it checks the `GIT_PROTOCOL` environment variable and serves the appropriate advertisement. So we should set `cmd.Env` with `GIT_PROTOCOL` from the request's `Git-Protocol` header, and use `--http-backend-info-refs` for the info/refs case. That's what `git http-backend` does internally. OK, feasible. But is it worth the complexity for a unit test? It gives real end-to-end confidence that a git client can clone through the proxy. I think it's worth it — this is the crux of the change. Let's write it carefully. Actually, let me reconsider the scope. The core deliverables: 1. The proxy package + tests (unit, with a fake forge that verifies forwarding/allowlist/auth — and ideally a real git e2e). 2. The wiring in run.go + docker.go + sandboxgit.go. 3. Updating the integration test. 4. Updating the docs (README, system.md if needed, zoo.hcl.example comments). 5. A comment on the issue explaining the design. Let's also check `loop.go` and the tools to see if anything else references the token or git auth (e.g., a `git` tool was removed in a previous commit — "Remove the git tool and Context.Git per review"). Let me grep for "token" and "extraHeader" across the repo. 6. **`system.md`**: the "Git" section says "Remote (pull, fetch, push, etc.) git operations are authenticated for you and simply work." That's still true. Maybe add a line that the sandbox has no Forgejo API credentials — git remote operations work, but direct API calls won't authenticate (use the tools). Actually, the agent might try `curl https://code.stdio.dk/api/v1/...` — that would now fail (no credentials). The system prompt already says to use the tools for Forgejo actions. We could add a sentence: "The sandbox has no Forgejo API credentials — use the provided tools for issue/PR actions." That's useful and honest. Let's add it. Now, let me also double-check the `config` package and `roster.go` for gitIdentity. And grep for other places that use the token in the sandbox context.
Now let me check the remaining pieces — the roster, config, and any other references to tokens/credentials in the sandbox path.
Tool šŸ”§ grep_search {"query": "token|Token", "glob": "internal/agentrun/*.go", "context_after": 2, "context_before": 1}
{"query": "token|Token", "glob": "internal/agentrun/*.go", "context_after": 2, "context_before": 1}
No matches found.
Tool šŸ”§ read_file {"path": "internal/agentrun/roster.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 120}
{"path": "internal/agentrun/roster.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 120}
{"path":"internal/agentrun/roster.go","content":"package agentrun\n\nimport (\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"log/slog\"\n\t\"strings\"\n\n\t\"github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/config\"\n\t\"github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/forgejo\"\n)\n\n// agentInfo pairs a configured agent with its Forgejo profile: the bio\n// (what its account says it does) and the name/email used to set git\n// commit authorship inside its container.\ntype agentInfo struct {\n\tName        string\n\tDescription string\n\tFullName    string\n\tEmail       string\n}\n\n// buildRoster fetches every configured agent's Forgejo profile (agent\n// config labels double as Forgejo usernames). A per-agent lookup failure\n// is logged and that agent is included with an empty profile rather than\n// failing the whole run — one missing/unreachable profile shouldn't\n// block someone else's job.\nfunc buildRoster(fg *forgejo.Client, agents []config.Agent, logger *slog.Logger) []agentInfo {\n\troster := make([]agentInfo, 0, len(agents))\n\n\tfor _, a := range agents {\n\t\tprofile, err := fg.AgentProfile(a.Name)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tlogger.Warn(\"failed to fetch agent profile from forgejo\", \"agent\", a.Name, \"error\", err)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\troster = append(roster, agentInfo{Name: a.Name, Description: profile.Description, FullName: profile.FullName, Email: profile.Email})\n\t}\n\n\treturn roster\n}\n\n// gitIdentity returns the git commit author name/email to configure\n// inside self's container, from its Forgejo profile, falling back to\n// its agent name and a synthetic zoo.local address for whichever fields\n// its profile doesn't set.\nfunc gitIdentity(self string, roster []agentInfo) (name, email string) {\n\tfor _, a := range roster {\n\t\tif a.Name == self {\n\t\t\tname, email = a.FullName, a.Email\n\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif name == \"\" {\n\t\tname = self\n\t}\n\n\tif email == \"\" {\n\t\temail = self + \"@zoo.local\"\n\t}\n\n\treturn name, email\n}\n\n// identitySection renders the \"who am I / who else is there\" prompt\n// section injected after the static system prompt: the agent's own\n// Forgejo profile description, and everyone else's, so it can decide\n// when a task is better handed off via the assign_issue tool.\nfunc identitySection(self string, roster []agentInfo) string {\n\tvar b strings.Builder\n\n\tvar selfDesc string\n\tvar others []agentInfo\n\n\tfor _, a := range roster {\n\t\tif a.Name == self {\n\t\t\tselfDesc = a.Description\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tothers = append(others, a)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tfmt.Fprintf(\u0026b, \"\\n\\n## Your identity\\n\\nYou are the agent %q.\", self)\n\n\tif selfDesc != \"\" {\n\t\tfmt.Fprintf(\u0026b, \" Your role, from your Forgejo profile description: %s\", selfDesc)\n\t} else {\n\t\tb.WriteString(\" Your Forgejo profile has no description set.\")\n\t}\n\n\tif len(others) \u003e 0 {\n\t\tb.WriteString(\"\\n\\n## Other agents\\n\\nIf this task is a better fit for another agent's role, use the assign_issue tool with their name to hand it off (this reassigns the issue/PR on Forgejo, which triggers their run):\\n\")\n\n\t\tfor _, a := range others {\n\t\t\tdesc := a.Description\n\t\t\tif desc == \"\" {\n\t\t\t\tdesc = \"(no description set)\"\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tfmt.Fprintf(\u0026b, \"### %s\\n\\n%s\\n\\n\", a.Name, desc)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn b.String()\n}","start_line":1,"end_line":105,"total_lines":105,"truncated":false}
Thinking
Interesting — grep didn't find "token" in `internal/agentrun/*.go`? That's weird, since run.go has `agent.Token`. Oh wait, the glob pattern might be the issue — the glob is relative to the project root. Let me retry with a different glob.
Tool šŸ”§ grep_search {"query": "Token", "glob": "**/*.go", "max_results": 80}
{"query": "Token", "glob": "**/*.go", "max_results": 80}
No matches found.
Thinking
Hmm, grep_search didn't find anything for "Token" inside the .go files? That's strange. Let me try a plain grep via bash.
Tool šŸ”§ bash {"command": "cd /project && grep -rn \"Token\" --include=\"*.go\" internal/ | head -50 && echo --- && grep -rn \"extraHeader\\|insteadOf\\|host.docker\" --include=\"*.go\" internal/ | head -20"}
{"command": "cd /project && grep -rn \"Token\" --include=\"*.go\" internal/ | head -50 && echo --- && grep -rn \"extraHeader\\|insteadOf\\|host.docker\" --include=\"*.go\" internal/ | head -20"}
internal/config/config.go:43:	Token string `hcl:"token,optional"`
internal/config/config.go:49:	Token  string `hcl:"token"`
internal/config/config.go:55:	Token         string `hcl:"token"`
internal/config/config.go:74:	Token string `hcl:"token,optional"`
internal/config/config.go:103:		if l.OpenAI == "" || l.Token == "" || l.Model == "" {
internal/config/config.go:109:	if c.Forgejo.URL == "" || c.Forgejo.Token == "" {
internal/config/config.go:194:	Token string
internal/config/config.go:204:				Token: a.Token,
internal/web/web_test.go:161:	cfg := &config.Config{Web: &config.Web{Token: "secret"}}
internal/web/web_test.go:210:	fg, err := forgejo.NewClient(config.Forgejo{URL: api.URL, Token: "test"})
internal/web/web.go:67:	if s.cfg.Web == nil || s.cfg.Web.Token == "" {
internal/web/web.go:71:	token := s.cfg.Web.Token
internal/llm/client.go:24:		token:      cfg.Token,
internal/llm/types.go:218:	PromptPerTokenMs    float64 `json:"prompt_per_token_ms"`
internal/llm/types.go:222:	PredictedPerTokenMs float64 `json:"predicted_per_token_ms"`
internal/forgejo/client.go:25:	c, err := sdk.NewClient(cfg.URL, sdk.SetToken(cfg.Token))
internal/forgejo/client.go:30:	return &Client{sdk: c, baseURL: cfg.URL, token: cfg.Token}, nil
internal/forgejo/client.go:33:// Token returns the shared zoo Forgejo identity's token, e.g. for
internal/forgejo/client.go:37:func (c *Client) Token() string {
internal/forgejo/client.go:46:	client, _ := sdk.NewClient(c.baseURL, sdk.SetToken(token))
internal/forgejo/client.go:61:	sudoClient, err := sdk.NewClient(c.baseURL, sdk.SetToken(c.token), sdk.SetSudo(username))
internal/forgejo/poll_test.go:38:	client, err := NewClient(config.Forgejo{URL: serverURL, Token: "test"})
internal/forgejo/client_test.go:76:	client, err := NewClient(config.Forgejo{URL: server.URL, Token: "test"})
internal/forgejo/client_test.go:110:	client, err := NewClient(config.Forgejo{URL: server.URL, Token: "test"})
internal/forgejo/client_test.go:147:	client, err := NewClient(config.Forgejo{URL: server.URL, Token: "test"})
internal/forgejo/client_test.go:188:	client, err := NewClient(config.Forgejo{URL: server.URL, Token: "test"})
internal/forgejo/client_test.go:226:	client, err := NewClient(config.Forgejo{URL: server.URL, Token: "test"})
internal/forgejo/client_test.go:246:	client, err := NewClient(config.Forgejo{URL: server.URL, Token: "test"})
internal/agentrun/run.go:183:	gitUser, gitToken := "zoo", r.forgejo.Token()
internal/agentrun/run.go:185:	if agent.Token != "" {
internal/agentrun/run.go:186:		gitUser, gitToken = agent.Name, agent.Token
internal/agentrun/run.go:213:	if err := configureSandboxGit(ctx, r.docker, containerID, repoInfo.CloneURL, gitUser, gitToken, gitName, gitEmail); err != nil {
internal/agentrun/run.go:239:			client: r.forgejoAs(agent.Name, agent.Token),
internal/scheduler/scheduler_test.go:20:		LLMs:        []config.LLM{{Name: "qwen", OpenAI: "https://example.com", Token: "tok", Model: "qwen3"}},
internal/scheduler/scheduler_test.go:21:		Forgejo:     config.Forgejo{URL: "https://example.com", Token: "tok"},
---
internal/agentrun/sandboxgit.go:80://   - http.<host>.extraHeader carrying the run's Forgejo credential,
internal/agentrun/sandboxgit.go:108:	if _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, "config", "--global", "http."+forgeHost(cloneURL)+".extraHeader", gitAuthHeader(user, token)); err != nil {
internal/agentrun/sandboxgit.go:121:// authenticates via the http.<host>.extraHeader configured by
internal/agentrun/docker_integration_test.go:108:// (including the http.<url>.extraHeader key whose subsection is a URL
internal/agentrun/docker_integration_test.go:181:	out, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, "config", "--system", "--get", "http."+forgeHost(cloneURL)+".extraHeader")
Thinking
Alright. The grep_search tool seems to have issues with globs, but bash's grep works. Now I have the full picture. Let me also check `internal/config/config.go` to understand the structure of the config (in case I want to add a config item, e.g. to disable the proxy — probably not needed, but let's take a look). Also check the docker/ directory.
Tool šŸ”§ read_file {"path": "internal/config/config.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 120}
{"path": "internal/config/config.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 120}
{"path":"internal/config/config.go","content":"// Package config loads and validates zoo's HCL configuration file.\npackage config\n\nimport (\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"strings\"\n\n\t\"github.com/hashicorp/hcl/v2/hclsimple\"\n)\n\n// Known event kinds. issue:assigned and pr:review are resolved\n// dynamically (agent name must match the Forgejo assignee's username,\n// or the pull request author's username, respectively) so they never\n// carry an `agent` attribute; the rest map statically to one\n// configured agent.\nconst (\n\tEventIssueNew      = \"issue:new\"\n\tEventIssueComment  = \"issue:comment\"\n\tEventIssueAssigned = \"issue:assigned\"\n\tEventPRNew         = \"pr:new\"\n\tEventPRReview      = \"pr:review\"\n)\n\nvar staticEventKinds = map[string]bool{\n\tEventIssueNew:     true,\n\tEventIssueComment: true,\n\tEventPRNew:        true,\n}\n\ntype Config struct {\n\tLLMs        []LLM       `hcl:\"llm,block\"`\n\tForgejo     Forgejo     `hcl:\"forgejo,block\"`\n\tEnvironment Environment `hcl:\"environment,block\"`\n\tAgents      []Agent     `hcl:\"agent,block\"`\n\tEvents      []Event     `hcl:\"event,block\"`\n\tWeb         *Web        `hcl:\"web,block\"`\n}\n\n// Web configures the dashboard's optional bearer-token gate. Leave the\n// block out of zoo.hcl entirely to run without one (fine on localhost;\n// put a real gate or a proxy in front for anything else).\ntype Web struct {\n\tToken string `hcl:\"token,optional\"`\n}\n\ntype LLM struct {\n\tName   string `hcl:\"name,label\"`\n\tOpenAI string `hcl:\"openai\"`\n\tToken  string `hcl:\"token\"`\n\tModel  string `hcl:\"model\"`\n}\n\ntype Forgejo struct {\n\tURL           string `hcl:\"url\"`\n\tToken         string `hcl:\"token\"`\n\tWebhookSecret string `hcl:\"webhook_secret,optional\"`\n\n\t// Repos is the allowlist of repository patterns to watch, e.g.\n\t// [\"acme/*\", \"acme/widgets\"]. Patterns are \"owner/repo\" pairs with\n\t// glob wildcards; \"*\" watches everything on the instance. An empty\n\t// list keeps the historical behavior of watching every repository\n\t// the token can see.\n\tRepos []string `hcl:\"repos,optional\"`\n}\n\ntype Environment struct {\n\tDockerImage string `hcl:\"docker_image\"`\n\tMaxLive     int    `hcl:\"max_live_agents\"`\n}\n\ntype Agent struct {\n\tName  string `hcl:\"name,label\"`\n\tLLM   string `hcl:\"llm\"`\n\tToken string `hcl:\"token,optional\"`\n}\n\ntype Event struct {\n\tKind         string `hcl:\"name,label\"`\n\tAgent        string `hcl:\"agent,optional\"`\n\tInstructions string `hcl:\"instructions,optional\"`\n}\n\n// Load reads and validates the config file at path.\nfunc Load(path string) (*Config, error) {\n\tvar cfg Config\n\n\tif err := hclsimple.DecodeFile(path, nil, \u0026cfg); err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"parse config: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tif err := cfg.Validate(); err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"invalid config: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\treturn \u0026cfg, nil\n}\n\n// Validate checks that the config is internally consistent: every\n// reference between blocks resolves, and required values are set.\nfunc (c *Config) Validate() error {\n\tllmNames := make(map[string]bool, len(c.LLMs))\n\tfor _, l := range c.LLMs {\n\t\tif l.OpenAI == \"\" || l.Token == \"\" || l.Model == \"\" {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"llm %q: openai, token, and model are required\", l.Name)\n\t\t}\n\t\tllmNames[l.Name] = true\n\t}\n\n\tif c.Forgejo.URL == \"\" || c.Forgejo.Token == \"\" {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"forgejo: url and token are required\")\n\t}\n\n\tfor _, p := range c.Forgejo.Repos {\n\t\tif err := validRepoPattern(p); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"forgejo: %w\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif c.Environment.MaxLive \u003c 1 {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"environment: max_live_agents must be \u003e= 1, got %d\", c.Environment.MaxLive)","start_line":1,"end_line":120,"total_lines":246,"truncated":true}
Tool šŸ”§ bash {"command": "cd /project && ls docker/ && cat docker/* 2>/dev/null | head -50 && go version"}
{"command": "cd /project && ls docker/ && cat docker/* 2>/dev/null | head -50 && go version"}
Dockerfile
group
passwd
shadow
uid1000-sudo
FROM debian:unstable

