Job 156dc59e-e736-45b1-b8e4-1b7ee35da9cc
Details and log output for this agent run.
Agent
greg
greg
Log
Thinking
First, let's start by exploring the project to understand what "zoo" is and how the sandbox mechanism works.
Tool 🔧 list_files {"path": ".", "recursive": true}
Arguments
{"path": ".", "recursive": true}
Result
/project/cmd /project/cmd/zoo /project/cmd/zoo/main.go /project/go.mod /project/go.sum /project/internal /project/internal/agentrun /project/internal/agentrun/clone.go /project/internal/agentrun/context.go /project/internal/agentrun/docker.go /project/internal/agentrun/docker_integration_test.go /project/internal/agentrun/forgejo.go /project/internal/agentrun/loop.go /project/internal/agentrun/roster.go /project/internal/agentrun/roster_test.go /project/internal/agentrun/run.go /project/internal/agentrun/seed_test.go /project/internal/agentrun/system.md /project/internal/config /project/internal/config/config.go /project/internal/config/config_test.go /project/internal/forgejo /project/internal/forgejo/client.go /project/internal/forgejo/client_test.go /project/internal/forgejo/event.go /project/internal/forgejo/poll.go /project/internal/forgejo/watcher.go /project/internal/forgejo/webhook.go /project/internal/forgejo/webhook_test.go /project/internal/livelog /project/internal/livelog/hub.go /project/internal/livelog/hub_test.go /project/internal/llm /project/internal/llm/client.go /project/internal/llm/streamer.go /project/internal/llm/streamer_test.go /project/internal/llm/types.go /project/internal/scheduler /project/internal/scheduler/scheduler.go /project/internal/scheduler/scheduler_test.go /project/internal/store /project/internal/store/schema.sql /project/internal/store/store.go /project/internal/store/store_test.go /project/internal/tools /project/internal/tools/bash.go /project/internal/tools/context.go /project/internal/tools/edit-file.go /project/internal/tools/forgejo.go /project/internal/tools/git.go /project/internal/tools/grep_search.go /project/internal/tools/list_files.go /project/internal/tools/move_file.go /project/internal/tools/read_file.go /project/internal/tools/registry.go /project/internal/tools/remove_file.go /project/internal/tools/shell.go /project/internal/tools/tools_test.go /project/internal/tools/write_file.go /project/internal/web /project/internal/web/templates.go /project/internal/web/web.go /project/internal/web/web_test.go /project/zoo.hcl.example
Tool 🔧 bash {"command": "cd /project && git log --oneline -10 && git status"}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /project && git log --oneline -10 && git status"}
Result
42fe9d9 (HEAD -> issue-38-greg, origin/main, origin/HEAD, main) Merge pull request 'Include full issue comment thread in the agent's seed message' (#34) from issue-33-greg into main 9e5dece Include full issue comment thread in the agent's seed message c8784fa Merge pull request 'fix(tools): make grep_search actually use regex (ERE)' (#32) from issue-31-greg into main 2c5b978 fix(tools): make grep_search actually use regex (ERE) ea073a3 Merge pull request 'Add job overview on dashboard' (#26) from issue-24-anna into main 3b38675 feat(dashboard): add job overview on dashboard 1c33680 Merge pull request 'Move max_live_agents into the environment block' (#23) from issue-22-mika into main 7cf22ff Move max_live_agents into the environment block 94b8ca1 Merge pull request 'Add per-agent Forgejo tokens, deprecate Sudo: header approach' (#21) from issue-16-mika into main f8c45dc Merge pull request 'web: show agent profile photos on the jobs pages' (#20) from issue-17-greg into main On branch issue-38-greg nothing to commit, working tree clean
Thinking
Let's take a look at the main files: clone.go, docker.go, run.go, config.go, and the git tool.
Tool 🔧 read_file {"path": "/project/internal/agentrun/clone.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 200}
Arguments
{"path": "/project/internal/agentrun/clone.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 200}
Result
{"path":"/project/internal/agentrun/clone.go","content":"package agentrun\r\n\r\nimport (\r\n\t\"context\"\r\n\t\"encoding/base64\"\r\n\t\"fmt\"\r\n\t\"os/exec\"\r\n\t\"strings\"\r\n)\r\n\r\n// gitAuthArgs returns the `-c http.extraHeader=...` global git arguments\r\n// that authenticate a single invocation as the shared zoo Forgejo\r\n// identity. Unlike embedding the token in the remote URL, a `-c`\r\n// override lives only for the lifetime of that one process and is never\r\n// written to .git/config on disk — where the container bind-mounting\r\n// this working tree (and any command an agent runs inside it via the\r\n// bash tool) could otherwise read it straight back out.\r\nfunc gitAuthArgs(token string) []string {\r\n\tauth := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(\"zoo:\" + token))\r\n\r\n\treturn []string{\"-c\", \"http.extraHeader=Authorization: Basic \" + auth}\r\n}\r\n\r\n// cloneAndBranch clones cloneURL into dir, authenticating the clone\r\n// itself with token (see gitAuthArgs), and checks out a new branch off\r\n// of defaultBranch. token never ends up in the resulting working tree:\r\n// the origin remote is left with the plain cloneURL.\r\nfunc cloneAndBranch(ctx context.Context, cloneURL, token, defaultBranch, branch, dir string) error {\r\n\targs := append(gitAuthArgs(token), \"clone\", \"--branch\", defaultBranch, \"--single-branch\", cloneURL, dir)\r\n\tif out, err := runGit(ctx, \"\", args...); err != nil {\r\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"clone: %w: %s\", err, out)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tif out, err := runGit(ctx, dir, \"checkout\", \"-b\", branch); err != nil {\r\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"checkout branch %q: %w: %s\", branch, err, out)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\treturn nil\r\n}\r\n\r\n// runGit runs a git subcommand on the host (not inside any container)\r\n// with no Forgejo credential attached.\r\nfunc runGit(ctx context.Context, dir string, args ...string) (string, error) {\r\n\tcmd := exec.CommandContext(ctx, \"git\", args...)\r\n\tif dir != \"\" {\r\n\t\tcmd.Dir = dir\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tout, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()\r\n\r\n\treturn strings.TrimSpace(string(out)), err\r\n}\r\n\r\n// runGitAuthed is runGit with token attached via gitAuthArgs, for the\r\n// one subcommand (push) that needs to authenticate against Forgejo.\r\nfunc runGitAuthed(ctx context.Context, dir, token string, args ...string) (string, error) {\r\n\treturn runGit(ctx, dir, append(gitAuthArgs(token), args...)...)\r\n}\r","start_line":1,"end_line":58,"total_lines":58,"truncated":false}
Tool 🔧 read_file {"path": "/project/internal/agentrun/docker.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 250}
Arguments
{"path": "/project/internal/agentrun/docker.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 250}
Result
{"path":"/project/internal/agentrun/docker.go","content":"package agentrun\r\n\r\nimport (\r\n\t\"context\"\r\n\t\"fmt\"\r\n\t\"io\"\r\n\t\"time\"\r\n\r\n\t\"github.com/docker/docker/api/types/container\"\r\n\t\"github.com/docker/docker/client\"\r\n)\r\n\r\n// containerCPUs and containerMemory bound each agent container's\r\n// resource usage; there's no per-agent config knob for this yet (see\r\n// TODO.md), so every run gets the same sane default.\r\nconst (\r\n\tcontainerNanoCPUs = 2_000_000_000 // 2 CPUs\r\n\tcontainerMemory = 2 \u003c\u003c 30 // 2 GiB\r\n)\r\n\r\ntype dockerRuntime struct {\r\n\tcli *client.Client\r\n}\r\n\r\nfunc newDockerRuntime() (*dockerRuntime, error) {\r\n\tcli, err := client.NewClientWithOpts(client.FromEnv, client.WithAPIVersionNegotiation())\r\n\tif err != nil {\r\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"docker client: %w\", err)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\treturn \u0026dockerRuntime{cli: cli}, nil\r\n}\r\n\r\n// createContainer creates and starts a container from image with the\r\n// given bind mounts, kept alive with `sleep infinity` regardless of the\r\n// image's own entrypoint so it can be repeatedly `exec`'d into.\r\nfunc (d *dockerRuntime) createContainer(ctx context.Context, image string, binds []string, name string) (string, error) {\r\n\tresp, err := d.cli.ContainerCreate(ctx,\r\n\t\t\u0026container.Config{\r\n\t\t\tImage: image,\r\n\t\t\tEntrypoint: []string{\"sleep\"},\r\n\t\t\tCmd: []string{\"infinity\"},\r\n\t\t\tWorkingDir: \"/project\",\r\n\t\t},\r\n\t\t\u0026container.HostConfig{\r\n\t\t\tBinds: binds,\r\n\t\t\tResources: container.Resources{\r\n\t\t\t\tNanoCPUs: containerNanoCPUs,\r\n\t\t\t\tMemory: containerMemory,\r\n\t\t\t},\r\n\t\t},\r\n\t\tnil, nil, name)\r\n\tif err != nil {\r\n\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"create container: %w\", err)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tif err := d.cli.ContainerStart(ctx, resp.ID, container.StartOptions{}); err != nil {\r\n\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"start container: %w\", err)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\treturn resp.ID, nil\r\n}\r\n\r\n// exec runs command via `sh -c` inside containerID and returns its\r\n// combined stdout+stderr (a TTY is attached so the two streams merge\r\n// without needing to demultiplex Docker's stdcopy framing) plus its exit\r\n// code.\r\nfunc (d *dockerRuntime) exec(ctx context.Context, containerID, command string) (string, int, error) {\r\n\tcreated, err := d.cli.ContainerExecCreate(ctx, containerID, container.ExecOptions{\r\n\t\tCmd: []string{\"sh\", \"-c\", command},\r\n\t\t// A TTY is attached (see doc comment above), which makes git's\r\n\t\t// isatty-based color.ui=auto default to enabling ANSI color codes\r\n\t\t// that pollute the captured job log. NO_COLOR covers tools that\r\n\t\t// honor that convention; the GIT_CONFIG_* override forces git's\r\n\t\t// own color.ui to \"never\" regardless of tty detection, since git\r\n\t\t// does not honor NO_COLOR itself.\r\n\t\t//\r\n\t\t// The same isatty check makes git launch a pager for diff/log/show,\r\n\t\t// and the pager (waiting on a stdin nothing ever attaches or\r\n\t\t// closes) then blocks forever with no way to time it out — see\r\n\t\t// exec's read loop below. GIT_PAGER/PAGER=cat disable that.\r\n\t\t// GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT=0 closes the same class of hang for\r\n\t\t// credential prompts on a private remote.\r\n\t\tEnv: []string{\r\n\t\t\t\"NO_COLOR=1\",\r\n\t\t\t\"GIT_CONFIG_COUNT=1\",\r\n\t\t\t\"GIT_CONFIG_KEY_0=color.ui\",\r\n\t\t\t\"GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_0=never\",\r\n\t\t\t\"GIT_PAGER=cat\",\r\n\t\t\t\"PAGER=cat\",\r\n\t\t\t\"GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT=0\",\r\n\t\t},\r\n\t\tTty: true,\r\n\t\tAttachStdout: true,\r\n\t\tAttachStderr: true,\r\n\t})\r\n\tif err != nil {\r\n\t\treturn \"\", 0, fmt.Errorf(\"exec create: %w\", err)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tattached, err := d.cli.ContainerExecAttach(ctx, created.ID, container.ExecAttachOptions{Tty: true})\r\n\tif err != nil {\r\n\t\treturn \"\", 0, fmt.Errorf(\"exec attach: %w\", err)\r\n\t}\r\n\tdefer attached.Close()\r\n\r\n\t// Once hijacked, this stream is a raw connection that ctx cancellation\r\n\t// no longer reaches — a wedged child process (pager, credential\r\n\t// prompt, anything else reading a stdin nobody attaches) would\r\n\t// otherwise block this read forever, past the run's deadline, with no\r\n\t// way to recover the job. Race the read against ctx and force-remove\r\n\t// the container to sever the connection if it fires.\r\n\ttype readResult struct {\r\n\t\toutput []byte\r\n\t\terr error\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\treadDone := make(chan readResult, 1)\r\n\r\n\tgo func() {\r\n\t\toutput, err := io.ReadAll(attached.Reader)\r\n\t\treadDone \u003c- readResult{output, err}\r\n\t}()\r\n\r\n\tvar output []byte\r\n\r\n\tselect {\r\n\tcase res := \u003c-readDone:\r\n\t\tif res.err != nil {\r\n\t\t\treturn \"\", 0, fmt.Errorf(\"exec read output: %w\", res.err)\r\n\t\t}\r\n\r\n\t\toutput = res.output\r\n\r\n\tcase \u003c-ctx.Done():\r\n\t\tkillCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second)\r\n\t\tdefer cancel()\r\n\r\n\t\t_ = d.cli.ContainerRemove(killCtx, containerID, container.RemoveOptions{Force: true})\r\n\t\t\u003c-readDone\r\n\r\n\t\treturn \"\", 0, ctx.Err()\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tinspect, err := d.cli.ContainerExecInspect(ctx, created.ID)\r\n\tif err != nil {\r\n\t\treturn string(output), 0, fmt.Errorf(\"exec inspect: %w\", err)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\treturn string(output), inspect.ExitCode, nil\r\n}\r\n\r\n// remove force-stops and removes containerID, ignoring \"already gone\"\r\n// errors so cleanup is safe to call unconditionally.\r\nfunc (d *dockerRuntime) remove(ctx context.Context, containerID string) error {\r\n\ttimeout := 5\r\n\t_ = d.cli.ContainerStop(ctx, containerID, container.StopOptions{Timeout: \u0026timeout})\r\n\r\n\tif err := d.cli.ContainerRemove(ctx, containerID, container.RemoveOptions{Force: true}); err != nil {\r\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"remove container: %w\", err)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\treturn nil\r\n}\r\n\r\nfunc (d *dockerRuntime) kill(ctx context.Context, containerID string) {\r\n\t_ = d.cli.ContainerKill(ctx, containerID, \"KILL\")\r\n}\r","start_line":1,"end_line":168,"total_lines":168,"truncated":false}
Thinking
Next, let's look at run.go and check how the clone is being done and how the container is being created.
Tool 🔧 read_file {"end_line": 400, "path": "/project/internal/agentrun/run.go", "start_line": 1}
Arguments
{"end_line": 400, "path": "/project/internal/agentrun/run.go", "start_line": 1}
Result
{"path":"/project/internal/agentrun/run.go","content":"// Package agentrun creates the throwaway per-job environment an agent\r\n// runs in: a git clone + branch bind-mounted into a Docker container,\r\n// the triggering event written to /event, and the tool-calling loop\r\n// (internal/llm + internal/tools) driven against it.\r\npackage agentrun\r\n\r\nimport (\r\n\t\"context\"\r\n\t_ \"embed\"\r\n\t\"encoding/json\"\r\n\t\"fmt\"\r\n\t\"log/slog\"\r\n\t\"os\"\r\n\t\"path/filepath\"\r\n\t\"strings\"\r\n\t\"sync\"\r\n\t\"time\"\r\n\r\n\t\"github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/config\"\r\n\t\"github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/forgejo\"\r\n\t\"github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/livelog\"\r\n\t\"github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/llm\"\r\n\t\"github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/store\"\r\n)\r\n\r\n//go:embed system.md\r\nvar defaultSystemPrompt string\r\n\r\n// DefaultTimeout bounds a single agent run's wall-clock time if the\r\n// caller doesn't override it.\r\nconst DefaultTimeout = 120 * time.Minute\r\n\r\ntype Runner struct {\r\n\tdocker *dockerRuntime\r\n\tforgejo *forgejo.Client\r\n\tstore *store.Store\r\n\thub *livelog.Hub\r\n\tcfg *config.Config\r\n\tlogger *slog.Logger\r\n\ttimeout time.Duration\r\n\tkeepOnFailure bool\r\n\r\n\tagentClientsMu sync.Mutex\r\n\tagentClients map[string]*forgejo.Client\r\n}\r\n\r\nfunc NewRunner(cfg *config.Config, fg *forgejo.Client, st *store.Store, hub *livelog.Hub, logger *slog.Logger, timeout time.Duration, keepOnFailure bool) (*Runner, error) {\r\n\tdocker, err := newDockerRuntime()\r\n\tif err != nil {\r\n\t\treturn nil, err\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tif timeout \u003c= 0 {\r\n\t\ttimeout = DefaultTimeout\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\treturn \u0026Runner{\r\n\t\tdocker: docker,\r\n\t\tforgejo: fg,\r\n\t\tstore: st,\r\n\t\thub: hub,\r\n\t\tcfg: cfg,\r\n\t\tlogger: logger,\r\n\t\ttimeout: timeout,\r\n\t\tkeepOnFailure: keepOnFailure,\r\n\t\tagentClients: make(map[string]*forgejo.Client),\r\n\t}, nil\r\n}\r\n\r\n// forgejoAs returns a Forgejo client that authenticates as the given\r\n// agent (using the agent's own token from config). This lets each agent\r\n// act as themselves on Forgejo without needing a global token with sudo\r\n// privileges. Clients are built once per agent and cached, since\r\n// constructing one costs an extra API round trip.\r\n//\r\n// If the agent has no token configured, falls back to the shared zoo\r\n// identity so existing deployments without per-agent tokens still work.\r\nfunc (r *Runner) forgejoAs(agentName, token string) *forgejo.Client {\r\n\tr.agentClientsMu.Lock()\r\n\tdefer r.agentClientsMu.Unlock()\r\n\r\n\tif c, ok := r.agentClients[agentName]; ok {\r\n\t\treturn c\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tvar c *forgejo.Client\r\n\tif token != \"\" {\r\n\t\tc = r.forgejo.As(token)\r\n\t} else {\r\n\t\t// Fallback: use shared identity. Optionally log a warning\r\n\t\t// if we ever want to enforce per-agent tokens.\r\n\t\tc = r.forgejo\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tr.agentClients[agentName] = c\r\n\r\n\treturn c\r\n}\r\n\r\n// Run implements scheduler.Runner.\r\nfunc (r *Runner) Run(ctx context.Context, jobID string, agent config.AgentConfig, llmCfg config.LLM, dockerImage string, ev forgejo.Event) error {\r\n\tctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, r.timeout)\r\n\tdefer cancel()\r\n\r\n\tlogger := r.logger.With(\"job\", jobID, \"agent\", agent.Name)\r\n\r\n\trepoInfo, err := r.forgejo.RepositoryInfo(ev.Owner, ev.Repo)\r\n\tif err != nil {\r\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"look up repository: %w\", err)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tworkDir, err := os.MkdirTemp(\"\", \"zoo-run-*\")\r\n\tif err != nil {\r\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"create work dir: %w\", err)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tsucceeded := false\r\n\r\n\tdefer func() {\r\n\t\tif succeeded || !r.keepOnFailure {\r\n\t\t\tos.RemoveAll(workDir)\r\n\t\t} else {\r\n\t\t\tlogger.Warn(\"keeping work dir after failure\", \"dir\", workDir)\r\n\t\t}\r\n\t}()\r\n\r\n\tbranch := fmt.Sprintf(\"issue-%d-%s\", ev.Index, agent.Name)\r\n\tprojectDir := filepath.Join(workDir, \"project\")\r\n\r\n\tif err := cloneAndBranch(ctx, repoInfo.CloneURL, r.forgejo.Token(), repoInfo.DefaultBranch, branch, projectDir); err != nil {\r\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"prepare git working tree: %w\", err)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\troster := buildRoster(r.forgejo, r.cfg.Agents, logger)\r\n\tgitName, gitEmail := gitIdentity(agent.Name, roster)\r\n\r\n\t// Local (not --global) scope, so this identity lives in\r\n\t// projectDir/.git/config: the one place both this host-side clone\r\n\t// and the container it's bind-mounted into (as /project) actually\r\n\t// share.\r\n\tif out, err := runGit(ctx, projectDir, \"config\", \"user.name\", gitName); err != nil {\r\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure git user.name: %w: %s\", err, out)\r\n\t}\r\n\tif out, err := runGit(ctx, projectDir, \"config\", \"user.email\", gitEmail); err != nil {\r\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure git user.email: %w: %s\", err, out)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\teventPath := filepath.Join(workDir, \"event.json\")\r\n\tif err := os.WriteFile(eventPath, ev.Raw, 0o644); err != nil {\r\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"write event file: %w\", err)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tcontainerID, err := r.docker.createContainer(ctx, dockerImage, []string{\r\n\t\tprojectDir + \":/project\",\r\n\t\teventPath + \":/event:ro\",\r\n\t}, fmt.Sprintf(\"zoo-issue-%d-%s\", ev.Index, agent.Name))\r\n\tif err != nil {\r\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"start container: %w\", err)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tdefer func() {\r\n\t\tcleanupCtx, cleanupCancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 30*time.Second)\r\n\t\tdefer cleanupCancel()\r\n\t\tif err := r.docker.remove(cleanupCtx, containerID); err != nil {\r\n\t\t\tlogger.Warn(\"failed to remove container\", \"container\", containerID, \"error\", err)\r\n\t\t}\r\n\t}()\r\n\r\n\t// /project is bind-mounted from the host, so it's owned by the host\r\n\t// UID that ran the clone, not whatever UID runs inside the\r\n\t// container (usually root) — git's ownership check rejects that by\r\n\t// default (\"detected dubious ownership\") unless told otherwise.\r\n\t// --system (not --global) so this holds regardless of which user\r\n\t// subsequent `docker exec` calls run as. Commit identity is\r\n\t// configured host-side, above, with --local scope so it's visible\r\n\t// from both sides of the bind mount without needing --global here.\r\n\tout, exitCode, err := r.docker.exec(ctx, containerID, \"git config --system --add safe.directory '*'\")\r\n\tif err != nil {\r\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure git safe.directory in container: %w: %s\", err, out)\r\n\t}\r\n\tif exitCode != 0 {\r\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure git safe.directory in container: exit %d: %s\", exitCode, out)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tlogAppend := func(stream, line string) {\r\n\t\tif err := r.store.AppendLog(context.Background(), jobID, stream, line); err != nil {\r\n\t\t\tlogger.Warn(\"failed to append log\", \"error\", err)\r\n\t\t}\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\trunCtx := \u0026runContext{\r\n\t\tdocker: r.docker,\r\n\t\tcontainerID: containerID,\r\n\t\tprojectDir: projectDir,\r\n\t\ttoken: r.forgejo.Token(),\r\n\t\tforgejo: \u0026runForgejoActions{\r\n\t\t\tclient: r.forgejoAs(agent.Name, agent.Token),\r\n\t\t\towner: ev.Owner,\r\n\t\t\trepo: ev.Repo,\r\n\t\t\tindex: ev.Index,\r\n\t\t\tlogger: logger,\r\n\t\t},\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tllmClient := llm.NewClient(llmCfg)\r\n\r\n\tsystemPrompt := defaultSystemPrompt + identitySection(agent.Name, roster)\r\n\r\n\tinstructions := r.cfg.EventInstructions(ev.Kind)\r\n\r\n\t// Fetch the full comment thread so the agent sees everything that's\r\n\t// been said on the issue/PR, not just the triggering event (which\r\n\t// only carries the latest comment, if any). A failure degrades to\r\n\t// no comments rather than failing the run: the agent can still do\r\n\t// its job, just without prior context.\r\n\tcomments, err := r.forgejo.ListIssueComments(ev.Owner, ev.Repo, ev.Index)\r\n\tif err != nil {\r\n\t\tlogger.Warn(\"fetch issue comments failed; agent will not see prior comments\", \"error\", err)\r\n\t\tcomments = nil\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tmessages := []llm.Message{\r\n\t\t{Role: \"system\", Content: systemPrompt},\r\n\t\t{Role: \"user\", Content: seedMessage(ev, branch, repoInfo.DefaultBranch, instructions, comments)},\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\thooks := r.streamHooks(jobID, logAppend)\r\n\r\n\t_, err = runLoop(ctx, llmClient, runCtx, messages, hooks)\r\n\tif err != nil {\r\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"agent loop: %w\", err)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tsucceeded = true\r\n\r\n\treturn nil\r\n}\r\n\r\n// streamHooks builds the Hooks a single Run passes to runLoop: every\r\n// delta is published live to the hub for connected dashboard viewers,\r\n// and once a reasoning/content block or tool call is complete, it's\r\n// persisted to the store as one row and the hub's replay buffer for\r\n// jobID is checkpointed — so a viewer connecting from this point on\r\n// sees it via the persisted history instead of a live replay, and is\r\n// never shown it twice.\r\nfunc (r *Runner) streamHooks(jobID string, logAppend func(stream, line string)) Hooks {\r\n\tvar reasoningBuf, contentBuf strings.Builder\r\n\r\n\treasoningOpen, contentOpen := false, false\r\n\r\n\treturn Hooks{\r\n\t\tOnReasoningDelta: func(delta string) {\r\n\t\t\tif !reasoningOpen {\r\n\t\t\t\treasoningOpen = true\r\n\t\t\t\treasoningBuf.Reset()\r\n\t\t\t\tr.hub.Publish(jobID, livelog.Event{Type: livelog.ReasoningStart})\r\n\t\t\t}\r\n\r\n\t\t\treasoningBuf.WriteString(delta)\r\n\t\t\tr.hub.Publish(jobID, livelog.Event{Type: livelog.ReasoningDelta, Text: delta})\r\n\t\t},\r\n\t\tOnContentDelta: func(delta string) {\r\n\t\t\tif !contentOpen {\r\n\t\t\t\tcontentOpen = true\r\n\t\t\t\tcontentBuf.Reset()\r\n\t\t\t\tr.hub.Publish(jobID, livelog.Event{Type: livelog.ContentStart})\r\n\t\t\t}\r\n\r\n\t\t\tcontentBuf.WriteString(delta)\r\n\t\t\tr.hub.Publish(jobID, livelog.Event{Type: livelog.ContentDelta, Text: delta})\r\n\t\t},\r\n\t\tOnTurnEnd: func() {\r\n\t\t\tif reasoningOpen {\r\n\t\t\t\tr.hub.Publish(jobID, livelog.Event{Type: livelog.ReasoningEnd})\r\n\t\t\t\tlogAppend(\"reasoning\", reasoningBuf.String())\r\n\t\t\t\tr.hub.Checkpoint(jobID)\r\n\t\t\t\treasoningOpen = false\r\n\t\t\t}\r\n\r\n\t\t\tif contentOpen {\r\n\t\t\t\tr.hub.Publish(jobID, livelog.Event{Type: livelog.ContentEnd})\r\n\t\t\t\tlogAppend(\"content\", contentBuf.String())\r\n\t\t\t\tr.hub.Checkpoint(jobID)\r\n\t\t\t\tcontentOpen = false\r\n\t\t\t}\r\n\t\t},\r\n\t\tOnTool: func(name, arguments, result string, toolErr bool) {\r\n\t\t\tr.hub.Publish(jobID, livelog.Event{\r\n\t\t\t\tType: livelog.Tool,\r\n\t\t\t\tName: name,\r\n\t\t\t\tArguments: arguments,\r\n\t\t\t\tResult: result,\r\n\t\t\t\tError: toolErr,\r\n\t\t\t})\r\n\r\n\t\t\tline, err := json.Marshal(store.ToolLogEntry{Name: name, Arguments: arguments, Result: result, Error: toolErr})\r\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\r\n\t\t\t\tr.logger.Warn(\"failed to marshal tool log entry\", \"job\", jobID, \"error\", err)\r\n\t\t\t} else {\r\n\t\t\t\tlogAppend(\"tool\", string(line))\r\n\t\t\t}\r\n\r\n\t\t\tr.hub.Checkpoint(jobID)\r\n\t\t},\r\n\t}\r\n}\r\n\r\nfunc seedMessage(ev forgejo.Event, branch, defaultBranch, instructions string, comments []forgejo.IssueComment) string {\r\n\traw, _ := json.MarshalIndent(json.RawMessage(ev.Raw), \"\", \" \")\r\n\r\n\tvar instructionsSection string\r\n\tif instructions != \"\" {\r\n\t\tinstructionsSection = fmt.Sprintf(\"Instructions for this event, from zoo.hcl:\\n%s\\n\\n\", instructions)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tvar commentsSection string\r\n\tif len(comments) \u003e 0 {\r\n\t\tvar b strings.Builder\r\n\t\tfmt.Fprintf(\u0026b, \"Comments (%d):\\n\\n\", len(comments))\r\n\r\n\t\tfor i, c := range comments {\r\n\t\t\tfmt.Fprintf(\u0026b, \"%d. %s (%s):\\n%s\\n\\n\", i+1, c.Author, c.Created.Format(time.RFC3339), c.Body)\r\n\t\t}\r\n\r\n\t\tcommentsSection = b.String()\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\treturn fmt.Sprintf(\r\n\t\t\"You were triggered by a %q event on %s/%s.\\n\\n\"+\r\n\t\t\t\"%sYour working branch is %q, checked out from the default branch %q.\\n\\n\"+\r\n\t\t\t\"Title: %s\\n\\nBody:\\n%s\\n\\n%sFull event payload:\\n```json\\n%s\\n```\",\r\n\t\tev.Kind, ev.Owner, ev.Repo, instructionsSection, branch, defaultBranch, ev.Title, ev.Body, commentsSection, raw)\r\n}\r","start_line":1,"end_line":333,"total_lines":333,"truncated":false}
Thinking
Alright, let's take a look at the git tool and the context to understand how git is currently being executed inside the sandbox.
Tool 🔧 read_file {"end_line": 200, "path": "/project/internal/tools/git.go", "start_line": 1}
Arguments
{"end_line": 200, "path": "/project/internal/tools/git.go", "start_line": 1}
Result
{"path":"/project/internal/tools/git.go","content":"package tools\r\n\r\nimport (\r\n\t\"context\"\r\n\t\"fmt\"\r\n\t\"slices\"\r\n\t\"strings\"\r\n\r\n\t\"github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/llm\"\r\n)\r\n\r\n// gitAllowed intentionally excludes remote-mutating subcommands other\r\n// than push: agents are expected to commit and push their own branch,\r\n// not touch remotes/config/etc.\r\nvar gitAllowed = []string{\r\n\t\"add\",\r\n\t\"branch\",\r\n\t\"checkout\",\r\n\t\"commit\",\r\n\t\"diff\",\r\n\t\"fetch\",\r\n\t\"log\",\r\n\t\"ls-remote\",\r\n\t\"pull\",\r\n\t\"push\",\r\n\t\"show\",\r\n\t\"status\",\r\n\t\"rm\",\r\n}\r\n\r\ntype gitParams struct {\r\n\tSubcommand string `json:\"subcommand\"`\r\n\tArgs []string `json:\"args\"`\r\n}\r\n\r\nfunc init() {\r\n\ttool := llm.NewTool(\r\n\t\t\"git\",\r\n\t\t\"Run a git subcommand with optional arguments against the project's working tree\")\r\n\r\n\ttool.AddEnumProperty(\"subcommand\", \"The git subcommand to run\", gitAllowed, true)\r\n\ttool.AddStringArrayProperty(\"args\", \"Additional arguments to pass to the git subcommand, e.g. ['HEAD~1', 'HEAD']\", false)\r\n\r\n\tRegister(tool, git)\r\n}\r\n\r\n// git runs subcommand via Context.Git, which executes it outside the\r\n// container (see that method's doc comment for why): the container\r\n// itself is never given a credential capable of authenticating against\r\n// Forgejo, so pushing has to happen on the host side instead.\r\nfunc git(ctx Context, params gitParams) (string, error) {\r\n\tif !slices.Contains(gitAllowed, params.Subcommand) {\r\n\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"git subcommand '%s' is not allowed. Only %s are permitted\", params.Subcommand, strings.Join(gitAllowed, \", \"))\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\toutput, err := ctx.Git(context.Background(), params.Subcommand, params.Args...)\r\n\tif err != nil {\r\n\t\treturn \"\", err\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tif output == \"\" {\r\n\t\tswitch params.Subcommand {\r\n\t\tcase \"diff\":\r\n\t\t\treturn \"No changes detected.\", nil\r\n\r\n\t\tcase \"status\":\r\n\t\t\treturn \"No status output.\", nil\r\n\t\t}\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\treturn strings.TrimSpace(output), nil\r\n}\r","start_line":1,"end_line":72,"total_lines":72,"truncated":false}
Tool 🔧 read_file {"end_line": 100, "path": "/project/internal/tools/context.go", "start_line": 1}
Arguments
{"end_line": 100, "path": "/project/internal/tools/context.go", "start_line": 1}
Result
{"path":"/project/internal/tools/context.go","content":"// Package tools is the registry of functions an agent's tool-calling\r\n// loop can invoke, ported from ../a/tools but retargeted at a Docker\r\n// container (via Exec) and the Forgejo issue/PR that triggered the run\r\n// (via Forgejo()) instead of a local sandboxed filesystem.\r\npackage tools\r\n\r\nimport \"context\"\r\n\r\n// Context is bound to a single agent run (job), unlike ../a's single\r\n// global Context, since multiple agents run concurrently in zoo.\r\ntype Context interface {\r\n\t// Exec runs command inside the run's container via `sh -c` and\r\n\t// returns combined stdout+stderr. The container never holds a\r\n\t// Forgejo credential, so this cannot reach the Forgejo API or\r\n\t// authenticate git operations against it — see Git.\r\n\tExec(ctx context.Context, command string) (string, error)\r\n\r\n\t// Git runs a git subcommand against the run's working tree on the\r\n\t// host, outside the container, so that operations needing a Forgejo\r\n\t// credential (currently just push) can authenticate without that\r\n\t// credential ever being written to disk where the container (and\r\n\t// anything run inside it via Exec) could read it.\r\n\tGit(ctx context.Context, subcommand string, args ...string) (string, error)\r\n\r\n\t// Forgejo returns the actions bound to the issue/PR that triggered\r\n\t// this run, so tools don't need to be told which repo/issue to act\r\n\t// on.\r\n\tForgejo() ForgejoActions\r\n}\r\n\r\n// ForgejoActions are the actions available to an agent against the\r\n// triggering issue/PR. Implemented by internal/agentrun, backed by\r\n// internal/forgejo.Client plus the run's owner/repo/issue.\r\ntype ForgejoActions interface {\r\n\tComment(body string) error\r\n\tOpenPullRequest(head, base, title, body string) error\r\n\tRequestReview(reviewers []string) error\r\n\tAddLabel(name string) error\r\n\tRemoveLabel(name string) error\r\n\tCloseIssue() error\r\n\tReopenIssue() error\r\n\r\n\t// AssignIssue hands the triggering issue/PR off to another agent by\r\n\t// their name (which doubles as their Forgejo username); the\r\n\t// resulting issue:assigned event triggers that agent's run.\r\n\tAssignIssue(agentName string) error\r\n}\r","start_line":1,"end_line":47,"total_lines":47,"truncated":false}
Thinking
Next, let's look at agentrun's context.go and check how `runContext` implements `Git`:
Tool 🔧 read_file {"end_line": 200, "path": "/project/internal/agentrun/context.go", "start_line": 1}
Arguments
{"end_line": 200, "path": "/project/internal/agentrun/context.go", "start_line": 1}
Result
{"path":"/project/internal/agentrun/context.go","content":"package agentrun\r\n\r\nimport (\r\n\t\"context\"\r\n\t\"fmt\"\r\n\r\n\t\"github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/tools\"\r\n)\r\n\r\n// runContext implements tools.Context for a single agent run, executing\r\n// shell commands via docker exec against the run's container, git\r\n// commands as the host process against the run's working tree (see\r\n// Git), and binding Forgejo actions to the triggering issue/PR.\r\ntype runContext struct {\r\n\tdocker *dockerRuntime\r\n\tcontainerID string\r\n\tprojectDir string\r\n\ttoken string\r\n\tforgejo tools.ForgejoActions\r\n}\r\n\r\nfunc (c *runContext) Exec(ctx context.Context, command string) (string, error) {\r\n\toutput, exitCode, err := c.docker.exec(ctx, c.containerID, command)\r\n\r\n\tif err != nil {\r\n\t\treturn output, err\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tif exitCode != 0 {\r\n\t\treturn output, fmt.Errorf(\"command exited with status %d\", exitCode)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\treturn output, nil\r\n}\r\n\r\n// Git implements tools.Context.Git by running git on the host against\r\n// c.projectDir rather than via docker exec. Only push needs to\r\n// authenticate against Forgejo, so only it carries the token, via a\r\n// per-invocation -c override that never touches .git/config (see\r\n// gitAuthArgs) — the container this same working tree is bind-mounted\r\n// into has no way to read it out.\r\nfunc (c *runContext) Git(ctx context.Context, subcommand string, args ...string) (string, error) {\r\n\tcmdArgs := append([]string{subcommand}, args...)\r\n\r\n\tif subcommand == \"push\" {\r\n\t\treturn runGitAuthed(ctx, c.projectDir, c.token, cmdArgs...)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\treturn runGit(ctx, c.projectDir, cmdArgs...)\r\n}\r\n\r\nfunc (c *runContext) Forgejo() tools.ForgejoActions {\r\n\treturn c.forgejo\r\n}\r","start_line":1,"end_line":54,"total_lines":54,"truncated":false}
Thinking
Now I understand the architecture:
1. `Runner.Run` clones the repo on the host side (`cloneAndBranch`), creates a branch, and sets up the git identity locally.
2. It bind-mounts the working directory into a Docker container as `/project`.
3. The `git` tool runs git on the host side, not inside the container — only `push` is authenticated with a token via `-c http.extraHeader=...`.
4. The container has no credentials at all, so `git pull`/`git fetch`/`git push` from inside the container (via the bash tool) can't authenticate.
What the Issue is asking for:
- Pass the agent token to the sandbox so the agent can perform its own git operations — including against the remote.
- Do the initial git clone inside the sandbox (not on the host).
- There should be no need to run git outside the sandbox.
- `git pull` must just work for the agent inside the sandbox. "Maybe I need to put something in .gitconfig, but it has to work."
So the plan:
1. **Clone inside the sandbox**: Instead of `cloneAndBranch` on the host, create the container first, then run `git clone` inside the container via `docker exec`. The container needs the token to authenticate the clone.
2. **Pass the token to the sandbox**: The cleanest way to make `git pull`/`fetch`/`push` "just work" inside the container is to write a git credential helper, or to set `http.extraHeader` in the repo-local `.git/config` (or global gitconfig inside the container).
Wait — but the current design deliberately avoids writing the token to `.git/config`. The reason is that the container bind-mounts the working tree, so the token would be readable from inside the container. But now the Issue explicitly asks for the token to be passed to the sandbox. So that concern is now moot — the whole point is that the agent inside the sandbox should have the token.
Options for how to pass the token to the sandbox:
**Option A: git credential helper.** Write a small script into the container (e.g., `/usr/local/bin/git-credential-zoo` or a file in the project directory) that returns the token, and configure `credential.helper` in the container's global gitconfig. The token could be passed via an environment variable… but environment variables for `docker exec` are set per-exec. The `exec` method already sets environment variables (NO_COLOR, GIT_CONFIG_*, etc.). So I can add `ZOO_GIT_TOKEN=<token>` to the exec environment and have the credential helper script read it. But wait — the credential helper runs as a child process of git, so it inherits git's environment, which includes the exec environment. That works.
But there's a subtlety: the token would appear in the container's environment, and the agent could read it via `env` inside the bash tool. That's fine — the Issue explicitly asks for the token to be passed to the sandbox.
**Option B: Write the token into the gitconfig.** The Issue says "Maybe I need to put something in .gitconfig, but it has to work." So the maintainer is suggesting putting the token in .gitconfig. I could write the token into the container's global gitconfig (e.g., `/root/.gitconfig` or `/etc/gitconfig`):
```
[http "https://code.stdio.dk"]
extraHeader = "Authorization: Basic <base64(zoo:token)>"
```
Or use a credential store file: `credential.helper = store --file /root/.git-credentials` with `https://zoo:<token>@code.stdio.dk` in it.
Hmm, but where does the gitconfig live? The container is created from an image. I can run `git config --global` via docker exec to write to the container's global gitconfig (e.g., root's `~/.gitconfig`). But the container's filesystem is ephemeral — no problem, since I set it up right after container creation.
Actually, wait. Let me think about which approach is most robust and "just works":
For `git pull` to work, git needs to authenticate the fetch. With `http.extraHeader` scoped to a URL prefix, it works for all git operations against that host. With a credential helper, git asks for credentials when the server demands auth (401). Forgejo supports Basic auth with username:token.
The credential store approach: `git config --global credential.helper store` writes to `~/.git-credentials` by default. I can write `https://zoo:<token>@code.stdio.dk` there. This works for http(s) remotes.
Actually, the simplest and most robust approach that "just works" for any git operation (clone, fetch, pull, push) against any Forgejo repo: configure a global credential helper inside the container.
Let me think about what the maintainer is hinting at: "Maybe I need to put something in .gitconfig, but it has to work." — they're suggesting putting something in .gitconfig. So let's do that.
Design:
1. In `run.go`:
- First create the container (with the bind mount for the empty project directory… wait, the project directory needs to exist on the host before the bind mount. Actually, Docker creates the directory if it doesn't exist. But the current code creates the directory via clone. Let me restructure:
- Create `workDir` (temp), create `projectDir` (empty) — or let Docker create it.
- Create the container with the bind mount `projectDir:/project`.
- Inside the container: configure git (safe.directory, identity, credentials).
- Inside the container: `git clone --branch <default> --single-branch <cloneURL> /project`… wait, cloning directly into `/project` requires the directory to be empty. If Docker created `/project` as an empty directory, `git clone <url> /project` works (cloning into an existing empty directory is fine).
- Then `git checkout -b <branch>` inside the container.
- Then run the loop.
2. Token to the sandbox:
- The cleanest way: pass the token as an environment variable on each exec (like the existing GIT_CONFIG_* env vars), and additionally write a gitconfig in the container that uses it.
But wait — if I write the token into the container's global gitconfig (e.g., `/root/.gitconfig`), that's on the container's filesystem, not on the bind mount. The container is ephemeral per run, so that's fine. The agent can read it via `cat /root/.gitconfig` (if running as root) — but again, the token is explicitly being passed to the sandbox.
Alternative: write the token into the bind-mounted working tree (e.g., `.git/config` local scope, or a `.git-credentials` file in the project directory). That persists on the host's temp directory, which is removed after the run. But it's also visible in the bind mount. Either works.
Hmm, which is better? Let me think about "git pull must just work."
If I put `http.extraHeader` in the repo-local `.git/config` (inside the bind mount), it works for that repo. If the agent clones another repo inside the sandbox, the local config doesn't apply. The global gitconfig inside the container (URL-scoped extraHeader or credential helper) applies to all repos.
I think the global gitconfig inside the container is the right approach:
- `git config --global http.<host>.extraHeader "Authorization: Basic <b64>"` — scoped to the Forgejo host, so it doesn't leak credentials to other hosts.
Or a credential helper. Which is more robust?
`http.extraHeader` with Basic auth: Forgejo accepts `Authorization: Basic base64(user:token)` for git over HTTP. The current host-side code already uses exactly this (`gitAuthArgs` uses `http.extraHeader=Authorization: Basic <auth>`), so it's proven to work with this Forgejo instance.
So: after container creation, run:
```
git config --global http.<host>.extraHeader "Authorization: Basic <b64(zoo:token)>"
```
where host is derived from cloneURL (e.g., `code.stdio.dk`).
Wait, but `git config --global` writes to `~/.gitconfig` of the user running the exec (root by default). The agent's exec also runs as root (default). So it's consistent.
Hmm, but there's a subtlety with `http.extraHeader` in the global config: it applies to all HTTP requests to that host, including non-git ones. That's fine.
Actually, wait. Let me reconsider: should I use the credential helper approach instead? The Issue says "Maybe I need to put something in .gitconfig." Either approach puts something in .gitconfig. The extraHeader approach is simpler and reuses the proven `gitAuthArgs` mechanism. Let's go with URL-scoped extraHeader in the container's global gitconfig.
But wait — one more consideration: the token. Which token? The Issue says "pass the agent token to the sandbox." The agent has its own token (`agent.Token`) — see PR #21 "Add per-agent Forgejo tokens." The current code uses `r.forgejo.Token()` (the shared zoo identity) for git operations and `agent.Token` for Forgejo API actions.
Hmm. "Pass the agent token to the sandbox to enable the agent to perform its own git operations." I think using the agent's own token (with a fallback to the shared zoo token) is the right call, consistent with `forgejoAs`. The agent acts as itself on Forgejo, so its git pushes should also be as itself. That way the commits/pushes are attributed to the agent's identity.
Let me look at how `agent.Token` is set up in config, and how `forgejoAs` falls back.
3. **The git tool**: Currently it runs on the host side. The Issue says "There should be no need to run git outside the sandbox." So the `git` tool should run inside the container via `docker exec`. That means:
- `runContext.Git` should run git inside the container (via `c.docker.exec`), not on the host.
- The `Git` method on the tools.Context interface — keep the interface, but the implementation changes to exec inside the container. Actually, I could even remove `Git` from the interface and have the git tool use `Exec`. But keeping the interface is cleaner for testing. Let me check how the git tool is tested… `tools_test.go` — let me look.
Also, the `git` tool's description says "Run a git subcommand with optional arguments against the project's working tree." That's still accurate.
Wait, but if git runs inside the container, the working directory matters: `docker exec` uses the container's WorkingDir `/project` (set in createContainer). Good.
Also, the git tool currently allows `fetch`, `pull`, `push`, `ls-remote` — all of which will now authenticate inside the container.
Should I expand the allowed subcommands? The Issue says "enable the agent to perform its own git operations — including against the remote." The current allowlist already includes fetch/pull/push/ls-remote. Maybe I should keep the allowlist as is (surgical change). Hmm, "its own git operations" — the allowlist already covers the common ones. Let me keep it.
4. **Host-side clone removal**: `cloneAndBranch` and `runGit`/`runGitAuthed` in `clone.go` — after this change, the host doesn't need git at all… except maybe for nothing. Let me check other uses of `runGit`/`cloneAndBranch`:
- `run.go`: `cloneAndBranch`, `runGit` (for git config user.name/email).
- `context.go`: `runGit`, `runGitAuthed`.
- `docker_integration_test.go` — let me check.
- `seed_test.go` — probably tests seedMessage.
If the clone happens inside the container, the host-side git config for user.name/email also has to move inside the container (global or local). Since the clone happens inside the container, I can set `git config --global user.name/email` inside the container.
Then `clone.go` can be deleted entirely (or repurposed). Let me check the integration tests to see what's being tested.
5. **Order of operations in Run**:
- Currently: clone on host → create container → exec safe.directory → loop.
- New: create workDir + projectDir (empty) → create container (bind mount) → exec: git config (safe.directory, identity, credentials) → exec: clone + branch → write event.json (can be before or after) → loop.
Wait, one issue: `createContainer` bind-mounts `projectDir:/project`. If projectDir doesn't exist, Docker creates it (as root-owned on the host… actually, Docker creates missing host directories for bind mounts, owned by root). That's fine. But to be safe, I'll `os.MkdirAll(projectDir)` on the host first.
Another subtlety: the container's WorkingDir is `/project` — with the bind mount, that's the project directory. `git clone <url> /project` into an empty directory works.
Actually, hmm, wait: `git clone <url> <dir>` requires the target directory to be empty or non-existent. Docker creates `/project` as an empty directory. Good.
6. **safe.directory**: The current code runs `git config --system --add safe.directory '*'` inside the container. Keep that (it's needed because the bind-mounted directory is owned by the host UID).
7. **Token in the environment vs. in gitconfig**: If I write the token into the container's global gitconfig (root's `~/.gitconfig`), no environment variable is needed. The token ends up in the container's filesystem (ephemeral). The agent can read it with `cat ~/.gitconfig` — that's fine per the Issue's intent.
But wait — is there a concern about the token being visible in the job log? If I run `git config --global http.<host>.extraHeader "..."` via docker exec, the command line contains the token. Does the job log record exec commands? Let me check: `logAppend` records tool calls (the `OnTool` hook records name, arguments, result). The setup execs (safe.directory, clone) are not recorded via logAppend — they're run directly by `r.docker.exec` in run.go, and their output is only used for error messages. But the live log hub… the setup execs don't go through hooks. OK.
But wait — the clone command: if I run `git clone <cloneURL> /project` and the URL is https, the token isn't in the URL (auth comes from gitconfig). Good, no token in the command line.
Hmm, but actually, wait. Let me reconsider: should the token be in the container's global gitconfig, or in the bind-mounted repo's local `.git/config`?
The maintainer said "Maybe I need to put something in .gitconfig." The global gitconfig inside the container is cleaner (doesn't pollute the bind-mounted working tree, which is the repo's .git/config — that's the host's temp directory, but still part of the repo's metadata. A local extraHeader in .git/config would also work, and would be visible to the agent via `git config -l`).
Actually, hmm, wait. There's one more thing to consider: the container image. Does the image have git? The current code already runs `git config --system` inside the container, so git exists in the image. Good.
Where does `git config --global` write? For root, that's `/root/.gitconfig`. The exec runs as root by default (no User set in ContainerExecCreate). The agent's bash tool also runs as root. Consistent.
But what if the image's default user isn't root? The current code relies on `git config --system` working, which requires write access to `/etc/gitconfig` (root). So the container runs as root. No problem.
8. **Which token**: Let me look at the config to see `agent.Token` and the forgejo client's `Token()`.
Let me also check `docker_integration_test.go` and `seed_test.go`, `config.go`, and `loop.go` for how runContext is used.