RUN apt-get update && \
    apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
        ca-certificates \
        clang \
        cpp \
        curl \
        forgejo-cli \
        g++ \
        gcc \
        git \
        gnupg \
        golang-go \
        libc6-dev \
        make \
        mercurial \
        netbase \
        openssh-client \
        pkg-config \
        procps \
        sq \
        subversion \
        sudo \
        wget \
    && \
    rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*

ADD --chmod=0644 passwd /etc/passwd
ADD --chmod=0644 group /etc/group
ADD --chmod=0640 shadow /etc/shadow
ADD --chmod=0644 uid1000-sudo /etc/sudoers.d/uid1000

RUN mkdir -p /home/user && \
    chown 1000:1000 /home/user

USER 1000:1000
root:x:0:
user:x:1000:
nogroup:x:65534:
root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
user:x:1000:1000:user,,,:/home/user:/bin/bash
nobody:x:65534:65534::
root:$y$j9T$ElEG3FgmW16OtVys3v4FL0$tunDvgySurBjIXi5UzXdVToBSZ1VE2zm/PG/oc2yeE/:19136:0:99999:7:::
user:$y$j9T$ElEG3FgmW16OtVys3v4FL0$tunDvgySurBjIXi5UzXdVToBSZ1VE2zm/PG/oc2yeE/:19136:0:99999:7:::
user ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL
go version go1.26.7 linux/amd64
Thinking
Now I have a grasp of the whole picture. Let me lay out the implementation plan: ## Design (summary) **A per-run git smart-HTTP proxy on the host.** The sandbox's git talks to a small HTTP proxy that zoo runs on the host, scoped to that run. The proxy: - Binds only to the Docker bridge gateway IP (reachable from the container via `host.docker.internal`), on an ephemeral port. - Requires a per-run random secret in the `X-Zoo-Run` header (constant-time comparison). - Accepts only git smart-HTTP endpoints (`info/refs?service=...`, `git-upload-pack`, `git-receive-pack`) and rejects everything else (so it can't be used as a generic Forgejo API proxy). - Forwards to the real Forgejo, injecting the real `Authorization` header on the host side. The sandbox's git config (system gitconfig inside the container) will contain: - `url.http://host.docker.internal:<port>/.insteadOf <forgeBase>/` — rewrites all git URLs for the forge (origin, submodules, PR refs) to go through the proxy. - `http.http://host.docker.internal:<port>.extraHeader = X-Zoo-Run: <secret>` — the only "credential" in the sandbox: a per-run nonce, valid only against this run's ephemeral port, and only for git endpoints. The Forgejo token stays on the host, in the proxy's memory. When the run ends, the proxy stops and the nonce becomes worthless. ## Files to change 1. **New `internal/gitproxy/gitproxy.go`** — the proxy server. 2. **New `internal/gitproxy/gitproxy_test.go`** — unit tests: - Secret enforcement (wrong/missing → 401). - Endpoint allowlist (API paths → 404; wrong service → 404; wrong method → 404/405). - Forwarding: correct target URL, auth header injection, body streaming, response pass-through. - End-to-end with real git: a minimal smart-HTTP forge (wrapping `git upload-pack`) + a real `git clone` through the proxy. 3. **`internal/agentrun/docker.go`** — add `ExtraHosts: host.docker.internal:host-gateway`; add a `gatewayIP` method (container inspect). 4. **`internal/agentrun/sandboxgit.go`** — rework `configureSandboxGit` to write insteadOf + secret header; add `forgeBase` helper; remove `gitAuthHeader`. 5. **`internal/agentrun/run.go`** — wire in the proxy: start it after container creation (needs the gateway IP), stop it on cleanup; pass proxy address + secret to configureSandboxGit. 6. **`internal/agentrun/sandboxgit_test.go`** — update tests for the new helpers. 7. **`internal/agentrun/docker_integration_test.go`** — update to the new configureSandboxGit signature; verify that the token is nowhere in the container (system gitconfig, /project, env vars). 8. **`internal/agentrun/system.md`** — document that the sandbox has no Forgejo API credentials. 9. **`README.md`** — document the credential model. OK, let me carefully think through the gitproxy implementation. ```go // Package gitproxy runs a per-run git smart-HTTP proxy on the host, // so the agent's sandbox can do authenticated git operations // (clone/fetch/pull/push) against the forge without holding the // Forgejo credential itself. package gitproxy import ( "crypto/rand" "crypto/subtle" "encoding/base64" "fmt" "io" "log/slog" "net" "net/http" "net/http/httputil" "net/url" "strings" ) const ( // Header is the per-run client credential the sandbox's git must // present on every request to the proxy. Header = "X-Zoo-Run" gitUploadPackService = "git-upload-pack" gitReceivePackService = "git-receive-pack" ) // Server is a per-run git smart-HTTP proxy... type Server struct { forgeBase *url.URL // target forge base (scheme://host[/prefix]) secret string // per-run client secret user string // forge identity to authenticate as token string logger *slog.Logger srv *http.Server lis net.Listener rp *httputil.ReverseProxy } // New creates a Server that proxies git smart-HTTP requests for // forgeBase (the forge URL, e.g. https://code.stdio.dk) to forgeBase, // authenticating them as user with token. Clients must present secret // in the X-Zoo-Run header. func New(forgeBase, user, token, secret string, logger *slog.Logger) (*Server, error) { u, err := url.Parse(forgeBase) ... } // NewSecret returns a fresh per-run client secret. func NewSecret() (string, error) { b := make([]byte, 32) if _, err := rand.Read(b); err != nil { return "", err } return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(b), nil } // Start listens on ip:0 (an ephemeral port on ip) and serves until // Stop. It returns the local address (ip:port) the sandbox's git // should point at. func (s *Server) Start(ip string) (string, error) { lis, err := net.Listen("tcp", net.JoinHostPort(ip, "0")) ... s.rp = httputil.NewSingleHostReverseProxy(s.forgeBase) ... s.srv = &http.Server{Handler: s.handler()} go s.srv.Serve(lis) return lis.Addr().String(), nil } func (s *Server) Stop() error { return s.srv.Close() } ``` Handler: ```go func (s *Server) handler() http.Handler { return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { if !s.authorized(r) { http.Error(w, "unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized) return } if !isGitRequest(r) { http.NotFound(w, r) return } s.rp.ServeHTTP(w, r) }) } ``` `isGitRequest`: ```go func isGitRequest(r *http.Request) bool { switch r.Method { case http.MethodGet: return strings.HasSuffix(r.URL.Path, "/info/refs") && (r.URL.Query().Get("service") == gitUploadPackService || r.URL.Query().Get("service") == gitReceivePackService) case http.MethodPost: return strings.HasSuffix(r.URL.Path, "/git-upload-pack") || strings.HasSuffix(r.URL.Path, "/git-receive-pack") default: return false } } ``` Hmm, one consideration: `git-receive-pack` POST for push. Also, git might do `GET /info/refs?service=git-receive-pack` before a push. Both are covered. ReverseProxy details: `httputil.NewSingleHostReverseProxy(target)` — the Director sets `req.URL.Scheme = target.Scheme`, `req.URL.Host = target.Host`, `req.URL.Path = singleJoiningSlash(target.Path, req.URL.Path)`, `req.Host = target.Host`. Wait, SingleHostReverseProxy's joinPath: if target has a path (e.g. `/forge`), it joins target.Path and req.URL.Path. Good. But there's a subtlety with the query string: the Director preserves req.URL.RawQuery. Good. Authorization header: set in the Director: `req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Basic "+base64(user+":"+token))`. Also, we should strip any incoming Authorization (the sandbox might send its own; we don't want it forwarded, or to shadow ours — Set overwrites, so no problem). Also, `X-Forwarded-For` etc. get added by ReverseProxy — harmless. One more: ReverseProxy's ErrorHandler — if the upstream is unreachable, it returns 502. Fine. Response pass-through: ReverseProxy copies status, headers, body. Good. **Git protocol v2**: the client sends a `Git-Protocol: version=2` header; ReverseProxy forwards all headers except hop-by-hop ones (Connection, Keep-Alive, Proxy-Authenticate, Proxy-Authorization, TE, Trailer, Transfer-Encoding, Upgrade). `Git-Protocol` is forwarded. Good. **Body streaming for receive-pack (push)**: ReverseProxy streams the request body (uses `req.Body` with `GetBody` for retries; for POST with a body, it just streams). Good. **Timeouts**: the http.Server default has no read/write timeouts. A long push could take a while. The run's ctx has a deadline, but the proxy's server isn't tied to ctx... Stop() closes it. Should I set generous timeouts? If a push hangs, the agent's git exec will hang until the run's ctx deadline, at which point the container is removed (exec's race handles that). The proxy's connection dies with the container. I think it's fine without explicit timeouts, but I could set `ReadHeaderTimeout` to something modest. Let me keep it simple: no timeouts (matches "git just works"; the run timeout bounds everything). Hmm, wait — one more important consideration: **concurrent runs**. Each run gets its own Server with its own ephemeral port and its own secret. Multiple runs in parallel: no problem. **What if the container's network is not the default bridge?** zoo doesn't specify a network, so it's always the default bridge. The gateway IP from inspect is correct. **Edge case: Docker Desktop (macOS/Windows)** — `host-gateway` maps to the host VM's IP; the proxy binds to that IP inside the VM (zoo runs inside the VM). Works the same way. **Edge case: `ip` is empty** (inspect didn't return a gateway — e.g. some exotic network mode). Fall back to `127.0.0.1`? In that case, `host.docker.internal` (mapped to the gateway) can't reach 127.0.0.1... actually, if the gateway is empty, something is off; let's fail with a clear error. Hmm, or fall back to binding to `0.0.0.0`? That's a security regression. Let me fail with a clear error. Actually — wait. Let me think again. If `NetworkSettings.Gateway` is empty but the container is on a network... for the default bridge, the gateway is always set (172.17.0.1). For user-defined networks, the gateway is also set. It's only empty for host network mode, in which case host.docker.internal isn't needed (the container is the host). zoo doesn't use host networking. So: error if empty. Hmm, actually, wait. Let me reconsider whether to use `host.docker.internal` at all. Alternative: use the gateway IP directly in the git URL (`http://172.17.0.1:PORT/...`) and skip ExtraHosts. That would work on Linux. On Docker Desktop, the gateway is the VM IP and zoo runs inside the VM — also works. Actually, using the gateway IP directly is simpler and avoids the extra-hosts mechanism! The container can always reach its own network's gateway. But: is it robust? If Docker's default bridge is 172.17.0.0/16, the gateway is 172.17.0.1. The container reaches 172.17.0.1:PORT → the host's bridge interface → the proxy bound to 172.17.0.1. Yes. With `host.docker.internal`, the git URL is more readable and portable, and doesn't depend on the bridge IP being routable (it is, but still). Both work. Let me go with `host.docker.internal` + ExtraHosts — it's the documented, stable mechanism, and the URL is self-explanatory in logs and gitconfig. Hmm, wait, one more consideration: `ExtraHosts` with `host-gateway` — Docker Desktop also defines `host.docker.internal` by default; adding it again with host-gateway is harmless (it just gets added to /etc/hosts). OK. Next, the **sandboxgit.go** rework: ```go // configureSandboxGit writes the container's system gitconfig so git // works inside the sandbox without further setup: // // - safe.directory '*', ... // - user.name / user.email, ... // - url.http://<proxyAddr>/.insteadOf <forgeBase>/, so every git // URL on the forge (the origin remote, submodules, PR head refs) // is transparently rewritten to go through the run's git proxy; // - http.http://<proxyAddr>.extraHeader carrying the run's per-run // client secret, which the proxy checks on every request; // - push.autoSetupRemote, ... // // The Forgejo credential itself never enters the container: the only // secret git holds is the per-run X-Zoo-Run nonce, which is valid only // against this run's proxy port and only for git smart-HTTP requests // (see internal/gitproxy). func configureSandboxGit(ctx context.Context, rt *dockerRuntime, containerID, cloneURL, proxyAddr, secret, name, email string) error { ... proxyBase := "http://" + proxyAddr + "/" forge := forgeBase(cloneURL) // e.g. "https://code.stdio.dk" if _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, "config", "--global", "url."+proxyBase+".insteadOf", forge+"/"); err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("configure url.insteadOf: %w", err) } if _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, "config", "--global", "http.http://"+proxyAddr+".extraHeader", gitproxy.Header+": "+secret); err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("configure git credential: %w", err) } ... } ``` Wait, the key for `http.<url>.extraHeader`: the existing code uses `http.` + `https://code.stdio.dk` + `.extraHeader`. So the key format is `http.<url>.extraHeader` where `<url>` includes the scheme. For the proxy: `http.http://host.docker.internal:PORT.extraHeader`. Hmm, does git's `http.<url>` matching work with a URL that includes a port? Yes — it's a prefix match against the remote URL string. And `url.<base>.insteadOf`: the key is `url.http://host.docker.internal:PORT/.insteadOf` — a URL with a trailing slash as the base. Git handles URLs in config keys without issue (the existing code already puts a full URL in the key). Wait, actually, I need to double-check the semantics of `url.<base>.insteadOf`: "One or more url.<base>.insteadOf options can be defined. Unless `--no-replace-origins` is used, any URL that starts with a value matching url.<base>.insteadOf will be rewritten to use base instead." So `url.http://host.docker.internal:39211/.insteadOf = https://code.stdio.dk/` means: any URL starting with `https://code.stdio.dk/` is rewritten to `http://host.docker.internal:39211/` + the rest. āœ“. **forgeBase helper**: ```go // forgeBase returns the scheme://host[/prefix] part of cloneURL — the // forge's base URL without the owner/repo path segments, e.g. // "https://code.stdio.dk" for "https://code.stdio.dk/abrander/zoo.git", // or "https://example.com/forge" for a forge installed under a path // prefix. The clone URL is always <base>/<owner>/<repo>[.git], so the // base is the URL with the last two path segments stripped. func forgeBase(cloneURL string) string { u, err := url.Parse(cloneURL) if err != nil || u.Host == "" { return cloneURL } segments := strings.Split(strings.Trim(u.Path, "/"), "/") // keep all but the last two segments (owner, repo) if len(segments) >= 2 { segments = segments[:len(segments)-2] } base := u.Scheme + "://" + u.Host if len(segments) > 0 { base += "/" + strings.Join(segments, "/") } return base } ``` Edge cases: - `https://code.stdio.dk/abrander/zoo.git` → segments [abrander, zoo.git] → keep [] → `https://code.stdio.dk` āœ“ - `https://example.com/forge/abrander/zoo.git` → [forge, abrander, zoo.git] → keep [forge] → `https://example.com/forge` āœ“ - `https://h/a/b.git?x=1` → path `/a/b.git` → keep [] → `https://h` āœ“ - `/bare` (local path) → u.Host == "" → return `/bare` as-is. But in that case, insteadOf prefix `/bare/`... hmm, a local path remote won't be rewritten (the prefix `/bare/` doesn't match `/bare`). Fine — in the integration test, the clone from `/bare` stays local. āœ“ - `not a url` → url.Parse succeeds (no error, Host is empty) → return as-is. insteadOf prefix `not a url/` — harmless. Wait, but there's a subtlety: if forgeBase falls back to the full clone URL (no host), the insteadOf prefix becomes `<cloneURL>/` and never matches the clone URL itself (no trailing slash) — so the clone goes direct to the forge without auth. That's the same degradation as the old forgeHost fallback. Acceptable; a real Forgejo clone URL always has a host. **run.go** changes: ```go // after createContainer: gateway, err := r.docker.gatewayIP(ctx, containerID) if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("resolve container gateway: %w", err) } secret, err := gitproxy.NewSecret() if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("generate git proxy secret: %w", err) } proxy, err := gitproxy.New(repoInfo.CloneURL /* or forge base */, gitUser, gitToken, secret, logger) if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("git proxy: %w", err) } proxyAddr, err := proxy.Start(gateway) if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("start git proxy: %w", err) } defer func() { if err := proxy.Stop(); err != nil { logger.Warn("failed to stop git proxy", "error", err) } }() if err := configureSandboxGit(ctx, r.docker, containerID, repoInfo.CloneURL, proxyAddr, secret, gitName, gitEmail); err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("configure git in container: %w", err) } ``` Wait — the proxy's forge base: the proxy needs to forward to the forge base. The proxy's target should be the forge base (scheme://host[/prefix]), and the incoming path (e.g. `/abrander/zoo.git/info/refs`) is appended. If I pass the full clone URL as forgeBase, SingleHostReverseProxy's target path would be `/abrander/zoo.git`, and the join would produce `/abrander/zoo.git/abrander/zoo.git/info/refs` — wrong. So the proxy must take the forge base, not the clone URL. Either compute `forgeBase(cloneURL)` in run.go and pass it to both the proxy and configureSandboxGit, or have gitproxy.New take the clone URL and derive the base itself. Cleaner: compute it once in run.go: ```go forge := sandboxgitForgeBase(repoInfo.CloneURL) // or export from agentrun proxy, err := gitproxy.New(forge, gitUser, gitToken, secret, logger) ``` But forgeBase is in the agentrun package (sandboxgit.go). gitproxy shouldn't import agentrun (agentrun imports gitproxy). Options: - gitproxy.New takes the clone URL and derives the base (duplicating the logic). - agentrun computes the base and passes it to both. Let me have agentrun compute it: `forgeBase := forgeBase(repoInfo.CloneURL)` and pass `forgeBase` to `gitproxy.New`. The helper stays in agentrun (sandboxgit.go), unexported. gitproxy just takes a base URL string. **docker.go** changes: ```go // ExtraHosts in createContainer: ExtraHosts: []string{"host.docker.internal:host-gateway"}, ``` And: ```go // gatewayIP returns the host-side gateway IP of the container's // network — the address the container reaches the host at (as // host.docker.internal, via the host-gateway extra host). func (d *dockerRuntime) gatewayIP(ctx context.Context, containerID string) (string, error) { info, err := d.cli.ContainerInspect(ctx, containerID) if err != nil { return "", fmt.Errorf("inspect container: %w", err) } for _, net := range info.NetworkSettings.Networks { if net.GatewayIP != "" { return net.GatewayIP, nil } } return "", fmt.Errorf("container %s has no network gateway", containerID) } ``` The Docker SDK's `types.NetworkSettings` has `Networks map[string]types.NetworkSettings` (in newer versions, `types.NetworkSettings` per network with a `GatewayIP` field). Let me check the version of the docker SDK in go.mod. **gitproxy tests** — the interesting part. Let me design a minimal smart-HTTP forge for e2e: ```go // testForge is a minimal git smart-HTTP server backed by a real bare // repo: it wraps `git upload-pack` the way git http-backend does, which // is all a clone/fetch needs. type testForge struct { t *testing.T repoDir string mu sync.Mutex lastAuth string } func (f *testForge) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { f.mu.Lock() f.lastAuth = r.Header.Get("Authorization") f.mu.Unlock() rel := strings.TrimPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/acme/widgets.git") switch { case r.Method == http.MethodGet && rel == "/info/refs" && r.URL.Query().Get("service") == "git-upload-pack": w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/x-git-upload-pack-advertisement") fmt.Fprint(w, "001e# service=git-upload-pack\n0000") f.uploadPack(w, r, "--advertise-refs") case r.Method == http.MethodPost && rel == "/git-upload-pack": w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/x-git-upload-pack-result") f.uploadPack(w, r) default: http.NotFound(w, r) } } func (f *testForge) uploadPack(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, args ...string) { args = append([]string{"upload-pack", f.repoDir}, args...) cmd := exec.Command("git", args...) cmd.Env = append(os.Environ(), "GIT_HTTP_EXPORT_ALL=1") if p := r.Header.Get("Git-Protocol"); p != "" { cmd.Env = append(cmd.Env, "GIT_PROTOCOL="+p) } cmd.Stdin = r.Body cmd.Stdout = w cmd.Stderr = w if err := cmd.Run(); err != nil { f.t.Errorf("git upload-pack: %v", err) } } ``` Hmm, wait — for protocol v2, the info/refs response must be a v2 advertisement. `git upload-pack --advertise-refs` produces a v1 advertisement. If the client sends `Git-Protocol: version=2` and gets a v1 advertisement... actually, how does the server decide? In `git http-backend`, the info-refs request runs `git upload-pack --http-backend-info-refs "$path"`, which checks the `GIT_PROTOCOL` env var: if `version=2`, it emits the v2 advertisement (which includes the `# service=...` line itself? no...). Let me recall the exact wire format: Smart HTTP v0 (protocol v0): ``` GET /info/refs?service=git-upload-pack → 200, Content-Type: application/x-git-upload-pack-advertisement 001e# service=git-upload-pack 0000<pkt-line ref advertisement> ``` Smart HTTP v2: ``` GET /info/refs?service=git-upload-pack (with Git-Protocol: version=2) → 200, Content-Type: application/x-git-upload-pack-advertisement 001e# service=git-upload-pack 0000<pkt-line: "version 2\n" then v2 lsrefs> ``` The `# service` line + flush is the same in both; what differs is the body after. `git upload-pack --http-backend-info-refs <repo>` with GIT_PROTOCOL=version=2 set emits the v2 body (starting with `000fversion 2\n0000`...). And plain `--advertise-refs` emits the v1 ref list. So in my test forge, I should use `--http-backend-info-refs` (not `--advertise-refs`) for the info/refs case, and pass the `GIT_PROTOCOL` env var from the request header. That's exactly what http-backend does. For the POST case: `git upload-pack <repo>` with GIT_PROTOCOL set (http-backend passes GIT_PROTOCOL through for the pack request too). The client's POST body contains `want <sha>\n` lines, and for v2, a `0000`-separated pkt-line request (v2: `want <sha> 0000`... actually the v2 request is pkt-lines: `want <sha>\n` with capabilities, then flush, then "done"? For upload-pack v2, the client sends a pkt-line `want` list + flush + `done`? Hmm, the v2 upload-pack request: `00XXwant <oid> [capabilities]\n...0000` and then the server responds. `git upload-pack` handles both v0 (newline-separated) and v2 (pkt-line) requests based on GIT_PROTOCOL. OK, this is all standard — `git http-backend` does exactly this, and my wrapper mimics it. The test will tell me if I got it wrong. But wait — do I want the e2e test to depend on the host having `git`? The unit test runs in the project container (which has git — I've been using it). And the docker-tagged integration test runs `git` on the host anyway. For the gitproxy package tests (no build tag), requiring `git` on the test host is a reasonable assumption for this repo (the README says Go + Docker; git is a given). Let me guard: if `git` isn't found, skip the e2e test. Now, the e2e test flow: 1. Create a temp bare repo with one commit on `main` (host git). 2. Start testForge (httptest.Server) serving it at `/acme/widgets.git`. 3. Start gitproxy.New(testForge.URL, "greg", "s3cr3t-token", secret, logger) bound to 127.0.0.1 (Start("127.0.0.1")). 4. Configure a temporary git home (GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL / GIT_CONFIG_SYSTEM or HOME) with: - `url.http://127.0.0.1:PORT/.insteadOf <forgeBase>/` — where forgeBase = testForge.URL (httptest gives `http://127.0.0.1:PORT2`). Hmm wait — insteadOf prefix: the clone URL is `http://127.0.0.1:PORT2/acme/widgets.git`. forgeBase = `http://127.0.0.1:PORT2`. Prefix `http://127.0.0.1:PORT2/` → rewrite to `http://127.0.0.1:PORT/` + `acme/widgets.git`. āœ“ - `http.http://127.0.0.1:PORT.extraHeader = X-Zoo-Run: <secret>` 5. `git clone http://127.0.0.1:PORT2/acme/widgets.git /tmp/clone` with GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL pointing at the temp config. 6. Assert: the clone succeeded; the forge saw `Authorization: Basic base64("greg:s3cr3t-token")` on the git requests. That's a real end-to-end: real git client → URL rewrite → proxy (secret check) → auth injection → real git smart-HTTP → clone. I can also test push: `git push` to the bare repo through the proxy (receive-pack). That tests the POST path with a body. Let me include it: after cloning, commit and push to `main`... the bare repo allows pushes (no hooks). The push goes via `git-receive-pack`. My testForge needs a receive-pack handler: `git receive-pack <repo>` reading the body. Let me add it: ```go case r.Method == http.MethodGet && rel == "/info/refs" && r.URL.Query().Get("service") == "git-receive-pack": w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/x-git-receive-pack-advertisement") fmt.Fprint(w, "001f# service=git-receive-pack\n0000") f.receivePack(w, r, "--http-backend-info-refs") case r.Method == http.MethodPost && rel == "/git-receive-pack": w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/x-git-receive-pack-result") f.receivePack(w, r) ``` `001f# service=git-receive-pack\n0000`: "# service=git-receive-pack\n" = 26 chars + \n = 27; 27+4 = 31 = 0x1f. āœ“ `git receive-pack --http-backend-info-refs <repo>` — hmm, does receive-pack have that flag? Yes: `git receive-pack --http-backend-info-refs <path>` exists (used by http-backend for v2). Let me double-check... `git receive-pack` options include `--http-backend-info-refs` (since around git 2.18, for protocol v2). The golang:latest image has a recent git. The project container has go1.26 and probably git 2.4x. OK. Actually, to reduce risk, for the e2e test I could force protocol v0 by setting `GIT_PROTOCOL` to empty... no wait, the client decides; the client (recent git) defaults to v2 and sends the Git-Protocol header. My forge passes it through, so v2 works if the flags are right. If `--http-backend-info-refs` isn't supported by the git version, the test will fail loudly and I'll adjust. Let me check the git version in the container first. Also, for the push test, the client needs a commit identity in the temp git config (user.name/email) — set in the temp global config. And the proxy's allowlist test (no real git): - `GET /api/v1/repos` with the correct secret → 404. - `GET /acme/widgets.git/info/refs` without a service → 404. - `GET /acme/widgets.git/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack` with the wrong secret → 401. - `POST /acme/widgets.git/git-upload-pack` with the correct secret → forwarded (200 from the forge). - `GET /acme/widgets.git/info/refs?service=bogus` → 404. - Method check: `POST /info/refs` → 404. And a "the token never reaches the client" assertion: the proxy's response must not contain the token (it doesn't — the auth is only injected upstream). I can assert the forge received the token and the client didn't see it (trivially true; skip). **Integration test updates** (docker tag): - `configureSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, cloneURL, proxyAddr, secret, name, email)`. - The test needs a proxyAddr — use a fake one, e.g. `127.0.0.1:9` (nothing listening; the test only checks the gitconfig round-trip, no actual HTTP). - Verify: `url.http://127.0.0.1:9/.insteadOf` == `https://forgejo.example/acme/` (the forgeBase of the clone URL + "/"), and `http.http://127.0.0.1:9.extraHeader` == `X-Zoo-Run: <secret>`. - Verify: the token string appears nowhere in the container: `grep -r super-secret-token /project /etc/gitconfig /root/.gitconfig 2>/dev/null || true` → must be empty. Also check the env vars of the exec process? The token is never in the env vars. I can grep the system gitconfig directly. - The clone from `/bare` still works (local path, no rewrite). Wait, one thing: in the integration test, `cloneAndBranch` clones from `/bare` — with insteadOf configured for `https://forgejo.example/acme/`, the local path is unaffected. āœ“ **system.md** update: add to the Git section: "The sandbox has no Forgejo API credentials — git remote operations are authenticated for you, but direct API calls (curl, forgejo-cli, ...) won't work; use the provided Forgejo tools for issue/PR actions." Hmm, the docker image even installs `forgejo-cli`! An agent could try `forgejo` CLI with the token — but the token isn't in the sandbox anymore, so it can't. Good to document. **README** update: the "Agent Definition" section says "its sandbox's git authenticates with it too". Update to describe the proxy model. Now — one more design question: **should the proxy also be used for the `forgejoAs` API client?** No — that's already host-side. No change. **What about the `web` dashboard or other components?** No change. **Config**: no new config items needed. The proxy is always on. (A `git_proxy = false` escape hatch? Not needed; keep it surgical.) Let me also double-check the docker SDK version for the `NetworkSettings.Networks` field name.
Let me check the Docker SDK version and the git version available in this container (for the test design):
Tool šŸ”§ bash {"command": "cd /project && grep -E \"docker|sdk\" go.mod && git --version && go doc github.com/docker/docker/api/types/network 2>/dev/null | head -30"}
{"command": "cd /project && grep -E \"docker|sdk\" go.mod && git --version && go doc github.com/docker/docker/api/types/network 2>/dev/null | head -30"}
	codeberg.org/mvdkleijn/forgejo-sdk/forgejo/v2 v2.2.0
	github.com/docker/docker v28.5.2+incompatible
	github.com/docker/go-connections v0.8.1 // indirect
	github.com/docker/go-units v0.5.0 // indirect
	github.com/moby/docker-image-spec v1.3.1 // indirect
	go.opentelemetry.io/auto/sdk v1.2.1 // indirect
git version 2.55.0
Thinking
Docker SDK v28.5.2. Let me check the type of NetworkSettings in this version.
Tool šŸ”§ bash {"command": "cd /project && go doc github.com/docker/docker/api/types/container.InspectResponse 2>/dev/null | head -20; go doc github.com/docker/docker/api/types/network.Settings 2>/dev/null | head -30; go doc github.com/docker/docker/api/types/network.NetworkSettings 2>/dev/null | head -40"}
{"command": "cd /project && go doc github.com/docker/docker/api/types/container.InspectResponse 2>/dev/null | head -20; go doc github.com/docker/docker/api/types/network.Settings 2>/dev/null | head -30; go doc github.com/docker/docker/api/types/network.NetworkSettings 2>/dev/null | head -40"}