Also let me check `system.md` (the system prompt) — it mentions git behavior ("For remote (pull, fetch, push, etc.) git operations, use the git tool"). That text is in my own system prompt above, and it's probably from system.md. After this change, the git tool runs inside the container. The system prompt text says "For remote (pull, fetch, push, etc.) git operations, use the git tool." That's still fine. But there might be other mentions of host-side git. Let me read system.md.
Let me read the remaining relevant files.
Tool 🔧 read_file {"end_line": 120, "path": "/project/internal/config/config.go", "start_line": 1}
Arguments
{"end_line": 120, "path": "/project/internal/config/config.go", "start_line": 1}
Result
{"path":"/project/internal/config/config.go","content":"// Package config loads and validates zoo's HCL configuration file.\r\npackage config\r\n\r\nimport (\r\n\t\"fmt\"\r\n\r\n\t\"github.com/hashicorp/hcl/v2/hclsimple\"\r\n)\r\n\r\n// Known event kinds. issue:assigned is resolved dynamically (agent name\r\n// must match the Forgejo assignee's username) so it never carries an\r\n// `agent` attribute; the rest map statically to one configured agent.\r\nconst (\r\n\tEventIssueNew = \"issue:new\"\r\n\tEventIssueComment = \"issue:comment\"\r\n\tEventIssueAssigned = \"issue:assigned\"\r\n\tEventPRNew = \"pr:new\"\r\n)\r\n\r\nvar staticEventKinds = map[string]bool{\r\n\tEventIssueNew: true,\r\n\tEventIssueComment: true,\r\n\tEventPRNew: true,\r\n}\r\n\r\ntype Config struct {\r\n\tLLMs []LLM `hcl:\"llm,block\"`\r\n\tForgejo Forgejo `hcl:\"forgejo,block\"`\r\n\tEnvironment Environment `hcl:\"environment,block\"`\r\n\tAgents []Agent `hcl:\"agent,block\"`\r\n\tEvents []Event `hcl:\"event,block\"`\r\n\tWeb *Web `hcl:\"web,block\"`\r\n}\r\n\r\n// Web configures the dashboard's optional bearer-token gate. Leave the\r\n// block out of zoo.hcl entirely to run without one (fine on localhost;\r\n// put a real gate or a proxy in front for anything else).\r\ntype Web struct {\r\n\tToken string `hcl:\"token,optional\"`\r\n}\r\n\r\ntype LLM struct {\r\n\tName string `hcl:\"name,label\"`\r\n\tOpenAI string `hcl:\"openai\"`\r\n\tToken string `hcl:\"token\"`\r\n\tModel string `hcl:\"model\"`\r\n}\r\n\r\ntype Forgejo struct {\r\n\tURL string `hcl:\"url\"`\r\n\tToken string `hcl:\"token\"`\r\n\tWebhookSecret string `hcl:\"webhook_secret,optional\"`\r\n}\r\n\r\ntype Environment struct {\r\n\tDockerImage string `hcl:\"docker_image\"`\r\n\tMaxLive int `hcl:\"max_live_agents\"`\r\n}\r\n\r\ntype Agent struct {\r\n\tName string `hcl:\"name,label\"`\r\n\tLLM string `hcl:\"llm\"`\r\n\tToken string `hcl:\"token,optional\"`\r\n}\r\n\r\ntype Event struct {\r\n\tKind string `hcl:\"name,label\"`\r\n\tAgent string `hcl:\"agent,optional\"`\r\n\tInstructions string `hcl:\"instructions,optional\"`\r\n}\r\n\r\n// Load reads and validates the config file at path.\r\nfunc Load(path string) (*Config, error) {\r\n\tvar cfg Config\r\n\r\n\tif err := hclsimple.DecodeFile(path, nil, \u0026cfg); err != nil {\r\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"parse config: %w\", err)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tif err := cfg.Validate(); err != nil {\r\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"invalid config: %w\", err)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\treturn \u0026cfg, nil\r\n}\r\n\r\n// Validate checks that the config is internally consistent: every\r\n// reference between blocks resolves, and required values are set.\r\nfunc (c *Config) Validate() error {\r\n\tllmNames := make(map[string]bool, len(c.LLMs))\r\n\tfor _, l := range c.LLMs {\r\n\t\tif l.OpenAI == \"\" || l.Token == \"\" || l.Model == \"\" {\r\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"llm %q: openai, token, and model are required\", l.Name)\r\n\t\t}\r\n\t\tllmNames[l.Name] = true\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tif c.Forgejo.URL == \"\" || c.Forgejo.Token == \"\" {\r\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"forgejo: url and token are required\")\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tif c.Environment.MaxLive \u003c 1 {\r\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"environment: max_live_agents must be \u003e= 1, got %d\", c.Environment.MaxLive)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tif c.Environment.DockerImage == \"\" {\r\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"environment: docker_image is required\")\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tagentNames := make(map[string]bool, len(c.Agents))\r\n\tfor _, a := range c.Agents {\r\n\t\tif !llmNames[a.LLM] {\r\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"agent %q: references undeclared llm %q\", a.Name, a.LLM)\r\n\t\t}\r\n\t\tagentNames[a.Name] = true\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tseenEventKinds := make(map[string]bool, len(c.Events))\r\n\tfor _, e := range c.Events {\r\n\t\tif seenEventKinds[e.Kind] {\r","start_line":1,"end_line":120,"total_lines":204,"truncated":true}
Tool 🔧 read_file {"end_line": 200, "path": "/project/internal/agentrun/docker_integration_test.go", "start_line": 1}
Arguments
{"end_line": 200, "path": "/project/internal/agentrun/docker_integration_test.go", "start_line": 1}
Result
{"path":"/project/internal/agentrun/docker_integration_test.go","content":"//go:build docker\r\n\r\n// Run with: go test -tags docker ./internal/agentrun/...\r\n// Requires a reachable Docker daemon (DOCKER_HOST or the default socket).\r\npackage agentrun\r\n\r\nimport (\r\n\t\"context\"\r\n\t\"os/exec\"\r\n\t\"strings\"\r\n\t\"testing\"\r\n\t\"time\"\r\n)\r\n\r\nfunc TestDockerRuntimeExecRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {\r\n\trt, err := newDockerRuntime()\r\n\tif err != nil {\r\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"docker client: %v\", err)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 60*time.Second)\r\n\tdefer cancel()\r\n\r\n\tcontainerID, err := rt.createContainer(ctx, \"debian:unstable\", nil, \"zoo-test-run\")\r\n\tif err != nil {\r\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"create container: %v\", err)\r\n\t}\r\n\tdefer rt.remove(context.Background(), containerID)\r\n\r\n\toutput, exitCode, err := rt.exec(ctx, containerID, \"echo hello-from-zoo\")\r\n\tif err != nil {\r\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"exec: %v\", err)\r\n\t}\r\n\tif exitCode != 0 {\r\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"expected exit code 0, got %d\", exitCode)\r\n\t}\r\n\tif !strings.Contains(output, \"hello-from-zoo\") {\r\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"unexpected output: %q\", output)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\t_, exitCode, err = rt.exec(ctx, containerID, \"exit 3\")\r\n\tif err != nil {\r\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"exec: %v\", err)\r\n\t}\r\n\tif exitCode != 3 {\r\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"expected exit code 3, got %d\", exitCode)\r\n\t}\r\n}\r\n\r\n// TestDockerRuntimeGitSafeDirectory reproduces the \"detected dubious\r\n// ownership\" error git raises against a bind-mounted repo owned by a\r\n// different UID than the container runs as, and confirms the `git\r\n// config --system --add safe.directory '*'` fix Run() applies (see\r\n// run.go) actually clears it, against the same golang:latest image\r\n// zoo.hcl now defaults to.\r\nfunc TestDockerRuntimeGitSafeDirectory(t *testing.T) {\r\n\tprojectDir := t.TempDir()\r\n\r\n\tfor _, args := range [][]string{\r\n\t\t{\"init\", \"-q\", projectDir},\r\n\t\t{\"-C\", projectDir, \"commit\", \"-q\", \"--allow-empty\", \"-m\", \"init\"},\r\n\t} {\r\n\t\tif out, err := exec.Command(\"git\", args...).CombinedOutput(); err != nil {\r\n\t\t\tt.Fatalf(\"git %v: %v: %s\", args, err, out)\r\n\t\t}\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\trt, err := newDockerRuntime()\r\n\tif err != nil {\r\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"docker client: %v\", err)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 60*time.Second)\r\n\tdefer cancel()\r\n\r\n\tcontainerID, err := rt.createContainer(ctx, \"golang:latest\", []string{projectDir + \":/project\"}, \"zoo-test-git\")\r\n\tif err != nil {\r\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"create container: %v\", err)\r\n\t}\r\n\tdefer rt.remove(context.Background(), containerID)\r\n\r\n\toutput, _, err := rt.exec(ctx, containerID, \"git status\")\r\n\tif err != nil {\r\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"exec: %v\", err)\r\n\t}\r\n\tif !strings.Contains(output, \"dubious ownership\") {\r\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"expected the bind mount to reproduce dubious ownership before the fix, got: %s\", output)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\toutput, exitCode, err := rt.exec(ctx, containerID, \"git config --system --add safe.directory '*'\")\r\n\tif err != nil || exitCode != 0 {\r\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"configure safe.directory: err=%v exit=%d: %s\", err, exitCode, output)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\toutput, exitCode, err = rt.exec(ctx, containerID, \"git status\")\r\n\tif err != nil {\r\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"exec: %v\", err)\r\n\t}\r\n\tif exitCode != 0 || strings.Contains(output, \"dubious ownership\") {\r\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"expected git status to succeed after the fix, got exit=%d: %s\", exitCode, output)\r\n\t}\r\n}\r","start_line":1,"end_line":102,"total_lines":102,"truncated":false}
Thinking
Next, let's check the remaining parts: the rest of config.go (the Token method on the forgejo client), loop.go, system.md, and the forgejo client's `Token()` and `As()`.
Tool 🔧 read_file {"end_line": 204, "path": "/project/internal/config/config.go", "start_line": 120}
Arguments
{"end_line": 204, "path": "/project/internal/config/config.go", "start_line": 120}
Result
{"path":"/project/internal/config/config.go","content":"\t\tif seenEventKinds[e.Kind] {\r\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"event %q: declared more than once\", e.Kind)\r\n\t\t}\r\n\t\tseenEventKinds[e.Kind] = true\r\n\r\n\t\tswitch {\r\n\t\tcase e.Kind == EventIssueAssigned:\r\n\t\t\tif e.Agent != \"\" {\r\n\t\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"event %q: must not set agent; the agent whose name matches the Forgejo assignee's username is triggered dynamically\", e.Kind)\r\n\t\t\t}\r\n\r\n\t\tcase staticEventKinds[e.Kind]:\r\n\t\t\tif e.Agent == \"\" {\r\n\t\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"event %q: agent is required\", e.Kind)\r\n\t\t\t}\r\n\t\t\tif !agentNames[e.Agent] {\r\n\t\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"event %q: references undeclared agent %q\", e.Kind, e.Agent)\r\n\t\t\t}\r\n\r\n\t\tdefault:\r\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"event %q: unknown event kind\", e.Kind)\r\n\t\t}\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\treturn nil\r\n}\r\n\r\n// AgentConfig holds an agent's full configuration including its\r\n// Forgejo token (if configured).\r\ntype AgentConfig struct {\r\n\tName string\r\n\tLLM string\r\n\tToken string\r\n}\r\n\r\n// AgentByName returns the agent config with the given name, if declared.\r\nfunc (c *Config) AgentByName(name string) (AgentConfig, bool) {\r\n\tfor _, a := range c.Agents {\r\n\t\tif a.Name == name {\r\n\t\t\treturn AgentConfig{\r\n\t\t\t\tName: a.Name,\r\n\t\t\t\tLLM: a.LLM,\r\n\t\t\t\tToken: a.Token,\r\n\t\t\t}, true\r\n\t\t}\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\treturn AgentConfig{}, false\r\n}\r\n\r\n// LLMByName returns the llm config with the given name, if declared.\r\nfunc (c *Config) LLMByName(name string) (LLM, bool) {\r\n\tfor _, l := range c.LLMs {\r\n\t\tif l.Name == name {\r\n\t\t\treturn l, true\r\n\t\t}\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\treturn LLM{}, false\r\n}\r\n\r\n// EventAgent returns the statically configured agent name for the given\r\n// event kind, if one is declared and set.\r\nfunc (c *Config) EventAgent(kind string) (string, bool) {\r\n\tfor _, e := range c.Events {\r\n\t\tif e.Kind == kind {\r\n\t\t\treturn e.Agent, e.Agent != \"\"\r\n\t\t}\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\treturn \"\", false\r\n}\r\n\r\n// EventInstructions returns the configured freeform instructions for the\r\n// given event kind, e.g. \"Please review this pull request and respond\r\n// appropriately.\" Returns \"\" if the event isn't declared or has none.\r\nfunc (c *Config) EventInstructions(kind string) string {\r\n\tfor _, e := range c.Events {\r\n\t\tif e.Kind == kind {\r\n\t\t\treturn e.Instructions\r\n\t\t}\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\treturn \"\"\r\n}\r","start_line":120,"end_line":204,"total_lines":204,"truncated":false}
Tool 🔧 grep_search {"query": "func \\(c \\*Client\\) (Token|As)", "context_after": 15, "glob": "*.go"}
Arguments
{"query": "func \\(c \\*Client\\) (Token|As)", "context_after": 15, "glob": "*.go"}
Result
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go:37:func (c *Client) Token() string {
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-38- return c.token
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-39-}
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-40-
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-41-// As returns a new Client that authenticates as the given token.
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-42-// This is used to create per-agent clients so each agent acts as
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-43-// themselves on Forgejo, without needing a global token with sudo
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-44-// privileges.
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go:45:func (c *Client) As(token string) *Client {
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-46- client, _ := sdk.NewClient(c.baseURL, sdk.SetToken(token))
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-47- return &Client{sdk: client, baseURL: c.baseURL, token: token}
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-48-}
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-49-
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-50-// Sudo returns a new Client that impersonates username (via Forgejo's
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-51-// "Sudo:" header) on every API call it makes, using the same underlying
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-52-// token. Actions an agent takes through it — comments, labels, PRs,
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-53-// assignment — are attributed to that agent's own Forgejo account
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-54-// instead of the shared zoo identity. The token must belong to a user
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-55-// with sudo scope/admin rights for this to work; Forgejo rejects the
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-56-// header otherwise.
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-57-//
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-58-// Deprecated: use As(token) with a per-agent token instead. Kept for
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-59-// backward compatibility during migration.
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-60-func (c *Client) Sudo(username string) (*Client, error) {
--
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go:282:func (c *Client) AssignIssue(owner, repo string, index int64, username string) error {
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-283- _, _, err := c.sdk.EditIssue(owner, repo, index, sdk.EditIssueOption{Assignees: []string{username}})
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-284- if err != nil {
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-285- return fmt.Errorf("assign %s/%s#%d to %q: %w", owner, repo, index, username, err)
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-286- }
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-287-
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-288- return nil
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-289-}
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-290-
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-291-// IssueTitle fetches the title of an issue or pull request from Forgejo.
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-292-// Returns an empty string (not an error) if the client is nil or the
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-293-// issue cannot be fetched — the caller should degrade gracefully.
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-294-func (c *Client) IssueTitle(owner, repo string, index int64) string {
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-295- if c == nil || c.sdk == nil {
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-296- return ""
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-297- }
Thinking
Next, let's check system.md (the system prompt), loop.go, and the remaining files that reference git on the host side.
Tool 🔧 read_file {"path": "/project/internal/agentrun/system.md", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 200}
Arguments
{"path": "/project/internal/agentrun/system.md", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 200}
Result
{"path":"/project/internal/agentrun/system.md","content":"You are an autonomous coding agent working inside `zoo`, a system that\r\ntriggers you from Forgejo (a Gitea-family forge) issue/PR events.\r\n\r\n**Your environment**\r\n\r\n- Your working tree is at `/project`, checked out on a fresh branch off\r\n the repository's default branch. Only `/project` persists; nothing\r\n outside it survives between tool calls.\r\n- The event that triggered you (issue or pull request JSON) is available\r\n at `/event` inside the container, and is also included below.\r\n- You have a real git remote configured with push access. When you're\r\n done, `git add`/`git commit`/`git push` your branch — that's how your\r\n work gets saved. Nothing is persisted automatically.\r\n\r\n**Tools**\r\n\r\n- `bash`, `git`, `read_file`, `write_file`, `list_files`, `grep_search`,\r\n `move_file`, `remove_file` operate on the project container.\r\n- `comment`, `open_pull_request`, `request_review`, `add_label`,\r\n `remove_label`, `close_issue`, `reopen_issue`, `assign_issue` act\r\n directly on the Forgejo issue/PR that triggered this run — use\r\n `comment` to report back to the person who filed it, and\r\n `open_pull_request` once you've pushed a branch with your changes.\r\n\r\nBelow, in \"Your identity\" and \"Other agents\", you'll find your own role\r\n(from your Forgejo profile) and a roster of the other agents zoo runs,\r\neach with their own role. If a task in front of you clearly belongs to\r\nsomeone else's role, use `assign_issue` to hand it off rather than\r\ndoing it yourself.\r\n\r\n**Git**\r\n\r\nYou may use normal git commands to manage your working tree. For remote\r\n(pull, fetch, push, etc.) git operations, you can use the `git` tool.\r\n\r\n**Guidelines**\r\n\r\n- Make surgical changes: modify only what's necessary for the task in\r\n the triggering event.\r\n- Before finishing, verify your changes (re-read the file, run tests or\r\n a build if the project has them).\r\n- Always leave a `comment` summarizing what you did (or why you couldn't\r\n finish), and use `open_pull_request` when you have a change ready for\r\n review. Don't leave the issue without a response.\r","start_line":1,"end_line":44,"total_lines":44,"truncated":false}
Tool 🔧 grep_search {"query": "runGit|cloneAndBranch|gitAuthArgs", "glob": "*.go"}
Arguments
{"query": "runGit|cloneAndBranch|gitAuthArgs", "glob": "*.go"}
Result
/project/internal/agentrun/context.go:40:// gitAuthArgs) — the container this same working tree is bind-mounted
/project/internal/agentrun/context.go:46: return runGitAuthed(ctx, c.projectDir, c.token, cmdArgs...)
/project/internal/agentrun/context.go:49: return runGit(ctx, c.projectDir, cmdArgs...)
/project/internal/agentrun/clone.go:11:// gitAuthArgs returns the `-c http.extraHeader=...` global git arguments
/project/internal/agentrun/clone.go:18:func gitAuthArgs(token string) []string {
/project/internal/agentrun/clone.go:24:// cloneAndBranch clones cloneURL into dir, authenticating the clone
/project/internal/agentrun/clone.go:25:// itself with token (see gitAuthArgs), and checks out a new branch off
/project/internal/agentrun/clone.go:28:func cloneAndBranch(ctx context.Context, cloneURL, token, defaultBranch, branch, dir string) error {
/project/internal/agentrun/clone.go:29: args := append(gitAuthArgs(token), "clone", "--branch", defaultBranch, "--single-branch", cloneURL, dir)
/project/internal/agentrun/clone.go:30: if out, err := runGit(ctx, "", args...); err != nil {
/project/internal/agentrun/clone.go:34: if out, err := runGit(ctx, dir, "checkout", "-b", branch); err != nil {
/project/internal/agentrun/clone.go:41:// runGit runs a git subcommand on the host (not inside any container)
/project/internal/agentrun/clone.go:43:func runGit(ctx context.Context, dir string, args ...string) (string, error) {
/project/internal/agentrun/clone.go:54:// runGitAuthed is runGit with token attached via gitAuthArgs, for the
/project/internal/agentrun/clone.go:56:func runGitAuthed(ctx context.Context, dir, token string, args ...string) (string, error) {
/project/internal/agentrun/clone.go:57: return runGit(ctx, dir, append(gitAuthArgs(token), args...)...)
/project/internal/agentrun/run.go:130: if err := cloneAndBranch(ctx, repoInfo.CloneURL, r.forgejo.Token(), repoInfo.DefaultBranch, branch, projectDir); err != nil {
/project/internal/agentrun/run.go:141: if out, err := runGit(ctx, projectDir, "config", "user.name", gitName); err != nil {
/project/internal/agentrun/run.go:144: if out, err := runGit(ctx, projectDir, "config", "user.email", gitEmail); err != nil {
Thinking
Next, let's check `loop.go` and `roster.go` (for `gitIdentity`), and further verify how `runContext` is constructed, and whether `projectDir` is used elsewhere (e.g., in tools via context). Also, let's check `tools_test.go` to see how `Context` is mocked.
Tool 🔧 read_file {"path": "/project/internal/agentrun/roster.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 120}
Arguments
{"path": "/project/internal/agentrun/roster.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 120}
Result
{"path":"/project/internal/agentrun/roster.go","content":"package agentrun\r\n\r\nimport (\r\n\t\"fmt\"\r\n\t\"log/slog\"\r\n\t\"strings\"\r\n\r\n\t\"github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/config\"\r\n\t\"github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/forgejo\"\r\n)\r\n\r\n// agentInfo pairs a configured agent with its Forgejo profile: the bio\r\n// (what its account says it does) and the name/email used to set git\r\n// commit authorship inside its container.\r\ntype agentInfo struct {\r\n\tName string\r\n\tDescription string\r\n\tFullName string\r\n\tEmail string\r\n}\r\n\r\n// buildRoster fetches every configured agent's Forgejo profile (agent\r\n// config labels double as Forgejo usernames). A per-agent lookup failure\r\n// is logged and that agent is included with an empty profile rather than\r\n// failing the whole run — one missing/unreachable profile shouldn't\r\n// block someone else's job.\r\nfunc buildRoster(fg *forgejo.Client, agents []config.Agent, logger *slog.Logger) []agentInfo {\r\n\troster := make([]agentInfo, 0, len(agents))\r\n\r\n\tfor _, a := range agents {\r\n\t\tprofile, err := fg.AgentProfile(a.Name)\r\n\t\tif err != nil {\r\n\t\t\tlogger.Warn(\"failed to fetch agent profile from forgejo\", \"agent\", a.Name, \"error\", err)\r\n\t\t}\r\n\r\n\t\troster = append(roster, agentInfo{Name: a.Name, Description: profile.Description, FullName: profile.FullName, Email: profile.Email})\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\treturn roster\r\n}\r\n\r\n// gitIdentity returns the git commit author name/email to configure\r\n// inside self's container, from its Forgejo profile, falling back to\r\n// its agent name and a synthetic zoo.local address for whichever fields\r\n// its profile doesn't set.\r\nfunc gitIdentity(self string, roster []agentInfo) (name, email string) {\r\n\tfor _, a := range roster {\r\n\t\tif a.Name == self {\r\n\t\t\tname, email = a.FullName, a.Email\r\n\t\t\tbreak\r\n\t\t}\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tif name == \"\" {\r\n\t\tname = self\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tif email == \"\" {\r\n\t\temail = self + \"@zoo.local\"\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\treturn name, email\r\n}\r\n\r\n// identitySection renders the \"who am I / who else is there\" prompt\r\n// section injected after the static system prompt: the agent's own\r\n// Forgejo profile description, and everyone else's, so it can decide\r\n// when a task is better handed off via the assign_issue tool.\r\nfunc identitySection(self string, roster []agentInfo) string {\r\n\tvar b strings.Builder\r\n\r\n\tvar selfDesc string\r\n\tvar others []agentInfo\r\n\r\n\tfor _, a := range roster {\r\n\t\tif a.Name == self {\r\n\t\t\tselfDesc = a.Description\r\n\t\t} else {\r\n\t\t\tothers = append(others, a)\r\n\t\t}\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tfmt.Fprintf(\u0026b, \"\\n\\n## Your identity\\n\\nYou are the agent %q.\", self)\r\n\r\n\tif selfDesc != \"\" {\r\n\t\tfmt.Fprintf(\u0026b, \" Your role, from your Forgejo profile description: %s\", selfDesc)\r\n\t} else {\r\n\t\tb.WriteString(\" Your Forgejo profile has no description set.\")\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tif len(others) \u003e 0 {\r\n\t\tb.WriteString(\"\\n\\n## Other agents\\n\\nIf this task is a better fit for another agent's role, use the assign_issue tool with their name to hand it off (this reassigns the issue/PR on Forgejo, which triggers their run):\\n\")\r\n\r\n\t\tfor _, a := range others {\r\n\t\t\tdesc := a.Description\r\n\t\t\tif desc == \"\" {\r\n\t\t\t\tdesc = \"(no description set)\"\r\n\t\t\t}\r\n\r\n\t\t\tfmt.Fprintf(\u0026b, \"### %s\\n\\n%s\\n\\n\", a.Name, desc)\r\n\t\t}\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\treturn b.String()\r\n}\r","start_line":1,"end_line":105,"total_lines":105,"truncated":false}
Tool 🔧 grep_search {"query": "projectDir", "glob": "*.go"}
Arguments
{"query": "projectDir", "glob": "*.go"}
Result
/project/internal/agentrun/context.go:17: projectDir string
/project/internal/agentrun/context.go:37:// c.projectDir rather than via docker exec. Only push needs to
/project/internal/agentrun/context.go:46: return runGitAuthed(ctx, c.projectDir, c.token, cmdArgs...)
/project/internal/agentrun/context.go:49: return runGit(ctx, c.projectDir, cmdArgs...)
/project/internal/agentrun/docker_integration_test.go:57: projectDir := t.TempDir()
/project/internal/agentrun/docker_integration_test.go:60: {"init", "-q", projectDir},
/project/internal/agentrun/docker_integration_test.go:61: {"-C", projectDir, "commit", "-q", "--allow-empty", "-m", "init"},
/project/internal/agentrun/docker_integration_test.go:76: containerID, err := rt.createContainer(ctx, "golang:latest", []string{projectDir + ":/project"}, "zoo-test-git")
/project/internal/agentrun/run.go:128: projectDir := filepath.Join(workDir, "project")
/project/internal/agentrun/run.go:130: if err := cloneAndBranch(ctx, repoInfo.CloneURL, r.forgejo.Token(), repoInfo.DefaultBranch, branch, projectDir); err != nil {
/project/internal/agentrun/run.go:138: // projectDir/.git/config: the one place both this host-side clone
/project/internal/agentrun/run.go:141: if out, err := runGit(ctx, projectDir, "config", "user.name", gitName); err != nil {
/project/internal/agentrun/run.go:144: if out, err := runGit(ctx, projectDir, "config", "user.email", gitEmail); err != nil {
/project/internal/agentrun/run.go:154: projectDir + ":/project",
/project/internal/agentrun/run.go:194: projectDir: projectDir,
Thinking
Next, let's check `tools_test.go` to see how the `Context` interface is mocked in the tests, and also check `loop.go` for how the tools are invoked.
Tool 🔧 read_file {"path": "/project/internal/tools/tools_test.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 150}
Arguments
{"path": "/project/internal/tools/tools_test.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 150}
Result
{"path":"/project/internal/tools/tools_test.go","content":"package tools\r\n\r\nimport (\r\n\t\"context\"\r\n\t\"fmt\"\r\n\t\"strings\"\r\n\t\"testing\"\r\n)\r\n\r\ntype fakeForgejoActions struct {\r\n\tcomments []string\r\n\tassigned []string\r\n}\r\n\r\nfunc (f *fakeForgejoActions) Comment(body string) error {\r\n\tf.comments = append(f.comments, body)\r\n\treturn nil\r\n}\r\nfunc (f *fakeForgejoActions) OpenPullRequest(head, base, title, body string) error { return nil }\r\nfunc (f *fakeForgejoActions) RequestReview(reviewers []string) error { return nil }\r\nfunc (f *fakeForgejoActions) AddLabel(name string) error { return nil }\r\nfunc (f *fakeForgejoActions) RemoveLabel(name string) error { return nil }\r\nfunc (f *fakeForgejoActions) CloseIssue() error { return nil }\r\nfunc (f *fakeForgejoActions) ReopenIssue() error { return nil }\r\nfunc (f *fakeForgejoActions) AssignIssue(agentName string) error {\r\n\tf.assigned = append(f.assigned, agentName)\r\n\treturn nil\r\n}\r\n\r\ntype fakeContext struct {\r\n\tlastCmd string\r\n\toutput string\r\n\terr error\r\n\tfg *fakeForgejoActions\r\n\r\n\tlastGitSubcommand string\r\n\tlastGitArgs []string\r\n}\r\n\r\nfunc (f *fakeContext) Exec(ctx context.Context, command string) (string, error) {\r\n\tf.lastCmd = command\r\n\treturn f.output, f.err\r\n}\r\n\r\nfunc (f *fakeContext) Git(ctx context.Context, subcommand string, args ...string) (string, error) {\r\n\tf.lastGitSubcommand = subcommand\r\n\tf.lastGitArgs = args\r\n\treturn f.output, f.err\r\n}\r\n\r\nfunc (f *fakeContext) Forgejo() ForgejoActions {\r\n\treturn f.fg\r\n}\r\n\r\nfunc TestShellQuote(t *testing.T) {\r\n\tcases := map[string]string{\r\n\t\t\"simple\": \"'simple'\",\r\n\t\t\"it's a dir\": `'it'\\''s a dir'`,\r\n\t}\r\n\tfor in, want := range cases {\r\n\t\tif got := shellQuote(in); got != want {\r\n\t\t\tt.Errorf(\"shellQuote(%q) = %q, want %q\", in, got, want)\r\n\t\t}\r\n\t}\r\n}\r\n\r\nfunc TestReadFileParsesMetaAndContent(t *testing.T) {\r\n\tfc := \u0026fakeContext{output: \"3\\nline one\\nline two\\nline three\\n\"}\r\n\r\n\tout, err := readFile(fc, readFileParams{Path: \"src/main.go\"})\r\n\tif err != nil {\r\n\t\tt.Fatal(err)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tif !strings.Contains(fc.lastCmd, \"/project/src/main.go\") {\r\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"expected command to reference /project/src/main.go, got %q\", fc.lastCmd)\r\n\t}\r\n\tif !strings.Contains(out, \"line one\") || !strings.Contains(out, `\"total_lines\":3`) {\r\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"unexpected result: %s\", out)\r\n\t}\r\n\tif strings.Contains(out, `\"truncated\":true`) {\r\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"full read should not be truncated: %s\", out)\r\n\t}\r\n}\r\n\r\nfunc TestGitRejectsDisallowedSubcommand(t *testing.T) {\r\n\tfc := \u0026fakeContext{}\r\n\r\n\t_, err := git(fc, gitParams{Subcommand: \"push-force\"})\r\n\tif err == nil {\r\n\t\tt.Fatal(\"expected error for disallowed subcommand\")\r\n\t}\r\n}\r\n\r\nfunc TestGitPassesSubcommandAndArgsThrough(t *testing.T) {\r\n\tfc := \u0026fakeContext{output: \"ok\"}\r\n\r\n\t_, err := git(fc, gitParams{Subcommand: \"commit\", Args: []string{\"-m\", \"fix: handle it's edge case\"}})\r\n\tif err != nil {\r\n\t\tt.Fatal(err)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tif fc.lastGitSubcommand != \"commit\" {\r\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"expected subcommand %q, got %q\", \"commit\", fc.lastGitSubcommand)\r\n\t}\r\n\tif len(fc.lastGitArgs) != 2 || fc.lastGitArgs[1] != \"fix: handle it's edge case\" {\r\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"expected args passed through unescaped, got %v\", fc.lastGitArgs)\r\n\t}\r\n}\r\n\r\nfunc TestCommentToolCallsForgejo(t *testing.T) {\r\n\tfg := \u0026fakeForgejoActions{}\r\n\tfc := \u0026fakeContext{fg: fg}\r\n\r\n\tif _, err := comment(fc, commentParams{Body: \"hello\"}); err != nil {\r\n\t\tt.Fatal(err)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tif len(fg.comments) != 1 || fg.comments[0] != \"hello\" {\r\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"unexpected comments: %v\", fg.comments)\r\n\t}\r\n}\r\n\r\nfunc TestAssignIssueToolCallsForgejo(t *testing.T) {\r\n\tfg := \u0026fakeForgejoActions{}\r\n\tfc := \u0026fakeContext{fg: fg}\r\n\r\n\tout, err := assignIssue(fc, assignIssueParams{Agent: \"greg\"})\r\n\tif err != nil {\r\n\t\tt.Fatal(err)\r\n\t}\r\n\tif out != \"Assigned to greg\" {\r\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"unexpected result: %q\", out)\r\n\t}\r\n\tif len(fg.assigned) != 1 || fg.assigned[0] != \"greg\" {\r\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"unexpected assignments: %v\", fg.assigned)\r\n\t}\r\n}\r\n\r\nfunc TestGrepSearchUsesExtendedRegex(t *testing.T) {\r\n\tfc := \u0026fakeContext{output: \"/project/foo.go:1:foo|bar\\n\"}\r\n\r\n\tout, err := grepSearch(fc, grepSearchParams{Pattern: `foo|bar`})\r\n\tif err != nil {\r\n\t\tt.Fatal(err)\r\n\t}\r\n\tif !strings.Contains(fc.lastCmd, \"grep -Rn -I -E\") {\r\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"expected grep to be invoked with -E (extended regex), got %q\", fc.lastCmd)\r\n\t}\r\n\tif !strings.Contains(out, \"foo|bar\") {\r","start_line":1,"end_line":150,"total_lines":181,"truncated":true}
Tool 🔧 read_file {"path": "/project/internal/agentrun/loop.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 120}
Arguments
{"path": "/project/internal/agentrun/loop.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 120}
Result
{"path":"/project/internal/agentrun/loop.go","content":"package agentrun\r\n\r\nimport (\r\n\t\"context\"\r\n\t\"fmt\"\r\n\t\"io\"\r\n\r\n\t\"github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/llm\"\r\n\t\"github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/tools\"\r\n)\r\n\r\n// Hooks lets a caller observe a runLoop invocation live, as the model\r\n// streams and tool calls execute, in addition to the final []llm.Message\r\n// it returns. Any of these may be nil.\r\ntype Hooks struct {\r\n\t// OnReasoningDelta and OnContentDelta fire with just the newly\r\n\t// streamed text for the current turn, not the accumulated total.\r\n\tOnReasoningDelta func(delta string)\r\n\tOnContentDelta func(delta string)\r\n\r\n\t// OnTurnEnd fires once per completed streamer round-trip, after the\r\n\t// model's message for that turn is fully received and before any of\r\n\t// its tool calls run.\r\n\tOnTurnEnd func()\r\n\r\n\t// OnTool fires once per tool call, after it has run.\r\n\tOnTool func(name, arguments, result string, toolErr bool)\r\n}\r\n\r\n// runLoop is a headless port of ../a's App.generate(): send messages +\r\n// tool defs, get a completion, run any tool_calls and append their\r\n// results, repeat until a plain finish or ctx is done.\r\nfunc runLoop(ctx context.Context, client *llm.Client, toolsCtx tools.Context, messages []llm.Message, hooks Hooks) ([]llm.Message, error) {\r\n\tfor {\r\n\t\tif err := ctx.Err(); err != nil {\r\n\t\t\treturn messages, err\r\n\t\t}\r\n\r\n\t\tstreamer, err := client.StreamChatCompletion(ctx, \u0026llm.ChatCompletionRequest{\r\n\t\t\tMessages: messages,\r\n\t\t\tStream: true,\r\n\t\t\tTools: tools.All(),\r\n\t\t})\r\n\t\tif err != nil {\r\n\t\t\treturn messages, fmt.Errorf(\"chat completion: %w\", err)\r\n\t\t}\r\n\r\n\t\tvar completion *llm.ChatCompletion\r\n\r\n\t\tvar prevContent, prevReasoning string\r\n\r\n\t\tfor {\r\n\t\t\tc, err := streamer.Get()\r\n\t\t\tif err == io.EOF {\r\n\t\t\t\tbreak\r\n\t\t\t}\r\n\r\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\r\n\t\t\t\treturn messages, fmt.Errorf(\"stream completion: %w\", err)\r\n\t\t\t}\r\n\r\n\t\t\tcompletion = c\r\n\r\n\t\t\tif len(c.Choices) \u003e 0 {\r\n\t\t\t\tmsg := c.Choices[0].Message\r\n\r\n\t\t\t\tif hooks.OnReasoningDelta != nil \u0026\u0026 len(msg.ReasoningContent) \u003e len(prevReasoning) {\r\n\t\t\t\t\thooks.OnReasoningDelta(msg.ReasoningContent[len(prevReasoning):])\r\n\t\t\t\t}\r\n\t\t\t\tprevReasoning = msg.ReasoningContent\r\n\r\n\t\t\t\tif hooks.OnContentDelta != nil \u0026\u0026 len(msg.Content) \u003e len(prevContent) {\r\n\t\t\t\t\thooks.OnContentDelta(msg.Content[len(prevContent):])\r\n\t\t\t\t}\r\n\t\t\t\tprevContent = msg.Content\r\n\t\t\t}\r\n\t\t}\r\n\r\n\t\tif hooks.OnTurnEnd != nil {\r\n\t\t\thooks.OnTurnEnd()\r\n\t\t}\r\n\r\n\t\tif completion == nil || len(completion.Choices) == 0 {\r\n\t\t\treturn messages, fmt.Errorf(\"model returned an empty completion\")\r\n\t\t}\r\n\r\n\t\tchoice := completion.Choices[0]\r\n\t\tmessages = append(messages, choice.Message)\r\n\r\n\t\tif choice.FinishReason != \"tool_calls\" || len(choice.Message.ToolCalls) == 0 {\r\n\t\t\treturn messages, nil\r\n\t\t}\r\n\r\n\t\tfor _, tc := range choice.Message.ToolCalls {\r\n\t\t\tif err := ctx.Err(); err != nil {\r\n\t\t\t\treturn messages, err\r\n\t\t\t}\r\n\r\n\t\t\tresult, err := tools.Call(toolsCtx, tc.FunctionCall)\r\n\r\n\t\t\ttoolErr := err != nil\r\n\t\t\tif toolErr {\r\n\t\t\t\tresult = fmt.Sprintf(\"ERROR CALLING TOOL: %s\", err.Error())\r\n\t\t\t}\r\n\r\n\t\t\tif hooks.OnTool != nil {\r\n\t\t\t\thooks.OnTool(tc.FunctionCall.Name, tc.FunctionCall.Arguments, result, toolErr)\r\n\t\t\t}\r\n\r\n\t\t\tmessages = append(messages, llm.Message{\r\n\t\t\t\tRole: \"tool\",\r\n\t\t\t\tContent: result,\r\n\t\t\t\tToolCallID: tc.Id,\r\n\t\t\t\tName: tc.FunctionCall.Name,\r\n\t\t\t})\r\n\t\t}\r\n\t}\r\n}\r","start_line":1,"end_line":118,"total_lines":118,"truncated":false}
Thinking
Now I have a grasp of the whole picture. Let me design the changes:
## Design
**Goal (from the issue):**
1. Pass the agent's token into the sandbox so the agent can do its own git operations, including against the remote.
2. Do the initial git clone inside the sandbox.
3. No need to run git outside the sandbox.
4. `git pull` must just work inside the sandbox (probably via .gitconfig).
**Plan:**
### 1. `run.go` — reorder Run():
- Create workDir + projectDir (empty) on the host.
- Create the container with the bind mount (projectDir:/project, eventPath:/event:ro).
- Write the event file (can be done before container creation — the bind mount needs the file to exist. Actually Docker bind mounts auto-create missing files as directories, so the event file must be written before createContainer. Currently it's written before createContainer. Keep that order.)
- Inside the container, via exec:
- `git config --system --add safe.directory '*'` (existing)
- `git config --global user.name <name>` / `user.email <email>` (moved from host-side local config)
- `git config --global http.<host>.extraHeader "Authorization: Basic <b64>"` (new — this is the "put something in .gitconfig" part, scoped to the Forgejo host)
- `git clone --branch <default> --single-branch <cloneURL> /project` (new — clone inside the sandbox)
- `git -C /project checkout -b <branch>` (or since WorkingDir is /project, just `git checkout -b <branch>`)
- Remove the host-side `cloneAndBranch` call and the host-side `runGit` config calls.
Wait — one question: should the clone be `git clone <url> /project`, or `git clone <url>` (which clones into `/project/<repo>`)? The working tree has to be at `/project` (tools reference /project/...). `git clone <url> /project` clones directly into /project. Good.
### 2. Token selection
The issue says "pass the agent's token to the sandbox". The agent's token is `agent.Token` (optional in config). The current git auth uses the shared `r.forgejo.Token()`.
I think the right approach is: use the agent's own token if configured, otherwise fall back to the shared zoo token — exactly mirroring `forgejoAs`. This way pushes are attributed to the agent's Forgejo identity, consistent with the per-agent token work in PR #21.
Let me write a helper in run.go:
```go
// gitToken returns the token the sandbox's git should authenticate
// with: the agent's own Forgejo token when configured (so its pushes
// are attributed to its own identity, matching forgejoAs), falling
// back to the shared zoo identity for deployments without per-agent
// tokens.
func (r *Runner) gitToken(agent config.AgentConfig) string {
if agent.Token != "" {
return agent.Token
}
return r.forgejo.Token()
}
```
Hmm, wait, but should I do this? Let me re-read the issue: "Pass the agent's token to the sandbox so the agent can do its own git operations — even against the remote."
"the agent token" — in this codebase, "agent token" specifically refers to the per-agent token (PR #21: "Add per-agent Forgejo tokens"). So yes, use `agent.Token` with a fallback to the shared token. That's the natural reading, and it's consistent with the existing `forgejoAs` fallback pattern.
### 3. `context.go` (agentrun) — Git runs inside the container
Change `runContext.Git` to run via `c.docker.exec` inside the container, not on the host:
```go
// Git implements tools.Context.Git by running git inside the run's
// container via docker exec, against the bind-mounted working tree at
// /project. Remote operations (fetch/pull/push) authenticate through
// the token configured in the container's global gitconfig at setup
// time (see Run), so they work without any host-side involvement.
func (c *runContext) Git(ctx context.Context, subcommand string, args ...string) (string, error) {
cmd := "git " + subcommand
for _, a := range args {
cmd += " " + shellQuote(a)
}
...
}
```
Wait — how do the other tools quote arguments? Let me check shell.go / bash.go for `shellQuote`. There's a `shellQuote` in the tools package (TestShellQuote). But `runContext` is in the agentrun package. Let me see how the tools build shell commands.
Actually, wait. Let me reconsider: should the `git` tool just use `ctx.Exec` with a shell-quoted command, and drop the `Git` method from the Context interface entirely? The issue says "no need to run git outside the sandbox" — the cleanest thing is to have the git tool exec inside the container like everything else.
But the `Git` method on the Context interface exists precisely because git used to run on the host. Now that git runs inside the container, the `Git` method is redundant — the git tool can just call `Exec("git <subcommand> <args...>")`.
Options:
- A: Keep the `Git` method on the interface, implement it in runContext via docker exec.
- B: Drop the `Git` method from the interface. The git tool uses `Exec` with a properly quoted command.
Option B is cleaner and more consistent: all tools operate on the container via Exec. The `Git` method and its doc comment ("so operations that need Forgejo credentials... can authenticate without the credential being written to disk") become obsolete. The interface doc in tools/context.go also needs updating (the Exec comment says "the container never holds Forgejo credentials, so this can't reach the Forgejo API or authenticate git operations against it" — now false).
Let me go with B: drop `Git` from the interface, update the git tool to build a shell command via Exec. This removes the special-casing entirely.
Hmm, but one consideration: the git tool's args are passed as a JSON string array. To run via `sh -c`, each arg must be shell-quoted. The tools package has `shellQuote` (used in read_file etc.). Let me check shell.go.
Also, the git tool currently returns a friendly message when output is empty for diff/status. Keep that.
Also, should I update the git tool description? "Run a git subcommand with optional arguments against the project's working tree" — still fine.
And the system prompt (system.md): "For remote (pull, fetch, push, etc.) git operations, you can use the `git` tool." — now git works fully inside the container, so the agent can also use `git` directly via bash. The system prompt text is still true (the git tool is available). But maybe I should update the **Git** section to say remote operations work directly (git pull/push just work). Let me update it to reflect reality: "Git remote operations (pull, fetch, push) are pre-authenticated in the sandbox and just work."
Actually, let me be careful about how much I change the system prompt — it's the agent's instructions. A small update to the Git section is justified since the environment changed materially.
### 4. `clone.go` — delete
`gitAuthArgs`, `cloneAndBranch`, `runGit`, `runGitAuthed` all become unused. Delete the file. But wait — the base64 auth header logic is still needed to build the gitconfig extraHeader. Let me move that logic to run.go (or a small helper).
Let me design the in-container setup. After container creation:
```go
// configureGit sets up the container's git: safe.directory for the
// bind-mounted tree, the agent's commit identity, and — scoped to the
// Forgejo host only — the Authorization header that authenticates
// every remote operation (clone, fetch, pull, push) the agent runs
// inside the sandbox.
```
Commands (each via r.docker.exec):
1. `git config --system --add safe.directory '*'`
2. `git config --global user.name '...'` — needs quoting. The name comes from the Forgejo profile's FullName. Can contain spaces or apostrophes. Use shellQuote. But shellQuote is in the tools package. Hmm, agentrun imports tools (runContext implements tools.Context), so I can use `tools.ShellQuote` if it's exported... it's lowercase `shellQuote` (unexported). Let me check shell.go.
Let me read shell.go and bash.go.
3. `git config --global user.email '...'`
4. `git config --global http.<host>.extraHeader 'Authorization: Basic <b64>'`
5. `git clone --branch <default> --single-branch <cloneURL> /project`
6. `git checkout -b <branch>` (WorkingDir is /project)
For the host in `http.<host>`, parse from cloneURL. `repoInfo.CloneURL` — what does RepositoryInfo return? Let me check the forgejo client's RepositoryInfo. CloneURL is probably `https://code.stdio.dk/abrander/zoo.git`. I can parse with `url.Parse` and use `u.Host`.
Edge case: what if cloneURL is a local path or ssh? Forgejo returns http(s) clone URLs by default. The existing code uses `http.extraHeader` for the clone, so it's already assuming http(s). Parse the host, and if parsing fails or the scheme isn't http/https, skip the extraHeader config (clone will just work unauthenticated for public repos... well, not really, but that's a degenerate case). Actually, to be safe: only set the header if the URL parses as http/https.
Hmm, wait. Actually, let me reconsider using a credential helper instead of extraHeader.
Reasons to prefer `http.extraHeader`:
- Already proven in this deployment (host-side clone/push uses it).
- No extra moving parts (no helper script, no credential store file).
- Simple: one gitconfig entry.
Reasons to prefer a credential helper:
- More "standard" git auth.
- extraHeader sends the header on every request to that host even when not needed (harmless here).
I'll go with extraHeader — minimal, proven, and the issue explicitly hints at ".gitconfig".
Now, where to put the gitconfig entry: `--global` (root's ~/.gitconfig inside the container). The container runs as root (the existing --system config requires root). The agent's bash tool also runs as root. Good.
Alternative: `--system` (/etc/gitconfig) — works regardless of which user the exec runs as, and the existing safe.directory uses --system for that reason ("so this holds no matter which user a subsequent docker exec call runs as"). For consistency and robustness, I could put all git config in --system scope:
- `git config --system safe.directory '*'` (existing)
- `git config --system user.name ...`
- `git config --system user.email ...`
- `git config --system http.<host>.extraHeader ...`
Hmm, but the issue says "maybe I need to put something in .gitconfig". /etc/gitconfig is also a gitconfig (the system-level one). But the more literal reading is the user's ~/.gitconfig.
Hmm, which is better here? Considerations: the bind-mounted /project is owned by the host UID. Git inside the container runs as root. safe.directory '*' handles that. For identity + auth, either scope works.
I think --global (root's ~/.gitconfig) is the most natural "put something in .gitconfig" and it's per-container (ephemeral, one run). Let me use --global for identity and auth. Keep safe.directory as --system (existing, with a good reason documented).
Hmm, wait, actually one more consideration: `git config --global` for root writes to /root/.gitconfig. If the image's default user is root, no problem. The existing integration tests use golang:latest (root). OK.
Actually, hold on, let me reconsider --system vs --global one more time. The comment on the existing safe.directory says "--system (not --global) so this holds no matter which user a subsequent docker exec call runs as". That logic applies equally to identity and auth: if some exec runs as a different user, --global won't apply. But all execs here run as the container's default user (root) — ContainerExecCreate has no User field set, so it's the image's default. Consistent. Let me use --global for identity + auth, and keep --system for safe.directory. Hmm...
Actually, yeah, let me just use --system for everything git-related in the container. Rationale:
- Uniform: one place (/etc/gitconfig), works for any user.
- The container is a throwaway per run, so there's no concern about polluting a persistent user home.
- The existing code already writes to /etc/gitconfig (safe.directory), so the pattern is established.
But the issue literally says ".gitconfig"... /etc/gitconfig is a gitconfig file. Hmm. I think either is defensible. Let me go with --global for user identity and credentials. Reasons:
1. It's the literal ".gitconfig" the maintainer mentioned.
2. Identity is conventionally a per-user thing.
Ugh, I'm going back and forth. Let me decide: **--global** (root's ~/.gitconfig) for user.name, user.email, http.<host>.extraHeader. Keep safe.directory as --system (existing behavior, documented reason). All execs run as the same default user, so consistency is guaranteed.
Hmm, one more angle: what if the docker image's default user isn't root? Then `git config --system` (existing) would fail with permission denied and the run would error out — so the deployment already requires root (or a user with write access to /etc/gitconfig). No problem.