        
Thinking
The `go doc` output was empty. Let me try a different approach to find the type.
Tool šŸ”§ bash {"command": "cd /project && grep -rn \"NetworkSettings\" $(go env GOMODCACHE)/github.com/docker/docker@v28.5.2+incompatible/api/types/types.go 2>/dev/null | head; ls $(go env GOMODCACHE)/github.com/docker/ 2>/dev/null"}
{"command": "cd /project && grep -rn \"NetworkSettings\" $(go env GOMODCACHE)/github.com/docker/docker@v28.5.2+incompatible/api/types/types.go 2>/dev/null | head; ls $(go env GOMODCACHE)/github.com/docker/ 2>/dev/null"}
ERROR CALLING TOOL: command exited with status 2
Thinking
Let's find the module cache path.
Tool šŸ”§ bash {"command": "cd /project && go env GOMODCACHE && find $(go env GOMODCACHE)/github.com/docker -maxdepth 2 -name \"*.go\" -path \"*api/types*\" 2>/dev/null | head -5"}
{"command": "cd /project && go env GOMODCACHE && find $(go env GOMODCACHE)/github.com/docker -maxdepth 2 -name \"*.go\" -path \"*api/types*\" 2>/dev/null | head -5"}
/home/user/go/pkg/mod
Thinking
The module isn't in the cache yet (the project hasn't been built here). Let me first run `go mod download`, or just run `go build ./...` to fetch the dependencies.
Tool šŸ”§ bash {"command": "cd /project && go build ./... 2>&1 | head -20 && echo BUILD_OK", "timeout": 300}
{"command": "cd /project && go build ./... 2>&1 | head -20 && echo BUILD_OK", "timeout": 300}
go: downloading github.com/docker/docker v28.5.2+incompatible
go: downloading github.com/hashicorp/hcl/v2 v2.24.0
go: downloading codeberg.org/mvdkleijn/forgejo-sdk/forgejo/v2 v2.2.0
go: downloading github.com/google/uuid v1.6.0
go: downloading modernc.org/sqlite v1.56.0
go: downloading github.com/docker/go-connections v0.8.1
go: downloading github.com/docker/go-units v0.5.0
go: downloading github.com/moby/docker-image-spec v1.3.1
go: downloading github.com/opencontainers/image-spec v1.1.1
go: downloading github.com/containerd/errdefs v1.0.0
go: downloading github.com/containerd/errdefs/pkg v0.3.0
go: downloading github.com/distribution/reference v0.6.0
go: downloading github.com/opencontainers/go-digest v1.0.0
go: downloading github.com/pkg/errors v0.9.1
go: downloading go.opentelemetry.io/contrib/instrumentation/net/http/otelhttp v0.70.0
go: downloading go.opentelemetry.io/otel/trace v1.45.0
go: downloading go.opentelemetry.io/otel v1.45.0
go: downloading github.com/42wim/httpsig v1.2.3
go: downloading github.com/go-fed/httpsig v1.1.0
go: downloading github.com/hashicorp/go-version v1.7.0
BUILD_OK
Thinking
The build succeeded. Next, let's check the Docker SDK types related to network settings.
Tool šŸ”§ bash {"command": "cd /project && grep -n \"Networks \" /home/user/go/pkg/mod/github.com/docker/docker@v28.5.2+incompatible/api/types/types.go | head -5 && grep -n \"GatewayIP\" /home/user/go/pkg/mod/github.com/docker/docker@v28.5.2+incompatible/api/types/types.go | head -5"}
{"command": "cd /project && grep -n \"Networks \" /home/user/go/pkg/mod/github.com/docker/docker@v28.5.2+incompatible/api/types/types.go | head -5 && grep -n \"GatewayIP\" /home/user/go/pkg/mod/github.com/docker/docker@v28.5.2+incompatible/api/types/types.go | head -5"}