### 5. Clone inside the sandbox — details
`git clone --branch <default> --single-branch <cloneURL> /project`
Wait, one gotcha: `git clone <url> /project` — /project exists (Docker created it as an empty directory via the bind mount). Cloning into an existing empty directory is allowed. Good.
Then `git checkout -b <branch>`.
But wait — what about PR events? Let me check: for pr:new events, what's the branch? `branch := fmt.Sprintf("issue-%d-%s", ev.Index, agent.Name)` — same for PRs (the branch name is issue-<index>-<agent>). And the clone is always from the repo's default branch. Hmm, but for PR review events, the agent should be on the PR's head branch... Let me check how that's handled currently. The clone is always `--branch defaultBranch`. Hmm, so for PR events the agent works on a fresh branch off the default branch, not the PR's head?
Wait, let me look at the seed message and the system prompt: "Your working tree is at /project, checked out on the working branch named in the briefing below. For most events that's a fresh branch off the repository's default branch. For PR review events it's the pull request's own head branch, so commits you push update the PR directly."
But the code always clones the default branch and creates `issue-<index>-<agent>`. Hmm, so the system prompt text (which is in my own briefing!) says PR review events check out the PR's head branch, but the code doesn't do that? Let me check git log / recent changes... Actually wait, the system prompt in my briefing says "For PR review events it's the pull request's own head branch" — that text is in system.md? No — let me re-read system.md... The system.md I read above says:
"- Your working tree is at `/project`, checked out on a fresh branch off the repository's default branch. Only `/project` persists; nothing outside it survives between tool calls."
That's different from my briefing text. My briefing has extra text: "For most events that's a fresh branch off the repository's default branch. For PR review events it's the pull request's own head branch, so commits you push update the PR directly." And "For remote (pull, fetch, push, etc.) git operations, you can use the git tool."
Interesting — so my briefing's system prompt is different from the current system.md in the repo. That means the deployed zoo (the one running me) is running a newer version than this repo checkout, or the briefing was generated from a different version. Not my problem — I'm working on this repo's code. The repo's system.md is the source of truth here.
OK so the current code: always clones the default branch, creates a fresh branch. I'll preserve that behavior exactly (clone inside the sandbox: `git clone --branch <default> --single-branch <url> /project && git checkout -b <branch>`).
### 6. Event file
Currently: `eventPath := filepath.Join(workDir, "event.json")`, written before createContainer, bind-mounted as /event:ro. Keep that.
### 7. workDir/projectDir creation
Currently, cloneAndBranch creates projectDir (git clone creates it). Now I need to `os.MkdirAll(projectDir, 0o755)` before createContainer (Docker would create it, but as root-owned on the host. Better to create it explicitly with the host user's ownership — actually, ownership matters for the dubious-ownership check, but safe.directory '*' handles it. Still, creating it explicitly is cleaner).
### 8. runContext changes
- Drop the `token` field (no longer needed — auth is in the container's gitconfig).
- Drop the `projectDir` field? It's only used by Git. If Git moves to exec inside the container, projectDir isn't needed in runContext. But wait — is projectDir used elsewhere via runContext? Grep shows only context.go uses it. Drop both fields.
Wait, actually, hmm: should I keep the `Git` method on the interface? Let me think about what's cleanest for the tools package:
The git tool currently:
```go
func git(ctx Context, params gitParams) (string, error) {
if !slices.Contains(gitAllowed, params.Subcommand) { ... }
output, err := ctx.Git(context.Background(), params.Subcommand, params.Args...)
...
}
```
New version:
```go
func git(ctx Context, params gitParams) (string, error) {
if !slices.Contains(gitAllowed, params.Subcommand) { ... }
cmd := "git " + params.Subcommand
for _, arg := range params.Args {
cmd += " " + shellQuote(arg)
}
output, err := ctx.Exec(context.Background(), cmd)
...
}
```
And drop `Git` from the Context interface, drop it from fakeContext in tests, update the doc comments.
This is a clean simplification: the container is the only place git runs.
Let me check shell.go for shellQuote.
### 9. Update doc comments
- The package doc in tools/context.go: "retargeted at a Docker container (via Exec) and the Forgejo issue/PR" — still fine. The Exec comment: "The container never holds Forgejo credentials, so this can't reach the Forgejo API or authenticate git operations against it — see Git." — needs updating: the container now holds the agent's git credentials (scoped to the Forgejo host), so git remote operations work inside the sandbox. It still can't reach the Forgejo *API* (no REST client / no API token env var)... well, actually, the token is a Forgejo token, so technically the agent could hit the API with it via curl. But that's out of scope. The point is: git operations work inside the sandbox.
- The agentrun package doc in run.go: "a git clone + branch bind-mounted into a Docker container" — now the clone happens inside the container. Update: "a Docker container with a git clone + branch bind-mounted..." Let me reword: "creates the throwaway per-job environment an agent runs in: a Docker container with the repo cloned into a bind-mounted working tree, the triggering event written to /event, and the tool-calling loop driven against it."
- The git tool doc in tools/git.go: "runs subcommand via Context.Git, which executes it outside the container (see that method's doc comment for why): the container itself is never given a credential capable of authenticating against Forgejo, so pushing has to happen on the host side instead." — update: runs inside the container. Remote operations authenticate via the token configured in the container's gitconfig.
### 10. Tests
- `tools_test.go`: fakeContext.Git — drop it. TestGitPassesSubcommandAndArgsThrough — update to check the shell command via lastCmd. E.g., expect `git commit -m 'fix: handle it'\''s edge case'`. Let me check the shellQuote implementation to predict the exact quoting.
- `docker_integration_test.go`: TestDockerRuntimeGitSafeDirectory — still valid (safe.directory is still applied). No changes needed.
- Add an integration test for the new in-container clone? Would need a real Forgejo remote — not feasible in a unit test. The existing integration tests use local git. I could add a test that verifies the gitconfig-based auth works: create a local bare repo, set up a container with an extraHeader for the local host... but a local file:// or path remote doesn't use http.extraHeader. I could stand up a local HTTP server... that's heavy. Let me keep the integration tests as-is, and maybe add a small test for the host-parsing helper (extracting the host from the clone URL).
Let me check what `RepositoryInfo` returns (the CloneURL field).
### 11. `seed_test.go` — check that it doesn't reference clone.
Let me also check `web.go` and other places that reference the clone or host git... grep for "clone" across the repo.
OK, let me read shell.go, bash.go, and the forgejo client's RepositoryInfo.
Tool 🔧 read_file {"path": "/project/internal/tools/shell.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 80}
Arguments
{"path": "/project/internal/tools/shell.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 80}
Result
{"path":"/project/internal/tools/shell.go","content":"package tools\r\n\r\nimport (\r\n\t\"context\"\r\n\t\"encoding/base64\"\r\n\t\"fmt\"\r\n\t\"strings\"\r\n)\r\n\r\n// shellQuote wraps s in single quotes for safe interpolation into a `sh\r\n// -c` command string, escaping any embedded single quotes.\r\nfunc shellQuote(s string) string {\r\n\treturn \"'\" + strings.ReplaceAll(s, \"'\", `'\\''`) + \"'\"\r\n}\r\n\r\nfunc resolvePath(path string) string {\r\n\tif path == \"\" {\r\n\t\treturn \"/project\"\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tif path == \".\" || path == \"./\" {\r\n\t\treturn \"/project\"\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tif strings.HasPrefix(path, \"/project/\") {\r\n\t\treturn path\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tif !strings.HasPrefix(path, \"/\") {\r\n\t\treturn \"/project/\" + strings.TrimPrefix(path, \"/\")\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\treturn path\r\n}\r\n\r\nfunc shellReadFile(ctx Context, path string) ([]byte, error) {\r\n\tp := resolvePath(path)\r\n\r\n\t// We use base64 encoding to avoid issues with binary data and\r\n\t// special characters in the file content. The output of the command\r\n\t// will be base64-encoded, which we then decode in Go.\r\n\toutput, err := ctx.Exec(context.Background(), \"base64 \"+shellQuote(p))\r\n\tif err != nil {\r\n\t\treturn nil, err\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tdecoded, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(output)\r\n\tif err != nil {\r\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"decode base64 output of %q: %w\", path, err)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\treturn decoded, nil\r\n}\r\n\r\nfunc shellWriteFile(ctx Context, path string, content []byte) error {\r\n\tp := resolvePath(path)\r\n\tencoded := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(content)\r\n\r\n\tcmd := fmt.Sprintf(\r\n\t\t`mkdir -p \"$(dirname %s)\" \u0026\u0026 echo %s | base64 -d \u003e %s`,\r\n\t\tshellQuote(p), shellQuote(encoded), shellQuote(p))\r\n\r\n\t_, err := ctx.Exec(context.Background(), cmd)\r\n\tif err != nil {\r\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"write %q: %w\", path, err)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\treturn nil\r\n}\r","start_line":1,"end_line":69,"total_lines":69,"truncated":false}
Tool 🔧 grep_search {"query": "CloneURL|RepositoryInfo", "glob": "*.go", "context_after": 8}
Arguments
{"query": "CloneURL|RepositoryInfo", "glob": "*.go", "context_after": 8}
Result
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go:221:// RepositoryInfo returns the pieces of repo metadata agentrun needs to
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-222-// clone and branch off of the right place.
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go:223:type RepositoryInfo struct {
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-224- DefaultBranch string
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go:225: CloneURL string
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-226-}
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-227-
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go:228:func (c *Client) RepositoryInfo(owner, repo string) (RepositoryInfo, error) {
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-229- r, _, err := c.sdk.GetRepo(owner, repo)
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-230- if err != nil {
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go:231: return RepositoryInfo{}, fmt.Errorf("get repo %s/%s: %w", owner, repo, err)
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-232- }
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-233-
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go:234: return RepositoryInfo{DefaultBranch: r.DefaultBranch, CloneURL: r.CloneURL}, nil
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-235-}
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-236-
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-237-func (c *Client) setIssueState(owner, repo string, index int64, state sdk.StateType) error {
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-238- _, _, err := c.sdk.EditIssue(owner, repo, index, sdk.EditIssueOption{State: &state})
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-239- if err != nil {
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-240- return fmt.Errorf("set state %q on %s/%s#%d: %w", state, owner, repo, index, err)
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-241- }
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go-242-
--
/project/internal/agentrun/clone.go:24:// cloneAndBranch clones cloneURL into dir, authenticating the clone
/project/internal/agentrun/clone.go-25-// itself with token (see gitAuthArgs), and checks out a new branch off
/project/internal/agentrun/clone.go-26-// of defaultBranch. token never ends up in the resulting working tree:
/project/internal/agentrun/clone.go:27:// the origin remote is left with the plain cloneURL.
/project/internal/agentrun/clone.go:28:func cloneAndBranch(ctx context.Context, cloneURL, token, defaultBranch, branch, dir string) error {
/project/internal/agentrun/clone.go:29: args := append(gitAuthArgs(token), "clone", "--branch", defaultBranch, "--single-branch", cloneURL, dir)
/project/internal/agentrun/clone.go-30- if out, err := runGit(ctx, "", args...); err != nil {
/project/internal/agentrun/clone.go-31- return fmt.Errorf("clone: %w: %s", err, out)
/project/internal/agentrun/clone.go-32- }
/project/internal/agentrun/clone.go-33-
/project/internal/agentrun/clone.go-34- if out, err := runGit(ctx, dir, "checkout", "-b", branch); err != nil {
/project/internal/agentrun/clone.go-35- return fmt.Errorf("checkout branch %q: %w: %s", branch, err, out)
/project/internal/agentrun/clone.go-36- }
/project/internal/agentrun/clone.go-37-
--
/project/internal/agentrun/run.go:107: repoInfo, err := r.forgejo.RepositoryInfo(ev.Owner, ev.Repo)
/project/internal/agentrun/run.go-108- if err != nil {
/project/internal/agentrun/run.go-109- return fmt.Errorf("look up repository: %w", err)
/project/internal/agentrun/run.go-110- }
/project/internal/agentrun/run.go-111-
/project/internal/agentrun/run.go-112- workDir, err := os.MkdirTemp("", "zoo-run-*")
/project/internal/agentrun/run.go-113- if err != nil {
/project/internal/agentrun/run.go-114- return fmt.Errorf("create work dir: %w", err)
/project/internal/agentrun/run.go-115- }
--
/project/internal/agentrun/run.go:130: if err := cloneAndBranch(ctx, repoInfo.CloneURL, r.forgejo.Token(), repoInfo.DefaultBranch, branch, projectDir); err != nil {
/project/internal/agentrun/run.go-131- return fmt.Errorf("prepare git working tree: %w", err)
/project/internal/agentrun/run.go-132- }
/project/internal/agentrun/run.go-133-
/project/internal/agentrun/run.go-134- roster := buildRoster(r.forgejo, r.cfg.Agents, logger)
/project/internal/agentrun/run.go-135- gitName, gitEmail := gitIdentity(agent.Name, roster)
/project/internal/agentrun/run.go-136-
/project/internal/agentrun/run.go-137- // Local (not --global) scope, so this identity lives in
/project/internal/agentrun/run.go-138- // projectDir/.git/config: the one place both this host-side clone
Thinking
Now I have everything I need. Let me also check `seed_test.go` and `roster_test.go` to make sure I don't break the tests, and check the `bash.go` tool too for context.
Actually, let me quickly check seed_test.go and see if there are any other references to host-side git (e.g., in the web dashboard or scheduler).
Tool 🔧 read_file {"path": "/project/internal/agentrun/seed_test.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 60}
Arguments
{"path": "/project/internal/agentrun/seed_test.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 60}
Result
{"path":"/project/internal/agentrun/seed_test.go","content":"package agentrun\r\n\r\nimport (\r\n\t\"strings\"\r\n\t\"testing\"\r\n\t\"time\"\r\n\r\n\t\"github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/forgejo\"\r\n)\r\n\r\nfunc TestSeedMessageIncludesInstructions(t *testing.T) {\r\n\tev := forgejo.Event{Kind: \"issue:comment\", Owner: \"acme\", Repo: \"widgets\", Index: 5, Title: \"t\", Body: \"b\", Raw: []byte(`{}`)}\r\n\r\n\tmsg := seedMessage(ev, \"issue-5-leon\", \"main\", \"Please review the comment and respond appropriately.\", nil)\r\n\r\n\tif !strings.Contains(msg, \"Instructions for this event, from zoo.hcl:\\nPlease review the comment and respond appropriately.\") {\r\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"expected instructions section, got: %s\", msg)\r\n\t}\r\n}\r\n\r\nfunc TestSeedMessageOmitsEmptyInstructions(t *testing.T) {\r\n\tev := forgejo.Event{Kind: \"pr:new\", Owner: \"acme\", Repo: \"widgets\", Index: 9, Raw: []byte(`{}`)}\r\n\r\n\tmsg := seedMessage(ev, \"issue-9-greg\", \"main\", \"\", nil)\r\n\r\n\tif strings.Contains(msg, \"Instructions for this event\") {\r\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"expected no instructions section, got: %s\", msg)\r\n\t}\r\n}\r\n\r\nfunc TestSeedMessageIncludesAllComments(t *testing.T) {\r\n\tev := forgejo.Event{Kind: \"issue:assigned\", Owner: \"acme\", Repo: \"widgets\", Index: 5, Title: \"t\", Body: \"b\", Raw: []byte(`{}`)}\r\n\r\n\tcomments := []forgejo.IssueComment{\r\n\t\t{Author: \"alice\", Body: \"Please also handle the edge case.\", Created: time.Date(2026, 8, 24, 9, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)},\r\n\t\t{Author: \"bob\", Body: \"And add a test for it.\", Created: time.Date(2026, 8, 24, 9, 5, 0, 0, time.UTC)},\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tmsg := seedMessage(ev, \"issue-5-greg\", \"main\", \"\", comments)\r\n\r\n\tfor _, want := range []string{\r\n\t\t\"Comments (2):\",\r\n\t\t\"1. alice (2026-08-24T09:00:00Z):\\nPlease also handle the edge case.\",\r\n\t\t\"2. bob (2026-08-24T09:05:00Z):\\nAnd add a test for it.\",\r\n\t} {\r\n\t\tif !strings.Contains(msg, want) {\r\n\t\t\tt.Fatalf(\"expected %q in seed message, got:\\n%s\", want, msg)\r\n\t\t}\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\t// Comments come before the raw payload, so the agent reads them\r\n\t// as part of the briefing, not buried in JSON.\r\n\tif !strings.Contains(msg, \"Comments (2):\") ||\r\n\t\tstrings.Index(msg, \"Comments (2):\") \u003e strings.Index(msg, \"Full event payload:\") {\r\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"expected comments section before the raw payload, got:\\n%s\", msg)\r\n\t}\r\n}\r\n\r\nfunc TestSeedMessageOmitsEmptyComments(t *testing.T) {\r\n\tev := forgejo.Event{Kind: \"issue:new\", Owner: \"acme\", Repo: \"widgets\", Index: 5, Title: \"t\", Body: \"b\", Raw: []byte(`{}`)}\r","start_line":1,"end_line":60,"total_lines":67,"truncated":true}
Tool 🔧 grep_search {"query": "host-side|outside the container|on the host", "glob": "*.go"}
Arguments
{"query": "host-side|outside the container|on the host", "glob": "*.go"}
Result
/project/internal/tools/context.go:19: // host, outside the container, so that operations needing a Forgejo /project/internal/tools/git.go:50:// Forgejo, so pushing has to happen on the host side instead. /project/internal/forgejo/client.go:34:// authenticating a host-side git clone/push against Forgejo (see /project/internal/agentrun/context.go:36:// Git implements tools.Context.Git by running git on the host against /project/internal/agentrun/clone.go:41:// runGit runs a git subcommand on the host (not inside any container) /project/internal/agentrun/run.go:138: // projectDir/.git/config: the one place both this host-side clone /project/internal/agentrun/run.go:175: // configured host-side, above, with --local scope so it's visible
Thinking
Let's also check the comment on line 34 of forgejo/client.go:
Tool 🔧 read_file {"end_line": 50, "path": "/project/internal/forgejo/client.go", "start_line": 1}
Arguments
{"end_line": 50, "path": "/project/internal/forgejo/client.go", "start_line": 1}
Result
{"path":"/project/internal/forgejo/client.go","content":"// Package forgejo wraps the Forgejo SDK and turns webhook deliveries and\r\n// polling results into a common Event stream for the scheduler.\r\npackage forgejo\r\n\r\nimport (\r\n\t\"fmt\"\r\n\t\"time\"\r\n\r\n\tsdk \"codeberg.org/mvdkleijn/forgejo-sdk/forgejo/v2\"\r\n\r\n\t\"github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/config\"\r\n)\r\n\r\n// Client is zoo's single shared Forgejo identity, used both for the\r\n// event sources (webhook/poll) and for actions agents/scheduler take\r\n// (comments, labels, PRs).\r\ntype Client struct {\r\n\tsdk *sdk.Client\r\n\r\n\tbaseURL string\r\n\ttoken string\r\n}\r\n\r\nfunc NewClient(cfg config.Forgejo) (*Client, error) {\r\n\tc, err := sdk.NewClient(cfg.URL, sdk.SetToken(cfg.Token))\r\n\tif err != nil {\r\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"forgejo client: %w\", err)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\treturn \u0026Client{sdk: c, baseURL: cfg.URL, token: cfg.Token}, nil\r\n}\r\n\r\n// Token returns the shared zoo Forgejo identity's token, e.g. for\r\n// authenticating a host-side git clone/push against Forgejo (see\r\n// internal/agentrun) without ever writing the credential into a working\r\n// tree an agent's container can read.\r\nfunc (c *Client) Token() string {\r\n\treturn c.token\r\n}\r\n\r\n// As returns a new Client that authenticates as the given token.\r\n// This is used to create per-agent clients so each agent acts as\r\n// themselves on Forgejo, without needing a global token with sudo\r\n// privileges.\r\nfunc (c *Client) As(token string) *Client {\r\n\tclient, _ := sdk.NewClient(c.baseURL, sdk.SetToken(token))\r\n\treturn \u0026Client{sdk: client, baseURL: c.baseURL, token: token}\r\n}\r\n\r\n// Sudo returns a new Client that impersonates username (via Forgejo's\r","start_line":1,"end_line":50,"total_lines":305,"truncated":true}
Thinking
Now I have a grasp of the whole picture. Let me lay out the implementation plan:
## Implementation Plan
### 1. `internal/agentrun/run.go`
Restructure `Run()`:
```go
func (r *Runner) Run(ctx context.Context, jobID string, agent config.AgentConfig, llmCfg config.LLM, dockerImage string, ev forgejo.Event) error {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, r.timeout)
defer cancel()
logger := r.logger.With("job", jobID, "agent", agent.Name)
repoInfo, err := r.forgejo.RepositoryInfo(ev.Owner, ev.Repo)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("look up repository: %w", err)
}
workDir, err := os.MkdirTemp("", "zoo-run-*")
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("create work dir: %w", err)
}
succeeded := false
defer func() {
if succeeded || !r.keepOnFailure {
os.RemoveAll(workDir)
} else {
logger.Warn("keeping work dir after failure", "dir", workDir)
}
}()
branch := fmt.Sprintf("issue-%d-%s", ev.Index, agent.Name)
projectDir := filepath.Join(workDir, "project")
if err := os.MkdirAll(projectDir, 0o755); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("create project dir: %w", err)
}
roster := buildRoster(r.forgejo, r.cfg.Agents, logger)
gitName, gitEmail := gitIdentity(agent.Name, roster)
eventPath := filepath.Join(workDir, "event.json")
if err := os.WriteFile(eventPath, ev.Raw, 0o644); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("write event file: %w", err)
}
containerID, err := r.docker.createContainer(ctx, dockerImage, []string{
projectDir + ":/project",
eventPath + ":/event:ro",
}, fmt.Sprintf("zoo-issue-%d-%s", ev.Index, agent.Name))
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("start container: %w", err)
}
defer func() {
cleanupCtx, cleanupCancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 30*time.Second)
defer cleanupCancel()
if err := r.docker.remove(cleanupCtx, containerID); err != nil {
logger.Warn("failed to remove container", "container", containerID, "error", err)
}
}()
if err := r.setupGit(ctx, containerID, repoInfo.CloneURL, gitToken, gitName, gitEmail, repoInfo.DefaultBranch, branch); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("prepare git working tree in sandbox: %w", err)
}
...
}
```
And a new helper `setupGit` (put it in clone.go? no — rename clone.go to sandbox.go or gitsetup.go). Actually, since clone.go is going to be deleted, let me create a new file `sandbox.go` (or keep the name clone.go and rewrite its contents). I think a rewrite of `clone.go` → new file `sandboxgit.go` is... hmm, let me think about naming. This file will contain:
- `gitToken(agent)` — token selection (or inline in run.go)
- `configureSandboxGit(ctx, containerID, cloneURL, token, name, email, defaultBranch, branch)` — runs the setup commands
- `hostFromURL` helper
- `basicAuthHeader(token)` helper
Should I rewrite `clone.go` as `sandbox.go`? Actually, the simplest thing is: delete clone.go and add the new helpers to a new file `sandboxgit.go`. Hmm, or just keep the filename clone.go and replace its contents — git history will show a rewrite. For clarity I'll create a new file `sandbox.go` and delete clone.go.
Wait, actually — the token selection. Let me reconsider whether to use the agent's token or the shared token.
The issue title: "Pass the token to the sandbox". Body: "Pass the agent token to the sandbox to enable agents to make their own git operations - even on the remote."
"the agent token" — per-agent tokens were added in PR #21 ("Add per-agent Forgejo tokens, deprecate Sudo: header approach"). In the config, each agent can have `token`. So "the agent token" = `agent.Token`.
But what if the agent has no token configured? Fallback to the shared zoo token (same as forgejoAs). This keeps existing deployments working.
So:
```go
// gitToken picks the token the sandbox's git authenticates with: the
// agent's own Forgejo token when configured, so its commits and pushes
// are attributed to its own identity (matching forgejoAs), falling
// back to the shared zoo identity for agents without a per-agent token.
func (r *Runner) gitToken(agent config.AgentConfig) string {
if agent.Token != "" {
return agent.Token
}
return r.forgejo.Token()
}
```
### setupGit implementation
```go
// setupGit prepares the container's git environment and clones the
// repo into /project — all inside the sandbox, so the host never runs
// git. It configures, in the container's global gitconfig:
//
// - the agent's commit identity (user.name/user.email),
// - an Authorization header scoped to the Forgejo host, so every
// remote operation the agent runs in the sandbox (clone, fetch,
// pull, push) authenticates with token and "just works".
//
// safe.directory is set at --system scope (see Run) so it holds
// regardless of which user a later exec runs as.
func setupGit(ctx context.Context, docker *dockerRuntime, containerID, cloneURL, token, name, email, defaultBranch, branch string) error {
commands := []string{
"git config --system --add safe.directory '*'",
"git config --global user.name " + shellQuote(name),
"git config --global user.email " + shellQuote(email),
}
if host, ok := gitHost(cloneURL); ok {
commands = append(commands,
"git config --global http."+host+".extraHeader "+shellQuote("Authorization: Basic "+basicAuth(token)))
}
commands = append(commands,
"git clone --branch "+shellQuote(defaultBranch)+" --single-branch "+shellQuote(cloneURL)+" /project",
"git checkout -b "+shellQuote(branch),
)
for _, cmd := range commands {
out, exitCode, err := docker.exec(ctx, containerID, cmd)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("%s: %w", cmd, err)
}
if exitCode != 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("%s: exit %d: %s", cmd, exitCode, out)
}
}
return nil
}
```
Wait — `shellQuote` is in the tools package and unexported. agentrun already imports tools. Options:
- Export it: `tools.ShellQuote`.
- Duplicate a small helper in agentrun.
Exporting `ShellQuote` from tools is reasonable — it's a generally useful helper, and agentrun is the main consumer. Hmm, but that widens the tools package API. Alternatively, put a local `shellQuote` in agentrun. A 2-line function; duplication is trivial but ugly.
Hmm. Actually — wait. Let me reconsider. Is there a way to avoid shell quoting entirely for the setup commands? I could use `git config --global key value` with the value passed via... exec only takes a single command string (sh -c). So quoting is needed for arbitrary values (names with spaces, URLs, etc.).
I'll export `ShellQuote` from tools and use it in agentrun. Actually wait, let me check: does agentrun import tools? Yes — context.go imports "github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/tools". Good.
Hmm, but wait — is it weird for agentrun to depend on a shell-quoting helper from tools? tools is "the registry of functions an agent's tool-calling loop can invoke". ShellQuote is an internal detail. Alternatively, I could move shellQuote to a small shared package... that's over-engineering. Let me just export it from tools with a clear doc comment. Actually, hmm, let me think again.
Alternative: do the setup in a different way that doesn't need quoting:
- `git config --global user.name` — name comes from Forgejo profile (FullName). Could be "Greg Coolio" (with space) — needs quoting.
- cloneURL — from Forgejo, a well-formed URL, but could theoretically contain special chars (unlikely; URLs with spaces are invalid).
- branch — `issue-38-greg`, safe chars.
- extraHeader value — base64 + "Authorization: Basic " — safe chars (base64 is A-Za-z0-9+/=, plus the fixed prefix with a space — the space needs quoting).
So quoting is needed. I'll export ShellQuote from tools. Clean enough.
Actually, wait — even simpler: I could write the setup as a single shell script passed to exec, with values quoted just once. Same thing. Let me go with a list of commands.
One more point: `git clone ... /project` — if the clone fails (e.g., bad token), the error message will include git's output. Good.
Also: `git checkout -b branch` — WorkingDir is /project, so it runs in /project. Good.
### 2. `internal/agentrun/context.go`
```go
type runContext struct {
docker *dockerRuntime
containerID string
forgejo tools.ForgejoActions
}
func (c *runContext) Exec(ctx context.Context, command string) (string, error) { ... unchanged ... }
// Git implements tools.Context.Git by running git inside the run's
// container via docker exec, against the bind-mounted working tree at
// /project. Remote operations (fetch, pull, push) authenticate through
// the Authorization header Run() puts in the container's global
// gitconfig, so they work with no host-side involvement.
func (c *runContext) Git(ctx context.Context, subcommand string, args ...string) (string, error) {
cmd := "git " + subcommand
for _, a := range args {
cmd += " " + tools.ShellQuote(a)
}
return c.Exec(ctx, cmd)
}
```
Hmm wait, decision: keep the `Git` method on the interface, or drop it and have the git tool use Exec?
Let me think about which is better for the codebase:
Keeping `Git` on the interface:
- The git tool stays clean (no shell-quoting logic in the tool; the Context implementation handles it).
- The interface documents the git-specific behavior.
- Tests: fakeContext.Git records subcommand/args — tests stay meaningful.
Dropping `Git`:
- One less interface method; everything goes through Exec.
- But then the git tool has to build a shell string with quoting — tool-level shell quoting is exactly what the other tools do (read_file etc. build shell commands). So it's consistent with the rest of the tools package!
Looking at the tools package: every tool (read_file, write_file, grep_search, bash) builds a shell command and calls ctx.Exec. The git tool is the only one using a special ctx.Git. From a consistency standpoint, dropping Git and having the git tool use Exec with ShellQuote is more uniform.
But the interface method `Git` also serves as documentation of intent. Hmm.
The issue says "There should be no need to run git outside the sandbox." Both options satisfy that.
I'll go with **dropping `Git` from the interface** — it's a simplification, and it makes the git tool consistent with every other tool (all operate on the container via Exec). The doc comment on the interface's Exec will be updated to reflect that the container now holds git credentials.
Wait, but there's a subtlety: the git tool currently uses `context.Background()` for ctx.Git — it ignores the passed ctx. Let me look:
```go
func git(ctx Context, params gitParams) (string, error) {
...
output, err := ctx.Git(context.Background(), params.Subcommand, params.Args...)
```
Interesting — it passes context.Background(), not the run's ctx. The other tools do the same (shellReadFile uses context.Background()). Hmm, that's the existing pattern — tool calls use background context so a cancelled run ctx doesn't... hmm, actually wait, that seems wrong (a timed-out run should stop the tool), but it's the existing pattern across all tools. Let me check bash.go:
Tool 🔧 read_file {"path": "/project/internal/tools/bash.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 80}
Arguments
{"path": "/project/internal/tools/bash.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 80}
Result
{"path":"/project/internal/tools/bash.go","content":"package tools\r\n\r\nimport (\r\n\t\"context\"\r\n\t\"fmt\"\r\n\t\"time\"\r\n\r\n\t\"github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/llm\"\r\n)\r\n\r\nconst maxTimeout = 300\r\n\r\ntype bashParams struct {\r\n\tCommand string `json:\"command\"`\r\n\tTimeout int `json:\"timeout,omitempty\"`\r\n}\r\n\r\nfunc init() {\r\n\ttool := llm.NewTool(\r\n\t\t\"bash\",\r\n\t\t\"Execute a shell command in the project container. Use this to run shell commands and scripts.\")\r\n\r\n\ttool.AddStringProperty(\"command\", \"The shell command to execute\", true)\r\n\ttool.AddIntegerProperty(\"timeout\", \"Optional timeout in seconds. Must not exceed 300 seconds.\", false)\r\n\r\n\tRegister(tool, bash)\r\n}\r\n\r\nfunc bash(ctx Context, params bashParams) (string, error) {\r\n\tif params.Timeout \u003c 0 {\r\n\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"timeout must not be negative\")\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tif params.Timeout \u003e maxTimeout {\r\n\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"timeout exceeds maximum of %d seconds\", maxTimeout)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tvar execCtx context.Context\r\n\tvar cancel context.CancelFunc\r\n\r\n\tif params.Timeout \u003e 0 {\r\n\t\texecCtx, cancel = context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), time.Duration(params.Timeout)*time.Second)\r\n\t} else {\r\n\t\texecCtx, cancel = context.WithCancel(context.Background())\r\n\t}\r\n\tdefer cancel()\r\n\r\n\toutput, err := ctx.Exec(execCtx, params.Command)\r\n\tif err != nil {\r\n\t\tif execCtx.Err() == context.DeadlineExceeded {\r\n\t\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"command timed out after %d seconds\", params.Timeout)\r\n\t\t}\r\n\r\n\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"command failed: %w\", err)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\treturn output, nil\r\n}\r","start_line":1,"end_line":58,"total_lines":58,"truncated":false}
Tool 🔧 read_file {"path": "/project/internal/tools/registry.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 80}
Arguments
{"path": "/project/internal/tools/registry.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 80}
Result
{"path":"/project/internal/tools/registry.go","content":"package tools\r\n\r\nimport (\r\n\t\"encoding/json\"\r\n\t\"fmt\"\r\n\r\n\t\"github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/llm\"\r\n)\r\n\r\ntype toolFunc[P any] func(Context, P) (string, error)\r\n\r\ntype tool struct {\r\n\ttool llm.Tool\r\n\tcall func(ctx Context, args string) (string, error)\r\n}\r\n\r\nvar registry = map[string]tool{}\r\n\r\n// All lists all known tools.\r\nfunc All() []llm.Tool {\r\n\tts := make([]llm.Tool, 0, len(registry))\r\n\r\n\tfor _, t := range registry {\r\n\t\tts = append(ts, t.tool)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\treturn ts\r\n}\r\n\r\n// Register registers a tool function with the given definition. The\r\n// registry is a stateless name-\u003efunc map shared across concurrent runs;\r\n// all per-run state lives in the Context passed to Call.\r\nfunc Register[P any](def llm.Tool, fun toolFunc[P]) {\r\n\tif def.Type != \"function\" {\r\n\t\tpanic(\"tool must be a function\")\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tif def.Function.Name == \"\" {\r\n\t\tpanic(\"tool function must have a name\")\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tif _, found := registry[def.Function.Name]; found {\r\n\t\tpanic(fmt.Sprintf(\"tool with name %q already registered\", def.Function.Name))\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tregistry[def.Function.Name] = tool{\r\n\t\ttool: def,\r\n\t\tcall: func(ctx Context, args string) (string, error) {\r\n\t\t\tvar params P\r\n\r\n\t\t\tif err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(args), \u0026params); err != nil {\r\n\t\t\t\treturn \"\", err\r\n\t\t\t}\r\n\r\n\t\t\treturn fun(ctx, params)\r\n\t\t},\r\n\t}\r\n}\r\n\r\n// Call invokes a registered tool by name with the given (raw JSON)\r\n// arguments, against the given run's Context.\r\nfunc Call(ctx Context, fcall llm.FunctionCall) (string, error) {\r\n\tt, found := registry[fcall.Name]\r\n\tif !found {\r\n\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"unknown function: %s\", fcall.Name)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\treturn t.call(ctx, fcall.Arguments)\r\n}\r","start_line":1,"end_line":69,"total_lines":69,"truncated":false}
Thinking
OK. The pattern is clear: the tool constructs a shell command and calls `ctx.Exec` with a context derived from `context.Background()` (with a timeout for bash). The git tool follows the same pattern: build a `git <subcommand> <quoted args>` command and call `ctx.Exec(context.Background(), cmd)`.
Alright, let's finalize the design and write the code.
## Final Plan
### Files to change:
1. **`internal/agentrun/clone.go`** → delete. Replace with **`internal/agentrun/sandbox.go`** (new), containing:
- `basicAuthHeader(token string) string` — "Authorization: Basic base64(zoo:token)"
- `gitHost(cloneURL string) (string, bool)` — parse the host from an http(s) URL
- `setupSandboxGit(ctx, docker, containerID, cloneURL, token, name, email, defaultBranch, branch string) error` — runs the setup commands inside the container.
2. **`internal/agentrun/run.go`**:
- Update the package doc.
- `Run()`:
- MkdirAll projectDir
- Write the event file
- createContainer
- `setupSandboxGit` (clone + branch + identity + credentials + safe.directory)
- Remove the host-side clone and host-side git config
- runContext without token/projectDir
- Add a `gitToken` method (agent token or shared).
3. **`internal/agentrun/context.go`**:
- Remove the `token` and `projectDir` fields.
- Remove the `Git` method (the tool uses Exec directly).
- Update the doc comments.
4. **`internal/tools/context.go`**:
- Remove the `Git` method from the `Context` interface.
- Update the `Exec` doc comment: the container now holds git credentials scoped to the Forgejo host, so git remote operations work inside the sandbox.
5. **`internal/tools/git.go`**:
- The `git` tool builds a shell command and calls `ctx.Exec`.
- Update the doc comment.
6. **`internal/tools/shell.go`**:
- Export `shellQuote` as `ShellQuote`? Wait — if the git tool is inside the tools package, it can use the unexported `shellQuote` directly. And agentrun needs it for the setup commands. So export it: `ShellQuote`. Update the callers (read_file, write_file use shellQuote — rename to ShellQuote).
Hmm wait, actually — do I want agentrun to import tools just for ShellQuote? agentrun already imports tools (for the Context/ForgejoActions interfaces). No problem.
Alternatively, keep shellQuote unexported and add a small local copy in agentrun… no, exporting is cleaner. Rename to `ShellQuote` and update the two call sites in shell.go.
7. **`internal/tools/tools_test.go`**:
- Remove `Git` from `fakeContext`.
- `TestGitPassesSubcommandAndArgsThrough`: verify that `fc.lastCmd` contains the properly quoted command.
- `TestGitRejectsDisallowedSubcommand`: no change (it errors before Exec).
8. **`internal/agentrun/system.md`**:
- Update the **Git** section: remote operations work directly inside the sandbox (pre-authenticated).
9. **`internal/forgejo/client.go`**:
- Update the `Token()` doc comment (it's no longer for "host-side git clone/push").
10. **`internal/agentrun/docker_integration_test.go`**:
- TestDockerRuntimeGitSafeDirectory still applies (safe.directory is still set inside the container). No change needed.
- Should I add an integration test for setupSandboxGit? It needs a real git remote over HTTP. I could stand up a small local HTTP git server in the test, but… that's too heavy. Alternative: test the pure helpers (gitHost, basicAuthHeader) in a unit test file. Let me add `sandbox_test.go` with unit tests for `gitHost` and `basicAuthHeader`.
Wait, one more thing to double-check: the `exec` environment in docker.go. The exec sets `GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT=0` etc. When git uses the extraHeader from the global config, no prompt occurs. Good.
But wait — one important detail: the `exec` environment sets `GIT_CONFIG_COUNT=1`, `GIT_CONFIG_KEY_0=color.ui`, `GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_0=never`. These environment variables override the config file (env vars take precedence over the system/global config). They only set color.ui, so they don't affect http.extraHeader. Good.
Another detail: the `sh -c` command string for `git config --global http.code.stdio.dk.extraHeader 'Authorization: Basic ...'`. The key contains a dot — no problem for git config.
Now — the base64 username: the existing code uses `"zoo:" + token`. For per-agent tokens, the username "zoo" is… hmm. In Forgejo, does Basic auth for git over HTTP require the username to match the token's owner? Let me think. Forgejo (Gitea): for git http basic auth, the token can be a personal access token, and the username can be anything? Actually, in Gitea, when authenticating with a token via basic auth, the username must match the token owner's username, or… let me recall. Gitea's docs: "You can use a personal access token as the password, with the username being the account name" — actually, in Gitea, for HTTP basic auth with a PAT, the username can be anything as long as the token is valid? No wait…
From the Gitea docs (https://docs.gitea.com/usage/git/git-credentials): "You can use a personal access token as the password, and the username can be anything" — hmm, I think in Gitea the username is ignored for token auth (any username + valid token works). Let me verify: in Gitea's `NewContext`/auth middleware, for basic auth it first tries username+password, then if the password looks like a token, it tries token auth regardless of the username. Yes — Gitea checks: if basic auth fails with user/pass, it tries the password as a token (if it starts with the token prefix or is a valid token). Actually, the logic in Gitea's `auth.go`: `Authenticate` → tries `authenticateBasic` (user:pass), and if that fails and the password looks like a token, it tries `authenticateToken` with just the token. So the username is irrelevant for token auth.
The existing code already uses `zoo:<token>` for the shared token (the "zoo" user), and it works (the agent pushes successfully today). For the agent's token, the username "zoo" is technically mismatched, but per Gitea's behavior the username is ignored for token auth. Hmm, but is that really true? Let me be careful.
Gitea source (v1.20+, `routers/common/auth.go` or `models/auth`): in `NewContext`, for basic auth:
```go
if username, password, ok := r.BasicAuth(); ok {
// ...
if user, err := auth.GetSignInUser(...); ...
}
```
Hmm, I don't remember exactly. Let me think about what's known: in Gitea, `git clone https://user:token@host/repo` works with any `user` as long as `token` is valid — this is documented behavior ("The username can be anything, as long as the token is valid"). Yes, I'm fairly confident: Gitea/Forgejo's basic auth falls back to treating the password as a token. The existing zoo code relies on exactly this with username "zoo" for the shared token.
To be safer, I could use the agent's name as the username: `agentName:token`? But the gitToken function only receives the token… I could pass the agent name too. Hmm.
Actually — wait. Let me reconsider. For the shared zoo token, the username "zoo" is presumably the shared account's username (the token belongs to the "zoo" user). For the agent's token, the token belongs to the agent's user (e.g., "greg"). If Gitea requires username==token owner, then "zoo:agentToken" would fail.
Let me check the Gitea/Forgejo source more carefully from memory… In Gitea's `routers/common/auth.go`:
```go
func NewContext(...) {
...
// If the request is authenticated with a token, use that
if token, ok := ...; ok {
...
}
```
And in `models/auth/auth.go`… the relevant function is `auth.SignIn` / `authenticateBasic`:
```go
func (m *OAuth2) ...
```
Hmm. What I recall from Gitea's docs on git credentials:
> **Personal access tokens**
> You can use a personal access token as the password for git over HTTP. The username can be anything.
Actually, I specifically remember this from the Gitea docs: "You can use a personal access token as the password, and the username can be anything" — hmm, or was it "the username must match the account that owns the token"?
Let me look at the actual Gitea code path (from memory of gitea/routers/common/auth.go):
```go
func NewContext(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
...
if req.URL.Path == "/api/..." { ... }
...
// Check if the request is authenticated
...
})
}
```
And in `services/auth/auth.go` there's:
```go
func (a *Basic) ...
```
Hmm, I can't reconstruct it exactly. But there's strong empirical evidence: the current zoo code does `base64("zoo:" + sharedToken)` and it works for clone and push (the agent has been successfully pushing branches to this Forgejo — the git log shows merged PRs from agent branches). So for the shared token, username "zoo" works.
For the agent's token, the safest thing is to use the agent's own name as the username: `base64(agentName + ":" + token)`. If Gitea ignores the username for token auth, this works. If Gitea requires username==owner, this also works (since the agent's Forgejo username == the agent name, per the roster code: "the agent config label doubles as the Forgejo username").
So: use the agent name as the Basic auth username. For the shared token fallback, the username is… "zoo"? The shared account's username — is it "zoo"? The existing code hardcodes "zoo" as the username for the shared token, so the shared account is presumably named "zoo".
So the auth header builder:
```go
// basicAuthHeader builds the Authorization header value git uses to
// authenticate against Forgejo: the agent's Forgejo username and its
// token (or the shared zoo identity's, for agents without a per-agent
// token).
func basicAuthHeader(username, token string) string {
auth := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(username + ":" + token))
return "Authorization: Basic " + auth
}
```
And in Run:
```go
gitUser, gitToken := "zoo", r.forgejo.Token()
if agent.Token != "" {
gitUser, gitToken = agent.Name, agent.Token
}
```
Hmm wait, but is the shared account's username really "zoo"? The existing code says `"zoo:" + token` and it works, so yes (or the username is ignored — either way "zoo" works for the shared token).
OK, this is clean. Let me also double-check the `forgejoAs` fallback: if the agent has no token, the API action uses the shared client. Consistent with my git fallback.
### Now, the setup commands — order and failure handling:
1. `git config --system --add safe.directory '*'` — existing, keep first.
2. `git config --global user.name '<name>'`
3. `git config --global user.email '<email>'`
4. `git config --global http.<host>.extraHeader 'Authorization: Basic <b64>'` (only if the URL is http/https)
5. `git clone --branch '<default>' --single-branch '<cloneURL>' /project`
6. `git checkout -b '<branch>'`
Wait, one more consideration for #5: `--single-branch` — the existing clone uses it. Keep it for parity.
And the clone target: `/project`. The container's WorkingDir is /project, so `git clone <url>` (no target) would also clone into /project (the current directory, since it's empty). But being explicit with `/project` is clearer.
Hmm, actually wait: `git clone <url> /project` — git requires the target directory to be empty or nonexistent. /project is created empty by the bind mount (Docker creates it). But what if Docker doesn't create it? For a bind mount to a nonexistent host path, Docker creates the host directory (as root). Since I MkdirAll on the host first, it exists and is empty. Good.
### Edge case: what if the branch already exists?
`git checkout -b <branch>` fails if the branch exists. The existing host-side code had the same behavior (fresh clone, so the branch can't exist locally). Same here. No problem.
### Event file and container creation order:
- workDir = MkdirTemp
- projectDir = workDir/project; MkdirAll
- eventPath = workDir/event.json; WriteFile
- createContainer (binds projectDir:/project, eventPath:/event:ro)
- setupSandboxGit
- run loop
### What about `repoInfo.DefaultBranch`?
Unchanged.
### runContext:
```go
type runContext struct {
docker *dockerRuntime
containerID string
forgejo tools.ForgejoActions
}
```
### tools.Context:
```go
type Context interface {
// Exec runs command inside the run's container via `sh -c` and
// returns combined stdout+stderr. The container's git is
// pre-authenticated against the Forgejo host (see agentrun.Run),
// so git remote operations (fetch, pull, push) work from inside
// the sandbox.
Exec(ctx context.Context, command string) (string, error)
// Forgejo returns the actions bound to the issue/PR that triggered
// this run, so tools don't need to be told which repo/issue to act
// on.
Forgejo() ForgejoActions
}
```
### tools/git.go:
```go
// git runs subcommand via Context.Exec inside the run's container,
// against the bind-mounted working tree at /project. Remote operations
// (fetch, pull, push) authenticate through the Authorization header
// the runner puts in the container's global gitconfig (see
// agentrun.Run), so they work from inside the sandbox.
func git(ctx Context, params gitParams) (string, error) {
if !slices.Contains(gitAllowed, params.Subcommand) {
return "", fmt.Errorf("git subcommand '%s' is not allowed. Only %s are permitted", params.Subcommand, strings.Join(gitAllowed, ", "))
}
cmd := "git " + params.Subcommand
for _, arg := range params.Args {
cmd += " " + ShellQuote(arg)
}
output, err := ctx.Exec(context.Background(), cmd)
...
}
```
Wait, the current git tool's doc says "git runs subcommand via Context.Git, which executes it outside the container (see that method's doc comment for why): the container itself is never given a credential capable of authenticating against Forgejo, so pushing has to happen on the host side instead." — replace it.
Also, the gitAllowed comment: "gitAllowed intentionally excludes remote-mutating subcommands other than push: agents are expected to commit and push their own branch, not touch remotes/config/etc." — still accurate.
### system.md **Git** section:
Currently:
```
**Git**
You may use normal git commands to manage your working tree. For remote
(pull, fetch, push, etc.) git operations, you can use the `git` tool.
```
New:
```
**Git**
You may use normal git commands to manage your working tree. Remote
operations (pull, fetch, push, etc.) are pre-authenticated in the
sandbox and simply work — use the `git` tool or `bash` as you see fit.
```
Hmm, let me keep it concise:
```
**Git**
You may use normal git commands to manage your working tree. Remote
git operations (pull, fetch, push, etc.) are pre-authenticated in the
sandbox and simply work.
```
### forgejo/client.go Token() comment:
Currently: "Token returns the shared zoo Forgejo identity's token, e.g. for authenticating a host-side git clone/push against Forgejo (see internal/agentrun) without ever writing the credential into a working tree an agent's container can read."
New: "Token returns the shared zoo Forgejo identity's token, e.g. as the fallback git credential for agents without a per-agent token (see internal/agentrun)."
### Tests:
**tools_test.go**:
- fakeContext: remove the Git method and the lastGit* fields.
- TestGitPassesSubcommandAndArgsThrough:
```go
func TestGitPassesSubcommandAndArgsThrough(t *testing.T) {
fc := &fakeContext{output: "ok"}
_, err := git(fc, gitParams{Subcommand: "commit", Args: []string{"-m", "fix: handle it's edge case"}})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
want := "git commit -m 'fix: handle it'\\''s edge case'"
if fc.lastCmd != want {
t.Fatalf("expected command %q, got %q", want, fc.lastCmd)
}
}
```
Let me verify shellQuote: `'` + replace(s, `'`, `'\''`) + `'`. For `fix: handle it's edge case`: `fix: handle it` + `'\''` + `s edge case` → wrapped: `'fix: handle it'\''s edge case'`. So the command is: `git commit -m 'fix: handle it'\''s edge case'`.
- TestGitRejectsDisallowedSubcommand: unchanged.
**New agentrun/sandbox_test.go** (unit, no docker):
```go
func TestGitHost(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct{ url, host string; ok bool }{
{"https://code.stdio.dk/abrander/zoo.git", "code.stdio.dk", true},
{"http://localhost:3000/abrander/zoo.git", "localhost:3000", true},
{"git@code.stdio.dk:abrander/zoo.git", "", false},
{"file:///srv/git/zoo.git", "", false},
{"not a url", "", false},
}
...
}
func TestBasicAuthHeader(t *testing.T) {
got := basicAuthHeader("greg", "tok123")
want := "Authorization: Basic " + base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte("greg:tok123"))
...
}
```
Hmm wait, "not a url" — url.Parse("not a url") actually succeeds (scheme "not", opaque "a url")? Let me think: url.Parse("not a url") — a space is invalid in a URL… does url.Parse return an error for a space? Actually, Go's url.Parse is lenient: "not a url" → error "parse \"not a url\": invalid character \" \" in host name"? Let me think. `url.Parse("not a url")`: it parses the scheme up to ':' — there's no colon, so scheme is empty, and the rest is the path… "not a url" has no colon, so it's parsed as a relative URL with path "not a url" — no error, u.Host == "". OK, so ok=false via empty host. Good.
For "git@code.stdio.dk:abrander/zoo.git": url.Parse → scheme "git", opaque? "git@code.stdio.dk:abrander/zoo.git" — scheme "git", then "code.stdio.dk:abrander/zoo.git"… hmm, for scheme "git", after "git:" the rest is "code.stdio.dk:abrander/zoo.git". Since it doesn't start with "//", it's an opaque URI: u.Opaque = "code.stdio.dk:abrander/zoo.git", u.Host = "". So ok=false. Good.
So gitHost:
```go
// gitHost returns the host (with port) of an http(s) clone URL, for
// scoping the sandbox's git Authorization header to the Forgejo host
// only. Non-http(s) URLs (ssh, local paths) return ok=false: they
// authenticate through other means and need no header.
func gitHost(cloneURL string) (string, bool) {
u, err := url.Parse(cloneURL)
if err != nil || (u.Scheme != "http" && u.Scheme != "https") || u.Host == "" {
return "", false
}
return u.Host, true
}
```
### Integration test (docker tag):
Should I extend docker_integration_test.go with a test that setupSandboxGit works end-to-end? It needs an HTTP git remote. I could create a local bare repo and serve it with a small in-test HTTP handler that requires basic auth… that's actually doable and would be a valuable test for "git pull must just work":
1. Create a temp bare repo on the host with an initial commit.
2. Start an httptest.Server that requires `Authorization: Basic base64(test:test)` and serves the repo via `git http-backend`… but the container needs to reach the host's server (DOCKER_HOST networking — the container reaches the host via host.docker.internal or the gateway IP; on Linux, the host's localhost isn't directly reachable from the container without --network=host).
This is getting complicated and environment-dependent (the container's networking). The existing integration tests avoid networking (bind mounts only). I'll skip the networked integration test; the unit tests + the existing safe.directory test + the real-world verification (I'm literally running in this system — well, the deployed version is different, but still) are enough.
Hmm wait, actually — can I verify end-to-end in this environment? Is there a Docker daemon in my container? Let me check. If docker is available, I could run the docker-tagged tests. Let me check `docker version` in the container.
Also — I should double-check the Go version and that the build passes: `go build ./...` and `go test ./...`.
### One more thing: the `exec` environment in docker.go
Should I add the token to the exec environment (e.g., GIT_ASKPASS or an env var)? No — the gitconfig approach is self-contained. No env var needed. Good: the token appears in the container's /root/.gitconfig (readable by the agent — as intended), and nowhere else.
Wait, actually — hmm, one more thought on where to put the credentials. /root/.gitconfig is inside the container's filesystem (ephemeral, per-run). The bind-mounted /project is on the host (temp dir, deleted after the run). Either way, the token is cleaned up with the run. The container's fs is deleted when the container is removed. Good.
But — `keepOnFailure` keeps the host's workDir on failure; the token is not in the workDir (it's in the container's fs, and the container is always removed… wait, is that true? On failure, the deferred container removal runs — yes, `defer r.docker.remove(...)` always runs. But wait, does keepOnFailure also keep the container? Let me re-read:
```go
defer func() {
cleanupCtx, cleanupCancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 30*time.Second)
defer cleanupCancel()
if err := r.docker.remove(cleanupCtx, containerID); err != nil {
logger.Warn("failed to remove container", ...)
}
}()
```
The container is always removed. Only the host's workDir is kept on failure. So the token (in the container's /root/.gitconfig) is always wiped.
Hmm, but wait — for debugging a failed run, it would be nice to inspect the container… that's an existing concern (keepOnFailure keeps the workDir but not the container). Not my problem today.
### What about the `git` tool's description?
"Run a git subcommand with optional arguments against the project's working tree" — still accurate.
### The system prompt's "Your environment" bullet:
"- You have a real git remote configured with push access. When you're done, `git add`/`git commit`/`git push` your branch — that's how your work gets saved." — still accurate, and now even more true (push works from inside the sandbox).
### Let me also check `web.go` / `scheduler.go` for any references to the clone or the token… let me grep "Token()" across the repo.
Let me check the remaining usages of `Token()` and look at how the scheduler calls Run:
Tool 🔧 grep_search {"glob": "*.go", "query": "\\.Token\\(\\)"}
Arguments
{"glob": "*.go", "query": "\\.Token\\(\\)"}
Result
/project/internal/agentrun/run.go:130: if err := cloneAndBranch(ctx, repoInfo.CloneURL, r.forgejo.Token(), repoInfo.DefaultBranch, branch, projectDir); err != nil {
/project/internal/agentrun/run.go:195: token: r.forgejo.Token(),
Tool 🔧 read_file {"path": "/project/internal/scheduler/scheduler.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 100}
Arguments
{"path": "/project/internal/scheduler/scheduler.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 100}
Result
{"path":"/project/internal/scheduler/scheduler.go","content":"// Package scheduler resolves incoming Forgejo events to configured\r\n// agents and runs them, bounded by max_live_agents.\r\npackage scheduler\r\n\r\nimport (\r\n\t\"context\"\r\n\t\"errors\"\r\n\t\"fmt\"\r\n\t\"log/slog\"\r\n\t\"sync\"\r\n\r\n\t\"github.com/google/uuid\"\r\n\r\n\t\"github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/config\"\r\n\t\"github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/forgejo\"\r\n\t\"github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/livelog\"\r\n\t\"github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/store\"\r\n)\r\n\r\n// forgejoActions is the narrow slice of Client the scheduler needs for\r\n// its own failure-reporting side effects (defined here, not in\r\n// internal/forgejo, so tests can inject a fake).\r\ntype forgejoActions interface {\r\n\tCreateIssueComment(owner, repo string, index int64, body string) error\r\n\tAddLabel(owner, repo string, index int64, name string) error\r\n}\r\n\r\n// FailureLabel is applied to the triggering issue/PR, alongside a\r\n// comment, whenever an agent run fails or times out.\r\nconst FailureLabel = \"zoo:failed\"\r\n\r\n// Runner runs a single agent invocation to completion. Implemented by\r\n// internal/agentrun.Run; a narrow interface here so the scheduler is\r\n// testable without Docker.\r\ntype Runner interface {\r\n\tRun(ctx context.Context, jobID string, agent config.AgentConfig, llm config.LLM, dockerImage string, ev forgejo.Event) error\r\n}\r\n\r\ntype Scheduler struct {\r\n\tcfg *config.Config\r\n\tstore *store.Store\r\n\tforgejo forgejoActions\r\n\trunner Runner\r\n\thub *livelog.Hub\r\n\tlogger *slog.Logger\r\n\r\n\tsem chan struct{}\r\n\twg sync.WaitGroup\r\n}\r\n\r\nfunc New(cfg *config.Config, st *store.Store, fg forgejoActions, runner Runner, hub *livelog.Hub, logger *slog.Logger) *Scheduler {\r\n\treturn \u0026Scheduler{\r\n\t\tcfg: cfg,\r\n\t\tstore: st,\r\n\t\tforgejo: fg,\r\n\t\trunner: runner,\r\n\t\thub: hub,\r\n\t\tlogger: logger,\r\n\t\tsem: make(chan struct{}, cfg.Environment.MaxLive),\r\n\t}\r\n}\r\n\r\n// resolveAgent returns the name of the agent that should handle ev, if\r\n// any. issue:assigned resolves dynamically: the agent whose config label\r\n// matches the Forgejo assignee's username. Every other event kind uses\r\n// the static event-\u003eagent mapping from config.\r\nfunc resolveAgent(cfg *config.Config, ev forgejo.Event) (string, bool) {\r\n\tif ev.Kind == config.EventIssueAssigned {\r\n\t\tif _, ok := cfg.AgentByName(ev.Assignee); ok {\r\n\t\t\treturn ev.Assignee, true\r\n\t\t}\r\n\r\n\t\treturn \"\", false\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\treturn cfg.EventAgent(ev.Kind)\r\n}\r\n\r\n// Run consumes events until ctx is canceled or the channel closes,\r\n// dispatching each to its resolved agent and blocking on the\r\n// max_live_agents semaphore before starting a run.\r\nfunc (s *Scheduler) Run(ctx context.Context, events \u003c-chan forgejo.Event) {\r\n\tfor {\r\n\t\tselect {\r\n\t\tcase \u003c-ctx.Done():\r\n\t\t\treturn\r\n\r\n\t\tcase ev, ok := \u003c-events:\r\n\t\t\tif !ok {\r\n\t\t\t\treturn\r\n\t\t\t}\r\n\r\n\t\t\ts.handle(ctx, ev)\r\n\t\t}\r\n\t}\r\n}\r\n\r\nfunc (s *Scheduler) handle(ctx context.Context, ev forgejo.Event) {\r\n\tagentName, ok := resolveAgent(s.cfg, ev)\r\n\tif !ok {\r","start_line":1,"end_line":100,"total_lines":241,"truncated":true}
Thinking
Everything's clear now. Let's start implementing the changes.
### Step 1: `internal/tools/shell.go` — export `shellQuote` as `ShellQuote`.
### Step 2: `internal/tools/context.go` — remove `Git` from the interface and update the docs.
### Step 3: `internal/tools/git.go` — use Exec.
### Step 4: `internal/tools/tools_test.go` — update fakeContext and the git tests.
### Step 5: `internal/agentrun/sandbox.go` — new file containing the setup logic.
### Step 6: `internal/agentrun/run.go` — restructure Run().
### Step 7: `internal/agentrun/context.go` — remove Git/token/projectDir.
### Step 8: Delete `internal/agentrun/clone.go`.
### Step 9: `internal/agentrun/system.md` — update the Git section.
### Step 10: `internal/forgejo/client.go` — update the Token() docs.
### Step 11: `internal/agentrun/sandbox_test.go` — unit tests for gitHost and basicAuthHeader.
After that, run build + tests, and if docker is available, run the docker-tagged tests too.
Let's start writing the code.
First, shell.go:
I now have the full picture. Let me lay out the design before implementing:
**Current state:** The host clones the repo (`cloneAndBranch`), the `git` tool runs git on the host (only `push` is authenticated via a per-invocation `-c` override), and the container has no credentials at all — so `git pull`/`fetch`/`push` from inside the sandbox can't work.
**Plan (per the issue):**
1. **Clone inside the sandbox** — create the container first, then `git clone` + branch via `docker exec`.
2. **Pass the token to the sandbox** — write an `Authorization: Basic` header, scoped to the Forgejo host only, into the container's global gitconfig (`git config --global http.<host>.extraHeader ...`), so *every* remote op (clone/fetch/pull/push) just works. Use the agent's own token when configured (matching `forgejoAs`), falling back to the shared zoo token.
3. **No git on the host** — delete `clone.go`'s host-side git helpers; the `git` tool runs inside the container via `Exec` like every other tool (drop the now-obsolete `Context.Git` method).
Let me implement. First, export `shellQuote` from tools (agentrun will need it to quote setup commands):
Tool 🔧 edit_file {"path": "/project/internal/tools/shell.go", "find": "// shellQuote wraps s in single quotes for safe interpolation into a `sh\n// -c` command string, escaping any embedded single quotes.\nfunc shellQuote(s string) string {\n\treturn \"'\" + strings.ReplaceAll(s, \"'\", `'\\''`) + \"'\"\n}", "replace": "// ShellQuote wraps s in single quotes for safe interpolation into a\n// `sh -c` command string, escaping any embedded single quotes.\nfunc ShellQuote(s string) string {\n\treturn \"'\" + strings.ReplaceAll(s, \"'\", `'\\''`) + \"'\"\n}"}
Arguments
{"path": "/project/internal/tools/shell.go", "find": "// shellQuote wraps s in single quotes for safe interpolation into a `sh\n// -c` command string, escaping any embedded single quotes.\nfunc shellQuote(s string) string {\n\treturn \"'\" + strings.ReplaceAll(s, \"'\", `'\\''`) + \"'\"\n}", "replace": "// ShellQuote wraps s in single quotes for safe interpolation into a\n// `sh -c` command string, escaping any embedded single quotes.\nfunc ShellQuote(s string) string {\n\treturn \"'\" + strings.ReplaceAll(s, \"'\", `'\\''`) + \"'\"\n}"}
Result
1 occurrences replaced
Thinking
Next, I'll update the two call sites of shellQuote inside shell.go:
Tool 🔧 edit_file {"find": "\toutput, err := ctx.Exec(context.Background(), \"base64 \"+shellQuote(p))", "replace": "\toutput, err := ctx.Exec(context.Background(), \"base64 \"+ShellQuote(p))", "path": "/project/internal/tools/shell.go"}
Arguments
{"find": "\toutput, err := ctx.Exec(context.Background(), \"base64 \"+shellQuote(p))", "replace": "\toutput, err := ctx.Exec(context.Background(), \"base64 \"+ShellQuote(p))", "path": "/project/internal/tools/shell.go"}
Result
1 occurrences replaced
Tool 🔧 edit_file {"find": "\tcmd := fmt.Sprintf(\n\t\t`mkdir -p \"$(dirname %s)\" && echo %s | base64 -d > %s`,\n\t\tshellQuote(p), shellQuote(encoded), shellQuote(p))", "replace": "\tcmd := fmt.Sprintf(\n\t\t`mkdir -p \"$(dirname %s)\" && echo %s | base64 -d > %s`,\n\t\tShellQuote(p), ShellQuote(encoded), ShellQuote(p))", "path": "/project/internal/tools/shell.go"}
Arguments
{"find": "\tcmd := fmt.Sprintf(\n\t\t`mkdir -p \"$(dirname %s)\" && echo %s | base64 -d > %s`,\n\t\tshellQuote(p), shellQuote(encoded), shellQuote(p))", "replace": "\tcmd := fmt.Sprintf(\n\t\t`mkdir -p \"$(dirname %s)\" && echo %s | base64 -d > %s`,\n\t\tShellQuote(p), ShellQuote(encoded), ShellQuote(p))", "path": "/project/internal/tools/shell.go"}
Result
1 occurrences replaced
Thinking
Next, I'll update `tools/context.go` — remove `Git` from the interface and update the documentation for `Exec`:
Now update the `tools.Context` interface — drop the obsolete `Git` method and fix the `Exec` doc:
Tool 🔧 edit_file {"find": "// Context is bound to a single agent run (job), unlike ../a's single\n// global Context, since multiple agents run concurrently in zoo.\ntype Context interface {\n\t// Exec runs command inside the run's container via `sh -c` and\n\t// returns combined stdout+stderr. The container never holds a\n\t// Forgejo credential, so this cannot reach the Forgejo API or\n\t// authenticate git operations against it — see Git.\n\tExec(ctx context.Context, command string) (string, error)\n\n\t// Git runs a git subcommand against the run's working tree on the\n\t// host, outside the container, so that operations needing a Forgejo\n\t// credential (currently just push) can authenticate without that\n\t// credential ever being written to disk where the container (and\n\t// anything run inside it via Exec) could read it.\n\tGit(ctx context.Context, subcommand string, args ...string) (string, error)\n\n\t// Forgejo returns the actions bound to the issue/PR that triggered\n\t// this run, so tools don't need to be told which repo/issue to act\n\t// on.\n\tForgejo() ForgejoActions\n}", "replace": "// Context is bound to a single agent run (job), unlike ../a's single\n// global Context, since multiple agents run concurrently in zoo.\ntype Context interface {\n\t// Exec runs command inside the run's container via `sh -c` and\n\t// returns combined stdout+stderr. The container's git is\n\t// pre-authenticated against the Forgejo host (see\n\t// internal/agentrun.Run), so git remote operations (fetch, pull,\n\t// push) work from inside the sandbox.\n\tExec(ctx context.Context, command string) (string, error)\n\n\t// Forgejo returns the actions bound to the issue/PR that triggered\n\t// this run, so tools don't need to be told which repo/issue to act\n\t// on.\n\tForgejo() ForgejoActions\n}", "path": "/project/internal/tools/context.go"}
Arguments
{"find": "// Context is bound to a single agent run (job), unlike ../a's single\n// global Context, since multiple agents run concurrently in zoo.\ntype Context interface {\n\t// Exec runs command inside the run's container via `sh -c` and\n\t// returns combined stdout+stderr. The container never holds a\n\t// Forgejo credential, so this cannot reach the Forgejo API or\n\t// authenticate git operations against it — see Git.\n\tExec(ctx context.Context, command string) (string, error)\n\n\t// Git runs a git subcommand against the run's working tree on the\n\t// host, outside the container, so that operations needing a Forgejo\n\t// credential (currently just push) can authenticate without that\n\t// credential ever being written to disk where the container (and\n\t// anything run inside it via Exec) could read it.\n\tGit(ctx context.Context, subcommand string, args ...string) (string, error)\n\n\t// Forgejo returns the actions bound to the issue/PR that triggered\n\t// this run, so tools don't need to be told which repo/issue to act\n\t// on.\n\tForgejo() ForgejoActions\n}", "replace": "// Context is bound to a single agent run (job), unlike ../a's single\n// global Context, since multiple agents run concurrently in zoo.\ntype Context interface {\n\t// Exec runs command inside the run's container via `sh -c` and\n\t// returns combined stdout+stderr. The container's git is\n\t// pre-authenticated against the Forgejo host (see\n\t// internal/agentrun.Run), so git remote operations (fetch, pull,\n\t// push) work from inside the sandbox.\n\tExec(ctx context.Context, command string) (string, error)\n\n\t// Forgejo returns the actions bound to the issue/PR that triggered\n\t// this run, so tools don't need to be told which repo/issue to act\n\t// on.\n\tForgejo() ForgejoActions\n}", "path": "/project/internal/tools/context.go"}
Result
1 occurrences replaced
Thinking
Next, I'll update `tools/git.go` to run inside the container via Exec:
Tool 🔧 edit_file {"find": "// git runs subcommand via Context.Git, which executes it outside the\n// container (see that method's doc comment for why): the container\n// itself is never given a credential capable of authenticating against\n// Forgejo, so pushing has to happen on the host side instead.\nfunc git(ctx Context, params gitParams) (string, error) {\n\tif !slices.Contains(gitAllowed, params.Subcommand) {\n\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"git subcommand '%s' is not allowed. Only %s are permitted\", params.Subcommand, strings.Join(gitAllowed, \", \"))\n\t}\n\n\toutput, err := ctx.Git(context.Background(), params.Subcommand, params.Args...)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn \"\", err\n\t}", "replace": "// git runs subcommand via Context.Exec inside the run's container,\n// against the bind-mounted working tree at /project. Remote operations\n// (fetch, pull, push) authenticate through the Authorization header the\n// runner puts in the container's global gitconfig (see\n// internal/agentrun.Run), so they work from inside the sandbox.\nfunc git(ctx Context, params gitParams) (string, error) {\n\tif !slices.Contains(gitAllowed, params.Subcommand) {\n\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"git subcommand '%s' is not allowed. Only %s are permitted\", params.Subcommand, strings.Join(gitAllowed, \", \"))\n\t}\n\n\tcmd := \"git \" + params.Subcommand\n\n\tfor _, arg := range params.Args {\n\t\tcmd += \" \" + ShellQuote(arg)\n\t}\n\n\toutput, err := ctx.Exec(context.Background(), cmd)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn \"\", err\n\t}", "path": "/project/internal/tools/git.go"}
Arguments
{"find": "// git runs subcommand via Context.Git, which executes it outside the\n// container (see that method's doc comment for why): the container\n// itself is never given a credential capable of authenticating against\n// Forgejo, so pushing has to happen on the host side instead.\nfunc git(ctx Context, params gitParams) (string, error) {\n\tif !slices.Contains(gitAllowed, params.Subcommand) {\n\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"git subcommand '%s' is not allowed. Only %s are permitted\", params.Subcommand, strings.Join(gitAllowed, \", \"))\n\t}\n\n\toutput, err := ctx.Git(context.Background(), params.Subcommand, params.Args...)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn \"\", err\n\t}", "replace": "// git runs subcommand via Context.Exec inside the run's container,\n// against the bind-mounted working tree at /project. Remote operations\n// (fetch, pull, push) authenticate through the Authorization header the\n// runner puts in the container's global gitconfig (see\n// internal/agentrun.Run), so they work from inside the sandbox.\nfunc git(ctx Context, params gitParams) (string, error) {\n\tif !slices.Contains(gitAllowed, params.Subcommand) {\n\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"git subcommand '%s' is not allowed. Only %s are permitted\", params.Subcommand, strings.Join(gitAllowed, \", \"))\n\t}\n\n\tcmd := \"git \" + params.Subcommand\n\n\tfor _, arg := range params.Args {\n\t\tcmd += \" \" + ShellQuote(arg)\n\t}\n\n\toutput, err := ctx.Exec(context.Background(), cmd)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn \"\", err\n\t}", "path": "/project/internal/tools/git.go"}
Result
1 occurrences replaced
Thinking
Next, I'll update `tools_test.go`: remove `Git` from fakeContext, and update `TestGitPassesSubcommandAndArgsThrough`.
Now update the tools tests:
Tool 🔧 edit_file {"find": "type fakeContext struct {\n\tlastCmd string\n\toutput string\n\terr error\n\tfg *fakeForgejoActions\n\n\tlastGitSubcommand string\n\tlastGitArgs []string\n}\n\nfunc (f *fakeContext) Exec(ctx context.Context, command string) (string, error) {\n\tf.lastCmd = command\n\treturn f.output, f.err\n}\n\nfunc (f *fakeContext) Git(ctx context.Context, subcommand string, args ...string) (string, error) {\n\tf.lastGitSubcommand = subcommand\n\tf.lastGitArgs = args\n\treturn f.output, f.err\n}\n\nfunc (f *fakeContext) Forgejo() ForgejoActions {\n\treturn f.fg\n}", "replace": "type fakeContext struct {\n\tlastCmd string\n\toutput string\n\terr error\n\tfg *fakeForgejoActions\n}\n\nfunc (f *fakeContext) Exec(ctx context.Context, command string) (string, error) {\n\tf.lastCmd = command\n\treturn f.output, f.err\n}\n\nfunc (f *fakeContext) Forgejo() ForgejoActions {\n\treturn f.fg\n}", "path": "/project/internal/tools/tools_test.go"}
Arguments
{"find": "type fakeContext struct {\n\tlastCmd string\n\toutput string\n\terr error\n\tfg *fakeForgejoActions\n\n\tlastGitSubcommand string\n\tlastGitArgs []string\n}\n\nfunc (f *fakeContext) Exec(ctx context.Context, command string) (string, error) {\n\tf.lastCmd = command\n\treturn f.output, f.err\n}\n\nfunc (f *fakeContext) Git(ctx context.Context, subcommand string, args ...string) (string, error) {\n\tf.lastGitSubcommand = subcommand\n\tf.lastGitArgs = args\n\treturn f.output, f.err\n}\n\nfunc (f *fakeContext) Forgejo() ForgejoActions {\n\treturn f.fg\n}", "replace": "type fakeContext struct {\n\tlastCmd string\n\toutput string\n\terr error\n\tfg *fakeForgejoActions\n}\n\nfunc (f *fakeContext) Exec(ctx context.Context, command string) (string, error) {\n\tf.lastCmd = command\n\treturn f.output, f.err\n}\n\nfunc (f *fakeContext) Forgejo() ForgejoActions {\n\treturn f.fg\n}", "path": "/project/internal/tools/tools_test.go"}
Result
1 occurrences replaced
Tool 🔧 edit_file {"find": "func TestGitPassesSubcommandAndArgsThrough(t *testing.T) {\n\tfc := &fakeContext{output: \"ok\"}\n\n\t_, err := git(fc, gitParams{Subcommand: \"commit\", Args: []string{\"-m\", \"fix: handle it's edge case\"}})\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatal(err)\n\t}\n\n\tif fc.lastGitSubcommand != \"commit\" {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"expected subcommand %q, got %q\", \"commit\", fc.lastGitSubcommand)\n\t}\n\tif len(fc.lastGitArgs) != 2 || fc.lastGitArgs[1] != \"fix: handle it's edge case\" {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"expected args passed through unescaped, got %v\", fc.lastGitArgs)\n\t}\n}", "replace": "func TestGitPassesSubcommandAndArgsThrough(t *testing.T) {\n\tfc := &fakeContext{output: \"ok\"}\n\n\t_, err := git(fc, gitParams{Subcommand: \"commit\", Args: []string{\"-m\", \"fix: handle it's edge case\"}})\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatal(err)\n\t}\n\n\t// The git tool shells out inside the container, so args must be\n\t// single-quoted for safe interpolation into the sh -c command.\n\twant := \"git commit -m 'fix: handle it'\\\\''s edge case'\"\n\tif fc.lastCmd != want {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"expected command %q, got %q\", want, fc.lastCmd)\n\t}\n}", "path": "/project/internal/tools/tools_test.go"}
Arguments
{"find": "func TestGitPassesSubcommandAndArgsThrough(t *testing.T) {\n\tfc := &fakeContext{output: \"ok\"}\n\n\t_, err := git(fc, gitParams{Subcommand: \"commit\", Args: []string{\"-m\", \"fix: handle it's edge case\"}})\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatal(err)\n\t}\n\n\tif fc.lastGitSubcommand != \"commit\" {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"expected subcommand %q, got %q\", \"commit\", fc.lastGitSubcommand)\n\t}\n\tif len(fc.lastGitArgs) != 2 || fc.lastGitArgs[1] != \"fix: handle it's edge case\" {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"expected args passed through unescaped, got %v\", fc.lastGitArgs)\n\t}\n}", "replace": "func TestGitPassesSubcommandAndArgsThrough(t *testing.T) {\n\tfc := &fakeContext{output: \"ok\"}\n\n\t_, err := git(fc, gitParams{Subcommand: \"commit\", Args: []string{\"-m\", \"fix: handle it's edge case\"}})\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatal(err)\n\t}\n\n\t// The git tool shells out inside the container, so args must be\n\t// single-quoted for safe interpolation into the sh -c command.\n\twant := \"git commit -m 'fix: handle it'\\\\''s edge case'\"\n\tif fc.lastCmd != want {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"expected command %q, got %q\", want, fc.lastCmd)\n\t}\n}", "path": "/project/internal/tools/tools_test.go"}
Result
1 occurrences replaced
Thinking
Next, I'll create a new `internal/agentrun/sandbox.go` containing the in-sandbox git setup:
Now create the new sandbox setup file in agentrun:
Tool 🔧 write_file {"path": "/project/internal/agentrun/sandbox.go", "content": "package agentrun\n\nimport (\n\t\"context\"\n\t\"encoding/base64\"\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"net/url\"\n\t\"strings\"\n\n\t\"github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/tools\"\n)\n\n// basicAuthHeader builds the value of the Authorization header git\n// sends to Forgejo for every remote operation: the account the token\n// belongs to (username) and the token itself, base64-encoded per RFC\n// 7617's Basic scheme. Forgejo accepts a personal access token as the\n// password regardless of the username, but matching the token owner\n// keeps the credential unambiguous in server logs.\nfunc basicAuthHeader(username, token string) string {\n\tauth := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(username + \":\" + token))\n\n\treturn \"Authorization: Basic \" + auth\n}\n\n// gitHost returns the host (with port) of an http(s) clone URL, for\n// scoping the sandbox's git Authorization header to the Forgejo host\n// only. Non-http(s) URLs (ssh, local paths) authenticate through other\n// means and need no header, so they report ok=false.\nfunc gitHost(cloneURL string) (string, bool) {\n\tu, err := url.Parse(cloneURL)\n\tif err != nil || (u.Scheme != \"http\" && u.Scheme != \"https\") || u.Host == \"\" {\n\t\treturn \"\", false\n\t}\n\n\treturn u.Host, true\n}\n\n// setupSandboxGit prepares the container's git environment and clones\n// the repo into /project — entirely inside the sandbox, so the host\n// never runs git. It configures, in the container's global gitconfig:\n//\n// - the agent's commit identity (user.name / user.email), and\n// - an Authorization header scoped to the Forgejo host, so every\n// remote operation the agent runs in the sandbox (clone, fetch,\n// pull, push) authenticates with the given token and simply works.\n//\n// safe.directory is set at --system scope so it holds regardless of\n// which user a later exec runs as; identity and the credential use\n// --global (the container runs as one user throughout its life).\nfunc setupSandboxGit(ctx context.Context, docker *dockerRuntime, containerID, cloneURL, username, token, name, email, defaultBranch, branch string) error {\n\tcommands := []string{\n\t\t\"git config --system --add safe.directory '*'\",\n\t\t\"git config --global user.name \" + tools.ShellQuote(name),\n\t\t\"git config --global user.email \" + tools.ShellQuote(email),\n\t}\n\n\tif host, ok := gitHost(cloneURL); ok {\n\t\tcommands = append(commands,\n\t\t\t\"git config --global http.\"+host+\".extraHeader \"+tools.ShellQuote(basicAuthHeader(username, token)))\n\t}\n\n\tcommands = append(commands,\n\t\t\"git clone --branch \"+tools.ShellQuote(defaultBranch)+\" --single-branch \"+tools.ShellQuote(cloneURL)+\" /project\",\n\t\t\"git checkout -b \"+tools.ShellQuote(branch),\n\t)\n\n\tfor _, cmd := range commands {\n\t\tout, exitCode, err := docker.exec(ctx, containerID, cmd)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"%s: %w\", redact(cmd, token), err)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif exitCode != 0 {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"%s: exit %d: %s\", redact(cmd, token), exitCode, out)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}\n\n// redact removes token from s before it lands in an error message (and\n// with it, the job log). Only the credential command carries it, but\n// scrubbing every command is cheap and keeps the rule simple.\nfunc redact(s, token string) string {\n\tif token == \"\" {\n\t\treturn s\n\t}\n\n\treturn strings.ReplaceAll(s, token, \"<redacted>\")\n}\n"}
Arguments
{"path": "/project/internal/agentrun/sandbox.go", "content": "package agentrun\n\nimport (\n\t\"context\"\n\t\"encoding/base64\"\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"net/url\"\n\t\"strings\"\n\n\t\"github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/tools\"\n)\n\n// basicAuthHeader builds the value of the Authorization header git\n// sends to Forgejo for every remote operation: the account the token\n// belongs to (username) and the token itself, base64-encoded per RFC\n// 7617's Basic scheme. Forgejo accepts a personal access token as the\n// password regardless of the username, but matching the token owner\n// keeps the credential unambiguous in server logs.\nfunc basicAuthHeader(username, token string) string {\n\tauth := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(username + \":\" + token))\n\n\treturn \"Authorization: Basic \" + auth\n}\n\n// gitHost returns the host (with port) of an http(s) clone URL, for\n// scoping the sandbox's git Authorization header to the Forgejo host\n// only. Non-http(s) URLs (ssh, local paths) authenticate through other\n// means and need no header, so they report ok=false.\nfunc gitHost(cloneURL string) (string, bool) {\n\tu, err := url.Parse(cloneURL)\n\tif err != nil || (u.Scheme != \"http\" && u.Scheme != \"https\") || u.Host == \"\" {\n\t\treturn \"\", false\n\t}\n\n\treturn u.Host, true\n}\n\n// setupSandboxGit prepares the container's git environment and clones\n// the repo into /project — entirely inside the sandbox, so the host\n// never runs git. It configures, in the container's global gitconfig:\n//\n// - the agent's commit identity (user.name / user.email), and\n// - an Authorization header scoped to the Forgejo host, so every\n// remote operation the agent runs in the sandbox (clone, fetch,\n// pull, push) authenticates with the given token and simply works.\n//\n// safe.directory is set at --system scope so it holds regardless of\n// which user a later exec runs as; identity and the credential use\n// --global (the container runs as one user throughout its life).\nfunc setupSandboxGit(ctx context.Context, docker *dockerRuntime, containerID, cloneURL, username, token, name, email, defaultBranch, branch string) error {\n\tcommands := []string{\n\t\t\"git config --system --add safe.directory '*'\",\n\t\t\"git config --global user.name \" + tools.ShellQuote(name),\n\t\t\"git config --global user.email \" + tools.ShellQuote(email),\n\t}\n\n\tif host, ok := gitHost(cloneURL); ok {\n\t\tcommands = append(commands,\n\t\t\t\"git config --global http.\"+host+\".extraHeader \"+tools.ShellQuote(basicAuthHeader(username, token)))\n\t}\n\n\tcommands = append(commands,\n\t\t\"git clone --branch \"+tools.ShellQuote(defaultBranch)+\" --single-branch \"+tools.ShellQuote(cloneURL)+\" /project\",\n\t\t\"git checkout -b \"+tools.ShellQuote(branch),\n\t)\n\n\tfor _, cmd := range commands {\n\t\tout, exitCode, err := docker.exec(ctx, containerID, cmd)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"%s: %w\", redact(cmd, token), err)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif exitCode != 0 {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"%s: exit %d: %s\", redact(cmd, token), exitCode, out)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}\n\n// redact removes token from s before it lands in an error message (and\n// with it, the job log). Only the credential command carries it, but\n// scrubbing every command is cheap and keeps the rule simple.\nfunc redact(s, token string) string {\n\tif token == \"\" {\n\t\treturn s\n\t}\n\n\treturn strings.ReplaceAll(s, token, \"<redacted>\")\n}\n"}
Result
OK
Thinking
Wait, there's a problem with the error message: `fmt.Errorf("%s: %w", redact(cmd, token), err)` — the command itself contains the token inside the base64-encoded header, not in plaintext. The token is base64-encoded within the command, so `strings.ReplaceAll(s, token, ...)` won't redact the base64 form. Hmm.
Let me think. The command is:
`git config --global http.code.stdio.dk.extraHeader 'Authorization: Basic Z3JlZzp0b2sxMjM='`
The token "tok123" appears as base64 "Z3JlZzp0b2sxMjM=" (base64 of "greg:tok123"). So replacing the plaintext token won't redact it.
Options:
1. Redact the entire header value: replace `basicAuthHeader(username, token)` in the command with `<redacted>`.
2. Don't include the credential command in the error message — use a generic label.
Option 2 is cleaner: for the credential command, report a fixed label like "configure git credential" instead of the full command. Let me restructure: make it a list of (label, command) pairs, and use the label in errors.
Actually, that's cleaner for all commands:
```go
type setupStep struct {
label string
cmd string
}
steps := []setupStep{
{"configure git safe.directory", "git config --system --add safe.directory '*'"},
{"configure git user.name", "git config --global user.name " + tools.ShellQuote(name)},
{"configure git user.email", "git config --global user.email " + tools.ShellQuote(email)},
}
if host, ok := gitHost(cloneURL); ok {
steps = append(steps, setupStep{"configure git credential", "git config --global http." + host + ".extraHeader " + tools.ShellQuote(basicAuthHeader(username, token))})
}
steps = append(steps,
setupStep{"clone repository", "git clone --branch " + tools.ShellQuote(defaultBranch) + " --single-branch " + tools.ShellQuote(cloneURL) + "/project"},
setupStep{"checkout branch " + branch, "git checkout -b " + tools.ShellQuote(branch)},
)
for _, step := range steps {
out, exitCode, err := docker.exec(ctx, containerID, step.cmd)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("%s: %w", step.label, err)
}
if exitCode != 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("%s: exit %d: %s", step.label, exitCode, out)
}
}
```
This completely avoids leaking the token into error messages — the credential step's error only shows the label and git's output (git doesn't echo the config value).
But wait — could git's *output* contain the token? For `git config --global http.host.extraHeader <value>`, git doesn't echo the value. For clone errors, the output is git's error message — the URL doesn't contain the token (it's in the header, not the URL). Good.
Also, the `redact` function becomes unnecessary. Let me rewrite sandbox.go with this cleaner structure.
One more consideration: `git clone ... /project` — if the clone fails partway through, /project might be left in a partial state. The run fails and the workDir gets deleted. No problem.
Also, should I keep `--single-branch`? The original code had it. Keep it.
Let me rewrite the file.
I found that the error path could leak the token in base64 form, so I'm restructuring to use step labels instead of raw commands in error messages.
Tool 🔧 write_file {"content": "package agentrun\n\nimport (\n\t\"context\"\n\t\"encoding/base64\"\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"net/url\"\n\n\t\"github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/tools\"\n)\n\n// basicAuthHeader builds the value of the Authorization header git\n// sends to Forgejo for every remote operation: the account the token\n// belongs to (username) and the token itself, base64-encoded per the\n// HTTP Basic scheme. Forgejo accepts a personal access token as the\n// password, but matching the token owner keeps the credential\n// unambiguous in server logs.\nfunc basicAuthHeader(username, token string) string {\n\tauth := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(username + \":\" + token))\n\n\treturn \"Authorization: Basic \" + auth\n}\n\n// gitHost returns the host (with port) of an http(s) clone URL, for\n// scoping the sandbox's git Authorization header to the Forgejo host\n// only. Non-http(s) URLs (ssh, local paths) authenticate through other\n// means and need no header, so they report ok=false.\nfunc gitHost(cloneURL string) (string, bool) {\n\tu, err := url.Parse(cloneURL)\n\tif err != nil || (u.Scheme != \"http\" && u.Scheme != \"https\") || u.Host == \"\" {\n\t\treturn \"\", false\n\t}\n\n\treturn u.Host, true\n}\n\n// setupSandboxGit prepares the container's git environment and clones\n// the repo into /project — entirely inside the sandbox, so the host\n// never runs git. It configures, in the container's global gitconfig:\n//\n// - the agent's commit identity (user.name / user.email), and\n// - an Authorization header scoped to the Forgejo host, so every\n// remote operation the agent runs in the sandbox (clone, fetch,\n// pull, push) authenticates with the given token and simply works.\n//\n// safe.directory is set at --system scope so it holds regardless of\n// which user a later exec runs as; identity and the credential use\n// --global (the container runs as one user throughout its life).\n//\n// Errors carry the step's label, never the command itself: the\n// credential step embeds the token (base64-encoded) and must not leak\n// it into the job log.\nfunc setupSandboxGit(ctx context.Context, docker *dockerRuntime, containerID, cloneURL, username, token, name, email, defaultBranch, branch string) error {\n\ttype step struct {\n\t\tlabel string\n\t\tcmd string\n\t}\n\n\tsteps := []step{\n\t\t{\"configure git safe.directory\", \"git config --system --add safe.directory '*'\"},\n\t\t{\"configure git user.name\", \"git config --global user.name \" + tools.ShellQuote(name)},\n\t\t{\"configure git user.email\", \"git config --global user.email \" + tools.ShellQuote(email)},\n\t}\n\n\tif host, ok := gitHost(cloneURL); ok {\n\t\tsteps = append(steps, step{\n\t\t\t\"configure git credential\",\n\t\t\t\"git config --global http.\" + host + \".extraHeader \" + tools.ShellQuote(basicAuthHeader(username, token)),\n\t\t})\n\t}\n\n\tsteps = append(steps,\n\t\tstep{\"clone repository\", \"git clone --branch \" + tools.ShellQuote(defaultBranch) + \" --single-branch \" + tools.ShellQuote(cloneURL) + \" /project\"},\n\t\tstep{\"checkout branch \" + branch, \"git checkout -b \" + tools.ShellQuote(branch)},\n\t)\n\n\tfor _, s := range steps {\n\t\tout, exitCode, err := docker.exec(ctx, containerID, s.cmd)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"%s: %w\", s.label, err)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif exitCode != 0 {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"%s: exit %d: %s\", s.label, exitCode, out)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}\n", "path": "/project/internal/agentrun/sandbox.go"}
Arguments
{"content": "package agentrun\n\nimport (\n\t\"context\"\n\t\"encoding/base64\"\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"net/url\"\n\n\t\"github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/tools\"\n)\n\n// basicAuthHeader builds the value of the Authorization header git\n// sends to Forgejo for every remote operation: the account the token\n// belongs to (username) and the token itself, base64-encoded per the\n// HTTP Basic scheme. Forgejo accepts a personal access token as the\n// password, but matching the token owner keeps the credential\n// unambiguous in server logs.\nfunc basicAuthHeader(username, token string) string {\n\tauth := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(username + \":\" + token))\n\n\treturn \"Authorization: Basic \" + auth\n}\n\n// gitHost returns the host (with port) of an http(s) clone URL, for\n// scoping the sandbox's git Authorization header to the Forgejo host\n// only. Non-http(s) URLs (ssh, local paths) authenticate through other\n// means and need no header, so they report ok=false.\nfunc gitHost(cloneURL string) (string, bool) {\n\tu, err := url.Parse(cloneURL)\n\tif err != nil || (u.Scheme != \"http\" && u.Scheme != \"https\") || u.Host == \"\" {\n\t\treturn \"\", false\n\t}\n\n\treturn u.Host, true\n}\n\n// setupSandboxGit prepares the container's git environment and clones\n// the repo into /project — entirely inside the sandbox, so the host\n// never runs git. It configures, in the container's global gitconfig:\n//\n// - the agent's commit identity (user.name / user.email), and\n// - an Authorization header scoped to the Forgejo host, so every\n// remote operation the agent runs in the sandbox (clone, fetch,\n// pull, push) authenticates with the given token and simply works.\n//\n// safe.directory is set at --system scope so it holds regardless of\n// which user a later exec runs as; identity and the credential use\n// --global (the container runs as one user throughout its life).\n//\n// Errors carry the step's label, never the command itself: the\n// credential step embeds the token (base64-encoded) and must not leak\n// it into the job log.\nfunc setupSandboxGit(ctx context.Context, docker *dockerRuntime, containerID, cloneURL, username, token, name, email, defaultBranch, branch string) error {\n\ttype step struct {\n\t\tlabel string\n\t\tcmd string\n\t}\n\n\tsteps := []step{\n\t\t{\"configure git safe.directory\", \"git config --system --add safe.directory '*'\"},\n\t\t{\"configure git user.name\", \"git config --global user.name \" + tools.ShellQuote(name)},\n\t\t{\"configure git user.email\", \"git config --global user.email \" + tools.ShellQuote(email)},\n\t}\n\n\tif host, ok := gitHost(cloneURL); ok {\n\t\tsteps = append(steps, step{\n\t\t\t\"configure git credential\",\n\t\t\t\"git config --global http.\" + host + \".extraHeader \" + tools.ShellQuote(basicAuthHeader(username, token)),\n\t\t})\n\t}\n\n\tsteps = append(steps,\n\t\tstep{\"clone repository\", \"git clone --branch \" + tools.ShellQuote(defaultBranch) + \" --single-branch \" + tools.ShellQuote(cloneURL) + \" /project\"},\n\t\tstep{\"checkout branch \" + branch, \"git checkout -b \" + tools.ShellQuote(branch)},\n\t)\n\n\tfor _, s := range steps {\n\t\tout, exitCode, err := docker.exec(ctx, containerID, s.cmd)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"%s: %w\", s.label, err)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif exitCode != 0 {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"%s: exit %d: %s\", s.label, exitCode, out)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}\n", "path": "/project/internal/agentrun/sandbox.go"}
Result
OK
Thinking
Next, I'll update `run.go`. Changes:
1. Package documentation.
2. `Run()`:
- After MkdirTemp, run MkdirAll on projectDir.
- Remove the `cloneAndBranch` call and the host-side `runGit` configuration.
- Move roster/gitIdentity to before container creation (needed for setup).
- Create the container.
- Call setupSandboxGit.
- runContext without token/projectDir.
3. Add a `gitToken` helper (or inline it).
Let me carefully rewrite the relevant part of Run(). Current code (lines 104-200):
```go
// Run implements scheduler.Runner.
func (r *Runner) Run(ctx context.Context, jobID string, agent config.AgentConfig, llmCfg config.LLM, dockerImage string, ev forgejo.Event) error {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, r.timeout)
defer cancel()
logger := r.logger.With("job", jobID, "agent", agent.Name)
repoInfo, err := r.forgejo.RepositoryInfo(ev.Owner, ev.Repo)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("look up repository: %w", err)
}
workDir, err := os.MkdirTemp("", "zoo-run-*")
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("create work dir: %w", err)
}
succeeded := false
defer func() {
if succeeded || !r.keepOnFailure {
os.RemoveAll(workDir)
} else {
logger.Warn("keeping work dir after failure", "dir", workDir)
}
}()
branch := fmt.Sprintf("issue-%d-%s", ev.Index, agent.Name)
projectDir := filepath.Join(workDir, "project")
if err := cloneAndBranch(ctx, repoInfo.CloneURL, r.forgejo.Token(), repoInfo.DefaultBranch, branch, projectDir); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("prepare git working tree: %w", err)
}
roster := buildRoster(r.forgejo, r.cfg.Agents, logger)
gitName, gitEmail := gitIdentity(agent.Name, roster)
// Local (not --global) scope, so this identity lives in
// projectDir/.git/config: the one place both this host-side clone
// and the container it's bind-mounted into (as /project) actually
// share.
if out, err := runGit(ctx, projectDir, "config", "user.name", gitName); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("configure git user.name: %w: %s", err, out)
}
if out, err := runGit(ctx, projectDir, "config", "user.email", gitEmail); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("configure git user.email: %w: %s", err, out)
}
eventPath := filepath.Join(workDir, "event.json")
if err := os.WriteFile(eventPath, ev.Raw, 0o644); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("write event file: %w", err)
}
containerID, err := r.docker.createContainer(ctx, dockerImage, []string{
projectDir + ":/project",
eventPath + ":/event:ro",
}, fmt.Sprintf("zoo-issue-%d-%s", ev.Index, agent.Name))
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("start container: %w", err)
}
defer func() {
cleanupCtx, cleanupCancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 30*time.Second)
defer cleanupCancel()
if err := r.docker.remove(cleanupCtx, containerID); err != nil {
logger.Warn("failed to remove container", "container", containerID, "error", err)
}
}()
// /project is bind-mounted from the host, so it's owned by the host
// UID that ran the clone, not whatever UID runs inside the
// container (usually root) — git's ownership check rejects that by
// default ("detected dubious ownership") unless told otherwise.
// --system (not --global) so this holds regardless of which user
// subsequent `docker exec` calls run as. Commit identity is
// configured host-side, above, with --local scope so it's visible
// from both sides of the bind mount without needing --global here.
out, exitCode, err := r.docker.exec(ctx, containerID, "git config --system --add safe.directory '*'")
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("configure git safe.directory in container: %w: %s", err, out)
}
if exitCode != 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("configure git safe.directory in container: exit %d: %s", exitCode, out)
}
logAppend := ...
runCtx := &runContext{
docker: r.docker,
containerID: containerID,
projectDir: projectDir,
token: r.forgejo.Token(),
forgejo: &runForgejoActions{...},
}
...
}
```
New version:
```go
// Run implements scheduler.Runner.
func (r *Runner) Run(ctx context.Context, jobID string, agent config.AgentConfig, llmCfg config.LLM, dockerImage string, ev forgejo.Event) error {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, r.timeout)
defer cancel()
logger := r.logger.With("job", jobID, "agent", agent.Name)
repoInfo, err := r.forgejo.RepositoryInfo(ev.Owner, ev.Repo)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("look up repository: %w", err)
}
workDir, err := os.MkdirTemp("", "zoo-run-*")
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("create work dir: %w", err)
}
succeeded := false
defer func() {
if succeeded || !r.keepOnFailure {
os.RemoveAll(workDir)
} else {
logger.Warn("keeping work dir after failure", "dir", workDir)
}
}()
branch := fmt.Sprintf("issue-%d-%s", ev.Index, agent.Name)
projectDir := filepath.Join(workDir, "project")
if err := os.MkdirAll(projectDir, 0o755); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("create project dir: %w", err)
}
roster := buildRoster(r.forgejo, r.cfg.Agents, logger)
gitName, gitEmail := gitIdentity(agent.Name, roster)
eventPath := filepath.Join(workDir, "event.json")
if err := os.WriteFile(eventPath, ev.Raw, 0o644); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("write event file: %w", err)
}
containerID, err := r.docker.createContainer(ctx, dockerImage, []string{
projectDir + ":/project",
eventPath + ":/event:ro",
}, fmt.Sprintf("zoo-issue-%d-%s", ev.Index, agent.Name))
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("start container: %w", err)
}
defer func() {
cleanupCtx, cleanupCancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 30*time.Second)
defer cleanupCancel()
if err := r.docker.remove(cleanupCtx, containerID); err != nil {
logger.Warn("failed to remove container", "container", containerID, "error", err)
}
}()
// The clone happens inside the sandbox, and the sandbox's git is
// authenticated with the agent's own token when one is configured
// (so its commits and pushes are attributed to its own identity,
// matching forgejoAs), falling back to the shared zoo identity.
gitUsername, gitToken := "zoo", r.forgejo.Token()
if agent.Token != "" {
gitUsername, gitToken = agent.Name, agent.Token
}
if err := setupSandboxGit(ctx, r.docker, containerID, repoInfo.CloneURL, gitUsername, gitToken, gitName, gitEmail, repoInfo.DefaultBranch, branch); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("prepare git working tree in sandbox: %w", err)
}
logAppend := ...
runCtx := &runContext{
docker: r.docker,
containerID: containerID,
forgejo: &runForgejoActions{...},
}
...
}
```
Wait — one question: for the shared token, should the username be "zoo"? The existing code used "zoo:" + token. Yes, keep "zoo".
Hmm, wait — actually, let me double-check the assumption that the shared account's username is "zoo". The existing code: `base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte("zoo:" + token))`. And it works in production (the agent has been pushing). So either the username "zoo" is correct, or Forgejo ignores the username. Either way, keeping "zoo" for the shared token preserves the current behavior exactly. For the agent's token, using the agent name is the best guess for the owner.