        
Thinking
Let's find where NetworkSettings is defined in the Docker SDK.
Tool šŸ”§ bash {"command": "cd /project && grep -rn \"Networks map\" /home/user/go/pkg/mod/github.com/docker/docker@v28.5.2+incompatible/api/types/ | head -5; grep -rn \"GatewayIP\" /home/user/go/pkg/mod/github.com/docker/docker@v28.5.2+incompatible/api/types/network/*.go 2>/dev/null | head -5"}
{"command": "cd /project && grep -rn \"Networks map\" /home/user/go/pkg/mod/github.com/docker/docker@v28.5.2+incompatible/api/types/ | head -5; grep -rn \"GatewayIP\" /home/user/go/pkg/mod/github.com/docker/docker@v28.5.2+incompatible/api/types/network/*.go 2>/dev/null | head -5"}
/home/user/go/pkg/mod/github.com/docker/docker@v28.5.2+incompatible/api/types/container/network_settings.go:12:	Networks map[string]*network.EndpointSettings
/home/user/go/pkg/mod/github.com/docker/docker@v28.5.2+incompatible/api/types/container/network_settings.go:84:	Networks map[string]*network.EndpointSettings
/home/user/go/pkg/mod/github.com/docker/docker@v28.5.2+incompatible/api/types/network/ipam_test.go:24:					AuxAddress: map[string]string{"DefaultGatewayIPv4": "2001:db8::1"},
/home/user/go/pkg/mod/github.com/docker/docker@v28.5.2+incompatible/api/types/network/ipam_test.go:30:				"invalid auxiliary address DefaultGatewayIPv4: parent subnet is an IPv4 block",
/home/user/go/pkg/mod/github.com/docker/docker@v28.5.2+incompatible/api/types/network/ipam_test.go:53:					AuxAddress: map[string]string{"DefaultGatewayIPv4": "dummy"},
/home/user/go/pkg/mod/github.com/docker/docker@v28.5.2+incompatible/api/types/network/ipam_test.go:59:				"invalid auxiliary address DefaultGatewayIPv4: invalid address",
/home/user/go/pkg/mod/github.com/docker/docker@v28.5.2+incompatible/api/types/network/ipam_test.go:80:					AuxAddress: map[string]string{"DefaultGatewayIPv4": "192.168.0.1"},
Thinking
Let's check the EndpointSettings type and the NetworkSettings struct inside container/network_settings.go.
Tool šŸ”§ bash {"command": "cd /project && sed -n '1,110p' /home/user/go/pkg/mod/github.com/docker/docker@v28.5.2+incompatible/api/types/container/network_settings.go && grep -n \"GatewayIP\" /home/user/go/pkg/mod/github.com/docker/docker@v28.5.2+incompatible/api/types/network/endpoint_settings.go"}
{"command": "cd /project && sed -n '1,110p' /home/user/go/pkg/mod/github.com/docker/docker@v28.5.2+incompatible/api/types/container/network_settings.go && grep -n \"GatewayIP\" /home/user/go/pkg/mod/github.com/docker/docker@v28.5.2+incompatible/api/types/network/endpoint_settings.go"}
ERROR CALLING TOOL: command exited with status 2: package container

import (
	"github.com/docker/docker/api/types/network"
	"github.com/docker/go-connections/nat"
)