Also, I'll update the package documentation at the top of run.go:
```go
// Package agentrun creates the throwaway per-job environment an agent
// runs in: a git clone + branch bind-mounted into a Docker container,
// the triggering event written to /event, and the tool-calling loop
// (internal/llm + internal/tools) driven against it.
```
New version:
```go
// Package agentrun creates the throwaway per-job environment an agent
// runs in: a Docker container with the repo cloned into a
// bind-mounted working tree (the clone itself happens inside the
// sandbox, authenticated with the agent's token), the triggering
// event written to /event, and the tool-calling loop (internal/llm +
// internal/tools) driven against it.
```
Let me make these edits.
Now restructure `run.go` — the clone moves into the sandbox, and the token selection follows the `forgejoAs` pattern:
Tool 🔧 edit_file {"find": "// Package agentrun creates the throwaway per-job environment an agent\n// runs in: a git clone + branch bind-mounted into a Docker container,\n// the triggering event written to /event, and the tool-calling loop\n// (internal/llm + internal/tools) driven against it.\npackage agentrun", "replace": "// Package agentrun creates the throwaway per-job environment an agent\n// runs in: a Docker container with the repo cloned into a bind-mounted\n// working tree — the clone itself happens inside the sandbox,\n// authenticated with the agent's token — the triggering event written\n// to /event, and the tool-calling loop (internal/llm + internal/tools)\n// driven against it.\npackage agentrun", "path": "/project/internal/agentrun/run.go"}
Arguments
{"find": "// Package agentrun creates the throwaway per-job environment an agent\n// runs in: a git clone + branch bind-mounted into a Docker container,\n// the triggering event written to /event, and the tool-calling loop\n// (internal/llm + internal/tools) driven against it.\npackage agentrun", "replace": "// Package agentrun creates the throwaway per-job environment an agent\n// runs in: a Docker container with the repo cloned into a bind-mounted\n// working tree — the clone itself happens inside the sandbox,\n// authenticated with the agent's token — the triggering event written\n// to /event, and the tool-calling loop (internal/llm + internal/tools)\n// driven against it.\npackage agentrun", "path": "/project/internal/agentrun/run.go"}
Result
1 occurrences replaced
Tool 🔧 edit_file {"find": "\tbranch := fmt.Sprintf(\"issue-%d-%s\", ev.Index, agent.Name)\n\tprojectDir := filepath.Join(workDir, \"project\")\n\n\tif err := cloneAndBranch(ctx, repoInfo.CloneURL, r.forgejo.Token(), repoInfo.DefaultBranch, branch, projectDir); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"prepare git working tree: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\troster := buildRoster(r.forgejo, r.cfg.Agents, logger)\n\tgitName, gitEmail := gitIdentity(agent.Name, roster)\n\n\t// Local (not --global) scope, so this identity lives in\n\t// projectDir/.git/config: the one place both this host-side clone\n\t// and the container it's bind-mounted into (as /project) actually\n\t// share.\n\tif out, err := runGit(ctx, projectDir, \"config\", \"user.name\", gitName); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure git user.name: %w: %s\", err, out)\n\t}\n\tif out, err := runGit(ctx, projectDir, \"config\", \"user.email\", gitEmail); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure git user.email: %w: %s\", err, out)\n\t}\n\n\teventPath := filepath.Join(workDir, \"event.json\")", "replace": "\tbranch := fmt.Sprintf(\"issue-%d-%s\", ev.Index, agent.Name)\n\tprojectDir := filepath.Join(workDir, \"project\")\n\n\tif err := os.MkdirAll(projectDir, 0o755); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"create project dir: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\troster := buildRoster(r.forgejo, r.cfg.Agents, logger)\n\tgitName, gitEmail := gitIdentity(agent.Name, roster)\n\n\teventPath := filepath.Join(workDir, \"event.json\")", "path": "/project/internal/agentrun/run.go"}
Arguments
{"find": "\tbranch := fmt.Sprintf(\"issue-%d-%s\", ev.Index, agent.Name)\n\tprojectDir := filepath.Join(workDir, \"project\")\n\n\tif err := cloneAndBranch(ctx, repoInfo.CloneURL, r.forgejo.Token(), repoInfo.DefaultBranch, branch, projectDir); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"prepare git working tree: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\troster := buildRoster(r.forgejo, r.cfg.Agents, logger)\n\tgitName, gitEmail := gitIdentity(agent.Name, roster)\n\n\t// Local (not --global) scope, so this identity lives in\n\t// projectDir/.git/config: the one place both this host-side clone\n\t// and the container it's bind-mounted into (as /project) actually\n\t// share.\n\tif out, err := runGit(ctx, projectDir, \"config\", \"user.name\", gitName); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure git user.name: %w: %s\", err, out)\n\t}\n\tif out, err := runGit(ctx, projectDir, \"config\", \"user.email\", gitEmail); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure git user.email: %w: %s\", err, out)\n\t}\n\n\teventPath := filepath.Join(workDir, \"event.json\")", "replace": "\tbranch := fmt.Sprintf(\"issue-%d-%s\", ev.Index, agent.Name)\n\tprojectDir := filepath.Join(workDir, \"project\")\n\n\tif err := os.MkdirAll(projectDir, 0o755); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"create project dir: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\troster := buildRoster(r.forgejo, r.cfg.Agents, logger)\n\tgitName, gitEmail := gitIdentity(agent.Name, roster)\n\n\teventPath := filepath.Join(workDir, \"event.json\")", "path": "/project/internal/agentrun/run.go"}
Result
1 occurrences replaced
Thinking
Next, replace the safe.directory exec block with a setupSandboxGit call, and update runContext:
Tool 🔧 edit_file {"find": "\t// /project is bind-mounted from the host, so it's owned by the host\n\t// UID that ran the clone, not whatever UID runs inside the\n\t// container (usually root) — git's ownership check rejects that by\n\t// default (\"detected dubious ownership\") unless told otherwise.\n\t// --system (not --global) so this holds regardless of which user\n\t// subsequent `docker exec` calls run as. Commit identity is\n\t// configured host-side, above, with --local scope so it's visible\n\t// from both sides of the bind mount without needing --global here.\n\tout, exitCode, err := r.docker.exec(ctx, containerID, \"git config --system --add safe.directory '*'\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure git safe.directory in container: %w: %s\", err, out)\n\t}\n\tif exitCode != 0 {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure git safe.directory in container: exit %d: %s\", exitCode, out)\n\t}", "replace": "\t// The clone happens inside the sandbox, and the sandbox's git is\n\t// authenticated with the agent's own token when one is configured\n\t// (so its commits and pushes are attributed to its own identity,\n\t// matching forgejoAs), falling back to the shared zoo identity —\n\t// whose Forgejo account is \"zoo\" — for agents without one.\n\tgitUsername, gitToken := \"zoo\", r.forgejo.Token()\n\tif agent.Token != \"\" {\n\t\tgitUsername, gitToken = agent.Name, agent.Token\n\t}\n\n\tif err := setupSandboxGit(ctx, r.docker, containerID, repoInfo.CloneURL, gitUsername, gitToken, gitName, gitEmail, repoInfo.DefaultBranch, branch); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"prepare git working tree in sandbox: %w\", err)\n\t}", "path": "/project/internal/agentrun/run.go"}
Arguments
{"find": "\t// /project is bind-mounted from the host, so it's owned by the host\n\t// UID that ran the clone, not whatever UID runs inside the\n\t// container (usually root) — git's ownership check rejects that by\n\t// default (\"detected dubious ownership\") unless told otherwise.\n\t// --system (not --global) so this holds regardless of which user\n\t// subsequent `docker exec` calls run as. Commit identity is\n\t// configured host-side, above, with --local scope so it's visible\n\t// from both sides of the bind mount without needing --global here.\n\tout, exitCode, err := r.docker.exec(ctx, containerID, \"git config --system --add safe.directory '*'\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure git safe.directory in container: %w: %s\", err, out)\n\t}\n\tif exitCode != 0 {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure git safe.directory in container: exit %d: %s\", exitCode, out)\n\t}", "replace": "\t// The clone happens inside the sandbox, and the sandbox's git is\n\t// authenticated with the agent's own token when one is configured\n\t// (so its commits and pushes are attributed to its own identity,\n\t// matching forgejoAs), falling back to the shared zoo identity —\n\t// whose Forgejo account is \"zoo\" — for agents without one.\n\tgitUsername, gitToken := \"zoo\", r.forgejo.Token()\n\tif agent.Token != \"\" {\n\t\tgitUsername, gitToken = agent.Name, agent.Token\n\t}\n\n\tif err := setupSandboxGit(ctx, r.docker, containerID, repoInfo.CloneURL, gitUsername, gitToken, gitName, gitEmail, repoInfo.DefaultBranch, branch); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"prepare git working tree in sandbox: %w\", err)\n\t}", "path": "/project/internal/agentrun/run.go"}
Result
1 occurrences replaced
Tool 🔧 edit_file {"find": "\trunCtx := &runContext{\n\t\tdocker: r.docker,\n\t\tcontainerID: containerID,\n\t\tprojectDir: projectDir,\n\t\ttoken: r.forgejo.Token(),\n\t\tforgejo: &runForgejoActions{", "replace": "\trunCtx := &runContext{\n\t\tdocker: r.docker,\n\t\tcontainerID: containerID,\n\t\tforgejo: &runForgejoActions{", "path": "/project/internal/agentrun/run.go"}
Arguments
{"find": "\trunCtx := &runContext{\n\t\tdocker: r.docker,\n\t\tcontainerID: containerID,\n\t\tprojectDir: projectDir,\n\t\ttoken: r.forgejo.Token(),\n\t\tforgejo: &runForgejoActions{", "replace": "\trunCtx := &runContext{\n\t\tdocker: r.docker,\n\t\tcontainerID: containerID,\n\t\tforgejo: &runForgejoActions{", "path": "/project/internal/agentrun/run.go"}
Result
ERROR CALLING TOOL: "\trunCtx := &runContext{\n\t\tdocker: r.docker,\n\t\tcontainerID: containerID,\n\t\tprojectDir: projectDir,\n\t\ttoken: r.forgejo.Token(),\n\t\tforgejo: &runForgejoActions{" not found in "/project/internal/agentrun/run.go"
Thinking
The second edit failed — probably due to a whitespace mismatch. Let me try reading the current state of run.go around runCtx.
Tool 🔧 read_file {"end_line": 200, "path": "/project/internal/agentrun/run.go", "start_line": 155}
Arguments
{"end_line": 200, "path": "/project/internal/agentrun/run.go", "start_line": 155}
Result
{"path":"/project/internal/agentrun/run.go","content":"\t\tif err := r.docker.remove(cleanupCtx, containerID); err != nil {\r\n\t\t\tlogger.Warn(\"failed to remove container\", \"container\", containerID, \"error\", err)\r\n\t\t}\r\n\t}()\r\n\r\n\t// The clone happens inside the sandbox, and the sandbox's git is\r\n\t// authenticated with the agent's own token when one is configured\r\n\t// (so its commits and pushes are attributed to its own identity,\r\n\t// matching forgejoAs), falling back to the shared zoo identity —\r\n\t// whose Forgejo account is \"zoo\" — for agents without one.\r\n\tgitUsername, gitToken := \"zoo\", r.forgejo.Token()\r\n\tif agent.Token != \"\" {\r\n\t\tgitUsername, gitToken = agent.Name, agent.Token\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tif err := setupSandboxGit(ctx, r.docker, containerID, repoInfo.CloneURL, gitUsername, gitToken, gitName, gitEmail, repoInfo.DefaultBranch, branch); err != nil {\r\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"prepare git working tree in sandbox: %w\", err)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tlogAppend := func(stream, line string) {\r\n\t\tif err := r.store.AppendLog(context.Background(), jobID, stream, line); err != nil {\r\n\t\t\tlogger.Warn(\"failed to append log\", \"error\", err)\r\n\t\t}\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\trunCtx := \u0026runContext{\r\n\t\tdocker: r.docker,\r\n\t\tcontainerID: containerID,\r\n\t\tprojectDir: projectDir,\r\n\t\ttoken: r.forgejo.Token(),\r\n\t\tforgejo: \u0026runForgejoActions{\r\n\t\t\tclient: r.forgejoAs(agent.Name, agent.Token),\r\n\t\t\towner: ev.Owner,\r\n\t\t\trepo: ev.Repo,\r\n\t\t\tindex: ev.Index,\r\n\t\t\tlogger: logger,\r\n\t\t},\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tllmClient := llm.NewClient(llmCfg)\r\n\r\n\tsystemPrompt := defaultSystemPrompt + identitySection(agent.Name, roster)\r\n\r\n\tinstructions := r.cfg.EventInstructions(ev.Kind)\r\n\r\n\t// Fetch the full comment thread so the agent sees everything that's\r","start_line":155,"end_line":200,"total_lines":322,"truncated":true}
Thinking
I see — the file uses `\r\n` line endings (CRLF). The reason my edit failed was... hmm, actually the first edit succeeded. The runCtx edit failed probably because of the line endings in my find string. Let me retry with the exact text. The read result shows the following:
```
runCtx := &runContext{
docker: r.docker,
containerID: containerID,
projectDir: projectDir,
token: r.forgejo.Token(),
forgejo: &runForgejoActions{
```
Wait, in the read result it shows `forgejo: &runForgejoActions{` — with 5 spaces before the &? In the original file (from the first read), it was displayed as `forgejo: &runForgejoActions{`. My find string had `forgejo: &runForgejoActions{` — that should match, but... unless the file is CRLF and the tool is handling it. The first edit (the big block) succeeded, and that also spanned multiple lines. Strange.
Oh wait — I got it. In the failed find, I wrote `token: r.forgejo.Token(),` — let me compare with the actual: `token: r.forgejo.Token(),`. Hmm, they look the same.
Let me look more carefully at the alignment of the actual lines:
- `docker: r.docker,` — "docker:" + 6 spaces
- `containerID: containerID,`
- `projectDir: projectDir,`
- `token: r.forgejo.Token(),` — "token:" + 7 spaces
- `forgejo: &runForgejoActions{` — "forgejo:" + 5 spaces
My find:
```
runCtx := &runContext{
docker: r.docker,
containerID: containerID,
projectDir: projectDir,
token: r.forgejo.Token(),
forgejo: &runForgejoActions{
```
This looks identical... The problem might be CRLF: the file is CRLF (in the read output, `\r` is displayed at the end of lines). The find string I provided uses LF. But the first multi-line edit succeeded... maybe the edit tool normalizes line endings on some paths. Hmm.
Actually, wait — maybe the first edit succeeded because it was done before... no, that's not it. Let me try a smaller edit: just delete the two lines `projectDir` and `token`.
The file uses CRLF line endings; let me do a smaller, targeted edit:
Tool 🔧 edit_file {"find": "\t\tcontainerID: containerID,\n\t\tprojectDir: projectDir,\n\t\ttoken: r.forgejo.Token(),\n\t\tforgejo: &runForgejoActions{", "replace": "\t\tcontainerID: containerID,\n\t\tforgejo: &runForgejoActions{", "path": "/project/internal/agentrun/run.go"}
Arguments
{"find": "\t\tcontainerID: containerID,\n\t\tprojectDir: projectDir,\n\t\ttoken: r.forgejo.Token(),\n\t\tforgejo: &runForgejoActions{", "replace": "\t\tcontainerID: containerID,\n\t\tforgejo: &runForgejoActions{", "path": "/project/internal/agentrun/run.go"}
Result
ERROR CALLING TOOL: "\t\tcontainerID: containerID,\n\t\tprojectDir: projectDir,\n\t\ttoken: r.forgejo.Token(),\n\t\tforgejo: &runForgejoActions{" not found in "/project/internal/agentrun/run.go"
Thinking
Hmm, it's still failing. Let me check the exact bytes of that region using bash (cat -A or sed).
Tool 🔧 bash {"command": "cd /project && sed -n '178,186p' internal/agentrun/run.go | cat -A | head -20"}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /project && sed -n '178,186p' internal/agentrun/run.go | cat -A | head -20"}
Result
^I}$
$
^IrunCtx := &runContext{$
^I^Idocker: r.docker,$
^I^IcontainerID: containerID,$
^I^IprojectDir: projectDir,$
^I^Itoken: r.forgejo.Token(),$
^I^Iforgejo: &runForgejoActions{$
^I^I^Iclient: r.forgejoAs(agent.Name, agent.Token),$
Thinking
The actual line is `forgejo: &runForgejoActions{` (one space, not five). The read_file output was misleading (it was displaying `forgejo: &runForgejoActions{` — no wait, it was displaying `forgejo: &runForgejoActions{`... hmm, actually looking at the read output again: `forgejo: &runForgejoActions{` — hmm, but cat -A shows `forgejo: &runForgejoActions{`. The read_file output must have been aligned in some different way. Oh well — I'll use the exact text from cat -A.
Tool 🔧 edit_file {"find": "\t\tcontainerID: containerID,\n\t\tprojectDir: projectDir,\n\t\ttoken: r.forgejo.Token(),\n\t\tforgejo: &runForgejoActions{", "replace": "\t\tcontainerID: containerID,\n\t\tforgejo: &runForgejoActions{", "path": "/project/internal/agentrun/run.go"}
Arguments
{"find": "\t\tcontainerID: containerID,\n\t\tprojectDir: projectDir,\n\t\ttoken: r.forgejo.Token(),\n\t\tforgejo: &runForgejoActions{", "replace": "\t\tcontainerID: containerID,\n\t\tforgejo: &runForgejoActions{", "path": "/project/internal/agentrun/run.go"}
Result
1 occurrences replaced
Thinking
Next, I'll update `agentrun/context.go` — remove the `Git` method, the `token`/`projectDir` fields, and update the documentation:
Now update `agentrun/context.go` — drop the host-side `Git` implementation and the now-unused fields:
Tool 🔧 write_file {"content": "package agentrun\n\nimport (\n\t\"context\"\n\t\"fmt\"\n\n\t\"github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/tools\"\n)\n\n// runContext implements tools.Context for a single agent run, executing\n// shell commands via docker exec against the run's container (git\n// included — the container's git is pre-authenticated against Forgejo\n// by setupSandboxGit) and binding Forgejo actions to the triggering\n// issue/PR.\ntype runContext struct {\n\tdocker *dockerRuntime\n\tcontainerID string\n\tforgejo tools.ForgejoActions\n}\n\nfunc (c *runContext) Exec(ctx context.Context, command string) (string, error) {\n\toutput, exitCode, err := c.docker.exec(ctx, c.containerID, command)\n\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn output, err\n\t}\n\n\tif exitCode != 0 {\n\t\treturn output, fmt.Errorf(\"command exited with status %d\", exitCode)\n\t}\n\n\treturn output, nil\n}\n\nfunc (c *runContext) Forgejo() tools.ForgejoActions {\n\treturn c.forgejo\n}\n", "path": "/project/internal/agentrun/context.go"}
Arguments
{"content": "package agentrun\n\nimport (\n\t\"context\"\n\t\"fmt\"\n\n\t\"github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/tools\"\n)\n\n// runContext implements tools.Context for a single agent run, executing\n// shell commands via docker exec against the run's container (git\n// included — the container's git is pre-authenticated against Forgejo\n// by setupSandboxGit) and binding Forgejo actions to the triggering\n// issue/PR.\ntype runContext struct {\n\tdocker *dockerRuntime\n\tcontainerID string\n\tforgejo tools.ForgejoActions\n}\n\nfunc (c *runContext) Exec(ctx context.Context, command string) (string, error) {\n\toutput, exitCode, err := c.docker.exec(ctx, c.containerID, command)\n\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn output, err\n\t}\n\n\tif exitCode != 0 {\n\t\treturn output, fmt.Errorf(\"command exited with status %d\", exitCode)\n\t}\n\n\treturn output, nil\n}\n\nfunc (c *runContext) Forgejo() tools.ForgejoActions {\n\treturn c.forgejo\n}\n", "path": "/project/internal/agentrun/context.go"}
Result
OK
Tool 🔧 remove_file {"path": "/project/internal/agentrun/clone.go"}
Arguments
{"path": "/project/internal/agentrun/clone.go"}
Result
File removed successfully
Thinking
Next, I'll update the **Git** section of `system.md` and the documentation for `Token()` in `forgejo/client.go`:
Tool 🔧 edit_file {"find": "**Git**\n\nYou may use normal git commands to manage your working tree. For remote\n(pull, fetch, push, etc.) git operations, you can use the `git` tool.", "replace": "**Git**\n\nYou may use normal git commands to manage your working tree. Remote\ngit operations (pull, fetch, push, etc.) are pre-authenticated in the\nsandbox and simply work — the `git` tool or `bash` both run inside it.", "path": "/project/internal/agentrun/system.md"}
Arguments
{"find": "**Git**\n\nYou may use normal git commands to manage your working tree. For remote\n(pull, fetch, push, etc.) git operations, you can use the `git` tool.", "replace": "**Git**\n\nYou may use normal git commands to manage your working tree. Remote\ngit operations (pull, fetch, push, etc.) are pre-authenticated in the\nsandbox and simply work — the `git` tool or `bash` both run inside it.", "path": "/project/internal/agentrun/system.md"}
Result
1 occurrences replaced
Tool 🔧 edit_file {"find": "// Token returns the shared zoo Forgejo identity's token, e.g. for\n// authenticating a host-side git clone/push against Forgejo (see\n// internal/agentrun) without ever writing the credential into a working\n// tree an agent's container can read.\nfunc (c *Client) Token() string {\n\treturn c.token\n}", "replace": "// Token returns the shared zoo Forgejo identity's token, e.g. as the\n// fallback git credential for agents without a per-agent token (see\n// internal/agentrun).\nfunc (c *Client) Token() string {\n\treturn c.token\n}", "path": "/project/internal/forgejo/client.go"}
Arguments
{"find": "// Token returns the shared zoo Forgejo identity's token, e.g. for\n// authenticating a host-side git clone/push against Forgejo (see\n// internal/agentrun) without ever writing the credential into a working\n// tree an agent's container can read.\nfunc (c *Client) Token() string {\n\treturn c.token\n}", "replace": "// Token returns the shared zoo Forgejo identity's token, e.g. as the\n// fallback git credential for agents without a per-agent token (see\n// internal/agentrun).\nfunc (c *Client) Token() string {\n\treturn c.token\n}", "path": "/project/internal/forgejo/client.go"}
Result
1 occurrences replaced
Thinking
Next, I'll add unit tests for the new helpers (`gitHost`, `basicAuthHeader`) in `internal/agentrun/sandbox_test.go`. I'll also check whether there's a test for `setupSandboxGit` that doesn't require docker — since it requires a dockerRuntime, I'll skip it.
Also, I should double-check the integration test file: `TestDockerRuntimeGitSafeDirectory` — it still works (safe.directory is still applied inside the container, but now via setupSandboxGit... no wait, that test applies the fix itself via exec, so it's independent of Run()). No problem.
Alright, let's write sandbox_test.go:
Now add unit tests for the new helpers:
Tool 🔧 write_file {"content": "package agentrun\n\nimport (\n\t\"encoding/base64\"\n\t\"testing\"\n)\n\nfunc TestGitHost(t *testing.T) {\n\tcases := []struct {\n\t\turl string\n\t\thost string\n\t\tok bool\n\t}{\n\t\t{\"https://code.stdio.dk/abrander/zoo.git\", \"code.stdio.dk\", true},\n\t\t{\"http://localhost:3000/abrander/zoo.git\", \"localhost:3000\", true},\n\t\t{\"git@code.stdio.dk:abrander/zoo.git\", \"\", false},\n\t\t{\"file:///srv/git/zoo.git\", \"\", false},\n\t\t{\"relative/path\", \"\", false},\n\t}\n\n\tfor _, tc := range cases {\n\t\thost, ok := gitHost(tc.url)\n\t\tif ok != tc.ok || host != tc.host {\n\t\t\tt.Errorf(\"gitHost(%q) = (%q, %v), want (%q, %v)\", tc.url, host, ok, tc.host, tc.ok)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc TestBasicAuthHeader(t *testing.T) {\n\twant := \"Authorization: Basic \" + base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(\"greg:tok123\"))\n\n\tif got := basicAuthHeader(\"greg\", \"tok123\"); got != want {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"basicAuthHeader = %q, want %q\", got, want)\n\t}\n}\n", "path": "/project/internal/agentrun/sandbox_test.go"}
Arguments
{"content": "package agentrun\n\nimport (\n\t\"encoding/base64\"\n\t\"testing\"\n)\n\nfunc TestGitHost(t *testing.T) {\n\tcases := []struct {\n\t\turl string\n\t\thost string\n\t\tok bool\n\t}{\n\t\t{\"https://code.stdio.dk/abrander/zoo.git\", \"code.stdio.dk\", true},\n\t\t{\"http://localhost:3000/abrander/zoo.git\", \"localhost:3000\", true},\n\t\t{\"git@code.stdio.dk:abrander/zoo.git\", \"\", false},\n\t\t{\"file:///srv/git/zoo.git\", \"\", false},\n\t\t{\"relative/path\", \"\", false},\n\t}\n\n\tfor _, tc := range cases {\n\t\thost, ok := gitHost(tc.url)\n\t\tif ok != tc.ok || host != tc.host {\n\t\t\tt.Errorf(\"gitHost(%q) = (%q, %v), want (%q, %v)\", tc.url, host, ok, tc.host, tc.ok)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc TestBasicAuthHeader(t *testing.T) {\n\twant := \"Authorization: Basic \" + base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(\"greg:tok123\"))\n\n\tif got := basicAuthHeader(\"greg\", \"tok123\"); got != want {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"basicAuthHeader = %q, want %q\", got, want)\n\t}\n}\n", "path": "/project/internal/agentrun/sandbox_test.go"}
Result
OK
Thinking
Alright, let's build and run the tests:
Now build and run the test suite:
Tool 🔧 bash {"command": "cd /project && gofmt -l . && go build ./... && go vet ./... && go test ./... 2>&1 | tail -20", "timeout": 300}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /project && gofmt -l . && go build ./... && go vet ./... && go test ./... 2>&1 | tail -20", "timeout": 300}
Result
ERROR CALLING TOOL: command failed: command exited with status 1
Thinking
Something failed. Let's check the output in more detail.
Tool 🔧 bash {"command": "cd /project && gofmt -l . ; echo \"---gofmt done---\" ; go build ./... 2>&1 ; echo \"---build done---\"", "timeout": 300}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /project && gofmt -l . ; echo \"---gofmt done---\" ; go build ./... 2>&1 ; echo \"---build done---\"", "timeout": 300}
Result
internal/scheduler/scheduler_test.go ---gofmt done--- # github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/tools internal/tools/grep_search.go:60:36: undefined: shellQuote internal/tools/grep_search.go:63:28: undefined: shellQuote internal/tools/list_files.go:31:69: undefined: shellQuote internal/tools/list_files.go:33:47: undefined: shellQuote internal/tools/move_file.go:30:61: undefined: shellQuote internal/tools/read_file.go:63:3: undefined: shellQuote internal/tools/remove_file.go:27:55: undefined: shellQuote ---build done---
Thinking
I overlooked other callers of `shellQuote` in other files. Let me find them all and update them. Also, `internal/scheduler/scheduler_test.go` is flagged by gofmt — is this a pre-existing issue? Let me check whether it was already unformatted before my changes (I haven't touched it). Let me verify with git status/diff.
I missed other `shellQuote` callers. Let me fix them all:
Tool 🔧 bash {"command": "cd /project && grep -rn \"shellQuote\" --include=\"*.go\" . | grep -v ShellQuote ; echo \"---\" ; git stash list ; git status --short"}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /project && grep -rn \"shellQuote\" --include=\"*.go\" . | grep -v ShellQuote ; echo \"---\" ; git stash list ; git status --short"}
Result
./internal/tools/grep_search.go:60: args = append(args, "--include="+shellQuote(params.Glob))
./internal/tools/grep_search.go:63: args = append(args, "-e", shellQuote(params.Pattern), "/project")
./internal/tools/remove_file.go:27: if _, err := ctx.Exec(context.Background(), "rm -f "+shellQuote(p)); err != nil {
./internal/tools/move_file.go:30: cmd := fmt.Sprintf(`mkdir -p "$(dirname %s)" && mv %s %s`, shellQuote(to), shellQuote(from), shellQuote(to))
./internal/tools/read_file.go:63: shellQuote(p), from, to)
./internal/tools/list_files.go:31: cmd = fmt.Sprintf(`find %s -mindepth 1 -not -path '*/.*' | sort`, shellQuote(p))
./internal/tools/list_files.go:33: cmd = fmt.Sprintf(`ls -la %s | tail -n +2`, shellQuote(p))
./internal/tools/tools_test.go:52: if got := shellQuote(in); got != want {
./internal/tools/tools_test.go:53: t.Errorf("shellQuote(%q) = %q, want %q", in, got, want)
---
D internal/agentrun/clone.go
M internal/agentrun/context.go
M internal/agentrun/run.go
M internal/agentrun/system.md
M internal/forgejo/client.go
M internal/tools/context.go
M internal/tools/git.go
M internal/tools/shell.go
M internal/tools/tools_test.go
?? internal/agentrun/sandbox.go
?? internal/agentrun/sandbox_test.go
Thinking
I'll use sed to replace all the remaining lowercase `shellQuote` calls with `ShellQuote` (being careful to only replace the identifier `shellQuote` and not `ShellQuote`). I'll also update the test function name in tools_test.go.
Also, regarding the gofmt issue with `internal/scheduler/scheduler_test.go` — this is a pre-existing one (I haven't touched it). Let me check whether it was already unformatted at the point of HEAD:
Tool 🔧 bash {"command": "cd /project && sed -i 's/\\bshellQuote\\b/ShellQuote/g' internal/tools/grep_search.go internal/tools/remove_file.go internal/tools/move_file.go internal/tools/read_file.go internal/tools/list_files.go internal/tools/tools_test.go && grep -rn \"shellQuote\" --include=\"*.go\" . ; echo \"exit: $?\" ; git stash show 2>/dev/null; git diff HEAD --stat -- internal/scheduler/scheduler_test.go"}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /project && sed -i 's/\\bshellQuote\\b/ShellQuote/g' internal/tools/grep_search.go internal/tools/remove_file.go internal/tools/move_file.go internal/tools/read_file.go internal/tools/list_files.go internal/tools/tools_test.go && grep -rn \"shellQuote\" --include=\"*.go\" . ; echo \"exit: $?\" ; git stash show 2>/dev/null; git diff HEAD --stat -- internal/scheduler/scheduler_test.go"}
Result
exit: 1
Thinking
All references to `shellQuote` have been replaced (grep found nothing → exit 1). And `scheduler_test.go` has no diff against HEAD — meaning its gofmt issue is pre-existing and not caused by me. I'll leave it as-is (surgical change).
Wait, but `TestShellQuote` in tools_test.go calls `ShellQuote(in)` — good, sed handled that.
Alright, let me rebuild and test.
All references updated (the gofmt flag on `scheduler_test.go` is pre-existing — no diff from HEAD). Rebuild and test:
Tool 🔧 bash {"command": "cd /project && go build ./... && go vet ./... && go test ./... 2>&1 | tail -20", "timeout": 300}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /project && go build ./... && go vet ./... && go test ./... 2>&1 | tail -20", "timeout": 300}
Result
? github.com/abrander/zoo/cmd/zoo [no test files]
ok github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/agentrun 0.004s
ok github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/config 0.004s
ok github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/forgejo 0.005s
ok github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/livelog 0.052s
ok github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/llm 0.003s
ok github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/scheduler 2.002s
ok github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/store 1.728s
--- FAIL: TestGitPassesSubcommandAndArgsThrough (0.00s)
tools_test.go:98: expected command "git commit -m 'fix: handle it'\\''s edge case'", got "git commit '-m' 'fix: handle it'\\''s edge case'"
FAIL
FAIL github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/tools 0.003s
ok github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/web 0.824s
FAIL
Thinking
The git tool quotes all arguments, including flags like `-m`. This is safe (quoting `-m` produces `'-m'`, which sh passes as `-m`), but it's ugly, and the test's expected value was assuming that only the value would be quoted.
Two options:
1. Quote all arguments (current behavior) — safe, and the test's expected value becomes `git commit '-m' 'fix: handle it'\''s edge case'`.
2. Only quote arguments that need it (heuristic) — riskier, and it's not done elsewhere either.
All the other tools unconditionally quote all interpolated values. Consistency + safety → keep quoting all arguments and fix the test's expected value.
Actually, hmm, wait. Let me think about whether quoting all arguments could break anything: `git log -p HEAD~1` → `git log -p 'HEAD~1'` — no problem. `git push origin issue-38-greg` → `git push 'origin' 'issue-38-greg'` — no problem. Quoting doesn't change the semantics of shell words. Safe.
I'll update the test's expected value.
The tool quotes all args (flags included) — safe and consistent with the other tools. Fix the test expectation:
Tool 🔧 edit_file {"find": "\t// The git tool shells out inside the container, so args must be\n\t// single-quoted for safe interpolation into the sh -c command.\n\twant := \"git commit -m 'fix: handle it'\\\\''s edge case'\"", "replace": "\t// The git tool shells out inside the container, so every arg must\n\t// be single-quoted for safe interpolation into the sh -c command.\n\twant := \"git commit '-m' 'fix: handle it'\\\\''s edge case'\"", "path": "/project/internal/tools/tools_test.go"}
Arguments
{"find": "\t// The git tool shells out inside the container, so args must be\n\t// single-quoted for safe interpolation into the sh -c command.\n\twant := \"git commit -m 'fix: handle it'\\\\''s edge case'\"", "replace": "\t// The git tool shells out inside the container, so every arg must\n\t// be single-quoted for safe interpolation into the sh -c command.\n\twant := \"git commit '-m' 'fix: handle it'\\\\''s edge case'\"", "path": "/project/internal/tools/tools_test.go"}
Result
1 occurrences replaced
Thinking
Wait, but I should double-check: is it really okay to quote flags like `-m`? `sh -c "git commit '-m' 'msg'"` — sh passes `-m` and `msg` as separate argv entries to git. Yes, no problem.
But, hmm, one edge case: what if the agent passes an argument starting with `-` that's meant for git, like `--`? `git checkout -- file` → `git checkout '--' 'file'` — no problem.
What about arguments that are empty strings? `git commit ''`... edge case, but no problem.
Alright, let me re-run the tests.
Tool 🔧 bash {"command": "cd /project && go build ./... && go vet ./... && go test ./... 2>&1 | tail -12", "timeout": 300}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /project && go build ./... && go vet ./... && go test ./... 2>&1 | tail -12", "timeout": 300}
Result
? github.com/abrander/zoo/cmd/zoo [no test files] ok github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/agentrun (cached) ok github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/config (cached) ok github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/forgejo (cached) ok github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/livelog (cached) ok github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/llm (cached) ok github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/scheduler (cached) ok github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/store (cached) ok github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/tools 0.003s ok github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/web (cached)
Thinking
All tests pass. Next, let's check whether Docker is available in this environment and try running the docker-tagged integration tests:
All green. Let me check if Docker is available here to run the integration tests:
Tool 🔧 bash {"command": "docker version 2>&1 | head -5; echo \"---\"; ls /var/run/docker.sock 2>&1"}
Arguments
{"command": "docker version 2>&1 | head -5; echo \"---\"; ls /var/run/docker.sock 2>&1"}
Result
ERROR CALLING TOOL: command failed: command exited with status 2
Thinking
Docker isn't available in this container (can't reach the daemon). So I can't run the docker-tagged integration tests here. The existing integration tests (`TestDockerRuntimeExecRoundTrip`, `TestDockerRuntimeGitSafeDirectory`) don't depend on my changes (they test the dockerRuntime directly), so they should continue to pass in CI/production environments where docker is available.
Hmm, wait — `TestDockerRuntimeGitSafeDirectory` applies the safe.directory fix itself, so it's independent. OK.
Now, let me do a full review of the final state of all the files I changed and confirm everything is consistent. I'll re-read the Run function in run.go in its entirety, and also check the final versions of the other files.
Docker isn't available in this container, so the docker-tagged integration tests can't run here (they're independent of my changes anyway — they test `dockerRuntime` directly). Let me do a final review of the full diff:
Tool 🔧 bash {"command": "cd /project && git diff HEAD --stat && git status --short"}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /project && git diff HEAD --stat && git status --short"}
Result
internal/agentrun/clone.go | 58 ------------------------------------------- internal/agentrun/context.go | 25 +++---------------- internal/agentrun/run.go | 49 ++++++++++++++---------------------- internal/agentrun/system.md | 5 ++-- internal/forgejo/client.go | 7 +++--- internal/tools/context.go | 14 +++-------- internal/tools/git.go | 17 +++++++++---- internal/tools/grep_search.go | 4 +-- internal/tools/list_files.go | 4 +-- internal/tools/move_file.go | 2 +- internal/tools/read_file.go | 2 +- internal/tools/remove_file.go | 2 +- internal/tools/shell.go | 10 ++++---- internal/tools/tools_test.go | 23 ++++++----------- 14 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 159 deletions(-) D internal/agentrun/clone.go M internal/agentrun/context.go M internal/agentrun/run.go M internal/agentrun/system.md M internal/forgejo/client.go M internal/tools/context.go M internal/tools/git.go M internal/tools/grep_search.go M internal/tools/list_files.go M internal/tools/move_file.go M internal/tools/read_file.go M internal/tools/remove_file.go M internal/tools/shell.go M internal/tools/tools_test.go ?? internal/agentrun/sandbox.go ?? internal/agentrun/sandbox_test.go
Thinking
Let's carefully review the entire diff:
Tool 🔧 bash {"command": "cd /project && git diff HEAD -- internal/agentrun/run.go internal/agentrun/context.go"}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /project && git diff HEAD -- internal/agentrun/run.go internal/agentrun/context.go"}
Result
diff --git a/internal/agentrun/context.go b/internal/agentrun/context.go
index 8d886fc..5594387 100644
--- a/internal/agentrun/context.go
+++ b/internal/agentrun/context.go
@@ -8,14 +8,13 @@ import (
)
// runContext implements tools.Context for a single agent run, executing
-// shell commands via docker exec against the run's container, git
-// commands as the host process against the run's working tree (see
-// Git), and binding Forgejo actions to the triggering issue/PR.
+// shell commands via docker exec against the run's container (git
+// included — the container's git is pre-authenticated against Forgejo
+// by setupSandboxGit) and binding Forgejo actions to the triggering
+// issue/PR.
type runContext struct {
docker *dockerRuntime
containerID string
- projectDir string
- token string
forgejo tools.ForgejoActions
}
@@ -33,22 +32,6 @@ func (c *runContext) Exec(ctx context.Context, command string) (string, error) {
return output, nil
}
-// Git implements tools.Context.Git by running git on the host against
-// c.projectDir rather than via docker exec. Only push needs to
-// authenticate against Forgejo, so only it carries the token, via a
-// per-invocation -c override that never touches .git/config (see
-// gitAuthArgs) — the container this same working tree is bind-mounted
-// into has no way to read it out.
-func (c *runContext) Git(ctx context.Context, subcommand string, args ...string) (string, error) {
- cmdArgs := append([]string{subcommand}, args...)
-
- if subcommand == "push" {
- return runGitAuthed(ctx, c.projectDir, c.token, cmdArgs...)
- }
-
- return runGit(ctx, c.projectDir, cmdArgs...)
-}
-
func (c *runContext) Forgejo() tools.ForgejoActions {
return c.forgejo
}
diff --git a/internal/agentrun/run.go b/internal/agentrun/run.go
index 9555f56..62ca9a9 100644
--- a/internal/agentrun/run.go
+++ b/internal/agentrun/run.go
@@ -1,7 +1,9 @@
// Package agentrun creates the throwaway per-job environment an agent
-// runs in: a git clone + branch bind-mounted into a Docker container,
-// the triggering event written to /event, and the tool-calling loop
-// (internal/llm + internal/tools) driven against it.
+// runs in: a Docker container with the repo cloned into a bind-mounted
+// working tree — the clone itself happens inside the sandbox,
+// authenticated with the agent's token — the triggering event written
+// to /event, and the tool-calling loop (internal/llm + internal/tools)
+// driven against it.
package agentrun
import (
@@ -127,24 +129,13 @@ func (r *Runner) Run(ctx context.Context, jobID string, agent config.AgentConfig
branch := fmt.Sprintf("issue-%d-%s", ev.Index, agent.Name)
projectDir := filepath.Join(workDir, "project")
- if err := cloneAndBranch(ctx, repoInfo.CloneURL, r.forgejo.Token(), repoInfo.DefaultBranch, branch, projectDir); err != nil {
- return fmt.Errorf("prepare git working tree: %w", err)
+ if err := os.MkdirAll(projectDir, 0o755); err != nil {
+ return fmt.Errorf("create project dir: %w", err)
}
roster := buildRoster(r.forgejo, r.cfg.Agents, logger)
gitName, gitEmail := gitIdentity(agent.Name, roster)
- // Local (not --global) scope, so this identity lives in
- // projectDir/.git/config: the one place both this host-side clone
- // and the container it's bind-mounted into (as /project) actually
- // share.
- if out, err := runGit(ctx, projectDir, "config", "user.name", gitName); err != nil {
- return fmt.Errorf("configure git user.name: %w: %s", err, out)
- }
- if out, err := runGit(ctx, projectDir, "config", "user.email", gitEmail); err != nil {
- return fmt.Errorf("configure git user.email: %w: %s", err, out)
- }
-
eventPath := filepath.Join(workDir, "event.json")
if err := os.WriteFile(eventPath, ev.Raw, 0o644); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("write event file: %w", err)
@@ -166,20 +157,18 @@ func (r *Runner) Run(ctx context.Context, jobID string, agent config.AgentConfig
}
}()
- // /project is bind-mounted from the host, so it's owned by the host
- // UID that ran the clone, not whatever UID runs inside the
- // container (usually root) — git's ownership check rejects that by
- // default ("detected dubious ownership") unless told otherwise.
- // --system (not --global) so this holds regardless of which user
- // subsequent `docker exec` calls run as. Commit identity is
- // configured host-side, above, with --local scope so it's visible
- // from both sides of the bind mount without needing --global here.
- out, exitCode, err := r.docker.exec(ctx, containerID, "git config --system --add safe.directory '*'")
- if err != nil {
- return fmt.Errorf("configure git safe.directory in container: %w: %s", err, out)
+ // The clone happens inside the sandbox, and the sandbox's git is
+ // authenticated with the agent's own token when one is configured
+ // (so its commits and pushes are attributed to its own identity,
+ // matching forgejoAs), falling back to the shared zoo identity —
+ // whose Forgejo account is "zoo" — for agents without one.
+ gitUsername, gitToken := "zoo", r.forgejo.Token()
+ if agent.Token != "" {
+ gitUsername, gitToken = agent.Name, agent.Token
}
- if exitCode != 0 {
- return fmt.Errorf("configure git safe.directory in container: exit %d: %s", exitCode, out)
+
+ if err := setupSandboxGit(ctx, r.docker, containerID, repoInfo.CloneURL, gitUsername, gitToken, gitName, gitEmail, repoInfo.DefaultBranch, branch); err != nil {
+ return fmt.Errorf("prepare git working tree in sandbox: %w", err)
}
logAppend := func(stream, line string) {
@@ -191,8 +180,6 @@ func (r *Runner) Run(ctx context.Context, jobID string, agent config.AgentConfig
runCtx := &runContext{
docker: r.docker,
containerID: containerID,
- projectDir: projectDir,
- token: r.forgejo.Token(),
forgejo: &runForgejoActions{
client: r.forgejoAs(agent.Name, agent.Token),
owner: ev.Owner,
Thinking
The diff for run.go looks good. One thing to double-check: the comment about safe.directory has been deleted, but the rationale for it is now documented in the doc comment of setupSandboxGit in sandbox.go ("safe.directory is set with --system scope so that it works regardless of which user runs subsequent execs"). Good.
Let me also check the remaining diffs (tools, system.md, client.go) and the new files.
Tool 🔧 bash {"command": "cd /project && git diff HEAD -- internal/tools/ internal/agentrun/system.md internal/forgejo/client.go"}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /project && git diff HEAD -- internal/tools/ internal/agentrun/system.md internal/forgejo/client.go"}
Result
diff --git a/internal/agentrun/system.md b/internal/agentrun/system.md
index 1c8d42f..ba81163 100644
--- a/internal/agentrun/system.md
+++ b/internal/agentrun/system.md
@@ -30,8 +30,9 @@ doing it yourself.
**Git**
-You may use normal git commands to manage your working tree. For remote
-(pull, fetch, push, etc.) git operations, you can use the `git` tool.
+You may use normal git commands to manage your working tree. Remote
+git operations (pull, fetch, push, etc.) are pre-authenticated in the
+sandbox and simply work — the `git` tool or `bash` both run inside it.
**Guidelines**
diff --git a/internal/forgejo/client.go b/internal/forgejo/client.go
index cc97bfe..de70e61 100644
--- a/internal/forgejo/client.go
+++ b/internal/forgejo/client.go
@@ -30,10 +30,9 @@ func NewClient(cfg config.Forgejo) (*Client, error) {
return &Client{sdk: c, baseURL: cfg.URL, token: cfg.Token}, nil
}
-// Token returns the shared zoo Forgejo identity's token, e.g. for
-// authenticating a host-side git clone/push against Forgejo (see
-// internal/agentrun) without ever writing the credential into a working
-// tree an agent's container can read.
+// Token returns the shared zoo Forgejo identity's token, e.g. as the
+// fallback git credential for agents without a per-agent token (see
+// internal/agentrun).
func (c *Client) Token() string {
return c.token
}
diff --git a/internal/tools/context.go b/internal/tools/context.go
index e49eba7..fb4fc47 100644
--- a/internal/tools/context.go
+++ b/internal/tools/context.go
@@ -10,18 +10,12 @@ import "context"
// global Context, since multiple agents run concurrently in zoo.
type Context interface {
// Exec runs command inside the run's container via `sh -c` and
- // returns combined stdout+stderr. The container never holds a
- // Forgejo credential, so this cannot reach the Forgejo API or
- // authenticate git operations against it — see Git.
+ // returns combined stdout+stderr. The container's git is
+ // pre-authenticated against the Forgejo host (see
+ // internal/agentrun.Run), so git remote operations (fetch, pull,
+ // push) work from inside the sandbox.
Exec(ctx context.Context, command string) (string, error)
- // Git runs a git subcommand against the run's working tree on the
- // host, outside the container, so that operations needing a Forgejo
- // credential (currently just push) can authenticate without that
- // credential ever being written to disk where the container (and
- // anything run inside it via Exec) could read it.
- Git(ctx context.Context, subcommand string, args ...string) (string, error)
-
// Forgejo returns the actions bound to the issue/PR that triggered
// this run, so tools don't need to be told which repo/issue to act
// on.
diff --git a/internal/tools/git.go b/internal/tools/git.go
index 0563788..bb69abf 100644
--- a/internal/tools/git.go
+++ b/internal/tools/git.go
@@ -44,16 +44,23 @@ func init() {
Register(tool, git)
}
-// git runs subcommand via Context.Git, which executes it outside the
-// container (see that method's doc comment for why): the container
-// itself is never given a credential capable of authenticating against
-// Forgejo, so pushing has to happen on the host side instead.
+// git runs subcommand via Context.Exec inside the run's container,
+// against the bind-mounted working tree at /project. Remote operations
+// (fetch, pull, push) authenticate through the Authorization header the
+// runner puts in the container's global gitconfig (see
+// internal/agentrun.Run), so they work from inside the sandbox.
func git(ctx Context, params gitParams) (string, error) {
if !slices.Contains(gitAllowed, params.Subcommand) {
return "", fmt.Errorf("git subcommand '%s' is not allowed. Only %s are permitted", params.Subcommand, strings.Join(gitAllowed, ", "))
}
- output, err := ctx.Git(context.Background(), params.Subcommand, params.Args...)
+ cmd := "git " + params.Subcommand
+
+ for _, arg := range params.Args {
+ cmd += " " + ShellQuote(arg)
+ }
+
+ output, err := ctx.Exec(context.Background(), cmd)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
diff --git a/internal/tools/grep_search.go b/internal/tools/grep_search.go
index b546e2b..3795458 100644
--- a/internal/tools/grep_search.go
+++ b/internal/tools/grep_search.go
@@ -57,10 +57,10 @@ func grepSearch(ctx Context, params grepSearchParams) (string, error) {
}
if params.Glob != "" {
- args = append(args, "--include="+shellQuote(params.Glob))
+ args = append(args, "--include="+ShellQuote(params.Glob))
}
- args = append(args, "-e", shellQuote(params.Pattern), "/project")
+ args = append(args, "-e", ShellQuote(params.Pattern), "/project")
cmd := strings.Join(args, " ") + fmt.Sprintf(" | head -n %d", maxResults)
diff --git a/internal/tools/list_files.go b/internal/tools/list_files.go
index 0d6f317..c207f75 100644
--- a/internal/tools/list_files.go
+++ b/internal/tools/list_files.go
@@ -28,9 +28,9 @@ func listFiles(ctx Context, params listFilesParams) (string, error) {
var cmd string
if params.Recursive {
- cmd = fmt.Sprintf(`find %s -mindepth 1 -not -path '*/.*' | sort`, shellQuote(p))
+ cmd = fmt.Sprintf(`find %s -mindepth 1 -not -path '*/.*' | sort`, ShellQuote(p))
} else {
- cmd = fmt.Sprintf(`ls -la %s | tail -n +2`, shellQuote(p))
+ cmd = fmt.Sprintf(`ls -la %s | tail -n +2`, ShellQuote(p))
}
output, err := ctx.Exec(context.Background(), cmd)
diff --git a/internal/tools/move_file.go b/internal/tools/move_file.go
index e5e4e16..308a149 100644
--- a/internal/tools/move_file.go
+++ b/internal/tools/move_file.go
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ func moveFile(ctx Context, params moveFileParams) (string, error) {
from := resolvePath(params.FromPath)
to := resolvePath(params.ToPath)
- cmd := fmt.Sprintf(`mkdir -p "$(dirname %s)" && mv %s %s`, shellQuote(to), shellQuote(from), shellQuote(to))
+ cmd := fmt.Sprintf(`mkdir -p "$(dirname %s)" && mv %s %s`, ShellQuote(to), ShellQuote(from), ShellQuote(to))
if _, err := ctx.Exec(context.Background(), cmd); err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("move %q to %q: %w", params.FromPath, params.ToPath, err)
diff --git a/internal/tools/read_file.go b/internal/tools/read_file.go
index acfe9bf..7f1139e 100644
--- a/internal/tools/read_file.go
+++ b/internal/tools/read_file.go
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ func readFile(ctx Context, params readFileParams) (string, error) {
cmd := fmt.Sprintf(
`f=%s; [ -f "$f" ] || { echo "read_file: no such file: $f" >&2; exit 1; }; wc -l < "$f"; sed -n '%d,%dp' "$f"`,
- shellQuote(p), from, to)
+ ShellQuote(p), from, to)
output, err := ctx.Exec(context.Background(), cmd)
if err != nil {
diff --git a/internal/tools/remove_file.go b/internal/tools/remove_file.go
index 9082763..361721d 100644
--- a/internal/tools/remove_file.go
+++ b/internal/tools/remove_file.go
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ func init() {
func removeFile(ctx Context, params removeFileParams) (string, error) {
p := resolvePath(params.Path)
- if _, err := ctx.Exec(context.Background(), "rm -f "+shellQuote(p)); err != nil {
+ if _, err := ctx.Exec(context.Background(), "rm -f "+ShellQuote(p)); err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("remove %q: %w", params.Path, err)
}
diff --git a/internal/tools/shell.go b/internal/tools/shell.go
index 94ea98d..a4b055e 100644
--- a/internal/tools/shell.go
+++ b/internal/tools/shell.go
@@ -7,9 +7,9 @@ import (
"strings"
)
-// shellQuote wraps s in single quotes for safe interpolation into a `sh
-// -c` command string, escaping any embedded single quotes.
-func shellQuote(s string) string {
+// ShellQuote wraps s in single quotes for safe interpolation into a
+// `sh -c` command string, escaping any embedded single quotes.
+func ShellQuote(s string) string {
return "'" + strings.ReplaceAll(s, "'", `'\''`) + "'"
}
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ func shellReadFile(ctx Context, path string) ([]byte, error) {
// We use base64 encoding to avoid issues with binary data and
// special characters in the file content. The output of the command
// will be base64-encoded, which we then decode in Go.
- output, err := ctx.Exec(context.Background(), "base64 "+shellQuote(p))
+ output, err := ctx.Exec(context.Background(), "base64 "+ShellQuote(p))
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ func shellWriteFile(ctx Context, path string, content []byte) error {
cmd := fmt.Sprintf(
`mkdir -p "$(dirname %s)" && echo %s | base64 -d > %s`,
- shellQuote(p), shellQuote(encoded), shellQuote(p))
+ ShellQuote(p), ShellQuote(encoded), ShellQuote(p))
_, err := ctx.Exec(context.Background(), cmd)
if err != nil {
diff --git a/internal/tools/tools_test.go b/internal/tools/tools_test.go
index eee2203..f1c4246 100644
--- a/internal/tools/tools_test.go
+++ b/internal/tools/tools_test.go
@@ -32,9 +32,6 @@ type fakeContext struct {
output string
err error
fg *fakeForgejoActions
-
- lastGitSubcommand string
- lastGitArgs []string
}
func (f *fakeContext) Exec(ctx context.Context, command string) (string, error) {
@@ -42,12 +39,6 @@ func (f *fakeContext) Exec(ctx context.Context, command string) (string, error)
return f.output, f.err
}
-func (f *fakeContext) Git(ctx context.Context, subcommand string, args ...string) (string, error) {
- f.lastGitSubcommand = subcommand
- f.lastGitArgs = args
- return f.output, f.err
-}
-
func (f *fakeContext) Forgejo() ForgejoActions {
return f.fg
}
@@ -58,8 +49,8 @@ func TestShellQuote(t *testing.T) {
"it's a dir": `'it'\''s a dir'`,
}
for in, want := range cases {
- if got := shellQuote(in); got != want {
- t.Errorf("shellQuote(%q) = %q, want %q", in, got, want)
+ if got := ShellQuote(in); got != want {
+ t.Errorf("ShellQuote(%q) = %q, want %q", in, got, want)
}
}
}
@@ -100,11 +91,11 @@ func TestGitPassesSubcommandAndArgsThrough(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatal(err)
}
- if fc.lastGitSubcommand != "commit" {
- t.Fatalf("expected subcommand %q, got %q", "commit", fc.lastGitSubcommand)
- }
- if len(fc.lastGitArgs) != 2 || fc.lastGitArgs[1] != "fix: handle it's edge case" {
- t.Fatalf("expected args passed through unescaped, got %v", fc.lastGitArgs)
+ // The git tool shells out inside the container, so every arg must
+ // be single-quoted for safe interpolation into the sh -c command.
+ want := "git commit '-m' 'fix: handle it'\\''s edge case'"
+ if fc.lastCmd != want {
+ t.Fatalf("expected command %q, got %q", want, fc.lastCmd)
}
}
Thinking
The diff looks clean. Next, let me re-verify a few subtle points:
1. **`git clone ... /project` when /project is not empty**: Docker creates `/project` via the bind mount. Since we MkdirAll on the host side first, it exists and is empty. `git clone <url> /project` works with an existing empty directory. ✓
2. **`git checkout -b <branch>`**: Runs with WorkingDir=/project. ✓
3. **The exec environment in docker.go** sets `GIT_CONFIG_COUNT=1` and `GIT_CONFIG_KEY_0=color.ui` — these environment variables take precedence over the config file, but only for color.ui. They don't affect `http.<host>.extraHeader`. ✓
4. **The token in the container's /root/.gitconfig**: The agent can read it — as intended by the issue ("pass the token to the sandbox").
5. **What about `git pull` specifically?** `git pull` = fetch + merge. Fetch authenticates via the extraHeader from the global gitconfig. ✓ "git pull must just work" — yes.
6. **What about the `origin` remote?** `git clone` sets `origin` to the plain cloneURL (no token embedded in the URL). ✓ (same as before)
7. **Concurrency**: Each run has its own container, its own /root/.gitconfig. No interference. ✓
8. **The `git` tool's allow list** still excludes `config`, `remote`, etc. — good. The agent can't easily exfiltrate the token via the git tool, but can read it via bash (`cat /root/.gitconfig`). That's inherent to the issue's request.
9. **`--single-branch` clone**: Preserved from the original behavior. ✓
10. **Branch name collisions**: `git checkout -b` fails if the branch exists — same as before (fresh clone). ✓
11. **`redact` function** — removed in the final sandbox.go version (using step labels instead). Let me re-verify that the final sandbox.go is the version with step labels… yes, I rewrote the whole file with the `step` struct. ✓
12. **Wait — one issue**: in `setupSandboxGit`, the clone step's command contains `cloneURL` — no problem, no token. But what if the cloneURL itself contains credentials (e.g., Forgejo returns a URL with a token embedded)? Forgejo's CloneURL is plain. No problem.
13. **What if `defaultBranch` contains weird characters?** It's quoted. ✓
14. **`git config --global http.<host>.extraHeader`** — if the host contains a port (e.g., `localhost:3000`), the config key becomes `http.localhost:3000.extraHeader`. Git's URL matching for `http.<base>`: the base is matched as a URL prefix… for a host with a port, does git match `http.localhost:3000` against the URL `http://localhost:3000/...`? Git's config URL matching: "the value of the variable is a URL prefix that must match the beginning of the remote URL"… actually for `http.<base>.*`, the base is matched against the URL including scheme? Let me recall: git docs say:
> http.<base>.*
> Various per-remote URL rewrite rules start with http.<base>, where <base> is a URL prefix… For example, http.example.com.* applies to URLs starting with http://example.com/…
Hmm, the exact matching rule: for `http.<base>.extraHeader`, git checks whether the URL starts with `<base>` (after the scheme?). From git's docs (git-config):
> **http.<base>.extraHeader**
> Passes an extra header to the remote server when fetching from an http:// or https:// <base> repository.
And the URL matching: "the <base> must match the beginning of the URL" — I think the full URL including scheme is matched against the base string, i.e., `http.example.com` matches `http://example.com/...`? No wait…
Let me think about how git actually implements this. In `http.c` / `remote.c`, `http_config`… the matching is done in `url_match` or via `git_config_get_subkey` with the key prefix `http.`. The value of `<base>` is compared: the URL must start with `<base>` after stripping the scheme?
From git's source (http.c):
```c
static int http_config(const char *var, const char *value, void *vdata)
{
...
if (!prefix_match(var, "http.", &key))
return 0;
...
if (!strcmp(key, "sslVerify")) ...
...
/* http.<base>.* */
...
}
```
Actually, the relevant code is in `http.c`:
```c
static int http_config(const char *var, const char *value, void *vdata)
{
struct http_info *info = vdata;
const char *key;
size_t key_len;
if (!prefix_match(var, "http.", &key))
return 0;
if (!strcmp(key, "sslVerify")) {
...
}
...
}
```
Hmm, and the matching against the URL is in `http_get_slot` / `get_url_match`… I recall that for `url.<base>.insteadOf`, the base must match the beginning of the URL (including scheme). For `http.<base>.*`, I think the base is compared against the URL with the scheme stripped…
Let me look at the actual git source. In `http.c`:
```c
static int http_config(const char *var, const char *value, void *vdata)
{
struct http_info *info = vdata;
const char *key;
size_t key_len;
if (!prefix_match(var, "http.", &key))
return 0;
if (!strcmp(key, "sslVerify")) {
...
} else if (!strcmp(key, "proxy")) {
...
} else if (!strcmp(key, "cookieJar")) {
...
} else if (!strcmp(key, "lowSpeedLimit")) {
...
} else if (!strcmp(key, "lowSpeedTime")) {
...
} else if (!strcmp(key, "maxRequests")) {
...
} else if (!strcmp(key, "minLargeFileSize")) {
...
} else if (!strcmp(key, "noEmptyPack")) {
...
} else if (!strcmp(key, "useragent")) {
...
} else if (!strcmp(key, "version")) {
...
} else if (!strcmp(key, "followRedirects")) {
...
} else if (!strcmp(key, "dumpTraffic")) {
...
} else if (!strcmp(key, "sslCAInfo")) {
...
} else if (!strcmp(key, "sslCAPath")) {
...
} else if (!strcmp(key, "sslCert")) {
...
} else if (!strcmp(key, "sslKey")) {
...
} else if (!strcmp(key, "sslCRLInfo")) {
...
} else if (!strcmp(key, "proxyAuthMethod")) {
...
} else if (!strcmp(key, "netrc")) {
...
} else if (!strcmp(key, "pushCurlHttpVersion")) {
...
} else if (!strcmp(key, "curlHttpVersion")) {
...
} else if (!strcmp(key, "verbose")) {
...
} else if (!strcmp(key, "header")) {
...
} else if (!strcmp(key, "extraHeader")) {
...
}
...
}
```
Hmm, no. The per-URL config is handled by `git_config_get_subkey` in `remote.c` / `http.c`:
From git's docs on `http.<base>.extraHeader`:
> Passes an extra header to the remote server when fetching from an http:// or https:// <base> repository.
And the general rule documented under `url.<base>`: "the <base> must match the beginning of the URL". For http.<base> variables, git's implementation (`http.c`):
```c
static int http_config(const char *var, const char *value, void *vdata)
{
...
/*
* http.<base>.*
*/
if (info->url && base_url_match(key, info->url)) {
...
}
}
```
Hmm, I don't remember exactly. Let me check `base_url_match`… I think it was in `http.c`:
```c
static int base_url_match(const char *base, const char *url)
{
size_t base_len = strlen(base);
...
}
```
Hmm. Actually, I found it — in git's `http.c`:
```c
static int http_config(const char *var, const char *value, void *vdata)
{
struct http_info *info = vdata;
const char *key;
size_t key_len;
if (!prefix_match(var, "http.", &key))
return 0;
key_len = strlen(key);
...
}
```
I can't reconstruct it exactly from memory. Let me reason from documented examples instead. From git's docs (git-config, http section):
> **http.<base>.extraHeader**
> Passes an extra header to the remote server when fetching from an http:// or https:// <base> repository.
And from the `url.<base>` section:
> **url.<base>.insteadOf**
> Causes Git to use the <base> URL when attempting to fetch or push from a URL that begins with the <insteadOf> string…
The key question: for `http.code.stdio.dk.extraHeader`, does git match against the URL `https://code.stdio.dk/abrander/zoo.git`?
I'm fairly confident that `http.<host>.extraHeader` is a standard, documented pattern for per-host auth headers, and it works with the host (with or without port). For example, GitHub's docs recommend:
```
git config --global http.gh.example.com.extraheader "Authorization: token xxx"
```
Hmm, actually GitHub's docs use `http.gh.mycompany.com.extraheader`. And git's own test suite has tests like:
```
test_config http.example.com.extraHeader "X-Test: 1"
```
Hmm, let me check git's tests… I recall `t/http-extrahdr.sh` or a test in `t/t5500`… there's a test:
```sh
test_config http.$TEST_DAEMON.extraHeader "X-Test: 1"
```
Hmm. I'm confident the pattern `http.<host>.extraHeader` is correct and widely used (it's in the git docs and used in the wild for per-host auth). The existing zoo code used `http.extraHeader` (no base = all hosts), which is a documented superset.
One nuance: does the base match include the scheme? If I set `http.code.stdio.dk.extraHeader`, does it apply to `https://code.stdio.dk/...`? Yes — the `http.*` section covers both http:// and https:// URLs (git's http config applies to both, and the <base> is the host part). This is well established: e.g., `http.localhost:3000.extraHeader` is used in the wild for local Gitea instances.
Hmm, wait, actually I want to double-check the port case, since the base might need to match the URL's authority exactly. If the URL is `https://localhost:3000/abrander/zoo.git` and the base is `localhost:3000`, does it match?
From git's source, `http.c` (I'm now recalling more specifically):
```c
static int http_config(const char *var, const char *value, void *vdata)
{
struct http_info *info = vdata;
const char *key;
size_t key_len;
if (!prefix_match(var, "http.", &key))
return 0;
key_len = strlen(key);
if (!strcmp(key, "sslVerify")) {
...
} else if (key_len + 1 < strlen(var) && !strcmp(var + key_len + 1, ".extraHeader")) {
/* http.<base>.extraHeader */
if (info->url && base_url_match(key, info->url)) {
...
}
}
...
}
```
Hmm, something like that. And `base_url_match`:
Actually, I found it in my memory of git's source — `http.c` has:
```c
/*
* Return 1 if the given url starts with the given base, 0 otherwise.
*/
static int base_url_match(const char *base, const char *url)
{
size_t base_len = strlen(base);
if (strncmp(base, url, base_len))
return 0;
if (url[base_len] && url[base_len] != '/')
return 0;
return 1;
}
```
Hmm, if that's the implementation, then the base must match the beginning of the full URL (including scheme). So `http.code.stdio.dk.extraHeader` with base `code.stdio.dk` would not match `https://code.stdio.dk/...`. Because the URL starts with `https://`, not `code.stdio.dk`!
Hmm wait, that can't be right, because the documented usage `http.<base>.extraHeader` with a host base is widely used…
Let me think again. Actually, I think the real implementation strips the scheme. Let me recall git's actual code (http.c, modern version):
```c
static int http_config(const char *var, const char *value, void *vdata)
{
struct http_info *info = vdata;
const char *key;
size_t key_len;
if (!prefix_match(var, "http.", &key))
return 0;
key_len = strlen(key);
if (!strcmp(key, "sslVerify")) {
...
} else if (!strcmp(key, "cookieJar")) {
...
} else if (!strcmp(key, "proxy")) {
...
} else if (!strcmp(key, "netrc")) {
...
} else if (!strcmp(key, "noEmptyPack")) {
...
} else if (!strcmp(key, "maxRequests")) {
...
} else if (!strcmp(key, "minLargeFileSize")) {
...
} else if (!strcmp(key, "lowSpeedLimit")) {
...
} else if (!strcmp(key, "lowSpeedTime")) {
...
} else if (!strcmp(key, "useragent")) {
...
} else if (!strcmp(key, "version")) {
...
} else if (!strcmp(key, "sslCAInfo")) {
...
} else if (!strcmp(key, "sslCAPath")) {
...
} else if (!strcmp(key, "sslCert")) {
...
} else if (!strcmp(key, "sslKey")) {
...
} else if (!strcmp(key, "sslCRLInfo")) {
...
} else if (!strcmp(key, "proxyAuthMethod")) {
...
} else if (!strcmp(key, "dumpTraffic")) {
...
} else if (!strcmp(key, "followRedirects")) {
...
} else if (!strcmp(key, "verbose")) {
...
} else if (!strcmp(key, "pushCurlHttpVersion")) {
...
} else if (!strcmp(key, "curlHttpVersion")) {
...
} else if (!strcmp(key, "header")) {
...
} else if (!strcmp(key, "extraHeader")) {
...
}
return 0;
}
```
No wait, that's not right either. The per-base handling is:
```c
} else if (key_len + 1 < strlen(var)) {
/* http.<base>.* */
const char *subkey = var + key_len + 1;
...
}
```
Honestly, I can't reconstruct the exact source from memory. Let me verify empirically instead — is git available in this container? Yes (I'm using git). Let me test locally:
```sh
git config --global http.example.com.extraHeader "X-Test: 1"
GIT_TRACE=1 git ls-remote https://example.com/foo 2>&1 | grep -i x-test
```
Hmm, that would make a network request. Better: use git's config parsing directly. There's no direct "show resolved config" for http headers… but I can test with a local HTTP server!
Actually, the simplest empirical test: spin up a small Python HTTP server that logs the request headers, and run `git ls-remote http://127.0.0.1:PORT/foo` with `http.127.0.0.1:PORT.extraHeader` set, and see if the header arrives.
Wait, but the question is whether the base `127.0.0.1:PORT` (host:port, no scheme) matches the URL `http://127.0.0.1:PORT/foo`. Let me test both with and without the scheme in the base.
Let me do that in the container. Actually — even better, I can test exactly what I'm deploying: `http.<host>.extraHeader` where host comes from url.Parse (host with port, no scheme).
Let me write a quick test:
```sh
cd /tmp && python3 -m http.server 8765 & # won't serve git, but will log headers?
```
Python's http.server logs the request line but not headers by default. Better to write a small server that prints headers:
```python
python3 -c "
import http.server, sys
class H(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
def do_GET(self):
print(dict(self.headers), flush=True)
self.send_response(401)
self.end_headers()
def do_HEAD(self):
self.do_GET()
http.server.HTTPServer(('127.0.0.1', 8765), H).serve_forever()
" &
```
Then:
```sh
git -c http.127.0.0.1:8765.extraHeader='X-Test: hello' ls-remote http://127.0.0.1:8765/foo/bar.git 2>&1
```
And check whether the server received X-Test: hello.
Note: git might not send the header on the first request… no, extraHeader is sent on every request to a matching URL.
Also, I need to double-check: does the git in this container support `http.<base>.extraHeader`? It's been supported since git 1.7.9 (2013). No problem.
Let me run this experiment.
The diff looks clean. Before committing, I want to empirically verify the one assumption I haven't tested: that `git config --global http.<host>.extraHeader` (host with port, no scheme) actually applies to `https://<host>/...` URLs — since that's the mechanism that makes `git pull` work. Let me test it against a local HTTP server that logs headers:
Tool 🔧 bash {"command": "cd /tmp && cat > hdrsrv.py <<'EOF'\nimport http.server\n\nclass H(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):\n def log_message(self, *a):\n pass\n def handle_one_request(self):\n super().handle_one_request()\n def do_GET(self):\n print(\"PATH:\", self.path, flush=True)\n print(\"X-TEST:\", self.headers.get(\"X-Test\"), flush=True)\n print(\"AUTH:\", self.headers.get(\"Authorization\"), flush=True)\n self.send_response(401)\n self.end_headers()\n do_HEAD = do_GET\n\nhttp.server.HTTPServer((\"127.0.0.1\", 8765), H).serve_forever()\nEOF\n(python3 hdrsrv.py > hdrsrv.log 2>&1 & echo $! > hdrsrv.pid)\nsleep 1\ngit -c http.127.0.0.1:8765.extraHeader='X-Test: hello' ls-remote http://127.0.0.1:8765/foo/bar.git 2>&1 | head -3\necho \"=== server saw: ===\"\ncat hdrsrv.log\nkill $(cat hdrsrv.pid) 2>/dev/null", "timeout": 60}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /tmp && cat > hdrsrv.py <<'EOF'\nimport http.server\n\nclass H(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):\n def log_message(self, *a):\n pass\n def handle_one_request(self):\n super().handle_one_request()\n def do_GET(self):\n print(\"PATH:\", self.path, flush=True)\n print(\"X-TEST:\", self.headers.get(\"X-Test\"), flush=True)\n print(\"AUTH:\", self.headers.get(\"Authorization\"), flush=True)\n self.send_response(401)\n self.end_headers()\n do_HEAD = do_GET\n\nhttp.server.HTTPServer((\"127.0.0.1\", 8765), H).serve_forever()\nEOF\n(python3 hdrsrv.py > hdrsrv.log 2>&1 & echo $! > hdrsrv.pid)\nsleep 1\ngit -c http.127.0.0.1:8765.extraHeader='X-Test: hello' ls-remote http://127.0.0.1:8765/foo/bar.git 2>&1 | head -3\necho \"=== server saw: ===\"\ncat hdrsrv.log\nkill $(cat hdrsrv.pid) 2>/dev/null", "timeout": 60}
Result
fatal: could not read Username for 'http://127.0.0.1:8765': terminal prompts disabled === server saw: === PATH: /foo/bar.git/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack X-TEST: None AUTH: None
Thinking
Interesting! The header didn't arrive: `X-TEST: None`. So does that mean `http.127.0.0.1:8765.extraHeader` didn't match the URL `http://127.0.0.1:8765/foo/bar.git`??
Wait — hmm. Let me check. Maybe the base matching requires the scheme to be included in the base? Let me test with `http.http://127.0.0.1:8765.extraHeader`... no wait, that's not right. Let me check how git matches.
Let me look at the git source in this container (if git is installed from source, it's probably not available). Let me test variations:
1. `-c http.127.0.0.1:8765.extraHeader=...` (host:port, no scheme) → failed (X-TEST: None)
2. `-c http.http://127.0.0.1:8765.extraHeader=...`? Hmm, that would make the key `http.http://127.0.0.1:8765.extraHeader`...
Hmm wait, actually, let me reconsider. Maybe the matching is: the base must match the beginning of the URL including the scheme? In that case, the base would be `http://127.0.0.1:8765`, and the config key would be `http.http://127.0.0.1:8765.extraHeader`? That seems weird, but...
Hmm, no wait. Let me look at the actual git source. Let me check if I can find the git source... no, let me just test empirically:
Test A: base = `127.0.0.1:8765` → key `http.127.0.0.1:8765.extraHeader` → failed (confirmed above).
Test B: base = `http://127.0.0.1:8765` → key `http.http://127.0.0.1:8765.extraHeader`.
Let me try Test B.
The header didn't arrive with a bare host:port base. Let me test the scheme-included base variant:
Tool 🔧 bash {"command": "cd /tmp && (python3 hdrsrv.py > hdrsrv2.log 2>&1 & echo $! > hdrsrv.pid)\nsleep 1\ngit -c 'http.http://127.0.0.1:8765.extraHeader=X-Test: hello' ls-remote http://127.0.0.1:8765/foo/bar.git 2>&1 | head -3\necho \"=== server saw: ===\"\ncat hdrsrv2.log\nkill $(cat hdrsrv.pid) 2>/dev/null", "timeout": 60}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /tmp && (python3 hdrsrv.py > hdrsrv2.log 2>&1 & echo $! > hdrsrv.pid)\nsleep 1\ngit -c 'http.http://127.0.0.1:8765.extraHeader=X-Test: hello' ls-remote http://127.0.0.1:8765/foo/bar.git 2>&1 | head -3\necho \"=== server saw: ===\"\ncat hdrsrv2.log\nkill $(cat hdrsrv.pid) 2>/dev/null", "timeout": 60}
Result
fatal: could not read Username for 'http://127.0.0.1:8765': terminal prompts disabled === server saw: === PATH: /foo/bar.git/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack X-TEST: hello AUTH: None
Thinking
Confirmed: git's `http.<base>.extraHeader` matches `<base>` against the **full URL including the scheme**. So the base must be `http://127.0.0.1:8765` or `https://code.stdio.dk`, and the config key becomes `http.http://127.0.0.1:8765.extraHeader` / `http.https://code.stdio.dk.extraHeader`.
Wait, that looks weird but it's correct: the config key is `http.<base>.extraHeader`, and `<base>` is the URL prefix (including scheme). Let me re-verify with a cleaner test — set it via `git config --global` (not -c) to confirm it behaves the same way, and also test that a base with scheme `https://` doesn't match an `http://` URL (i.e., that the scheme is part of the match):
Actually, the important practical question for my implementation is: which base should I write? The clone URL from Forgejo is `https://code.stdio.dk/abrander/zoo.git`. The remote operations the agent performs (pull/fetch/push) use the same URL (origin = cloneURL). So if I scope the header to the exact URL prefix of the clone URL, it will match all operations against origin.
But what if the agent clones a different repo on the same host, or uses a different scheme? The issue's requirement is that "git pull must just work" — for the working repo. Scoping to the exact URL (scheme + host) covers that.
Hmm, but should I scope to just the host (both schemes), or to the exact URL prefix? Options:
1. `http.https://code.stdio.dk.extraHeader` — matches only https URLs to code.stdio.dk.
2. Two entries: `http.http://code.stdio.dk.extraHeader` + `http.https://code.stdio.dk.extraHeader` — matches both schemes.
3. No base: `http.extraHeader` — matches all http(s) requests from the container to any host.
Option 3 is what the old host-side code effectively did (`-c http.extraHeader=...` — no base, all hosts). It's the simplest, and the container is a single-purpose throwaway sandbox whose only git remote is Forgejo. But it would also send the Forgejo credential to any other host the agent might git-fetch from (e.g., if the agent clones a public GitHub repo inside the sandbox, the Authorization header would be sent to github.com — credential leakage to a third party!).
That's a real security consideration. The old host-side code had the same property (the -c flag applied to the whole process, but the host-side git only ever talked to Forgejo). Inside the sandbox, the agent is free to git-clone arbitrary repos, so scoping to the Forgejo host is important.
So: scope to the Forgejo host. To be robust to both schemes, write entries for both `http://<host>` and `https://<host>`? Or just the scheme that the clone URL uses?
The clone URL from Forgejo uses one scheme (typically https). The origin remote uses exactly that URL. `git pull`/`fetch`/`push` against origin use the same URL → same scheme → the single-scheme entry matches.
If the agent adds a different remote (e.g., a mirror on the same host with a different scheme), that's an edge case. Writing both scheme entries is cheap and covers it. Let's write both `http://<host>` and `https://<host>` entries — hmm, wait. Is that overkill? Let me think...
Actually, hmm, wait. Let me reconsider: is it even valid to have a scheme in the base in the first place? The test above proved that it works (`http.http://127.0.0.1:8765.extraHeader` matched `http://127.0.0.1:8765/...`).
Hmm, but wait — I should double-check how git parses the key `http.http://127.0.0.1:8765.extraHeader`. The section is `http`, the subsection is `http://127.0.0.1:8765`, the variable is `extraHeader`. Git config subsections can contain any character (including `://` and `:`). It worked in the test, so no problem.
Now, which scheme(s)? Let me derive from the clone URL: use the URL's own scheme + host as the primary base. Should I also add the other scheme? Let's keep it simple and robust: write entries for both `http://<host>` and `https://<host>`. Two config lines, covers everything on that host regardless of scheme.
Hmm, wait, actually — let me reconsider once more. Is there a downside to both? If the agent fetches from `http://code.stdio.dk` (plain http, same host), the header gets sent — that's the Forgejo host, so no problem. No third-party leakage. OK, both schemes.
Hmm, but wait — what about subdomains or different ports? E.g., Forgejo at `code.stdio.dk:8443`? The base includes the port (u.Host includes the port). If the agent uses a different port for the same logical host, no match → no auth → git will fail with a 401. Edge case, acceptable (the clone URL is the canonical one).
So, let me update `gitHost` to return a scheme+host base... no, let me restructure:
```go
// gitAuthBases returns the URL bases (scheme + host) to scope the
// sandbox's git Authorization header to: the Forgejo host over both
// http and https, so remote operations work regardless of which
// scheme the agent's remotes use. Git matches http.<base>.* config
// against the full URL, scheme included. Non-http(s) clone URLs
// (ssh, local paths) authenticate through other means and need no
// header, so they report ok=false.
func gitAuthBases(cloneURL string) ([]string, bool) {
u, err := url.Parse(cloneURL)
if err != nil || u.Host == "" {
return nil, false
}
switch u.Scheme {
case "http", "https":
default:
return nil, false
}
return []string{"http://" + u.Host, "https://" + u.Host}, true
}
```
And in setupSandboxGit:
```go
if bases, ok := gitAuthBases(cloneURL); ok {
for _, base := range bases {
steps = append(steps, step{
"configure git credential",
"git config --global http." + base + ".extraHeader " + tools.ShellQuote(basicAuthHeader(username, token)),
})
}
}
```
Hmm wait, but the config key: `git config --global http.http://code.stdio.dk.extraHeader '...'`. The key contains `//` — git config handles it as a subsection. It worked in my test.
Hmm, one more check: `git config --global http.https://code.stdio.dk.extraHeader` — the section is `http`, the subsection is `https://code.stdio.dk`. When git reads the config, it looks for the key `http.https://code.stdio.dk.extraHeader`. No problem.
But, hmm, wait — actually, let me reconsider whether to include both schemes or just the clone URL's scheme.
Arguments for both: robustness if the agent switches schemes.
Arguments for just the clone URL's scheme: minimalism; the origin remote uses the clone URL's scheme.
The issue says "git pull must just work" — pull uses origin → clone URL's scheme. One entry is enough for the core requirement. But both entries are two lines and strictly more robust. Let's go with both.
Hmm, actually wait a moment, let me reconsider the whole approach once more. Is `http.extraHeader` the best mechanism, or should I use a credential helper (`credential.helper`)?
With a credential helper, git asks for credentials when the server returns 401, and the helper returns username/password. The helper could be a small shell script written into the container:
```sh
#!/bin/sh
echo "username=zoo"
echo "password=$ZOO_TOKEN"
```
With `git config --global credential.helper '/usr/local/bin/git-credential-zoo'` and the token passed via environment variable... but the exec's env vars are per-exec, and the credential helper is invoked by git during any exec — the env var would have to be present on every exec. I could add `ZOO_GIT_TOKEN=...` to the Env list in docker.exec — but then the token would be in the env of every command the agent runs (visible via `env`). With the gitconfig approach, the token is only in /root/.gitconfig. Both are readable by the agent (root). The gitconfig approach is simpler (no script file, no env plumbing) and proven (the old host-side code used extraHeader against this Forgejo).
Sticking with extraHeader.
Another consideration — **`GIT_CONFIG_COUNT` env var in docker.exec**: it sets `GIT_CONFIG_COUNT=1`, `GIT_CONFIG_KEY_0=color.ui`, `GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_0=never`. These env-var config entries take precedence over file-based config, but only for the keys they set. `http.*.extraHeader` is unaffected. ✓ (verified in my head; the env override mechanism is per-key).
Now, one more important verification: my test used `-c` (command-line config). The deployment uses `git config --global` (file-based). The matching logic is identical (config is config). But just to be safe, let me re-verify with a file-based global config. Also, let me verify that the header is actually sent on a **push**-like request (git-receive-pack) — the header mechanism is the same for all requests, so no problem.
Let me run the file-based test:
```sh
git config --global http.http://127.0.0.1:8765.extraHeader 'X-Test: fromfile'
git ls-remote http://127.0.0.1:8765/foo/bar.git
```
And confirm that X-TEST: fromfile appears. Then clean up the global config (my container's /root/.gitconfig — it's my sandbox, but let's keep it clean).
I found that git matches `http.<base>.*` against the full URL including the scheme, so the base needs to be `https://code.stdio.dk` rather than just the host. Now I'll verify this works with file-based global gitconfig as it will be deployed.
Tool 🔧 bash {"command": "cd /tmp && (python3 hdrsrv.py > hdrsrv3.log 2>&1 & echo $! > hdrsrv.pid)\nsleep 1\ngit config --global 'http.http://127.0.0.1:8765.extraHeader' 'X-Test: fromfile'\ngit ls-remote http://127.0.0.1:8765/foo/bar.git 2>&1 | head -3\necho \"=== server saw: ===\"\ncat hdrsrv3.log\nkill $(cat hdrsrv.pid) 2>/dev/null\ngit config --global --unset 'http.http://127.0.0.1:8765.extraHeader'\necho \"cleaned up\"", "timeout": 60}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /tmp && (python3 hdrsrv.py > hdrsrv3.log 2>&1 & echo $! > hdrsrv.pid)\nsleep 1\ngit config --global 'http.http://127.0.0.1:8765.extraHeader' 'X-Test: fromfile'\ngit ls-remote http://127.0.0.1:8765/foo/bar.git 2>&1 | head -3\necho \"=== server saw: ===\"\ncat hdrsrv3.log\nkill $(cat hdrsrv.pid) 2>/dev/null\ngit config --global --unset 'http.http://127.0.0.1:8765.extraHeader'\necho \"cleaned up\"", "timeout": 60}
Result
fatal: could not read Username for 'http://127.0.0.1:8765': terminal prompts disabled === server saw: === PATH: /foo/bar.git/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack X-TEST: fromfile AUTH: None cleaned up
Thinking
Confirmed: file-based `git config --global http.http://127.0.0.1:8765.extraHeader` works — the header was sent. (The 401 → "could not read Username" is expected since the test server always returns 401 and doesn't accept Basic auth. The point was to verify that the header is attached.)
Next, update `sandbox.go`:
1. `gitHost` → `gitAuthBases` returns both `http://<host>` and `https://<host>` bases.
2. Update `setupSandboxGit` to add one step per base.
3. Update `sandbox_test.go` accordingly.
Wait, one more consideration: should the base include the path? No — host-level scoping is correct (all repos on the Forgejo host).
Also, the doc comment for `basicAuthHeader` says "per RFC 7617's Basic scheme" — no wait, in the final version I wrote "base64-encoded per the HTTP Basic scheme". RFC 7617 is actually OAuth Bearer tokens. HTTP Basic auth is RFC 7235. Let me fix this reference — in the final file I wrote "base64-encoded per the HTTP Basic scheme" — let me check what I actually wrote… In the final sandbox.go: "the account the token belongs to (username) and the token itself, base64-encoded per the HTTP Basic scheme." Good, no wrong RFC reference.
Alright, let me rewrite the relevant part of sandbox.go.
File-based global gitconfig works. Now update `sandbox.go` to use scheme-included URL bases (both schemes, for robustness):
Tool 🔧 edit_file {"find": "// gitHost returns the host (with port) of an http(s) clone URL, for\n// scoping the sandbox's git Authorization header to the Forgejo host\n// only. Non-http(s) URLs (ssh, local paths) authenticate through other\n// means and need no header, so they report ok=false.\nfunc gitHost(cloneURL string) (string, bool) {\n\tu, err := url.Parse(cloneURL)\n\tif err != nil || (u.Scheme != \"http\" && u.Scheme != \"https\") || u.Host == \"\" {\n\t\treturn \"\", false\n\t}\n\n\treturn u.Host, true\n}", "replace": "// gitAuthBases returns the URL bases to scope the sandbox's git\n// Authorization header to: the Forgejo host (with port) over both\n// http and https, so remote operations work regardless of which\n// scheme the agent's remotes use. Git matches http.<base>.* config\n// against the full URL, scheme included — hence the scheme-prefixed\n// bases. Non-http(s) clone URLs (ssh, local paths) authenticate\n// through other means and need no header, so they report ok=false.\nfunc gitAuthBases(cloneURL string) ([]string, bool) {\n\tu, err := url.Parse(cloneURL)\n\tif err != nil || (u.Scheme != \"http\" && u.Scheme != \"https\") || u.Host == \"\" {\n\t\treturn nil, false\n\t}\n\n\treturn []string{\"http://\" + u.Host, \"https://\" + u.Host}, true\n}", "path": "/project/internal/agentrun/sandbox.go"}
Arguments
{"find": "// gitHost returns the host (with port) of an http(s) clone URL, for\n// scoping the sandbox's git Authorization header to the Forgejo host\n// only. Non-http(s) URLs (ssh, local paths) authenticate through other\n// means and need no header, so they report ok=false.\nfunc gitHost(cloneURL string) (string, bool) {\n\tu, err := url.Parse(cloneURL)\n\tif err != nil || (u.Scheme != \"http\" && u.Scheme != \"https\") || u.Host == \"\" {\n\t\treturn \"\", false\n\t}\n\n\treturn u.Host, true\n}", "replace": "// gitAuthBases returns the URL bases to scope the sandbox's git\n// Authorization header to: the Forgejo host (with port) over both\n// http and https, so remote operations work regardless of which\n// scheme the agent's remotes use. Git matches http.<base>.* config\n// against the full URL, scheme included — hence the scheme-prefixed\n// bases. Non-http(s) clone URLs (ssh, local paths) authenticate\n// through other means and need no header, so they report ok=false.\nfunc gitAuthBases(cloneURL string) ([]string, bool) {\n\tu, err := url.Parse(cloneURL)\n\tif err != nil || (u.Scheme != \"http\" && u.Scheme != \"https\") || u.Host == \"\" {\n\t\treturn nil, false\n\t}\n\n\treturn []string{\"http://\" + u.Host, \"https://\" + u.Host}, true\n}", "path": "/project/internal/agentrun/sandbox.go"}
Result
1 occurrences replaced
Tool 🔧 edit_file {"find": "\tif host, ok := gitHost(cloneURL); ok {\n\t\tsteps = append(steps, step{\n\t\t\t\"configure git credential\",\n\t\t\t\"git config --global http.\" + host + \".extraHeader \" + tools.ShellQuote(basicAuthHeader(username, token)),\n\t\t})\n\t}", "replace": "\tif bases, ok := gitAuthBases(cloneURL); ok {\n\t\tfor _, base := range bases {\n\t\t\tsteps = append(steps, step{\n\t\t\t\t\"configure git credential\",\n\t\t\t\t\"git config --global http.\" + base + \".extraHeader \" + tools.ShellQuote(basicAuthHeader(username, token)),\n\t\t\t})\n\t\t}\n\t}", "path": "/project/internal/agentrun/sandbox.go"}
Arguments
{"find": "\tif host, ok := gitHost(cloneURL); ok {\n\t\tsteps = append(steps, step{\n\t\t\t\"configure git credential\",\n\t\t\t\"git config --global http.\" + host + \".extraHeader \" + tools.ShellQuote(basicAuthHeader(username, token)),\n\t\t})\n\t}", "replace": "\tif bases, ok := gitAuthBases(cloneURL); ok {\n\t\tfor _, base := range bases {\n\t\t\tsteps = append(steps, step{\n\t\t\t\t\"configure git credential\",\n\t\t\t\t\"git config --global http.\" + base + \".extraHeader \" + tools.ShellQuote(basicAuthHeader(username, token)),\n\t\t\t})\n\t\t}\n\t}", "path": "/project/internal/agentrun/sandbox.go"}
Result
1 occurrences replaced
Thinking
Next, I'll update the test file for `gitAuthBases`:
Update the tests to match:
Tool 🔧 write_file {"content": "package agentrun\n\nimport (\n\t\"encoding/base64\"\n\t\"reflect\"\n\t\"testing\"\n)\n\nfunc TestGitAuthBases(t *testing.T) {\n\tcases := []struct {\n\t\turl string\n\t\tbases []string\n\t\tok bool\n\t}{\n\t\t{\"https://code.stdio.dk/abrander/zoo.git\", []string{\"http://code.stdio.dk\", \"https://code.stdio.dk\"}, true},\n\t\t{\"http://localhost:3000/abrander/zoo.git\", []string{\"http://localhost:3000\", \"https://localhost:3000\"}, true},\n\t\t{\"git@code.stdio.dk:abrander/zoo.git\", nil, false},\n\t\t{\"file:///srv/git/zoo.git\", nil, false},\n\t\t{\"relative/path\", nil, false},\n\t}\n\n\tfor _, tc := range cases {\n\t\tbases, ok := gitAuthBases(tc.url)\n\t\tif ok != tc.ok || !reflect.DeepEqual(bases, tc.bases) {\n\t\t\tt.Errorf(\"gitAuthBases(%q) = (%v, %v), want (%v, %v)\", tc.url, bases, ok, tc.bases, tc.ok)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc TestBasicAuthHeader(t *testing.T) {\n\twant := \"Authorization: Basic \" + base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(\"greg:tok123\"))\n\n\tif got := basicAuthHeader(\"greg\", \"tok123\"); got != want {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"basicAuthHeader = %q, want %q\", got, want)\n\t}\n}\n", "path": "/project/internal/agentrun/sandbox_test.go"}
Arguments
{"content": "package agentrun\n\nimport (\n\t\"encoding/base64\"\n\t\"reflect\"\n\t\"testing\"\n)\n\nfunc TestGitAuthBases(t *testing.T) {\n\tcases := []struct {\n\t\turl string\n\t\tbases []string\n\t\tok bool\n\t}{\n\t\t{\"https://code.stdio.dk/abrander/zoo.git\", []string{\"http://code.stdio.dk\", \"https://code.stdio.dk\"}, true},\n\t\t{\"http://localhost:3000/abrander/zoo.git\", []string{\"http://localhost:3000\", \"https://localhost:3000\"}, true},\n\t\t{\"git@code.stdio.dk:abrander/zoo.git\", nil, false},\n\t\t{\"file:///srv/git/zoo.git\", nil, false},\n\t\t{\"relative/path\", nil, false},\n\t}\n\n\tfor _, tc := range cases {\n\t\tbases, ok := gitAuthBases(tc.url)\n\t\tif ok != tc.ok || !reflect.DeepEqual(bases, tc.bases) {\n\t\t\tt.Errorf(\"gitAuthBases(%q) = (%v, %v), want (%v, %v)\", tc.url, bases, ok, tc.bases, tc.ok)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc TestBasicAuthHeader(t *testing.T) {\n\twant := \"Authorization: Basic \" + base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(\"greg:tok123\"))\n\n\tif got := basicAuthHeader(\"greg\", \"tok123\"); got != want {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"basicAuthHeader = %q, want %q\", got, want)\n\t}\n}\n", "path": "/project/internal/agentrun/sandbox_test.go"}
Result
OK
Thinking
Alright, let's do a full end-to-end simulation of what `setupSandboxGit` does — without Docker, but we can simulate the exact same shell commands against a local git server and prove that clone + pull + push work with the configured gitconfig. This is a valuable verification of the core claim that "git pull must simply work."
Plan:
1. Create a bare "remote" repo on disk.
2. Serve it over HTTP using git http-backend with basic auth (user "greg", token "sekret").
3. In a temp directory (simulating the container's /root), set up a global gitconfig with the same entries that setupSandboxGit writes:
- `http.http://127.0.0.1:PORT.extraHeader = Authorization: Basic base64(greg:sekret)`
- `http.https://127.0.0.1:PORT.extraHeader = ...`
- user.name/user.email
4. `git clone --branch main --single-branch http://127.0.0.1:PORT/repo.git /tmp/sim/project`
5. `git checkout -b issue-38-greg`
6. Make a change, commit, `git push origin issue-38-greg`
7. In a second clone, `git pull` / `git fetch` — verify that authentication works.
Serving git over HTTP with auth: use `git http-backend` via a CGI script. Let me write a small Python CGI server:
```python
import http.server, subprocess, os, urllib.parse
class GitHandler(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
def log_message(self, *a): pass
def do_GET(self):
self.run_git("git-upload-pack")
def do_POST(self):
length = int(self.headers.get("Content-Length", 0))
body = self.rfile.read(length)
self.run_git("git-receive-pack", body)
def run_git(self, service, body=b""):
# check auth
auth = self.headers.get("Authorization", "")
import base64
expected = "Basic " + base64.b64encode(b"greg:sekret").decode()
if auth != expected:
self.send_response(401)
self.send_header("WWW-Authenticate", 'Basic realm="git"')
self.end_headers()
return
env = dict(os.environ,
GIT_PROJECT_ROOT="/tmp/sim/remote-root",
GIT_HTTP_EXPORT_ALL="1",
PATH_INFO=urllib.parse.unquote(self.path),
GIT_HTTP_SERVICE=service,
REMOTE_USER="greg")
p = subprocess.run(["git", "http-backend"], input=body, env=env, capture_output=True)
out = p.stdout
# parse CGI headers
hdr, _, payload = out.partition(b"\r\n\r\n")
self.send_response(200)
for line in hdr.decode().splitlines():
k, _, v = line.partition(":")
self.send_header(k.strip(), v.strip())
self.end_headers()
self.wfile.write(payload)
http.server.HTTPServer(("127.0.0.1", 8766), GitHandler).serve_forever()
```
This is a reasonably faithful simulation of a Forgejo git endpoint (401 + Basic auth + http-backend).
Let me write this test as a shell script. Actually — should this be a permanent test in the repo? It would be a unit test that doesn't require Docker (just git + python3). Hmm, the repo's tests are in Go, and a Go test that spins up an HTTP git server is possible (net/http + exec git http-backend). That would be a genuinely valuable regression test for "git pull works with the gitconfig credential."
Let me think about scope. The issue is about the mechanism, and a Go test that does:
1. Creates a bare repo (exec git).
2. Serves it with net/http + git http-backend, requiring basic auth.
3. Writes a temporary GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL (or uses `git config --file`) with the exact same entries that setupSandboxGit writes (via the same helper — e.g., by calling the same function that builds the command… hmm, setupSandboxGit takes a dockerRuntime, so it can't be called directly).
Hmm — to test the actual setup commands, I'd need to refactor setupSandboxGit to separate "build the list of commands" from "execute them." That's a clean refactor:
```go
// sandboxGitCommands returns the shell commands setupSandboxGit runs,
// in order. Split out so tests can exercise the exact commands without
// a Docker daemon.
func sandboxGitCommands(cloneURL, username, token, name, email, defaultBranch, branch string) []string { ... }
func setupSandboxGit(ctx, docker, containerID, cloneURL, username, token, name, email, defaultBranch, branch string) error {
for _, cmd := range sandboxGitCommands(...) {
...exec...
}
}
```
But in that case, the error labels are lost (the label was per-step). I could return []step (label+cmd). And the test runs the commands via `sh -c` on the host (the test environment has git) against a local HTTP git server, with HOME pointed at a temp dir (so --global writes there).
Wait, but `git config --system --add safe.directory '*'` — in the test, --system writes to /etc/gitconfig, which requires root. In CI/test environments, that might not be writable. Hmm. The test could skip that step, or run as root… In my container I'm probably root. But in general, the test should be robust.
Hmm, this is getting complicated. Let me weigh: the value of a full e2e test (clone/pull/push against a local authed git server) is high — it directly verifies the core claim of the issue. The complexity is moderate.
Alternative: a simpler test that only verifies the credential mechanism:
1. Local bare repo served over HTTP with basic auth (401 without credentials).
2. `git -c include.path=... ls-remote <url>` — no, I want to test the global gitconfig path.
3. Set `GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL=/tmp/test-gitconfig` env var (git supports the GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL env var that overrides the location of the global config file!). Then write the exact same entries that setupSandboxGit writes (reproducing the command construction) into that file, and run `git ls-remote` / `git clone` / `git pull` / `git push`.
Using the GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL env var avoids touching the real /root/.gitconfig. And I can completely skip the --system safe.directory step in the test (it's orthogonal to auth).
To avoid duplicating the command construction, I'll refactor setupSandboxGit to expose the command list. Let me restructure:
```go
// sandboxGitStep is one shell command setupSandboxGit runs in the
// container, with a label for error messages.
type sandboxGitStep struct {
label string
cmd string
}
// sandboxGitCommands returns the steps setupSandboxGit runs, in order:
// git environment setup (safe.directory, commit identity, Forgejo
// credential) and the clone + branch checkout. Split out from
// setupSandboxGit so tests can exercise the exact commands without a
// Docker daemon.
func sandboxGitCommands(cloneURL, username, token, name, email, defaultBranch, branch string) []sandboxGitStep {
steps := []sandboxGitStep{
{"configure git safe.directory", "git config --system --add safe.directory '*'"},
{"configure git user.name", "git config --global user.name " + tools.ShellQuote(name)},
{"configure git user.email", "git config --global user.email " + tools.ShellQuote(email)},
}
if bases, ok := gitAuthBases(cloneURL); ok {
for _, base := range bases {
steps = append(steps, sandboxGitStep{
"configure git credential",
"git config --global http." + base + ".extraHeader " + tools.ShellQuote(basicAuthHeader(username, token)),
})
}
}
return append(steps,
sandboxGitStep{"clone repository", "git clone --branch " + tools.ShellQuote(defaultBranch) + " --single-branch " + tools.ShellQuote(cloneURL) + " /project"},
sandboxGitStep{"checkout branch " + branch, "git checkout -b " + tools.ShellQuote(branch)},
)
}
func setupSandboxGit(ctx context.Context, docker *dockerRuntime, containerID string, cloneURL, username, token, name, email, defaultBranch, branch string) error {
for _, s := range sandboxGitCommands(cloneURL, username, token, name, email, defaultBranch, branch) {
out, exitCode, err := docker.exec(ctx, containerID, s.cmd)
...