// NetworkSettings exposes the network settings in the api
type NetworkSettings struct {
	NetworkSettingsBase
	DefaultNetworkSettings
	Networks map[string]*network.EndpointSettings
}

// NetworkSettingsBase holds networking state for a container when inspecting it.
//
// Deprecated: Most fields in NetworkSettingsBase are deprecated. Fields which aren't deprecated will move to
// NetworkSettings in v29.0, and this struct will be removed.
type NetworkSettingsBase struct {
	Bridge     string      // Deprecated: This field is only set when the daemon is started with the --bridge flag specified.
	SandboxID  string      // SandboxID uniquely represents a container's network stack
	SandboxKey string      // SandboxKey identifies the sandbox
	Ports      nat.PortMap // Ports is a collection of PortBinding indexed by Port

	// HairpinMode specifies if hairpin NAT should be enabled on the virtual interface
	//
	// Deprecated: This field is never set and will be removed in a future release.
	HairpinMode bool
	// LinkLocalIPv6Address is an IPv6 unicast address using the link-local prefix
	//
	// Deprecated: This field is never set and will be removed in a future release.
	LinkLocalIPv6Address string
	// LinkLocalIPv6PrefixLen is the prefix length of an IPv6 unicast address
	//
	// Deprecated: This field is never set and will be removed in a future release.
	LinkLocalIPv6PrefixLen int
	SecondaryIPAddresses   []network.Address // Deprecated: This field is never set and will be removed in a future release.
	SecondaryIPv6Addresses []network.Address // Deprecated: This field is never set and will be removed in a future release.
}

// DefaultNetworkSettings holds the networking state for the default bridge, if the container is connected to that
// network.
//
// Deprecated: this struct is deprecated since Docker v1.11 and will be removed in v29. You should look for the default
// network in NetworkSettings.Networks instead.
type DefaultNetworkSettings struct {
	// EndpointID uniquely represents a service endpoint in a Sandbox
	//
	// Deprecated: This field will be removed in v29. You should look for the default network in NetworkSettings.Networks instead.
	EndpointID string
	// Gateway holds the gateway address for the network
	//
	// Deprecated: This field will be removed in v29. You should look for the default network in NetworkSettings.Networks instead.
	Gateway string
	// GlobalIPv6Address holds network's global IPv6 address
	//
	// Deprecated: This field will be removed in v29. You should look for the default network in NetworkSettings.Networks instead.
	GlobalIPv6Address string
	// GlobalIPv6PrefixLen represents mask length of network's global IPv6 address
	//
	// Deprecated: This field will be removed in v29. You should look for the default network in NetworkSettings.Networks instead.
	GlobalIPv6PrefixLen int
	// IPAddress holds the IPv4 address for the network
	//
	// Deprecated: This field will be removed in v29. You should look for the default network in NetworkSettings.Networks instead.
	IPAddress string
	// IPPrefixLen represents mask length of network's IPv4 address
	//
	// Deprecated: This field will be removed in v29. You should look for the default network in NetworkSettings.Networks instead.
	IPPrefixLen int
	// IPv6Gateway holds gateway address specific for IPv6
	//
	// Deprecated: This field will be removed in v29. You should look for the default network in NetworkSettings.Networks instead.
	IPv6Gateway string
	// MacAddress holds the MAC address for the network
	//
	// Deprecated: This field will be removed in v29. You should look for the default network in NetworkSettings.Networks instead.
	MacAddress string
}

// NetworkSettingsSummary provides a summary of container's networks
// in /containers/json
type NetworkSettingsSummary struct {
	Networks map[string]*network.EndpointSettings
}
grep: /home/user/go/pkg/mod/github.com/docker/docker@v28.5.2+incompatible/api/types/network/endpoint_settings.go: No such file or directory
Thinking
Let's find the EndpointSettings type:
Tool šŸ”§ bash {"command": "cd /project && grep -rn \"GatewayIP\" /home/user/go/pkg/mod/github.com/docker/docker@v28.5.2+incompatible/api/types/network/*.go | grep -v _test | head -5 && grep -rn \"type EndpointSettings\" /home/user/go/pkg/mod/github.com/docker/docker@v28.5.2+incompatible/api/types/network/*.go"}
{"command": "cd /project && grep -rn \"GatewayIP\" /home/user/go/pkg/mod/github.com/docker/docker@v28.5.2+incompatible/api/types/network/*.go | grep -v _test | head -5 && grep -rn \"type EndpointSettings\" /home/user/go/pkg/mod/github.com/docker/docker@v28.5.2+incompatible/api/types/network/*.go"}
/home/user/go/pkg/mod/github.com/docker/docker@v28.5.2+incompatible/api/types/network/endpoint.go:10:type EndpointSettings struct {
Thinking
Let's take a look at the EndpointSettings struct:
Tool šŸ”§ bash {"command": "cd /project && sed -n '1,60p' /home/user/go/pkg/mod/github.com/docker/docker@v28.5.2+incompatible/api/types/network/endpoint.go"}
{"command": "cd /project && sed -n '1,60p' /home/user/go/pkg/mod/github.com/docker/docker@v28.5.2+incompatible/api/types/network/endpoint.go"}
package network

import (
	"errors"
	"fmt"
	"net"
)

// EndpointSettings stores the network endpoint details
type EndpointSettings struct {
	// Configurations
	IPAMConfig *EndpointIPAMConfig
	Links      []string
	Aliases    []string // Aliases holds the list of extra, user-specified DNS names for this endpoint.
	// MacAddress may be used to specify a MAC address when the container is created.
	// Once the container is running, it becomes operational data (it may contain a
	// generated address).
	MacAddress string
	DriverOpts map[string]string

	// GwPriority determines which endpoint will provide the default gateway
	// for the container. The endpoint with the highest priority will be used.
	// If multiple endpoints have the same priority, they are lexicographically
	// sorted based on their network name, and the one that sorts first is picked.
	GwPriority int
	// Operational data
	NetworkID           string
	EndpointID          string
	Gateway             string
	IPAddress           string
	IPPrefixLen         int
	IPv6Gateway         string
	GlobalIPv6Address   string
	GlobalIPv6PrefixLen int
	// DNSNames holds all the (non fully qualified) DNS names associated to this endpoint. First entry is used to
	// generate PTR records.
	DNSNames []string
}

// Copy makes a deep copy of `EndpointSettings`
func (es *EndpointSettings) Copy() *EndpointSettings {
	epCopy := *es
	if es.IPAMConfig != nil {
		epCopy.IPAMConfig = es.IPAMConfig.Copy()
	}

	if es.Links != nil {
		links := make([]string, 0, len(es.Links))
		epCopy.Links = append(links, es.Links...)
	}

	if es.Aliases != nil {
		aliases := make([]string, 0, len(es.Aliases))
		epCopy.Aliases = append(aliases, es.Aliases...)
	}