}
return nil
}
```
And the e2e test (docker tag? no — plain, but requires git + python3? no python needed if I write the HTTP server in Go inside the test):
```go
// TestSandboxGitCommandsRemoteOps runs the exact commands
// setupSandboxGit would run in the container (minus the --system
// safe.directory step, which needs root) against a local git
// repository served over HTTP with basic auth, and verifies that
// clone, commit, push, and pull all work with only the gitconfig
// credential — the "git pull must simply work" guarantee.
func TestSandboxGitCommandsRemoteOps(t *testing.T) {
// 1. bare repo with an initial commit on main
// 2. httptest server: git http-backend, 401 unless Authorization matches
// 3. temp HOME with a global gitconfig; run the steps (skipping --system) via sh -c
// — but the clone step targets /project, which the test can't write to!
}
```
Ah, right — the clone step hardcodes `/project`. In the test, /project is… wait, I'm running inside a container where /project is my working tree! I must not clone into /project in the test. Hmm.
Options:
- Parameterize the target dir in sandboxGitCommands (add a `projectDir` parameter, default "/project" in setupSandboxGit). The test passes a temp dir.
- Or the test rewrites the command (fragile).
Parameterizing is cleaner:
```go
func sandboxGitCommands(projectDir, cloneURL, username, token, name, email, defaultBranch, branch string) []sandboxGitStep
```
And setupSandboxGit calls it with "/project".
Now the test:
1. `t.TempDir()` for the "remote root" + bare repo:
- `git init --bare remote.git`
- Seed a commit: clone into a temp dir, commit, push to the bare repo… or `git init` a work repo, commit, `git push bare main`.
2. HTTP server (in Go):
```go
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Header.Get("Authorization") != "Basic "+b64("greg:sekret") {
w.Header().Set("WWW-Authenticate", `Basic realm="git"`)
http.Error(w, "Unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
// run git http-backend
env := append(os.Environ(), "GIT_PROJECT_ROOT="+root, "GIT_HTTP_EXPORT_ALL=1", "PATH_INFO="+path, "GIT_HTTP_SERVICE="+service, "REMOTE_USER=greg")
// read body for POST
cmd := exec.Command("git", "http-backend")
cmd.Env = env
cmd.Stdin = r.Body
out, err := cmd.Output()
// parse CGI headers
...
}))
```
3. Global gitconfig: use `GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL` env var? Hmm wait — actually, the test runs the commands via `sh -c` (like the container does). To redirect `git config --global` to a temp file, I can set the `HOME` env var for the sh process (git's --global uses $HOME/.gitconfig). If I set HOME=tempdir, `git config --global` writes to tempdir/.gitconfig.
But the first step is `git config --system --add safe.directory '*'` — that writes to /etc/gitconfig (needs root). In the test, skip steps whose label is "configure git safe.directory" (document the reason: needs root, orthogonal to auth).
4. Run each remaining step via `sh -c` with HOME=tempHome, GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT=0.
5. Then verify:
- The clone happened in the temp project dir.
- `git push origin issue-38-greg` works (via sh -c in the project dir).
- A second clone + `git pull`… hmm, pull on the new branch? Let me do this: after the push, in the project dir `git pull origin main`? Or simulate the agent's `git pull`: fetch the main branch and pull it. The simplest meaningful check: in the cloned repo, `git pull` (pulls the current branch — the new branch doesn't exist on the remote… `git pull` on a branch without an upstream fails).
Let me structure the verification:
- Step commands: clone + checkout -b issue-38-greg.
- Make a commit on issue-38-greg.
- `git push origin issue-38-greg` → must succeed (proves push auth).
- `git checkout main` (or the default branch) and `git pull` → hmm, main has an upstream (origin/main from the clone) → `git pull` works and proves pull auth. But to make pull meaningful, first push a new commit to main from a second clone…
A simpler, more robust sequence:
a. Run the setup steps (clone, branch).
b. Commit + push the branch → proves clone + push auth.
c. In the same repo, `git checkout main && git pull` → proves pull auth (fetches from origin/main; no new commits, but the fetch still authenticates — a 401 would make it fail).
d. Even better: from a second temp clone (with the same gitconfig), push a commit to main, then `git pull` in the first repo → actually pulls in the new commit. This fully proves "git pull simply works."
Let me do (d) — it's not much more code.
This is a solid test. Where to put it? `internal/agentrun/sandbox_test.go` — plain (no build tag), requires `git` and `sh` on the host — the same assumption the docker integration test makes about git (it runs `exec.Command("git", ...)` without a build tag… no wait, the docker test is behind the `docker` build tag). Hmm, the existing non-docker tests don't exec git. My new test execs git + sh + runs an HTTP server. Is that acceptable as a plain unit test? It's self-contained and fast (<2s). Many Go projects have such tests. But if git isn't installed in the test environment, it fails… The repo already requires git for the docker-tagged tests. For the plain test, I could add a skip if git isn't found:
```go
if _, err := exec.LookPath("git"); err != nil {
t.Skip("git not available")
}
```
That's reasonable.
Hmm, wait. Let me reconsider the scope. Is this test overkill for this change? The issue explicitly says: "git pull must simply work for the agents inside the sandbox. I'm not sure how, but it must work." A regression test that proves clone/push/pull work with just the gitconfig credential is the strongest possible answer to that requirement. I think it's worth it. Let me keep it focused and clean.
One more design point: parameterize `sandboxGitCommands` with the project dir. Signature:
```go
func sandboxGitCommands(projectDir, cloneURL, username, token, name, email, defaultBranch, branch string) []sandboxGitStep
```
10 parameters — a bit much, but they're all simple strings. Alternatively, a small struct. Let me use a struct for readability:
Hmm, let me keep it simple — the existing code style in this repo uses plain parameters (setupSandboxGit already has 10). Let me keep the plain parameters for consistency.
Now, the CGI parsing in the test server: the output of `git http-backend` is:
```
Status: 200 OK\r\n
Content-Type: application/x-git-upload-pack-result\r\n
\r\n
<payload>
```
Parse: split on the first "\r\n\r\n", parse the headers, write them, then the payload.
Let me write it:
```go
func TestSandboxGitCommandsRemoteOps(t *testing.T) {
if _, err := exec.LookPath("git"); err != nil {
t.Skip("git not available")
}
// A bare "remote" repo with one commit on main, served over HTTP
// that demands basic auth (greg:sekret) — standing in for Forgejo's
// git endpoint.
remoteRoot := t.TempDir()
bare := filepath.Join(remoteRoot, "zoo.git")
run := func(dir string, env []string, args ...string) string {
cmd := exec.Command(args[0], args[1:]...)
cmd.Dir = dir
cmd.Env = append(os.Environ(), env...)
out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("git %v: %v: %s", args, err, out)
}
return string(out)
}
seed := t.TempDir()
run("", nil, "git", "init", "-q", "-b", "main", seed)
run(seed, nil, "git", "config", "user.name", "seed")
run(seed, nil, "git", "config", "user.email", "seed@zoo.local")
os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(seed, "hello.txt"), []byte("hello\n"), 0o644)
run(seed, nil, "git", "add", ".")
run(seed, nil, "git", "commit", "-q", "-m", "initial")
run(seed, nil, "git", "push", "-q", "file://"+bare, "main") // hmm, push to a nonexistent bare repo
```
Wait — `git init --bare` the bare repo first, then push to it:
```go
run("", nil, "git", "init", "-q", "--bare", bare)
...
run(seed, nil, "git", "push", "-q", bare, "main")
```
Pushing to a local path works without auth. Good.
HTTP server:
```go
wantAuth := "Basic " + base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte("greg:sekret"))
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Header.Get("Authorization") != wantAuth {
w.Header().Set("WWW-Authenticate", `Basic realm="git"`)
http.Error(w, "Unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
service := "git-upload-pack"
if r.Method == http.MethodPost {
service = "git-receive-pack"
}
cmd := exec.Command("git", "http-backend")
cmd.Env = append(os.Environ(),
"GIT_PROJECT_ROOT="+remoteRoot,
"GIT_HTTP_EXPORT_ALL=1",
"PATH_INFO="+r.URL.Path,
"GIT_HTTP_SERVICE="+service,
"REMOTE_USER=greg",
)
cmd.Stdin = r.Body
out, err := cmd.Output()
if err != nil {
http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
hdr, _, payload := bytes.Cut(out, []byte("\r\n\r\n"))
w.WriteHeader(200)
for _, line := range strings.Split(string(hdr), "\r\n") {
k, v, _ := strings.Cut(line, ": ")
if k != "" {
w.Header().Set(strings.TrimPrefix(k, "Status: "), v) // hmm, Status line
}
}
w.Write(payload)
}))
defer srv.Close()
```
Hmm, parsing the Status line: `Status: 200 OK`. I can just ignore the Status line and always write 200 (http-backend for a valid request returns 200; for a missing repo it returns 404 — but in the test the repo exists). Let me handle it: parse the status code from the Status line, default to 200.
Actually, simpler:
```go
status := 200
for _, line := range strings.Split(string(hdr), "\r\n") {
k, v, found := strings.Cut(line, ": ")
if !found {
continue
}
if strings.EqualFold(k, "Status") {
fmt.Sscanf(v, "%d", &status)
continue
}
w.Header().Set(k, v)
}
w.WriteHeader(status)
w.Write(payload)
```
Next, the sandbox simulation:
```go
home := t.TempDir()
projectDir := t.TempDir()
env := []string{
"HOME=" + home,
"GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT=0",
}
sh := func(dir, command string) {
cmd := exec.Command("sh", "-c", command)
cmd.Dir = dir
cmd.Env = append(os.Environ(), env...)
out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("sh -c %q: %v: %s", command, err, out)
}
}
cloneURL := srv.URL + "/zoo.git"
for _, s := range sandboxGitCommands(projectDir, cloneURL, "greg", "sekret", "Greg Coolio", "greg@zoo.local", "main", "issue-38-greg") {
if s.label == "configure git safe.directory" {
continue // --system scope needs root; orthogonal to auth
}
sh("", s.cmd)
}
```
Wait — but the clone step clones into projectDir (a parameter). Good, that's why I parameterized it.
Hmm wait, one issue: `git clone` into projectDir — projectDir exists (t.TempDir creates it) and is empty. Good.
But wait: `git config --global` with HOME=home → writes to home/.gitconfig. But the `git clone` step runs `sh -c` with the same env → the clone uses home/.gitconfig → the auth header applies.
Then the verification:
```go
// Push the agent's branch.
sh(projectDir, "echo world >> hello.txt && git add . && git commit -q -m 'agent change' && git push -q origin issue-38-greg")
```
Hmm wait, the commit needs user.name/email — already set in the gitconfig (the user.name step). Good.
```go
// A second clone, like another agent's sandbox, pushes to main;
// the first sandbox's `git pull` must simply fetch it.
other := t.TempDir()
sh("", "git clone -q "+cloneURL+" "+other) // hmm — this clone also needs auth!
```
Right — the second clone also needs the auth header. The same gitconfig (HOME=home) applies. `sh("", "git clone -q 'URL' other")` — needs quoting. Use ShellQuote.
```go
sh("", "git clone -q "+tools.ShellQuote(cloneURL)+" "+tools.ShellQuote(other))
sh(other, "echo more >> hello.txt && git add . && git commit -q -m 'other change' && git push -q origin main")
// And the pull that must simply work:
out := shOutput(projectDir, "git checkout -q main && git pull -q origin main") // hmm
```
Wait, after `git checkout main`, `git pull` — main has an upstream origin/main (set by the clone). A plain `git pull` works. Let me verify that the pulled change is present:
```go
out, err := shOutput(projectDir, "git checkout -q main && git pull && cat hello.txt")
if !strings.Contains(out, "more") { t.Fatalf(...) }
```
Hmm, `git pull` prints "Already up to date" or the merge info to stderr — CombinedOutput captures it. And `git pull` on main: the clone set the branch.main remote=origin merge=refs/heads/main. Good.
Wait, one subtlety: the clone was `--single-branch --branch main` — only main was fetched. After the agent's branch push, the remote has main + issue-38-greg. `git pull` on main fetches main. No problem.
Also, the second clone (without --single-branch) fetches all branches — no problem.
Now — the push from the first sandbox: `git push -q origin issue-38-greg` — the push uses the http.extraHeader from the global gitconfig → the server accepts it.
One more check — `git push` to a local HTTP server with http-backend: receive-pack over HTTP works with http-backend. Good.
Also, the `run` helper for seeding: `git init -b main` — the git version in the container: let me check `git --version`. `-b` for init requires git 2.28+. Let me check. If it's older, use `git init -q` + `git checkout -b main`… let me check the version first.
Also, the test needs imports: bytes, encoding/base64, net/http, net/http/httptest, os, os/exec, path/filepath, strings, testing. And the tools package for ShellQuote (agentrun already imports tools in other files; in the test file I import "github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/tools").
Hmm wait — actually, do I want the test in package agentrun (whitebox)? Yes, it's in sandbox_test.go, same package.
Let me also double-check that `git http-backend` exists in the container (it's part of git core, the `git http-backend` subcommand — available in standard git builds; on Debian it's in the git package… on some distros it's in git-core? It's part of git since 1.5, included in standard builds). Let me verify in the container.
Let me check the git version and http-backend availability.
Now I'll refactor `sandbox.go` to expose the command list (so a test can exercise the exact commands without Docker), and check what git tooling is available for such a test:
Tool 🔧 bash {"command": "git --version && which git http-backend 2>/dev/null; git http-backend --help >/dev/null 2>&1 && echo \"http-backend OK\"; which sh python3"}
Arguments
{"command": "git --version && which git http-backend 2>/dev/null; git http-backend --help >/dev/null 2>&1 && echo \"http-backend OK\"; which sh python3"}
Result
git version 2.47.3 /usr/bin/git /usr/bin/sh /usr/bin/python3
Thinking
`git http-backend` didn't output "OK" — let me check more carefully. `git http-backend --help` — hmm, http-backend is a builtin, and `git http-backend --help` should display the usage. Let me test it directly.
Tool 🔧 bash {"command": "GIT_PROJECT_ROOT=/tmp GIT_HTTP_EXPORT_ALL=1 PATH_INFO=/x.git/info/refs GIT_HTTP_SERVICE=git-upload-pack REMOTE_USER=x git http-backend </dev/null 2>&1 | head -5; echo \"exit: $?\""}
Arguments
{"command": "GIT_PROJECT_ROOT=/tmp GIT_HTTP_EXPORT_ALL=1 PATH_INFO=/x.git/info/refs GIT_HTTP_SERVICE=git-upload-pack REMOTE_USER=x git http-backend </dev/null 2>&1 | head -5; echo \"exit: $?\""}
Result
fatal: No REQUEST_METHOD from server Status: 500 Internal Server Error Expires: Fri, 01 Jan 1980 00:00:00 GMT Pragma: no-cache Cache-Control: no-cache, max-age=0, must-revalidate exit: 0
Thinking
`git http-backend` works (it needs the CGI environment variable REQUEST_METHOD, which my Go test server provides via the http package... no wait, actually not — the Go test server has to set REQUEST_METHOD in the env of the exec'd process. The http server doesn't automatically pass CGI variables to child processes. I need to set REQUEST_METHOD=GET/POST myself.)
Alright, let me refactor sandbox.go to expose `sandboxGitCommands`, and then write the e2e test.
`git http-backend` works (needs CGI env vars, which the test server will set). Now refactor `sandbox.go` to expose the command list:
Tool 🔧 read_file {"path": "/project/internal/agentrun/sandbox.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 100}
Arguments
{"path": "/project/internal/agentrun/sandbox.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 100}
Result
{"path":"/project/internal/agentrun/sandbox.go","content":"package agentrun\r\n\r\nimport (\r\n\t\"context\"\r\n\t\"encoding/base64\"\r\n\t\"fmt\"\r\n\t\"net/url\"\r\n\r\n\t\"github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/tools\"\r\n)\r\n\r\n// basicAuthHeader builds the value of the Authorization header git\r\n// sends to Forgejo for every remote operation: the account the token\r\n// belongs to (username) and the token itself, base64-encoded per the\r\n// HTTP Basic scheme. Forgejo accepts a personal access token as the\r\n// password, but matching the token owner keeps the credential\r\n// unambiguous in server logs.\r\nfunc basicAuthHeader(username, token string) string {\r\n\tauth := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(username + \":\" + token))\r\n\r\n\treturn \"Authorization: Basic \" + auth\r\n}\r\n\r\n// gitAuthBases returns the URL bases to scope the sandbox's git\r\n// Authorization header to: the Forgejo host (with port) over both\r\n// http and https, so remote operations work regardless of which\r\n// scheme the agent's remotes use. Git matches http.\u003cbase\u003e.* config\r\n// against the full URL, scheme included — hence the scheme-prefixed\r\n// bases. Non-http(s) clone URLs (ssh, local paths) authenticate\r\n// through other means and need no header, so they report ok=false.\r\nfunc gitAuthBases(cloneURL string) ([]string, bool) {\r\n\tu, err := url.Parse(cloneURL)\r\n\tif err != nil || (u.Scheme != \"http\" \u0026\u0026 u.Scheme != \"https\") || u.Host == \"\" {\r\n\t\treturn nil, false\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\treturn []string{\"http://\" + u.Host, \"https://\" + u.Host}, true\r\n}\r\n\r\n// setupSandboxGit prepares the container's git environment and clones\r\n// the repo into /project — entirely inside the sandbox, so the host\r\n// never runs git. It configures, in the container's global gitconfig:\r\n//\r\n// - the agent's commit identity (user.name / user.email), and\r\n// - an Authorization header scoped to the Forgejo host, so every\r\n// remote operation the agent runs in the sandbox (clone, fetch,\r\n// pull, push) authenticates with the given token and simply works.\r\n//\r\n// safe.directory is set at --system scope so it holds regardless of\r\n// which user a later exec runs as; identity and the credential use\r\n// --global (the container runs as one user throughout its life).\r\n//\r\n// Errors carry the step's label, never the command itself: the\r\n// credential step embeds the token (base64-encoded) and must not leak\r\n// it into the job log.\r\nfunc setupSandboxGit(ctx context.Context, docker *dockerRuntime, containerID, cloneURL, username, token, name, email, defaultBranch, branch string) error {\r\n\ttype step struct {\r\n\t\tlabel string\r\n\t\tcmd string\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tsteps := []step{\r\n\t\t{\"configure git safe.directory\", \"git config --system --add safe.directory '*'\"},\r\n\t\t{\"configure git user.name\", \"git config --global user.name \" + tools.ShellQuote(name)},\r\n\t\t{\"configure git user.email\", \"git config --global user.email \" + tools.ShellQuote(email)},\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tif bases, ok := gitAuthBases(cloneURL); ok {\r\n\t\tfor _, base := range bases {\r\n\t\t\tsteps = append(steps, step{\r\n\t\t\t\t\"configure git credential\",\r\n\t\t\t\t\"git config --global http.\" + base + \".extraHeader \" + tools.ShellQuote(basicAuthHeader(username, token)),\r\n\t\t\t})\r\n\t\t}\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tsteps = append(steps,\r\n\t\tstep{\"clone repository\", \"git clone --branch \" + tools.ShellQuote(defaultBranch) + \" --single-branch \" + tools.ShellQuote(cloneURL) + \" /project\"},\r\n\t\tstep{\"checkout branch \" + branch, \"git checkout -b \" + tools.ShellQuote(branch)},\r\n\t)\r\n\r\n\tfor _, s := range steps {\r\n\t\tout, exitCode, err := docker.exec(ctx, containerID, s.cmd)\r\n\t\tif err != nil {\r\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"%s: %w\", s.label, err)\r\n\t\t}\r\n\r\n\t\tif exitCode != 0 {\r\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"%s: exit %d: %s\", s.label, exitCode, out)\r\n\t\t}\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\treturn nil\r\n}\r","start_line":1,"end_line":94,"total_lines":94,"truncated":false}
Thinking
Let's restructure: extract `sandboxGitCommands(projectDir, cloneURL, username, token, name, email, defaultBranch, branch) []sandboxGitStep`, and have setupSandboxGit iterate over it.
Tool 🔧 edit_file {"find": "// setupSandboxGit prepares the container's git environment and clones\n// the repo into /project — entirely inside the sandbox, so the host\n// never runs git. It configures, in the container's global gitconfig:\n//\n// - the agent's commit identity (user.name / user.email), and\n// - an Authorization header scoped to the Forgejo host, so every\n// remote operation the agent runs in the sandbox (clone, fetch,\n// pull, push) authenticates with the given token and simply works.\n//\n// safe.directory is set at --system scope so it holds regardless of\n// which user a later exec runs as; identity and the credential use\n// --global (the container runs as one user throughout its life).\n//\n// Errors carry the step's label, never the command itself: the\n// credential step embeds the token (base64-encoded) and must not leak\n// it into the job log.\nfunc setupSandboxGit(ctx context.Context, docker *dockerRuntime, containerID, cloneURL, username, token, name, email, defaultBranch, branch string) error {\n\ttype step struct {\n\t\tlabel string\n\t\tcmd string\n\t}\n\n\tsteps := []step{\n\t\t{\"configure git safe.directory\", \"git config --system --add safe.directory '*'\"},\n\t\t{\"configure git user.name\", \"git config --global user.name \" + tools.ShellQuote(name)},\n\t\t{\"configure git user.email\", \"git config --global user.email \" + tools.ShellQuote(email)},\n\t}\n\n\tif bases, ok := gitAuthBases(cloneURL); ok {\n\t\tfor _, base := range bases {\n\t\t\tsteps = append(steps, step{\n\t\t\t\t\"configure git credential\",\n\t\t\t\t\"git config --global http.\" + base + \".extraHeader \" + tools.ShellQuote(basicAuthHeader(username, token)),\n\t\t\t})\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tsteps = append(steps,\n\t\tstep{\"clone repository\", \"git clone --branch \" + tools.ShellQuote(defaultBranch) + \" --single-branch \" + tools.ShellQuote(cloneURL) + \" /project\"},\n\t\tstep{\"checkout branch \" + branch, \"git checkout -b \" + tools.ShellQuote(branch)},\n\t)\n\n\tfor _, s := range steps {\n\t\tout, exitCode, err := docker.exec(ctx, containerID, s.cmd)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"%s: %w\", s.label, err)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif exitCode != 0 {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"%s: exit %d: %s\", s.label, exitCode, out)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}", "replace": "// sandboxGitStep is one shell command setupSandboxGit runs in the\n// container, with a label for error messages.\ntype sandboxGitStep struct {\n\tlabel string\n\tcmd string\n}\n\n// sandboxGitCommands returns the steps setupSandboxGit runs, in order:\n// the git environment (safe.directory, commit identity, Forgejo\n// credential) and the clone + branch checkout into projectDir. Split\n// out from setupSandboxGit so tests can exercise the exact commands\n// without a Docker daemon.\nfunc sandboxGitCommands(projectDir, cloneURL, username, token, name, email, defaultBranch, branch string) []sandboxGitStep {\n\tsteps := []sandboxGitStep{\n\t\t{\"configure git safe.directory\", \"git config --system --add safe.directory '*'\"},\n\t\t{\"configure git user.name\", \"git config --global user.name \" + tools.ShellQuote(name)},\n\t\t{\"configure git user.email\", \"git config --global user.email \" + tools.ShellQuote(email)},\n\t}\n\n\tif bases, ok := gitAuthBases(cloneURL); ok {\n\t\tfor _, base := range bases {\n\t\t\tsteps = append(steps, sandboxGitStep{\n\t\t\t\t\"configure git credential\",\n\t\t\t\t\"git config --global http.\" + base + \".extraHeader \" + tools.ShellQuote(basicAuthHeader(username, token)),\n\t\t\t})\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn append(steps,\n\t\tsandboxGitStep{\"clone repository\", \"git clone --branch \" + tools.ShellQuote(defaultBranch) + \" --single-branch \" + tools.ShellQuote(cloneURL) + \" \" + tools.ShellQuote(projectDir)},\n\t\tsandboxGitStep{\"checkout branch \" + branch, \"git checkout -b \" + tools.ShellQuote(branch)},\n\t)\n}\n\n// setupSandboxGit prepares the container's git environment and clones\n// the repo into /project — entirely inside the sandbox, so the host\n// never runs git. It configures, in the container's global gitconfig:\n//\n// - the agent's commit identity (user.name / user.email), and\n// - an Authorization header scoped to the Forgejo host, so every\n// remote operation the agent runs in the sandbox (clone, fetch,\n// pull, push) authenticates with the given token and simply works.\n//\n// safe.directory is set at --system scope so it holds regardless of\n// which user a later exec runs as; identity and the credential use\n// --global (the container runs as one user throughout its life).\n//\n// Errors carry the step's label, never the command itself: the\n// credential step embeds the token (base64-encoded) and must not leak\n// it into the job log.\nfunc setupSandboxGit(ctx context.Context, docker *dockerRuntime, containerID, cloneURL, username, token, name, email, defaultBranch, branch string) error {\n\tfor _, s := range sandboxGitCommands(\"/project\", cloneURL, username, token, name, email, defaultBranch, branch) {\n\t\tout, exitCode, err := docker.exec(ctx, containerID, s.cmd)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"%s: %w\", s.label, err)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif exitCode != 0 {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"%s: exit %d: %s\", s.label, exitCode, out)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}", "path": "/project/internal/agentrun/sandbox.go"}
Arguments
{"find": "// setupSandboxGit prepares the container's git environment and clones\n// the repo into /project — entirely inside the sandbox, so the host\n// never runs git. It configures, in the container's global gitconfig:\n//\n// - the agent's commit identity (user.name / user.email), and\n// - an Authorization header scoped to the Forgejo host, so every\n// remote operation the agent runs in the sandbox (clone, fetch,\n// pull, push) authenticates with the given token and simply works.\n//\n// safe.directory is set at --system scope so it holds regardless of\n// which user a later exec runs as; identity and the credential use\n// --global (the container runs as one user throughout its life).\n//\n// Errors carry the step's label, never the command itself: the\n// credential step embeds the token (base64-encoded) and must not leak\n// it into the job log.\nfunc setupSandboxGit(ctx context.Context, docker *dockerRuntime, containerID, cloneURL, username, token, name, email, defaultBranch, branch string) error {\n\ttype step struct {\n\t\tlabel string\n\t\tcmd string\n\t}\n\n\tsteps := []step{\n\t\t{\"configure git safe.directory\", \"git config --system --add safe.directory '*'\"},\n\t\t{\"configure git user.name\", \"git config --global user.name \" + tools.ShellQuote(name)},\n\t\t{\"configure git user.email\", \"git config --global user.email \" + tools.ShellQuote(email)},\n\t}\n\n\tif bases, ok := gitAuthBases(cloneURL); ok {\n\t\tfor _, base := range bases {\n\t\t\tsteps = append(steps, step{\n\t\t\t\t\"configure git credential\",\n\t\t\t\t\"git config --global http.\" + base + \".extraHeader \" + tools.ShellQuote(basicAuthHeader(username, token)),\n\t\t\t})\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tsteps = append(steps,\n\t\tstep{\"clone repository\", \"git clone --branch \" + tools.ShellQuote(defaultBranch) + \" --single-branch \" + tools.ShellQuote(cloneURL) + \" /project\"},\n\t\tstep{\"checkout branch \" + branch, \"git checkout -b \" + tools.ShellQuote(branch)},\n\t)\n\n\tfor _, s := range steps {\n\t\tout, exitCode, err := docker.exec(ctx, containerID, s.cmd)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"%s: %w\", s.label, err)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif exitCode != 0 {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"%s: exit %d: %s\", s.label, exitCode, out)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}", "replace": "// sandboxGitStep is one shell command setupSandboxGit runs in the\n// container, with a label for error messages.\ntype sandboxGitStep struct {\n\tlabel string\n\tcmd string\n}\n\n// sandboxGitCommands returns the steps setupSandboxGit runs, in order:\n// the git environment (safe.directory, commit identity, Forgejo\n// credential) and the clone + branch checkout into projectDir. Split\n// out from setupSandboxGit so tests can exercise the exact commands\n// without a Docker daemon.\nfunc sandboxGitCommands(projectDir, cloneURL, username, token, name, email, defaultBranch, branch string) []sandboxGitStep {\n\tsteps := []sandboxGitStep{\n\t\t{\"configure git safe.directory\", \"git config --system --add safe.directory '*'\"},\n\t\t{\"configure git user.name\", \"git config --global user.name \" + tools.ShellQuote(name)},\n\t\t{\"configure git user.email\", \"git config --global user.email \" + tools.ShellQuote(email)},\n\t}\n\n\tif bases, ok := gitAuthBases(cloneURL); ok {\n\t\tfor _, base := range bases {\n\t\t\tsteps = append(steps, sandboxGitStep{\n\t\t\t\t\"configure git credential\",\n\t\t\t\t\"git config --global http.\" + base + \".extraHeader \" + tools.ShellQuote(basicAuthHeader(username, token)),\n\t\t\t})\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn append(steps,\n\t\tsandboxGitStep{\"clone repository\", \"git clone --branch \" + tools.ShellQuote(defaultBranch) + \" --single-branch \" + tools.ShellQuote(cloneURL) + \" \" + tools.ShellQuote(projectDir)},\n\t\tsandboxGitStep{\"checkout branch \" + branch, \"git checkout -b \" + tools.ShellQuote(branch)},\n\t)\n}\n\n// setupSandboxGit prepares the container's git environment and clones\n// the repo into /project — entirely inside the sandbox, so the host\n// never runs git. It configures, in the container's global gitconfig:\n//\n// - the agent's commit identity (user.name / user.email), and\n// - an Authorization header scoped to the Forgejo host, so every\n// remote operation the agent runs in the sandbox (clone, fetch,\n// pull, push) authenticates with the given token and simply works.\n//\n// safe.directory is set at --system scope so it holds regardless of\n// which user a later exec runs as; identity and the credential use\n// --global (the container runs as one user throughout its life).\n//\n// Errors carry the step's label, never the command itself: the\n// credential step embeds the token (base64-encoded) and must not leak\n// it into the job log.\nfunc setupSandboxGit(ctx context.Context, docker *dockerRuntime, containerID, cloneURL, username, token, name, email, defaultBranch, branch string) error {\n\tfor _, s := range sandboxGitCommands(\"/project\", cloneURL, username, token, name, email, defaultBranch, branch) {\n\t\tout, exitCode, err := docker.exec(ctx, containerID, s.cmd)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"%s: %w\", s.label, err)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif exitCode != 0 {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"%s: exit %d: %s\", s.label, exitCode, out)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}", "path": "/project/internal/agentrun/sandbox.go"}
Result
1 occurrences replaced
Thinking
Next, I'll write an e2e test. I'll append to sandbox_test.go. The contents of the test are as follows:
1. Skip if git is not available.
2. Create a bare repository with a seed commit on `main`.
3. Serve it via httptest + `git http-backend`, requiring Basic auth `greg:sekret`.
4. Run the exact `sandboxGitCommands` steps via `sh -c` with a temporary HOME (skipping the --system safe.directory step since it requires root privileges).
5. Verify: commit + push the agent's branch; push a commit to main from a second clone; `git pull` in the first clone picks it up.
Details to be careful about:
- The `git http-backend` CGI requires the environment variables: REQUEST_METHOD, PATH_INFO, GIT_PROJECT_ROOT, GIT_HTTP_EXPORT_ALL, GIT_HTTP_SERVICE, REMOTE_USER, CONTENT_LENGTH (for POST).
- For POST (git-receive-pack), the body must be piped to stdin.
- The response from http-backend: headers separated from the body by \r\n\r\n.
Let me write the test:
```go
// TestSandboxGitCommandsRemoteOps runs the exact commands
// setupSandboxGit runs in the container (except for the --system
// safe.directory step, which requires root privileges) against a local
// repository served over HTTP with Basic auth, and verifies that
// clone, push, and pull all work with only the gitconfig credentials —
// the "git pull must just work" guarantee.
func TestSandboxGitCommandsRemoteOps(t *testing.T) {
if _, err := exec.LookPath("git"); err != nil {
t.Skip("git not available")
}
const (
username = "greg"
token = "sekret"
)
// A bare "remote" repository with one commit on main, standing in
// for Forgejo's git endpoint.
remoteRoot := t.TempDir()
bare := filepath.Join(remoteRoot, "zoo.git")
git := func(dir string, args ...string) {
cmd := exec.Command(args[0], args[1:]...)
cmd.Dir = dir
out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("%v: %v: %s", args, err, out)
}
}
git("", "git", "init", "-q", "--bare", bare)
seed := t.TempDir()
git("", "git", "init", "-q", "-b", "main", seed)
git(seed, "git", "config", "user.name", "seed")
git(seed, "git", "config", "user.email", "seed@zoo.local")
if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(seed, "hello.txt"), []byte("hello\n"), 0o644); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
git(seed, "git", "add", ".")
git(seed, "git", "commit", "-q", "-m", "initial")
git(seed, "git", "push", "-q", bare, "main")
// Serve the bare repo over HTTP, requiring Basic auth.
wantAuth := "Basic " + base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(username+":"+token))
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Header.Get("Authorization") != wantAuth {
w.Header().Set("WWW-Authenticate", `Basic realm="git"`)
http.Error(w, "Unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
service := "git-upload-pack"
if r.Method == http.MethodPost {
service = "git-receive-pack"
}
cmd := exec.Command("git", "http-backend")
cmd.Env = append(os.Environ(),
"REQUEST_METHOD="+r.Method,
"PATH_INFO="+r.URL.Path,
"GIT_PROJECT_ROOT="+remoteRoot,
"GIT_HTTP_EXPORT_ALL=1",
"GIT_HTTP_SERVICE="+service,
"REMOTE_USER="+username,
)
cmd.Stdin = r.Body
out, err := cmd.Output()
if err != nil {
http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
hdr, _, payload := bytes.Cut(out, []byte("\r\n\r\n"))
status := 200
for _, line := range strings.Split(string(hdr), "\r\n") {
k, v, ok := strings.Cut(line, ": ")
if !ok {
continue
}
if strings.EqualFold(k, "Status") {
fmt.Sscanf(v, "%d", &status)
continue
}
w.Header().Set(k, v)
}
w.WriteHeader(status)
_, _ = w.Write(payload)
}))
defer srv.Close()
// A temporary HOME so the steps' `git config --global` writes there
// instead of the test runner's real gitconfig.
home := t.TempDir()
projectDir := t.TempDir()
sh := func(dir, command string) string {
cmd := exec.Command("sh", "-c", command)
cmd.Dir = dir
cmd.Env = append(os.Environ(), "HOME="+home, "GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT=0")
out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("sh -c %q: %v: %s", command, err, out)
}
return string(out)
}
cloneURL := srv.URL + "/zoo.git"
for _, s := range sandboxGitCommands(projectDir, cloneURL, username, token, "Greg Coolio", "greg@zoo.local", "main", "issue-38-greg") {
if s.label == "configure git safe.directory" {
continue // --system scope needs root; orthogonal to auth
}
sh("", s.cmd)
}
// The agent commits on its branch and pushes it.
sh(projectDir, "echo world >> hello.txt && git add . && git commit -q -m 'agent change' && git push -q origin issue-38-greg")
// A second sandbox (fresh clone, same credential) pushes to main.
other := t.TempDir()
sh("", "git clone -q "+tools.ShellQuote(cloneURL)+" "+tools.ShellQuote(other))
sh(other, "echo more >> hello.txt && git add . && git commit -q -m 'other change' && git push -q origin main")
// And the pull that must simply work.
out := sh(projectDir, "git checkout -q main && git pull && cat hello.txt")
if !strings.Contains(out, "more") {
t.Fatalf("git pull did not bring in the remote commit, output: %s", out)
}
}
```
Wait, there are a few issues:
1. `git("", "git", "init", "-q", "-b", "main", seed)` — the dir parameter is "" (the current directory of the test process — the package directory). `git init <dir>` doesn't depend on cwd. OK.
2. `git(seed, "git", "push", "-q", bare, "main")` — pushing to a local bare repo path. The bare repo has no default branch config, but... pushing main creates the ref. No problem.
3. The `sh` for the clone step: `git clone --branch 'main' --single-branch 'http://127.0.0.1:PORT/zoo.git' '/tmp/...'` — the clone uses HOME=home → the global gitconfig has the extraHeader for `http://127.0.0.1:PORT` → auth works.
4. `git push -q origin issue-38-greg` from projectDir — the cwd is projectDir. ✓
5. Second clone: `git clone -q <url> <other>` — a full clone (both branches). Uses the same HOME. ✓
6. `git checkout -q main && git pull && cat hello.txt` — hmm, `git pull` on main: upstream is set (origin/main). It fetches and merges the "other change". Output includes the merge info + file contents. `hello.txt` should contain "hello\nworld\nmore\n" — wait:
- Initial commit: hello.txt = "hello\n"
- Agent's branch: adds "world" → on branch issue-38-greg: "hello\nworld\n"
- Second clone (from main): "hello\n" + "more" → "hello\nmore\n" pushed to main.
- First repo: checkout main (still "hello\n"), pull → merges "more" → "hello\nmore\n".
- cat → "hello\nmore\n" — contains "more". ✓ (Note: "world" is not on main — it's only on the agent's branch. No problem.)
7. `git pull` without arguments: needs upstream config — the clone sets it up for the current branch (main). ✓
8. Potential issue: `git clone`'s progress output goes to stderr; with -q it's quiet. OK.
9. The `git push` in step 4 — wait, does the push need `GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT=0`? It's in the env. If auth fails, git will try to prompt → fails immediately. Good (test failure will be clear).
10. httptest server URL: `http://127.0.0.1:PORT`. `gitAuthBases` returns `http://127.0.0.1:PORT` and `https://127.0.0.1:PORT`. The clone URL uses http → matches the first base. ✓
11. `fmt.Sscanf(v, "%d", &status)` — v = "200 OK" → Sscanf parses 200 and stops at the space. ✓
12. Imports needed in sandbox_test.go: bytes, encoding/base64, fmt, net/http, net/http/httptest, os, os/exec, path/filepath, strings, testing, tools.
Hmm, wait — one more thing to double-check: `cmd.Env = append(os.Environ(), ...)` — os.Environ() in the test process includes the test environment's HOME etc.; appending HOME=... after it overrides it (later entries win in exec's env resolution? Actually, in POSIX, for duplicate env vars, the last one wins... hmm, is that really true? In execve, the envp array is passed as-is; C's getenv returns the first match! Go's os/exec passes envp as-is. The C runtime's getenv returns the first occurrence. So if os.Environ() already has HOME, appending another HOME later, C's getenv will return the first one (the original)!
Hmm wait, is that right? getenv walks the envp array and returns the first match. Yes — first match wins. So appending HOME=home after os.Environ() (which contains the real HOME) won't override it!
To be safe, I should build the env explicitly: filter out HOME from os.Environ() and then append. Or use `exec.Command` with `cmd.Env = append(filtered, "HOME="+home, ...)`.
Let me write a helper:
```go
withEnv := func(kv ...string) []string {
env := make([]string, 0, len(os.Environ())+len(kv))
overrides := map[string]bool{}
for _, k := range kv {
key, _, _ := strings.Cut(k, "=")
overrides[key] = true
}
for _, e := range os.Environ() {
key, _, _ := strings.Cut(e, "=")
if !overrides[key] {
env = append(env, e)
}
}
return append(env, kv...)
}
```
Hmm, a bit heavy. Simpler: for the sh steps, the only thing that matters is HOME (for git config --global) and GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT. PATH needs to be preserved (to find git/sh). Let me just build it explicitly:
```go
env := []string{
"HOME=" + home,
"PATH=" + os.Getenv("PATH"),
"GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT=0",
}
```
That's clean and deterministic. For the git http-backend exec, the env needs GIT_PROJECT_ROOT etc. + PATH (to find git... actually exec.Command("git", ...) uses PATH to find git — if I set cmd.Env explicitly, I have to include PATH). Let me build it explicitly there too:
```go
cmd.Env = []string{
"PATH=" + os.Getenv("PATH"),
"REQUEST_METHOD=" + r.Method,
"PATH_INFO=" + r.URL.Path,
"GIT_PROJECT_ROOT=" + remoteRoot,
"GIT_HTTP_EXPORT_ALL=1",
"GIT_HTTP_SERVICE=" + service,
"REMOTE_USER=" + username,
}
```
Hmm, http-backend might need other env vars (e.g., GIT_PROTOCOL? not required). The manual test I ran earlier used os.Environ() + additions and it worked (it got as far as complaining about REQUEST_METHOD). To be safe, I could also use os.Environ() + additions for http-backend (no override needed there — no HOME concern; git http-backend doesn't read user config... well, it might read gitconfig for http.* settings, but that's fine/irrelevant).
Actually, for the http-backend exec, os.Environ() + additions is fine (no override needed). For the sh steps, I need to override HOME → use the explicit env list.
Wait, also for the `git` seeding helper (the first one): it runs with the test process's default env — no problem (it doesn't need HOME override; it uses `git config` (local scope) for identity).
Hmm, one more: the `git init -b main` in the seeding — git 2.47 supports -b. ✓ (the container has 2.47.3; CI probably has something similar; the docker-tagged tests already assume modern git)
13. Another consideration: `t.TempDir()` for projectDir — the clone step clones into it. t.TempDir creates the directory (empty). ✓
14. Concurrency: httptest server + exec — no problem.
15. `sh` helper: `exec.Command("sh", "-c", command)` with Dir set. For the clone step, dir="" (cwd = the package directory) — the command uses absolute paths. ✓
Alright, let me write the final test file. I'll rewrite sandbox_test.go in full.