	if len(es.DNSNames) > 0 {
		epCopy.DNSNames = make([]string, len(es.DNSNames))
		copy(epCopy.DNSNames, es.DNSNames)
	}
Thinking
`network.EndpointSettings` has a `Gateway string` field. So in `gatewayIP` we iterate over `info.NetworkSettings.Networks` (map[string]*network.EndpointSettings) and grab the first non-empty `Gateway`. OK, let's write the code. Starting with the `internal/gitproxy` package. ### internal/gitproxy/gitproxy.go ```go // Package gitproxy runs a per-run git smart-HTTP proxy on the host, // letting an agent's sandbox do authenticated git operations (clone, // fetch, pull, push) against the forge without holding the forge // credential itself. // // The sandbox's git is pointed at the proxy with a url.insteadOf // rewrite plus a per-run client secret (see agentrun.configureSandboxGit). // The proxy checks the secret on every request, accepts only git // smart-HTTP endpoints, and forwards the request to the real forge // with the real Authorization header — which only ever exists on the // host side. When the run ends the proxy stops and the secret is // worthless. package gitproxy import ( "crypto/rand" "crypto/subtle" "encoding/base64" "fmt" "log/slog" "net" "net/http" "net/http/httputil" "net/url" "strings" ) // Header is the name of the header carrying the per-run client secret. // The sandbox's git is configured to send it on every request to the // proxy; the proxy rejects requests that don't carry the right value. const Header = "X-Zoo-Run" const ( gitUploadPackService = "git-upload-pack" gitReceivePackService = "git-receive-pack" ) // Server is a per-run git smart-HTTP proxy: it accepts git // clone/fetch/push traffic from the sandbox (authenticated with the // per-run secret) and forwards it to the forge, authenticated with the // real forge credential. type Server struct { forgeBase *url.URL user string token string secret string logger *slog.Logger srv *http.Server rp *httputil.ReverseProxy } // New returns a Server that proxies git smart-HTTP requests for // forgeBase (the forge's base URL, e.g. "https://code.stdio.dk" — no // owner/repo path) to forgeBase, authenticating them as user with // token. Clients must present secret in the Header header. func New(forgeBase, user, token, secret string, logger *slog.Logger) (*Server, error) { u, err := url.Parse(forgeBase) if err != nil || u.Scheme == "" || u.Host == "" { return nil, fmt.Errorf("git proxy: invalid forge base %q", forgeBase) } if secret == "" { return nil, fmt.Errorf("git proxy: empty client secret") } if logger == nil { logger = slog.Default() } return &Server{ forgeBase: u, user: user, token: token, secret: secret, logger: logger, }, nil } // NewSecret returns a fresh random per-run client secret. func NewSecret() (string, error) { b := make([]byte, 32) if _, err := rand.Read(b); err != nil { return "", fmt.Errorf("generate secret: %w", err) } return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(b), nil } // Start listens on an ephemeral port on ip and serves until Stop is // called. It returns the local address (ip:port) the sandbox's git // should point at. func (s *Server) Start(ip string) (string, error) { lis, err := net.Listen("tcp", net.JoinHostPort(ip, "0")) if err != nil { return "", fmt.Errorf("git proxy listen on %s: %w", ip, err) } s.rp = httputil.NewSingleHostReverseProxy(s.forgeBase) s.rp.Director = func(req *http.Request) { // SingleHostReverseProxy's default director rewrites the URL // onto forgeBase; keep that, and replace any client-supplied // Authorization with the run's real forge credential. ... } ... } ``` Hmm, wait. `httputil.NewSingleHostReverseProxy(target)` sets `rp.Director` to a function that does the URL rewrite. If I overwrite `rp.Director` wholesale, I have to redo the URL join myself. Better approach: wrap the default director: ```go defaultDirector := func(req *http.Request) { req.URL.Scheme = s.forgeBase.Scheme req.URL.Host = s.forgeBase.Host req.URL.Path = singleJoiningSlash(s.forgeBase.Path, req.URL.Path) req.URL.RawPath = singleJoiningSlash(s.forgeBase.RawPath, req.URL.RawPath) req.Host = s.forgeBase.Host } ``` Actually, `NewSingleHostReverseProxy` does exactly this internally. I can capture it: ```go rp := httputil.NewSingleHostReverseProxy(s.forgeBase) dir := rp.Director rp.Director = func(req *http.Request) { dir(req) req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Basic "+base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(s.user+":"+s.token))) } ``` This is clean: default behavior + auth injection. Also, should I strip incoming `Authorization`? `Header.Set` overwrites whatever the client sent. Good. ReverseProxy's ErrorHandler: default returns 502 with a message. Fine. One more thing: ReverseProxy sets `req.Header["X-Forwarded-For"]` and `X-Forwarded-Host`/`X-Forwarded-Proto`. Forgejo doesn't care. OK. Also `rp.ErrorLog`? Set `rp.ErrorLog = slog.New(...)`? httputil's ErrorLog is a `*log.Logger`. I can create one from slog via io.Discard or a small adapter. Trivial; skip or use log.New(io.Discard...). Actually, proxy errors (upstream down) are worth logging. Let me wire a small adapter: ```go rp.ErrorLog = log.New(slogWriter{s.logger}, "git proxy: ", 0) ``` where slogWriter writes to the logger. Hmm, that's extra code. Simpler: `log.New(io.Discard, "", 0)`? No — I want to see upstream failures in zoo's log. Let me write a small writer adapter (5 lines). Actually, the handler itself can log 401/404 rejections (useful for debugging: agent tries to hit the API through the proxy). And upstream errors via ErrorLog. OK. Handler: ```go func (s *Server) handler() http.Handler { return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { if !s.authorized(r) { s.logger.Warn("git proxy: rejected request without valid run secret", "path", r.URL.Path) http.Error(w, "unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized) return } if !isGitSmartHTTP(r) { // Anything that isn't a git smart-HTTP request (API calls, // web UI, ...) gets a 404: the proxy is a git-only tunnel, // not a general-purpose forge proxy. s.logger.Warn("git proxy: rejected non-git request", "method", r.Method, "path", r.URL.Path) http.NotFound(w, r) return } s.rp.ServeHTTP(w, r) }) } func (s *Server) authorized(r *http.Request) bool { got := r.Header.Get(Header) return subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(got), []byte(s.secret)) == 1 } ``` Note: ConstantTimeCompare returns 0 for different lengths — safe. isGitSmartHTTP: ```go // isGitSmartHTTP reports whether r is one of the four git smart-HTTP // requests git makes over HTTP(S): the ref advertisements (GET // /info/refs?service=git-upload-pack|git-receive-pack) and the pack // exchanges (POST /git-upload-pack, /git-receive-pack). func isGitSmartHTTP(r *http.Request) bool { switch r.Method { case http.MethodGet: return strings.HasSuffix(r.URL.Path, "/info/refs") && (r.URL.Query().Get("service") == gitUploadPackService || r.URL.Query().Get("service") == gitReceivePackService) case http.MethodPost: return strings.HasSuffix(r.URL.Path, "/git-upload-pack") || strings.HasSuffix(r.URL.Path, "/git-receive-pack") default: return false } } ``` Stop: ```go // Stop shuts the proxy down. It's safe to call once per Start. func (s *Server) Stop() error { if s.srv == nil { return nil } return s.srv.Close() } ``` `http.Server.Close` closes the listener and active connections. For long-running pushes, Close will sever them — that's fine at run end (the container is being removed anyway). Hmm, one consideration: `srv.Close()` also closes in-flight requests. At run end that's the desired behavior. ### internal/gitproxy/gitproxy_test.go Test plan: 1. `TestProxyRejectsBadSecret` — a fake forge (simple handler that records and returns 200), start proxy on 127.0.0.1, request with wrong/missing secret → 401; forge must not have been hit. 2. `TestProxyRejectsNonGitRequests` — correct secret, `GET /api/v1/user` → 404; `GET /repo.git/info/refs` (no service) → 404; `GET /repo.git/info/refs?service=bogus` → 404; `POST /repo.git/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack` → 404; `GET /repo.git/git-upload-pack` → 404 (wrong method); forge not hit. 3. `TestProxyForwardsGitRequests` — correct secret, `GET /acme/widgets.git/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack` → 200, forge receives request with path `/acme/widgets.git/info/refs`, query `service=git-upload-pack`, and `Authorization: Basic base64(user:token)`; response body passes through. Also POST `/acme/widgets.git/git-receive-pack` with a body → forge receives body. 4. `TestProxyEndToEndCloneAndPush` — real git e2e (skip if no git): bare repo, testForge smart-HTTP server, proxy, temp git config with insteadOf + extraHeader, `git clone` + commit + `git push`. Assert the forge saw the real auth header on every request. For the e2e, I need to be careful about how git resolves the temp config: use env vars `GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL=/tmp/xyz/gitconfig` and `GIT_CONFIG_SYSTEM=/dev/null`? GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL replaces the global config; system config is also read — in the container /etc/gitconfig probably doesn't exist, but to be safe set `GIT_CONFIG_SYSTEM=/dev/null` too? Hmm, /dev/null as a git config file — git reads it as an empty file, that's fine. Actually, setting GIT_CONFIG_SYSTEM to a nonexistent path errors? Let me just create an empty file. Or use `HOME=/tmp/xyz` — git's global config is `$HOME/.gitconfig`. Simplest: set HOME to a temp dir and write `.gitconfig` there. Also `GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT=0` to fail fast if auth is missing. Wait, one gotcha: insteadOf + extraHeader in `$HOME/.gitconfig` — that's the "global" config, and the existing production code uses `--global` (same thing). Good, this mirrors production exactly. Also, the clone URL in the e2e: `http://127.0.0.1:<forgeport>/acme/widgets.git`. forgeBase = `http://127.0.0.1:<forgeport>`. insteadOf prefix: `http://127.0.0.1:<forgeport>/`. url base: `http://127.0.0.1:<proxyport>/`. But wait — the proxy's `forgeBase` parameter: I pass `forge.URL` from httptest, which is `http://127.0.0.1:PORT`. SingleHostReverseProxy target path is empty → join is fine. For push: the clone gets an origin; `git push origin main`... wait, the clone's default branch — I'll init the seed repo with `-b main`. After clone, HEAD → main. Commit a change and `git push` (with push.autoSetupRemote? In the e2e I'll do `git push origin main` explicitly — simpler, no autoSetupRemote needed). Push needs a receive-pack handler in testForge. And the bare repo must accept the push: a bare repo cloned from the seed — `git clone --bare seed bare` — pushing to `main` of the bare repo works (non-fast-forward protection: the push is a fast-forward since we built on top of it). Also, git push over HTTP: client does `GET /info/refs?service=git-receive-pack` (with Git-Protocol: version=2) then `POST /git-receive-pack`. My testForge handles both. `git receive-pack --http-backend-info-refs` — let me verify this flag exists in git 2.55. It does (added in 2.18? Let me quickly verify with `git receive-pack --help` in the container). Also, for v2 receive-pack info/refs, the response is `# service=git-receive-pack\n0000` + v2 advertisement. `git receive-pack --http-backend-info-refs` with GIT_PROTOCOL=version=2 handles that. Let me verify the flags exist before writing the tests. ### sandboxgit.go changes ```go package agentrun import ( "context" "fmt" "net/url" "strings" "github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/gitproxy" ) // This file makes git "just work" inside the agent's container: the // initial clone happens in the sandbox, and the sandbox's git is // pointed at the run's git proxy (internal/gitproxy) so every // subsequent remote operation (pull, fetch, push, ...) authenticates // without any per-invocation plumbing. Zoo itself never runs git // outside the sandbox, and the forge credential never enters the // container: the proxy holds it on the host side. ``` - `shellQuote`, `shellGitCmd`, `runSandboxGit` — unchanged. - Remove `gitAuthHeader`. - Replace `forgeHost` with `forgeBase`. - New `configureSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, cloneURL, proxyAddr, secret, name, email)`. Wait — one more thing to double-check: the key for `http.<url>.extraHeader`. The old code: `"http." + forgeHost(cloneURL) + ".extraHeader"` where forgeHost = `https://code.stdio.dk`. So key = `http.https://code.stdio.dk.extraHeader`. New: `"http.http://" + proxyAddr + ".extraHeader"` where proxyAddr = `host.docker.internal:39211`. Key = `http.http://host.docker.internal:39211.extraHeader`. And the insteadOf key: `"url.http://" + proxyAddr + "/.insteadOf"` = `url.http://host.docker.internal:39211/.insteadOf`, value = forgeBase + "/". Hmm — one more consideration about `insteadOf` and the clone URL itself. `cloneAndBranch` runs `git clone <cloneURL> /project`. The clone URL `https://code.stdio.dk/abrander/zoo.git` matches the prefix `https://code.stdio.dk/` → gets rewritten to the proxy URL. So the clone goes through the proxy. The origin stored in `.git/config` is the original clone URL (git stores the URL as given). Subsequent fetch/push to origin: origin URL matches the prefix → rewritten → proxy. āœ“ What about `git push` to a different remote (e.g., agent adds a fork remote)? If it's on the same forge → goes through the proxy. If it's a different host (e.g., GitHub) → no rewrite → direct, unauthenticated (same as before). ### run.go changes In `Run()`, after `createContainer`: ```go // The sandbox's git talks to the forge through a per-run proxy on // the host (internal/gitproxy): the forge credential stays on the // host side, and the only secret the container holds is a per-run // nonce that only unlocks git smart-HTTP on this proxy's port. // The container reaches the host as host.docker.internal (the // host-gateway extra host set in createContainer), so the proxy // binds to the container's network gateway. gateway, err := r.docker.gatewayIP(ctx, containerID) if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("resolve container network gateway: %w", err) } gitProxy, err := gitproxy.New(forgeBase(repoInfo.CloneURL), gitUser, gitToken, secret?, logger) ... ``` Wait, ordering: I need `secret` before `gitproxy.New`. And `forgeBase` — that's an unexported function in the agentrun package (sandboxgit.go), so run.go can call it directly (same package). ```go secret, err := gitproxy.NewSecret() if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("generate git proxy secret: %w", err) } gitProxy, err := gitproxy.New(forgeBase(repoInfo.CloneURL), gitUser, gitToken, secret, logger) if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("git proxy: %w", err) } proxyAddr, err := gitProxy.Start(gateway) if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("start git proxy: %w", err) } defer func() { if err := gitProxy.Stop(); err != nil { logger.Warn("failed to stop git proxy", "error", err) } }() if err := configureSandboxGit(ctx, r.docker, containerID, repoInfo.CloneURL, proxyAddr, secret, gitName, gitEmail); err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("configure git in container: %w", err) } ``` Note: `forgeBase` name collision — the agentrun function `forgeBase(cloneURL string) string` and the gitproxy parameter. Fine. Also, update the comment block above (the "The credential the sandbox's git uses..." comment) to reflect the proxy. ### docker.go changes - `createContainer`: add `ExtraHosts: []string{"host.docker.internal:host-gateway"}` to container.Config. - Add `gatewayIP` method. ### Integration test updates `TestDockerRuntimeSandboxGit`: - Change the `configureSandboxGit` call: `configureSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, cloneURL, "127.0.0.1:9", "test-run-secret", "Greg Coolio", "greg@noreply.localhost")`. - Replace the credential round-trip check: - `url.http://127.0.0.1:9/.insteadOf` == `https://forgejo.example/acme/` - `http.http://127.0.0.1:9.extraHeader` == `X-Zoo-Run: test-run-secret` - Token leak check: grep for `super-secret-token` in `/project`, `/etc/gitconfig` (system gitconfig location — where does `git config --global` write? For the container user... hmm. In the integration test, the container runs as the image's default user (golang:latest → root? golang:latest runs as root by default; the custom docker/ image runs as 1000). `git config --global` writes to `$HOME/.gitconfig`. The old test read it back with `git config --system --get` — wait, it used `--system`! Let me re-read: ```go out, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, "config", "--system", "--get", "http."+forgeHost(cloneURL)+".extraHeader") ``` But `configureSandboxGit` uses `--global`. Hmm, `git config --global` writes to $HOME/.gitconfig; `--system` reads /etc/gitconfig. These are different! Unless... in the golang:latest image HOME=/root and the container runs as root, and... no, --system is /etc/gitconfig. Wait, does `git config --global` in a container with HOME unset write to /etc/gitconfig? No — if HOME is unset, git falls back to... hmm, actually git uses `HOME` for --global; if HOME is unset, it uses the passwd entry's home dir. Wait, let me re-read the old test. It calls `configureSandboxGit` (which uses `--global`), then reads back with `--system --get`. For that to work, the global config would have to be the system config... that happens when HOME is unset and git can't determine a home dir → falls back to system? Let me think: git's `--global` config file resolution: `$HOME/.gitconfig`; if HOME is unset, uses getpwuid's home; if that fails... actually, I recall that in some containers `git config --global` writes to `/etc/gitconfig`? No... Hmm, wait — actually there's a subtlety: the `TestDockerRuntimeGitSafeDirectory` test runs `git config --system --add safe.directory '*'` explicitly, and the comment in run.go says "safe.directory, commit identity, and remote credentials all go into the container's system gitconfig (see configureSandboxGit)". But configureSandboxGit uses `--global`! Let me re-read configureSandboxGit... yes: `runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, "config", "--global", ...)`. And the integration test reads back with `--system`. So either: 1. The test is broken (but presumably it passed at some point — it's in the repo). 2. In the golang:latest container, `git config --global` writes to /etc/gitconfig. When does git's --global point to /etc/gitconfig? When HOME is unset and there's no passwd entry? The golang:latest container runs as root with HOME=/root. So --global → /root/.gitconfig. --system → /etc/gitconfig. Different files! Maybe... `git config --global` when running as root with HOME unset? The docker exec in `rt.exec` doesn't set HOME. Docker exec: env vars come from the container config's Env (the image's ENV) — the golang image sets HOME=/root? Let me check: the golang:latest Dockerfile sets `ENV HOME=/root`. So HOME=/root, --global → /root/.gitconfig. Then how did the old test's `--system --get` read back the value?? It should fail... unless the test was never actually run (docker tag — opt-in!). The docker-tagged tests are run with `go test -tags docker` and "require a reachable Docker daemon". Maybe they haven't been run in CI here, or maybe they were run and passed... Hmm, wait. Let me look at git's behavior more carefully. `git config --global` — "the user-specific file, usually $HOME/.gitconfig". If HOME is unset: "if $HOME is unset, git uses the entry from getpwuid". As root in a container, getpwuid(0) → /root. So /root/.gitconfig. But wait — maybe the test passed because... let me actually check: does `git config --global` in the golang:latest container write to /etc/gitconfig? I can test in this container (I'm user 1000 with HOME=/home/user). Let me actually run it to check. Actually, I can't easily run a golang container here (is there a docker daemon in this container? let me check). Actually, let me check whether docker is available in this environment — if so, I can run the integration tests!
Let me check whether Docker is available in this environment (for running the integration tests), and verify a git config behavior question:
Tool šŸ”§ bash {"command": "docker version 2>&1 | head -8; echo ---; git config --global --list 2>&1 | head -3; echo \"HOME=$HOME\"; ls -la /etc/gitconfig 2>&1"}
{"command": "docker version 2>&1 | head -8; echo ---; git config --global --list 2>&1 | head -3; echo \"HOME=$HOME\"; ls -la /etc/gitconfig 2>&1"}
ERROR CALLING TOOL: command exited with status 2: sh: 1: docker: not found
---
safe.directory=*
user.name=Greg Coolio
user.email=greg@example.com
HOME=/home/user
ls: cannot access '/etc/gitconfig': No such file or directory
Thinking
This container doesn't have a Docker daemon, so I can't run docker-tagged integration tests here. I'll update them carefully so they're logically consistent. Interesting point: this container's global git config already has `safe.directory=*`, `user.name=Greg Coolio`, `user.email=greg@example.com` set — this is the environment's own git identity for committing. Good to know. Now, about the `--global` vs `--system` mismatch in the old integration test: the old test was reading back with `--system`, but configureSandboxGit was writing with `--global`. Since I can't run docker here, I can't verify which one was correct. But wait — maybe in the golang:latest image, when running as root via docker exec without HOME... docker exec inherits the container config's Env. golang:latest sets `ENV HOME=/root`. So `--global` → /root/.gitconfig, `--system` → /etc/gitconfig. The old test should fail on the read-back... unless the test was written against a different version of configureSandboxGit that used `--system`. Let me check the git history of sandboxgit.go to see if it previously used --system.
Tool šŸ”§ bash {"command": "cd /project && git log --oneline -8 -- internal/agentrun/sandboxgit.go && git show c3d3720:internal/agentrun/sandboxgit.go 2>/dev/null | grep -n \"global\\|system\" | head"}
{"command": "cd /project && git log --oneline -8 -- internal/agentrun/sandboxgit.go && git show c3d3720:internal/agentrun/sandboxgit.go 2>/dev/null | grep -n \"global\\|system\" | head"}
10c3dce Better Docker/git inter.
c3d3720 Pass the agent's git credential to the sandbox, clone inside it
13:// credential is written to the container's system gitconfig so every
74:// configureSandboxGit writes the container's system gitconfig so git
90:// The credential lives in the container's own filesystem (ephemeral,
96:	if _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, "config", "--system", "--add", "safe.directory", "*"); err != nil {
100:	if _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, "config", "--system", "user.name", name); err != nil {
104:	if _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, "config", "--system", "user.email", email); err != nil {
108:	if _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, "config", "--system", "http."+forgeHost(cloneURL)+".extraHeader", gitAuthHeader(user, token)); err != nil {
112:	if _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, "config", "--system", "push.autoSetupRemote", "true"); err != nil {
Thinking
The original commit used `--system`, and the integration test was reading back with `--system`. Then "10c3dce Better Docker/git inter." changed it to `--global`, but the integration test wasn't updated (still reading with `--system`). In other words, the docker-tagged integration test is currently stale/broken with respect to that assertion (or the test has never been run since that change). In my changes I'll make the test consistent with the code: read back with `--global` (matching `configureSandboxGit`'s `--global`). No wait — should I keep `--global` or switch to `--system`? The comment in run.go says "system gitconfig". The current code uses `--global`. The custom docker image runs as UID 1000 (user), and golang:latest runs as root. `--global` works in either case (HOME is set in both images). `--system` requires root (writing to /etc/gitconfig) — the custom image's user 1000 can't write to /etc/gitconfig! So `--global` is the correct choice for the custom image (the one in docker/). The comment in run.go is stale. I'll keep `--global` and fix the test's read-back to `--global`, and also fix the stale comment in run.go. Now, let me also double-check the `git config --global` key syntax for URL-based keys: `git config --global "url.http://host.docker.internal:39211/.insteadOf" "https://code.stdio.dk/"`. Git config keys: subsections can contain slashes and colons (the existing code already does this with `http.https://code.stdio.dk.extraHeader`). For `url.<base>.insteadOf`, <base> is a URL — git's documentation shows examples like `url.git://github.com/.insteadOf = git@github.com:`. So a full URL with a trailing slash as base is standard. āœ“ Next, let me verify that `git receive-pack --http-backend-info-refs` exists in git 2.55, and check the behavior of `git upload-pack --http-backend-info-refs`.
The old integration test was written against `--system` config, but the code now uses `--global` (which is correct for the non-root custom image). I'll fix that inconsistency as part of this change. Let me verify the git plumbing flags I plan to use in tests:
Tool šŸ”§ bash {"command": "git upload-pack --help 2>&1 | grep -A2 \"http-backend\" | head -8; echo ---; git receive-pack --help 2>&1 | grep -A2 \"http-backend\" | head -8"}
{"command": "git upload-pack --help 2>&1 | grep -A2 \"http-backend\" | head -8; echo ---; git receive-pack --help 2>&1 | grep -A2 \"http-backend\" | head -8"}
---
Thinking
Hmm, `git upload-pack --help` doesn't show http-backend? Let me check the full help.
Tool šŸ”§ bash {"command": "git upload-pack -h 2>&1 | head -40; echo ===; git receive-pack -h 2>&1 | head -40"}
{"command": "git upload-pack -h 2>&1 | head -40; echo ===; git receive-pack -h 2>&1 | head -40"}
usage: git-upload-pack [--[no-]strict] [--timeout=<n>] [--stateless-rpc]
                       [--advertise-refs] <directory>

    --[no-]stateless-rpc  quit after a single request/response exchange
    --[no-]strict         do not try <directory>/.git/ if <directory> is no Git directory
    --[no-]timeout <n>    interrupt transfer after <n> seconds of inactivity

===
usage: git receive-pack <git-dir>

    -q, --[no-]quiet      quiet