Now write the end-to-end test proving clone/push/pull work with only the gitconfig credential:
Tool 🔧 write_file {"content": "package agentrun\n\nimport (\n\t\"bytes\"\n\t\"encoding/base64\"\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"net/http\"\n\t\"net/http/httptest\"\n\t\"os\"\n\t\"os/exec\"\n\t\"path/filepath\"\n\t\"strings\"\n\t\"testing\"\n\n\t\"github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/tools\"\n)\n\nfunc TestGitAuthBases(t *testing.T) {\n\tcases := []struct {\n\t\turl string\n\t\tbases []string\n\t\tok bool\n\t}{\n\t\t{\"https://code.stdio.dk/abrander/zoo.git\", []string{\"http://code.stdio.dk\", \"https://code.stdio.dk\"}, true},\n\t\t{\"http://localhost:3000/abrander/zoo.git\", []string{\"http://localhost:3000\", \"https://localhost:3000\"}, true},\n\t\t{\"git@code.stdio.dk:abrander/zoo.git\", nil, false},\n\t\t{\"file:///srv/git/zoo.git\", nil, false},\n\t\t{\"relative/path\", nil, false},\n\t}\n\n\tfor _, tc := range cases {\n\t\tbases, ok := gitAuthBases(tc.url)\n\t\tif ok != tc.ok || !reflect.DeepEqual(bases, tc.bases) {\n\t\t\tt.Errorf(\"gitAuthBases(%q) = (%v, %v), want (%v, %v)\", tc.url, bases, ok, tc.bases, tc.ok)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc TestBasicAuthHeader(t *testing.T) {\n\twant := \"Authorization: Basic \" + base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(\"greg:tok123\"))\n\n\tif got := basicAuthHeader(\"greg\", \"tok123\"); got != want {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"basicAuthHeader = %q, want %q\", got, want)\n\t}\n}\n\n// TestSandboxGitCommandsRemoteOps runs the exact commands\n// setupSandboxGit runs in the container (minus the --system\n// safe.directory step, which needs root) against a local repository\n// served over HTTP with basic auth, and verifies that clone, push, and\n// pull all work with only the gitconfig credential — the \"git pull\n// must simply work\" guarantee.\nfunc TestSandboxGitCommandsRemoteOps(t *testing.T) {\n\tif _, err := exec.LookPath(\"git\"); err != nil {\n\t\tt.Skip(\"git not available\")\n\t}\n\n\tconst (\n\t\tusername = \"greg\"\n\t\ttoken = \"sekret\"\n\t)\n\n\tgit := func(dir string, args ...string) {\n\t\tcmd := exec.Command(args[0], args[1:]...)\n\t\tcmd.Dir = dir\n\n\t\tout, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tt.Fatalf(\"%v: %v: %s\", args, err, out)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// A bare \"remote\" repo with one commit on main, standing in for\n\t// Forgejo's git endpoint.\n\tremoteRoot := t.TempDir()\n\tbare := filepath.Join(remoteRoot, \"zoo.git\")\n\n\tgit(\"\", \"git\", \"init\", \"-q\", \"--bare\", bare)\n\n\tseed := t.TempDir()\n\tgit(\"\", \"git\", \"init\", \"-q\", \"-b\", \"main\", seed)\n\tgit(seed, \"git\", \"config\", \"user.name\", \"seed\")\n\tgit(seed, \"git\", \"config\", \"user.email\", \"seed@zoo.local\")\n\tif err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(seed, \"hello.txt\"), []byte(\"hello\\n\"), 0o644); err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatal(err)\n\t}\n\tgit(seed, \"git\", \"add\", \".\")\n\tgit(seed, \"git\", \"commit\", \"-q\", \"-m\", \"initial\")\n\tgit(seed, \"git\", \"push\", \"-q\", bare, \"main\")\n\n\t// Serve the bare repo over HTTP, demanding basic auth.\n\twantAuth := \"Basic \" + base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(username+\":\"+token))\n\n\tsrv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\tif r.Header.Get(\"Authorization\") != wantAuth {\n\t\t\tw.Header().Set(\"WWW-Authenticate\", `Basic realm=\"git\"`)\n\t\t\thttp.Error(w, \"Unauthorized\", http.StatusUnauthorized)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tservice := \"git-upload-pack\"\n\t\tif r.Method == http.MethodPost {\n\t\t\tservice = \"git-receive-pack\"\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tcmd := exec.Command(\"git\", \"http-backend\")\n\t\tcmd.Env = append(os.Environ(),\n\t\t\t\"REQUEST_METHOD=\"+r.Method,\n\t\t\t\"PATH_INFO=\"+r.URL.Path,\n\t\t\t\"GIT_PROJECT_ROOT=\"+remoteRoot,\n\t\t\t\"GIT_HTTP_EXPORT_ALL=1\",\n\t\t\t\"GIT_HTTP_SERVICE=\"+service,\n\t\t\t\"REMOTE_USER=\"+username,\n\t\t)\n\t\tcmd.Stdin = r.Body\n\n\t\tout, err := cmd.Output()\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\thttp.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\n\t\thdr, _, payload := bytes.Cut(out, []byte(\"\\r\\n\\r\\n\"))\n\t\tstatus := 200\n\n\t\tfor _, line := range strings.Split(string(hdr), \"\\r\\n\") {\n\t\t\tk, v, ok := strings.Cut(line, \": \")\n\t\t\tif !ok {\n\t\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tif strings.EqualFold(k, \"Status\") {\n\t\t\t\t_, _ = fmt.Sscanf(v, \"%d\", &status)\n\n\t\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tw.Header().Set(k, v)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tw.WriteHeader(status)\n\t\t_, _ = w.Write(payload)\n\t}))\n\tdefer srv.Close()\n\n\t// A temp HOME so the steps' `git config --global` writes there\n\t// instead of the test runner's real gitconfig.\n\thome := t.TempDir()\n\tprojectDir := t.TempDir()\n\n\tsh := func(dir, command string) string {\n\t\tcmd := exec.Command(\"sh\", \"-c\", command)\n\t\tcmd.Dir = dir\n\t\tcmd.Env = []string{\n\t\t\t\"HOME=\" + home,\n\t\t\t\"PATH=\" + os.Getenv(\"PATH\"),\n\t\t\t\"GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT=0\",\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tout, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tt.Fatalf(\"sh -c %q: %v: %s\", command, err, out)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\treturn string(out)\n\t}\n\n\tcloneURL := srv.URL + \"/zoo.git\"\n\n\tfor _, s := range sandboxGitCommands(projectDir, cloneURL, username, token, \"Greg Coolio\", \"greg@zoo.local\", \"main\", \"issue-38-greg\") {\n\t\tif s.label == \"configure git safe.directory\" {\n\t\t\tcontinue // --system scope needs root; orthogonal to auth\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tsh(\"\", s.cmd)\n\t}\n\n\t// The agent commits on its branch and pushes it.\n\tsh(projectDir, \"echo world >> hello.txt && git add . && git commit -q -m 'agent change' && git push -q origin issue-38-greg\")\n\n\t// A second sandbox (fresh clone, same credential) pushes to main.\n\tother := t.TempDir()\n\tsh(\"\", \"git clone -q \"+tools.ShellQuote(cloneURL)+\" \"+tools.ShellQuote(other))\n\tsh(other, \"echo more >> hello.txt && git add . && git commit -q -m 'other change' && git push -q origin main\")\n\n\t// And the pull that must simply work.\n\tout := sh(projectDir, \"git checkout -q main && git pull && cat hello.txt\")\n\tif !strings.Contains(out, \"more\") {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"git pull did not bring in the remote commit, output: %s\", out)\n\t}\n}\n", "path": "/project/internal/agentrun/sandbox_test.go"}
Arguments
{"content": "package agentrun\n\nimport (\n\t\"bytes\"\n\t\"encoding/base64\"\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"net/http\"\n\t\"net/http/httptest\"\n\t\"os\"\n\t\"os/exec\"\n\t\"path/filepath\"\n\t\"strings\"\n\t\"testing\"\n\n\t\"github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/tools\"\n)\n\nfunc TestGitAuthBases(t *testing.T) {\n\tcases := []struct {\n\t\turl string\n\t\tbases []string\n\t\tok bool\n\t}{\n\t\t{\"https://code.stdio.dk/abrander/zoo.git\", []string{\"http://code.stdio.dk\", \"https://code.stdio.dk\"}, true},\n\t\t{\"http://localhost:3000/abrander/zoo.git\", []string{\"http://localhost:3000\", \"https://localhost:3000\"}, true},\n\t\t{\"git@code.stdio.dk:abrander/zoo.git\", nil, false},\n\t\t{\"file:///srv/git/zoo.git\", nil, false},\n\t\t{\"relative/path\", nil, false},\n\t}\n\n\tfor _, tc := range cases {\n\t\tbases, ok := gitAuthBases(tc.url)\n\t\tif ok != tc.ok || !reflect.DeepEqual(bases, tc.bases) {\n\t\t\tt.Errorf(\"gitAuthBases(%q) = (%v, %v), want (%v, %v)\", tc.url, bases, ok, tc.bases, tc.ok)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc TestBasicAuthHeader(t *testing.T) {\n\twant := \"Authorization: Basic \" + base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(\"greg:tok123\"))\n\n\tif got := basicAuthHeader(\"greg\", \"tok123\"); got != want {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"basicAuthHeader = %q, want %q\", got, want)\n\t}\n}\n\n// TestSandboxGitCommandsRemoteOps runs the exact commands\n// setupSandboxGit runs in the container (minus the --system\n// safe.directory step, which needs root) against a local repository\n// served over HTTP with basic auth, and verifies that clone, push, and\n// pull all work with only the gitconfig credential — the \"git pull\n// must simply work\" guarantee.\nfunc TestSandboxGitCommandsRemoteOps(t *testing.T) {\n\tif _, err := exec.LookPath(\"git\"); err != nil {\n\t\tt.Skip(\"git not available\")\n\t}\n\n\tconst (\n\t\tusername = \"greg\"\n\t\ttoken = \"sekret\"\n\t)\n\n\tgit := func(dir string, args ...string) {\n\t\tcmd := exec.Command(args[0], args[1:]...)\n\t\tcmd.Dir = dir\n\n\t\tout, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tt.Fatalf(\"%v: %v: %s\", args, err, out)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// A bare \"remote\" repo with one commit on main, standing in for\n\t// Forgejo's git endpoint.\n\tremoteRoot := t.TempDir()\n\tbare := filepath.Join(remoteRoot, \"zoo.git\")\n\n\tgit(\"\", \"git\", \"init\", \"-q\", \"--bare\", bare)\n\n\tseed := t.TempDir()\n\tgit(\"\", \"git\", \"init\", \"-q\", \"-b\", \"main\", seed)\n\tgit(seed, \"git\", \"config\", \"user.name\", \"seed\")\n\tgit(seed, \"git\", \"config\", \"user.email\", \"seed@zoo.local\")\n\tif err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(seed, \"hello.txt\"), []byte(\"hello\\n\"), 0o644); err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatal(err)\n\t}\n\tgit(seed, \"git\", \"add\", \".\")\n\tgit(seed, \"git\", \"commit\", \"-q\", \"-m\", \"initial\")\n\tgit(seed, \"git\", \"push\", \"-q\", bare, \"main\")\n\n\t// Serve the bare repo over HTTP, demanding basic auth.\n\twantAuth := \"Basic \" + base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(username+\":\"+token))\n\n\tsrv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\tif r.Header.Get(\"Authorization\") != wantAuth {\n\t\t\tw.Header().Set(\"WWW-Authenticate\", `Basic realm=\"git\"`)\n\t\t\thttp.Error(w, \"Unauthorized\", http.StatusUnauthorized)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tservice := \"git-upload-pack\"\n\t\tif r.Method == http.MethodPost {\n\t\t\tservice = \"git-receive-pack\"\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tcmd := exec.Command(\"git\", \"http-backend\")\n\t\tcmd.Env = append(os.Environ(),\n\t\t\t\"REQUEST_METHOD=\"+r.Method,\n\t\t\t\"PATH_INFO=\"+r.URL.Path,\n\t\t\t\"GIT_PROJECT_ROOT=\"+remoteRoot,\n\t\t\t\"GIT_HTTP_EXPORT_ALL=1\",\n\t\t\t\"GIT_HTTP_SERVICE=\"+service,\n\t\t\t\"REMOTE_USER=\"+username,\n\t\t)\n\t\tcmd.Stdin = r.Body\n\n\t\tout, err := cmd.Output()\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\thttp.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\n\t\thdr, _, payload := bytes.Cut(out, []byte(\"\\r\\n\\r\\n\"))\n\t\tstatus := 200\n\n\t\tfor _, line := range strings.Split(string(hdr), \"\\r\\n\") {\n\t\t\tk, v, ok := strings.Cut(line, \": \")\n\t\t\tif !ok {\n\t\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tif strings.EqualFold(k, \"Status\") {\n\t\t\t\t_, _ = fmt.Sscanf(v, \"%d\", &status)\n\n\t\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tw.Header().Set(k, v)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tw.WriteHeader(status)\n\t\t_, _ = w.Write(payload)\n\t}))\n\tdefer srv.Close()\n\n\t// A temp HOME so the steps' `git config --global` writes there\n\t// instead of the test runner's real gitconfig.\n\thome := t.TempDir()\n\tprojectDir := t.TempDir()\n\n\tsh := func(dir, command string) string {\n\t\tcmd := exec.Command(\"sh\", \"-c\", command)\n\t\tcmd.Dir = dir\n\t\tcmd.Env = []string{\n\t\t\t\"HOME=\" + home,\n\t\t\t\"PATH=\" + os.Getenv(\"PATH\"),\n\t\t\t\"GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT=0\",\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tout, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tt.Fatalf(\"sh -c %q: %v: %s\", command, err, out)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\treturn string(out)\n\t}\n\n\tcloneURL := srv.URL + \"/zoo.git\"\n\n\tfor _, s := range sandboxGitCommands(projectDir, cloneURL, username, token, \"Greg Coolio\", \"greg@zoo.local\", \"main\", \"issue-38-greg\") {\n\t\tif s.label == \"configure git safe.directory\" {\n\t\t\tcontinue // --system scope needs root; orthogonal to auth\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tsh(\"\", s.cmd)\n\t}\n\n\t// The agent commits on its branch and pushes it.\n\tsh(projectDir, \"echo world >> hello.txt && git add . && git commit -q -m 'agent change' && git push -q origin issue-38-greg\")\n\n\t// A second sandbox (fresh clone, same credential) pushes to main.\n\tother := t.TempDir()\n\tsh(\"\", \"git clone -q \"+tools.ShellQuote(cloneURL)+\" \"+tools.ShellQuote(other))\n\tsh(other, \"echo more >> hello.txt && git add . && git commit -q -m 'other change' && git push -q origin main\")\n\n\t// And the pull that must simply work.\n\tout := sh(projectDir, \"git checkout -q main && git pull && cat hello.txt\")\n\tif !strings.Contains(out, \"more\") {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"git pull did not bring in the remote commit, output: %s\", out)\n\t}\n}\n", "path": "/project/internal/agentrun/sandbox_test.go"}
Result
OK
Thinking
I used `reflect.DeepEqual` but didn't import `reflect`. Let me add the import and run the tests.
Tool 🔧 edit_file {"find": "\t\"net/http\"\n\t\"net/http/httptest\"\n\t\"os\"\n\t\"os/exec\"\n\t\"path/filepath\"\n\t\"strings\"\n\t\"testing\"", "replace": "\t\"net/http\"\n\t\"net/http/httptest\"\n\t\"os\"\n\t\"os/exec\"\n\t\"path/filepath\"\n\t\"reflect\"\n\t\"strings\"\n\t\"testing\"", "path": "/project/internal/agentrun/sandbox_test.go"}
Arguments
{"find": "\t\"net/http\"\n\t\"net/http/httptest\"\n\t\"os\"\n\t\"os/exec\"\n\t\"path/filepath\"\n\t\"strings\"\n\t\"testing\"", "replace": "\t\"net/http\"\n\t\"net/http/httptest\"\n\t\"os\"\n\t\"os/exec\"\n\t\"path/filepath\"\n\t\"reflect\"\n\t\"strings\"\n\t\"testing\"", "path": "/project/internal/agentrun/sandbox_test.go"}
Result
1 occurrences replaced
Thinking
Wait, I need to re-check the ordering of the imports — `reflect` goes after `path/filepath` and before `strings`. In alphabetical order: bytes, encoding/base64, fmt, net/http, net/http/httptest, os, os/exec, path/filepath, reflect, strings, testing. Yep, that's what I did.
Alright, let's run the tests:
Tool 🔧 bash {"command": "cd /project && go build ./... && go vet ./... && go test ./internal/agentrun/ -run 'TestGitAuthBases|TestBasicAuthHeader|TestSandboxGitCommandsRemoteOps' -v 2>&1 | tail -20", "timeout": 120}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /project && go build ./... && go vet ./... && go test ./internal/agentrun/ -run 'TestGitAuthBases|TestBasicAuthHeader|TestSandboxGitCommandsRemoteOps' -v 2>&1 | tail -20", "timeout": 120}
Result
ERROR CALLING TOOL: command failed: command exited with status 1
Thinking
Let's check the actual error:
Tool 🔧 bash {"command": "cd /project && go test ./internal/agentrun/ -run 'TestSandboxGitCommandsRemoteOps' -v 2>&1 | head -40", "timeout": 120}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /project && go test ./internal/agentrun/ -run 'TestSandboxGitCommandsRemoteOps' -v 2>&1 | head -40", "timeout": 120}
Result
# github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/agentrun [github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/agentrun.test] internal/agentrun/sandbox_test.go:143:18: cannot use payload (variable of type bool) as []byte value in argument to w.Write FAIL github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/agentrun [build failed] FAIL
Thinking
`bytes.Cut` returns (before, after []byte, found bool) — I wrote `hdr, _, payload := bytes.Cut(...)`, so `payload` is a bool. Fix: `hdr, payload, _ := bytes.Cut(out, []byte("\r\n\r\n"))`.
Tool 🔧 edit_file {"find": "\t\thdr, _, payload := bytes.Cut(out, []byte(\"\\r\\n\\r\\n\"))", "replace": "\t\thdr, payload, _ := bytes.Cut(out, []byte(\"\\r\\n\\r\\n\"))", "path": "/project/internal/agentrun/sandbox_test.go"}
Arguments
{"find": "\t\thdr, _, payload := bytes.Cut(out, []byte(\"\\r\\n\\r\\n\"))", "replace": "\t\thdr, payload, _ := bytes.Cut(out, []byte(\"\\r\\n\\r\\n\"))", "path": "/project/internal/agentrun/sandbox_test.go"}
Result
1 occurrences replaced
Thinking
Wait, `bytes.Cut` returns `(before, after []byte, found bool)`. So `hdr, payload, _` — hdr is before (the header), payload is after (the body). This is correct. Let me try running it again.
Tool 🔧 bash {"command": "cd /project && go build ./... && go vet ./... && go test ./internal/agentrun/ -run 'TestGitAuthBases|TestBasicAuthHeader|TestSandboxGitCommandsRemoteOps' -v 2>&1 | tail -20", "timeout": 120}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /project && go build ./... && go vet ./... && go test ./internal/agentrun/ -run 'TestGitAuthBases|TestBasicAuthHeader|TestSandboxGitCommandsRemoteOps' -v 2>&1 | tail -20", "timeout": 120}
Result
=== RUN TestGitAuthBases
--- PASS: TestGitAuthBases (0.00s)
=== RUN TestBasicAuthHeader
--- PASS: TestBasicAuthHeader (0.00s)
=== RUN TestSandboxGitCommandsRemoteOps
sandbox_test.go:163: sh -c "git checkout -b 'issue-38-greg'": exit status 128: fatal: a branch named 'issue-38-greg' already exists
--- FAIL: TestSandboxGitCommandsRemoteOps (0.07s)
FAIL
FAIL github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/agentrun 0.070s
FAIL
Thinking
Interesting: "a branch named 'issue-38-greg' already exists". Why?
The clone step: `git clone --branch 'main' --single-branch <url> <projectDir>`. With `--single-branch`, only main is fetched... but wait — the remote already has the `issue-38-greg` branch! Because... hmm, why would the remote have issue-38-greg?
Ah, I see. The test is reusing the same bare repo... no, `t.TempDir()` is fresh for each test run. Hmm.
Wait — actually, the problem is: `git clone --single-branch --branch main` — after the clone, HEAD is main. Then `git checkout -b issue-38-greg` — "already exists"?? That means the remote had an issue-38-greg branch, and the clone created a local tracking branch for it... but with --single-branch, only main should be fetched.
Hold on. Could it be that... a previous test run left state behind? No, it's a fresh TempDir.
Hmm, wait — actually, let me think about `git clone --single-branch --branch main`. The clone fetches only main. Local branches: main. So `git checkout -b issue-38-greg` should work...
Unless the remote bare repo has issue-38-greg, and the clone's default refspec... no, --single-branch restricts to main.
Wait, wait. Let me re-read: "fatal: a branch named 'issue-38-greg' already exists". Hmm, could it be that the test ran twice in the same process? No, that's not it.
Oh, wait. I got it! `git clone ... <projectDir>` — projectDir is `t.TempDir()`, and... no, that's not it.
Hmm, let me think about `git init -q -b main seed` and `git push -q bare main`. The bare repo has refs/heads/main. Then the clone...
Actually — hold on. Could the problem be: the httptest server is serving `remoteRoot` as GIT_PROJECT_ROOT, and the PATH_INFO is `/zoo.git/info/refs`. That's fine.
Let me debug: run the steps manually and see what happens. Actually — hmm, "a branch named 'issue-38-greg' already exists" — maybe the clone is creating it because the remote has it. How could the remote have it? `git push -q bare main` — only main.
Could it be... the earlier failed test run (the one with the bytes.Cut bug) — no, that one failed at build time.
Hmm, wait — actually, let me look at the test sequence again:
1. `git init -q --bare bare` — fresh.
2. Seed: init -b main, commit, `git push -q bare main` — bare has main.
3. Server starts.
4. Steps: safe.directory (skipped), user.name, user.email, credential×2, clone, checkout -b.
The clone: `git clone --branch 'main' --single-branch 'http://127.0.0.1:PORT/zoo.git' '<projectDir>'`.
Hmm, wait — could it be that the clone is failing and leaving something behind? No, the error is at the checkout step, and the clone step succeeded (sh would have t.Fatal'd if it failed).
Let me actually debug this in the container. I'll reproduce it manually.
Actually — oh. I think I've got it! `git clone --single-branch` — when you clone with --single-branch, git creates the local branch for the cloned branch. But there's a subtle point: `git clone` also sets up remote-tracking refs for the fetched branches. `git checkout -b issue-38-greg` creates a new local branch... "already exists" means a local branch named issue-38-greg exists after the clone.
How? If the remote had refs/heads/issue-38-greg and the clone's refspec fetched it... with --single-branch, the refspec is `+refs/heads/main:refs/remotes/origin/main`. Only main.
Unless the remote had issue-38-greg and git clone created a local branch for it... no, clone only creates a local branch for the checked-out branch (main).
Hmm, wait, could it be that the bare repo actually has issue-38-greg from a previous test run? t.TempDir is unique per run. But — the bare repo is at `filepath.Join(remoteRoot, "zoo.git")`, and remoteRoot = t.TempDir() — unique.
Let me debug directly.
Odd — the branch shouldn't exist. Let me debug manually:
Tool 🔧 bash {"command": "cd /tmp && rm -rf dbg && mkdir -p dbg/root dbg/seed dbg/proj && cd dbg\ngit init -q --bare root/zoo.git\ngit init -q -b main seed\ncd seed && git config user.name seed && git config user.email s@x\necho hello > hello.txt && git add . && git commit -q -m initial && git push -q ../root/zoo.git main\ncd ..\ngit -C root/zoo.git branch -a\necho \"=== clone ===\"\ngit clone -q --branch main --single-branch root/zoo.git proj 2>&1\ngit -C proj branch -a\necho \"=== checkout -b ===\"\ngit -C proj checkout -b issue-38-greg 2>&1", "timeout": 60}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /tmp && rm -rf dbg && mkdir -p dbg/root dbg/seed dbg/proj && cd dbg\ngit init -q --bare root/zoo.git\ngit init -q -b main seed\ncd seed && git config user.name seed && git config user.email s@x\necho hello > hello.txt && git add . && git commit -q -m initial && git push -q ../root/zoo.git main\ncd ..\ngit -C root/zoo.git branch -a\necho \"=== clone ===\"\ngit clone -q --branch main --single-branch root/zoo.git proj 2>&1\ngit -C proj branch -a\necho \"=== checkout -b ===\"\ngit -C proj checkout -b issue-38-greg 2>&1", "timeout": 60}
Result
main === clone === * main remotes/origin/main === checkout -b === Switched to a new branch 'issue-38-greg'
Thinking
The local path version works without issues. So the problem must be in the HTTP version. The difference is: over HTTP, `git clone` first fetches `info/refs` — and my server serves the bare repo at `remoteRoot` with `PATH_INFO=/zoo.git/...`.
Wait a sec... could it be that the HTTP clone is fetching more refs? No...
Hmm, hold on. Let me think about `git clone --single-branch` over HTTP. The smart HTTP protocol: the client requests `/zoo.git/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack`, and the server advertises all refs (main + whatever else exists). With --single-branch, the client only requests main.
But wait — does the bare repo have other refs? `git init --bare` creates HEAD → refs/heads/main (in newer git, the default branch name is... git 2.47's default is still "master" unless init.defaultBranch is set! Hmm, `git init --bare` creates a HEAD pointing to refs/heads/master (or main if init.defaultBranch=main is set). No refs exist yet.
After `git push -q root/zoo.git main` — refs/heads/main exists. HEAD still points to master (nonexistent).
So the remote only has main. The clone should only see main.
Hmm, so why "branch already exists"?? Let me run the exact same test scenario over HTTP... no, wait. Let me re-read the test failure:
```
sandbox_test.go:163: sh -c "git checkout -b 'issue-38-greg'": exit status 128: fatal: a branch named 'issue-38-greg' already exists
```
Line 163 is the step execution loop. So the clone succeeded, and then checkout -b failed with "already exists".
Oh, wait. I think I get it now!! `sh` is running with `cmd.Dir = dir`, and dir is "" — meaning the test process's current directory. The clone step: `git clone --branch 'main' --single-branch 'http://...' '/tmp/TestXxx/proj'`. No problem.
Hmm, but wait — what about the `git checkout -b 'issue-38-greg'` step — this runs with `cmd.Dir = ""` (the package directory /project/internal/agentrun!), not projectDir!!
Looking at my loop: `sh("", s.cmd)` — every step runs with dir="" (the test's cwd = /project/internal/agentrun). The checkout step `git checkout -b 'issue-38-greg'` runs in the test's current directory — which is the zoo repo's working tree (/project/internal/agentrun, part of the /project checkout)!
And the /project checkout is... on branch issue-38-greg!!! That's my working branch! So `git checkout -b issue-38-greg` in /project/internal/agentrun says "a branch named 'issue-38-greg' already exists" — because I'm literally on that branch right now!
In the actual container, the WorkingDir is /project, so the checkout step runs in the cloned repo. In my test, the step's cwd has to be projectDir for the checkout step (and the clone step can run from anywhere).
Fix: run each step with dir=projectDir? The clone step with cwd=projectDir: `git clone ... <projectDir>` — cloning into the current directory... `git clone url /path` with cwd=/path — does git complain? "fatal: destination path '/path' already exists and is not an empty directory"? No — it's empty, so it's fine. Actually, when cwd == target and the target is empty, `git clone url .` works.
Simplest approach: run all steps with dir=projectDir. The git config steps don't care about cwd. The clone step: `git clone --branch main --single-branch URL <projectDir>` with cwd=projectDir (empty) — works (equivalent to cloning into ".").
Let me verify: `cd emptydir && git clone url /abs/path/to/emptydir` — git clones into the absolute path, which is the current directory. This works (it's the same as `git clone url .`).
Let me fix the test: `sh(projectDir, s.cmd)`.
Phew — good thing I tested this. In the actual deployment, the container's WorkingDir is /project, so the checkout runs in the right place.
Found it — in the test, all steps run with `dir=""` (the test's cwd, which is *this repo's* working tree — and I'm literally on branch `issue-38-greg` here). In the real container, WorkingDir is `/project`. Fix: run the steps from `projectDir`:
Tool 🔧 edit_file {"find": "\tfor _, s := range sandboxGitCommands(projectDir, cloneURL, username, token, \"Greg Coolio\", \"greg@zoo.local\", \"main\", \"issue-38-greg\") {\n\t\tif s.label == \"configure git safe.directory\" {\n\t\t\tcontinue // --system scope needs root; orthogonal to auth\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tsh(\"\", s.cmd)\n\t}", "replace": "\t// The container's WorkingDir is /project, so the steps (notably the\n\t// branch checkout) run from the working tree.\n\tfor _, s := range sandboxGitCommands(projectDir, cloneURL, username, token, \"Greg Coolio\", \"greg@zoo.local\", \"main\", \"issue-38-greg\") {\n\t\tif s.label == \"configure git safe.directory\" {\n\t\t\tcontinue // --system scope needs root; orthogonal to auth\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tsh(projectDir, s.cmd)\n\t}", "path": "/project/internal/agentrun/sandbox_test.go"}
Arguments
{"find": "\tfor _, s := range sandboxGitCommands(projectDir, cloneURL, username, token, \"Greg Coolio\", \"greg@zoo.local\", \"main\", \"issue-38-greg\") {\n\t\tif s.label == \"configure git safe.directory\" {\n\t\t\tcontinue // --system scope needs root; orthogonal to auth\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tsh(\"\", s.cmd)\n\t}", "replace": "\t// The container's WorkingDir is /project, so the steps (notably the\n\t// branch checkout) run from the working tree.\n\tfor _, s := range sandboxGitCommands(projectDir, cloneURL, username, token, \"Greg Coolio\", \"greg@zoo.local\", \"main\", \"issue-38-greg\") {\n\t\tif s.label == \"configure git safe.directory\" {\n\t\t\tcontinue // --system scope needs root; orthogonal to auth\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tsh(projectDir, s.cmd)\n\t}", "path": "/project/internal/agentrun/sandbox_test.go"}
Result
1 occurrences replaced
Thinking
Wait, but the clone step: `git clone --branch 'main' --single-branch 'URL' '<projectDir>'` with cwd = projectDir (empty). Let me check whether this works — clone into the current directory via an absolute path.
Tool 🔧 bash {"command": "cd /project && go test ./internal/agentrun/ -run 'TestSandboxGitCommandsRemoteOps' -v 2>&1 | tail -10", "timeout": 120}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /project && go test ./internal/agentrun/ -run 'TestSandboxGitCommandsRemoteOps' -v 2>&1 | tail -10", "timeout": 120}
Result
=== RUN TestSandboxGitCommandsRemoteOps
sandbox_test.go:163: sh -c "echo world >> hello.txt && git add . && git commit -q -m 'agent change' && git push -q origin issue-38-greg": exit status 1: error: Cannot access URL http://127.0.0.1:33069/zoo.git/, return code 22
fatal: git-http-push failed
error: failed to push some refs to 'http://127.0.0.1:33069/zoo.git'
--- FAIL: TestSandboxGitCommandsRemoteOps (0.09s)
FAIL
FAIL github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/agentrun 0.094s
FAIL
Thinking
Progress — clone + checkout + commit are now working. The PUSH is failing: "Cannot access URL http://127.0.0.1:33069/zoo.git/, return code 22" — HTTP 404 (return code 22 = CURLE_HTTP_RETURNED_ERROR).
The push goes to `/zoo.git/git-receive-pack` (POST). My server: PATH_INFO = r.URL.Path = `/zoo.git/git-receive-pack`. GIT_PROJECT_ROOT=remoteRoot. So http-backend looks for `remoteRoot/zoo.git` — that exists (the bare repo).
Hmm, return code 22 means the server returned 4xx/5xx. Which status? Let me debug: the http-backend for receive-pack needs to write to the repo — the bare repo is in t.TempDir() and is owned by the test user, so it should be writable.
Wait — actually, the problem might be this: my server's handler is calling `http.Error` on authentication failure — but the push is sending the auth header (extraHeader). Hmm, is that really the case? The push URL is `http://127.0.0.1:33069/zoo.git` — the base `http://127.0.0.1:33069` matches. The header should be sent.
Let me add debugging: have the server log the request and the http-backend output. Let me try to reproduce it manually.
Push fails with HTTP 4xx. Let me debug the http-backend interaction manually:
Tool 🔧 bash {"command": "cd /tmp/dbg && cat > srv.py <<'EOF'\nimport http.server, subprocess, os, base64, sys\n\nclass H(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):\n def log_message(self, *a): pass\n def _run(self):\n auth = self.headers.get(\"Authorization\", \"\")\n expected = \"Basic \" + base64.b64encode(b\"greg:sekret\").decode()\n if auth != expected:\n self.send_response(401)\n self.send_header(\"WWW-Authenticate\", 'Basic realm=\"git\"')\n self.end_headers()\n print(\"AUTH FAIL\", self.path, repr(auth), file=sys.stderr, flush=True)\n return\n length = int(self.headers.get(\"Content-Length\", 0))\n body = self.rfile.read(length) if length else b\"\"\n service = \"git-receive-pack\" if self.command == \"POST\" else \"git-upload-pack\"\n env = dict(os.environ,\n REQUEST_METHOD=self.command,\n PATH_INFO=self.path,\n GIT_PROJECT_ROOT=\"/tmp/dbg/root\",\n GIT_HTTP_EXPORT_ALL=\"1\",\n GIT_HTTP_SERVICE=service,\n REMOTE_USER=\"greg\")\n p = subprocess.run([\"git\", \"http-backend\"], input=body, env=env, capture_output=True)\n out = p.stdout\n hdr, _, payload = out.partition(b\"\\r\\n\\r\\n\")\n print(\"REQ\", self.command, self.path, \"->\", p.returncode, file=sys.stderr, flush=True)\n if p.stderr:\n print(\"STDERR:\", p.stderr.decode()[:500], file=sys.stderr, flush=True)\n status = 200\n for line in hdr.decode().splitlines():\n k, _, v = line.partition(\":\")\n if k.strip().lower() == \"status\":\n status = int(v.strip().split()[0])\n elif k.strip():\n self.send_header(k.strip(), v.strip())\n self.send_response(status)\n self.end_headers()\n self.wfile.write(payload)\n do_GET = _run\n do_POST = _run\n\nhttp.server.HTTPServer((\"127.0.0.1\", 8799), H).serve_forever()\nEOF\n(python3 srv.py > srv.log 2>&1 & echo $! > srv.pid)\nsleep 1\nexport HOME=/tmp/dbg/fakehome && mkdir -p $HOME\ngit config --global http.http://127.0.0.1:8799.extraHeader 'Authorization: Basic '$(echo -n greg:sekret | base64)\ngit config --global user.name t && git config --global user.email t@x\ncd /tmp/dbg/proj && git push http://127.0.0.1:8799/zoo.git issue-38-greg 2>&1 | head -5\necho \"=== server log ===\"\ncat srv.log\nkill $(cat srv.pid) 2>/dev/null", "timeout": 60}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /tmp/dbg && cat > srv.py <<'EOF'\nimport http.server, subprocess, os, base64, sys\n\nclass H(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):\n def log_message(self, *a): pass\n def _run(self):\n auth = self.headers.get(\"Authorization\", \"\")\n expected = \"Basic \" + base64.b64encode(b\"greg:sekret\").decode()\n if auth != expected:\n self.send_response(401)\n self.send_header(\"WWW-Authenticate\", 'Basic realm=\"git\"')\n self.end_headers()\n print(\"AUTH FAIL\", self.path, repr(auth), file=sys.stderr, flush=True)\n return\n length = int(self.headers.get(\"Content-Length\", 0))\n body = self.rfile.read(length) if length else b\"\"\n service = \"git-receive-pack\" if self.command == \"POST\" else \"git-upload-pack\"\n env = dict(os.environ,\n REQUEST_METHOD=self.command,\n PATH_INFO=self.path,\n GIT_PROJECT_ROOT=\"/tmp/dbg/root\",\n GIT_HTTP_EXPORT_ALL=\"1\",\n GIT_HTTP_SERVICE=service,\n REMOTE_USER=\"greg\")\n p = subprocess.run([\"git\", \"http-backend\"], input=body, env=env, capture_output=True)\n out = p.stdout\n hdr, _, payload = out.partition(b\"\\r\\n\\r\\n\")\n print(\"REQ\", self.command, self.path, \"->\", p.returncode, file=sys.stderr, flush=True)\n if p.stderr:\n print(\"STDERR:\", p.stderr.decode()[:500], file=sys.stderr, flush=True)\n status = 200\n for line in hdr.decode().splitlines():\n k, _, v = line.partition(\":\")\n if k.strip().lower() == \"status\":\n status = int(v.strip().split()[0])\n elif k.strip():\n self.send_header(k.strip(), v.strip())\n self.send_response(status)\n self.end_headers()\n self.wfile.write(payload)\n do_GET = _run\n do_POST = _run\n\nhttp.server.HTTPServer((\"127.0.0.1\", 8799), H).serve_forever()\nEOF\n(python3 srv.py > srv.log 2>&1 & echo $! > srv.pid)\nsleep 1\nexport HOME=/tmp/dbg/fakehome && mkdir -p $HOME\ngit config --global http.http://127.0.0.1:8799.extraHeader 'Authorization: Basic '$(echo -n greg:sekret | base64)\ngit config --global user.name t && git config --global user.email t@x\ncd /tmp/dbg/proj && git push http://127.0.0.1:8799/zoo.git issue-38-greg 2>&1 | head -5\necho \"=== server log ===\"\ncat srv.log\nkill $(cat srv.pid) 2>/dev/null", "timeout": 60}
Result
ERROR CALLING TOOL: command failed: command exited with status 2
Thinking
Something failed. Let's run it step by step to see what happened.
Tool 🔧 bash {"command": "cd /tmp/dbg && (python3 srv.py > srv.log 2>&1 & echo $! > srv.pid); sleep 1; ls /tmp/dbg; cat srv.log 2>/dev/null | head", "timeout": 30}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /tmp/dbg && (python3 srv.py > srv.log 2>&1 & echo $! > srv.pid); sleep 1; ls /tmp/dbg; cat srv.log 2>/dev/null | head", "timeout": 30}
Result
fakehome proj root seed srv.log srv.pid srv.py
Thinking
The server log is empty, and the previous command exited with exit code 2 — probably `git config --global ...` failed. Because... hmm, exit code 2. Let me check: `export HOME=/tmp/dbg/fakehome` — this was created by the failed command (fakehome exists). `git config --global http.http://127.0.0.1:8799.extraHeader 'Authorization: Basic ...'` — hmm, this should work.
Wait, the error output was swallowed. Let me re-run the push part with explicit error display.
Tool 🔧 bash {"command": "cd /tmp/dbg && export HOME=/tmp/dbg/fakehome\ngit config --global http.http://127.0.0.1:8799.extraHeader \"Authorization: Basic $(echo -n greg:sekret | base64)\" ; echo \"cfg1: $?\"\ngit config --global user.name t ; echo \"cfg2: $?\"\ngit config --global user.email t@x ; echo \"cfg3: $?\"\ngit -C proj push http://127.0.0.1:8799/zoo.git issue-38-greg 2>&1 | head -8; echo \"push: $?\"\necho \"=== server log ===\"; cat srv.log", "timeout": 60}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /tmp/dbg && export HOME=/tmp/dbg/fakehome\ngit config --global http.http://127.0.0.1:8799.extraHeader \"Authorization: Basic $(echo -n greg:sekret | base64)\" ; echo \"cfg1: $?\"\ngit config --global user.name t ; echo \"cfg2: $?\"\ngit config --global user.email t@x ; echo \"cfg3: $?\"\ngit -C proj push http://127.0.0.1:8799/zoo.git issue-38-greg 2>&1 | head -8; echo \"push: $?\"\necho \"=== server log ===\"; cat srv.log", "timeout": 60}
Result
cfg1: 0 cfg2: 0 cfg3: 0 fatal: unable to access 'http://127.0.0.1:8799/zoo.git/': Failed to connect to 127.0.0.1 port 8799 after 0 ms: Could not connect to server push: 0 === server log ===
Thinking
The server isn't running ("Could not connect"). The background launch using `(... &)` within the same command may have been killed when the command finished (the shell's process group gets killed). The earlier `hdrsrv` test worked with the same pattern, but... that's because the server was launched and used within the same command. Here, the server was launched in a previous command, and by the time this command ran, it was already dead.
Let's do everything in a single command.
The server died between commands. Let me do it all in one shot:
Tool 🔧 bash {"command": "cd /tmp/dbg && rm -f srv.log && (python3 srv.py > srv.log 2>&1 & echo $! > srv.pid) && sleep 1\nexport HOME=/tmp/dbg/fakehome\ngit -C proj push http://127.0.0.1:8799/zoo.git issue-38-greg 2>&1 | head -8\necho \"=== server log ===\"; cat srv.log\nkill $(cat srv.pid) 2>/dev/null; true", "timeout": 60}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /tmp/dbg && rm -f srv.log && (python3 srv.py > srv.log 2>&1 & echo $! > srv.pid) && sleep 1\nexport HOME=/tmp/dbg/fakehome\ngit -C proj push http://127.0.0.1:8799/zoo.git issue-38-greg 2>&1 | head -8\necho \"=== server log ===\"; cat srv.log\nkill $(cat srv.pid) 2>/dev/null; true", "timeout": 60}
Result
fatal: unable to access 'http://127.0.0.1:8799/zoo.git/': Received HTTP/0.9 when not allowed === server log === REQ GET /zoo.git/info/refs?service=git-receive-pack -> 0 STDERR: Request not supported: '/tmp/dbg/root/zoo.git/info/refs?service=git-receive-pack'
Thinking
Found it! Two bugs in my Python debug server:
1. `PATH_INFO=self.path` — `self.path` includes the query string (`/zoo.git/info/refs?service=git-receive-pack`). http-backend doesn't want the query in PATH_INFO. In the Go test I'm using `r.URL.Path` (no query) — that part is correct.
2. "Request not supported" — hmm, this is because PATH_INFO contained the query string, so http-backend couldn't recognize it as a git service path.
So the Python server has a bug, but the Go test uses `r.URL.Path` (correct). However, the Go test also failed with return code 22 (404). Let me think about what else is different in the Go test.
In the Go test:
- `PATH_INFO=r.URL.Path` → `/zoo.git/git-receive-pack` ✓
- `GIT_PROJECT_ROOT=remoteRoot` ✓
- `GIT_HTTP_SERVICE=git-receive-pack` ✓
- `REMOTE_USER=greg` ✓
- `REQUEST_METHOD=POST` ✓
- body → stdin ✓
Hmm, wait — for a push, git first does a GET on `info/refs?service=git-receive-pack` (to check reachability), and then does a POST. The GET should work.
"return code 22" = HTTP error. Which status? Let me add logging to the Go test… no, first let me fix the Python server (urllib.parse.unquote(self.path.split('?')[0])) and check whether push works at all in this setup. If it does, then I'll dig into the Go test.
The Python server had a bug (query string in PATH_INFO). Let me fix it and verify push works over this setup at all:
Tool 🔧 bash {"command": "cd /tmp/dbg && sed -i 's|PATH_INFO=self.path,|PATH_INFO=self.path.split(\"?\")[0],|' srv.py && rm -f srv.log\n(python3 srv.py > srv.log 2>&1 & echo $! > srv.pid) && sleep 1\nexport HOME=/tmp/dbg/fakehome\ngit -C proj push http://127.0.0.1:8799/zoo.git issue-38-greg 2>&1 | head -8\necho \"=== server log ===\"; cat srv.log\nkill $(cat srv.pid) 2>/dev/null; true", "timeout": 60}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /tmp/dbg && sed -i 's|PATH_INFO=self.path,|PATH_INFO=self.path.split(\"?\")[0],|' srv.py && rm -f srv.log\n(python3 srv.py > srv.log 2>&1 & echo $! > srv.pid) && sleep 1\nexport HOME=/tmp/dbg/fakehome\ngit -C proj push http://127.0.0.1:8799/zoo.git issue-38-greg 2>&1 | head -8\necho \"=== server log ===\"; cat srv.log\nkill $(cat srv.pid) 2>/dev/null; true", "timeout": 60}
Result
fatal: unable to access 'http://127.0.0.1:8799/zoo.git/': Received HTTP/0.9 when not allowed === server log === REQ GET /zoo.git/info/refs?service=git-receive-pack -> 0
Thinking
"Received HTTP/0.9 when not allowed" — this means the response didn't have a valid HTTP status line. In my Python server, after `self.send_response(status)` I call `self.end_headers()` and then write the payload. But looking at the flow: for the GET info/refs request, http-backend returned 0, and the response was… "HTTP/0.9" means curl couldn't find the "HTTP/1.x 200" line.
Wait — in `_run`, for the GET case: `length = int(self.headers.get("Content-Length", 0))` → 0, body=b"". http-backend runs and returns 0. Then it parses the headers, send_response(status), end_headers, wfile.write(payload). That should produce a valid HTTP response, but…
Oh, wait. I got it — `self.send_response(status)` writes "HTTP/1.0 200 OK" (the default protocol_version is HTTP/1.0). That should be fine, but…
Hmm, "Received HTTP/0.9 when not allowed" — curl says this when the response doesn't start with "HTTP/". Could it be… the response started with something else? Let me check: http-backend's output for info/refs is:
```
Status: 200 OK
Expires: ...
Pragma: ...
Cache-Control: ...
Content-Type: application/x-git-upload-pack-advertisement
Content-Length: ...
<payload>
```
My parsing: `hdr, _, payload = out.partition(b"\r\n\r\n")` — no problem. Then for each line: k, _, v = line.partition(":"). For "Status: 200 OK" → k="Status", v=" 200 OK" → status=200. For other headers → send_header.
Then `self.send_response(status)` → writes "HTTP/1.0 200 OK\r\nServer: ...\r\nDate: ...\r\n". Then end_headers, then the payload.
Hmm, that looks correct… unless an exception occurred inside the handler after the connection was established. For example, `int(v.strip().split()[0])` — v.strip() = "200 OK" → "200" → no problem.
Wait, let me look at the log again: "REQ GET /zoo.git/info/refs?service=git-receive-pack -> 0" — the request was processed, http-backend's rc=0, and no STDERR line. So the handler should have continued… but curl received an HTTP/0.9 response.
Oh, wait. I got it! `self.send_response(status)` — but before that, in the AUTH FAIL branch… no, auth passed (there's no "AUTH FAIL" line in the log).
Hmm, let me look at the handler flow once more:
```python
def _run(self):
auth = self.headers.get("Authorization", "")
expected = ...
if auth != expected:
...401...
return
length = int(self.headers.get("Content-Length", 0))
body = self.rfile.read(length) if length else b""
...
p = subprocess.run(["git", "http-backend"], input=body, env=env, capture_output=True)
out = p.stdout
hdr, _, payload = out.partition(b"\r\n\r\n")
...
self.send_response(status)
self.end_headers()
self.wfile.write(payload)
```
Hmm, wait — for a GET request, does git send a Content-Length? No, a GET has no body. length=0, body=b"". No problem.
Hmm, "HTTP/0.9 when not allowed"… let me test the server directly with curl and see the raw response.
Tool 🔧 bash {"command": "cd /tmp/dbg && (python3 srv.py > srv.log 2>&1 & echo $! > srv.pid) && sleep 1\ncurl -s -i -H \"Authorization: Basic $(echo -n greg:sekret | base64)\" \"http://127.0.0.1:8799/zoo.git/info/refs?service=git-receive-pack\" | head -15\necho \"=== server log ===\"; cat srv.log\nkill $(cat srv.pid) 2>/dev/null; true", "timeout": 60}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /tmp/dbg && (python3 srv.py > srv.log 2>&1 & echo $! > srv.pid) && sleep 1\ncurl -s -i -H \"Authorization: Basic $(echo -n greg:sekret | base64)\" \"http://127.0.0.1:8799/zoo.git/info/refs?service=git-receive-pack\" | head -15\necho \"=== server log ===\"; cat srv.log\nkill $(cat srv.pid) 2>/dev/null; true", "timeout": 60}
Result
=== server log === REQ GET /zoo.git/info/refs?service=git-receive-pack -> 0
Thinking
curl received nothing (empty output) — the server processed the request (log line exists, rc=0) but didn't send a response. So an exception must be occurring inside the handler after the log output... but in that case, the exception should be printed to stderr by http.server (handle_error) → it should show up in srv.log. But there's nothing there.
Wait a sec... `print("REQ", ..., file=sys.stderr, flush=True)` is before the response. After that: parsing the header... `self.send_header(k.strip(), v.strip())`...
Oh, wait. I got it!!! `self.send_response(status)` — but in the 401 branch, `self.send_response(401)` was already being called... no, that's not it.
Hmm, let me look at the partition again: `out.partition(b"\r\n\r\n")`. What if http-backend's headers end with `\n` (LF) instead of `\r\n` (CRLF)?? In the earlier manual test, the output showed `Status: 500 Internal Server Error` followed by `Expires: Fri, 01 Jan 1980...` — I couldn't confirm the line endings. If http-backend uses LF line endings, partition(b"\r\n\r\n") finds nothing → hdr = the entire out, payload = b""... then `for line in hdr.decode().splitlines()` — all lines get treated as headers, including the payload lines! And `self.send_header(k, v)` with a garbage value... and then send_response... hmm, but even so, a response should still be sent.
Wait, if partition fails: hdr = the entire output (headers + payload), payload = b"". The loop `for line in hdr.decode().splitlines()`: the first line "Status: 200 OK" → status=200. Other header lines → send_header. Then the payload lines (the ref advertisement, e.g. "001e# service=git-receive-pack\n0000...") → partition(":") — a line like "001e# service=git-receive-pack" has no colon → `k, _, v = line.partition(":")` → k=the entire line, v="" → `if k.strip(): self.send_header(k.strip(), v.strip())` → send_header with a value containing spaces or invalid characters → **ValueError: Invalid header value** → exception → no response!
That's it. http-backend's output line endings: CGI spec says CRLF, but git http-backend... let me check: the earlier manual test output:
```
Status: 500 Internal Server Error
Expires: Fri, 01 Jan 1980 00:00:00 GMT
...
```
Let me check the actual bytes.
The server sends nothing after processing — likely a header-parsing crash. Let me check http-backend's actual line endings:
Tool 🔧 bash {"command": "cd /tmp/dbg && GIT_PROJECT_ROOT=/tmp/dbg/root GIT_HTTP_EXPORT_ALL=1 PATH_INFO=/zoo.git/info/refs GIT_HTTP_SERVICE=git-upload-pack REMOTE_USER=greg REQUEST_METHOD=GET git http-backend </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -c 400 | od -c | head -20"}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /tmp/dbg && GIT_PROJECT_ROOT=/tmp/dbg/root GIT_HTTP_EXPORT_ALL=1 PATH_INFO=/zoo.git/info/refs GIT_HTTP_SERVICE=git-upload-pack REMOTE_USER=greg REQUEST_METHOD=GET git http-backend </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -c 400 | od -c | head -20"}
Result
0000000 E x p i r e s : F r i , 0 1 0000020 J a n 1 9 8 0 0 0 : 0 0 : 0000040 0 0 G M T \r \n P r a g m a : 0000060 n o - c a c h e \r \n C a c h e - 0000100 C o n t r o l : n o - c a c h 0000120 e , m a x - a g e = 0 , m u 0000140 s t - r e v a l i d a t e \r \n C 0000160 o n t e n t - L e n g t h : 5 0000200 7 \r \n C o n t e n t - T y p e : 0000220 t e x t / p l a i n \r \n \r \n 5 0000240 6 8 d c b 0 6 1 1 d b 9 3 4 4 b 0000260 8 a f a e d 9 e 2 0 5 5 5 1 7 f 0000300 4 5 f 2 2 c 2 \t r e f s / h e a 0000320 d s / m a i n \n 0000330
Thinking
Interesting! The output starts with `Expires: ...` — there's no `Status:` line at the top! And the line endings are CRLF, with `\r\n\r\n` before the payload. So my partition is working, but the first line is `Expires:`, not `Status:`.
Wait, where did the Status line go? In the earlier 500 test, `Status: 500 Internal Server Error` was displayed first. In the success case, apparently git http-backend omits the Status line when it's 200? Let me check: in git's http-backend.c:
```c
static void send_header(const char *fmt, ...)
...
if (!status_sent) {
...
}
```
Hmm, actually I recall it like this: http-backend only outputs "Status: ..." when the status is not 200? Let me verify: in http-backend.c:
```c
static void http_status(int code, const char *msg)
{
...
}
```
Hmm. Actually, from the od output: the headers are Expires, Pragma, Cache-Control, Content-Length, Content-Type — no Status line. So in the 200 case, git http-backend doesn't output a Status line (per the CGI spec, status defaults to 200 OK).
So in my Go test: `status := 200` default, no Status line → status stays 200. ✓ That part is fine.
So then, why did the Go test get a 404 (return code 22)?? And why did my Python server send nothing?
About the Python server: the header lines are parsed without issue (Expires, Pragma, Cache-Control, Content-Length, Content-Type — all valid headers, no colons in the values… wait, `Content-Length: 57` is fine). Then send_response(200), end_headers, write the payload. This should work!
Could it be… an exception in `self.send_header("Content-Length", "57")`? No, that's valid.
Hmm wait, actually — let me look at the Python log again: "REQ GET /zoo.git/info/refs?service=git-receive-pack -> 0" — and curl received nothing. If an exception occurred, http.server's handle_error should print a traceback to stderr → srv.log. But there's nothing there.
Oh, wait. I got it!!! In the Python server, `do_GET = _run` and `do_POST = _run` are assigned at the class level after the definition of `_run` — that's fine. But `self.command` — BaseHTTPRequestHandler sets self.command in parse_request. That's fine.
Hmm, let me look at the auth check again: `auth = self.headers.get("Authorization", "")` — in the curl test I passed the header. The log shows "REQ GET ... -> 0", which is after the auth check (the print is after the subprocess). So auth passed.
Then: `length = int(self.headers.get("Content-Length", 0))` — for a GET with no Content-Length → `int(0)`… `self.headers.get("Content-Length", 0)` returns 0 (int) → `int(0)` = 0 → body = b"". OK.
`subprocess.run(["git", "http-backend"], input=body, env=env, capture_output=True)` — env contains os.environ + overrides. Wait — os.environ of the Python process… does it contain PATH? Yes.
`out = p.stdout` — the header+payload shown above. `hdr, _, payload = out.partition(b"\r\n\r\n")` — found. Loop over the lines:
- "Expires: Fri, 01 Jan 1980 00:00:00 GMT" → k="Expires", v="Fri, 01 Jan 1980 00:00:00 GMT" → send_header ✓
- "Pragma: no-cache" ✓
- "Cache-Control: no-cache, max-age=0, must-revalidate" ✓
- "Content-Length: 57" ✓
- "Content-Type: text/plain" ✓
send_response(200) → "HTTP/1.0 200 OK". end_headers. wfile.write(payload).
This should work!! Why did curl receive nothing?!
Hmm wait — did curl actually connect? "curl -s -i" produced no output at all. And the server log shows the request was processed. So the response was… lost?
Oh. Oh, wait. I got it. `self.send_response(status)` — but `send_response` also calls `self.log_request`, which calls `log_message` — I overrode log_message to pass. That's fine.
Hmm, let me actually test the Python server directly with curl -v and see what happens.
The response has no `Status:` line on 200 (default) and CRLF endings — my Go test handles that. But the Python server sent nothing to curl. Let me trace it:
Tool 🔧 bash {"command": "cd /tmp/dbg && rm -f srv.log && (python3 -u srv.py > srv.log 2>&1 & echo $! > srv.pid) && sleep 1\ncurl -sv -H \"Authorization: Basic $(echo -n greg:sekret | base64)\" \"http://127.0.0.1:8799/zoo.git/info/refs?service=git-receive-pack\" -o /dev/null 2>&1 | tail -12\necho \"=== server log ===\"; cat srv.log\nkill $(cat srv.pid) 2>/dev/null; true", "timeout": 60}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /tmp/dbg && rm -f srv.log && (python3 -u srv.py > srv.log 2>&1 & echo $! > srv.pid) && sleep 1\ncurl -sv -H \"Authorization: Basic $(echo -n greg:sekret | base64)\" \"http://127.0.0.1:8799/zoo.git/info/refs?service=git-receive-pack\" -o /dev/null 2>&1 | tail -12\necho \"=== server log ===\"; cat srv.log\nkill $(cat srv.pid) 2>/dev/null; true", "timeout": 60}
Result
* Trying 127.0.0.1:8799... * Connected to 127.0.0.1 (127.0.0.1) port 8799 * using HTTP/1.x > GET /zoo.git/info/refs?service=git-receive-pack HTTP/1.1 > Host: 127.0.0.1:8799 > User-Agent: curl/8.14.1 > Accept: */* > Authorization: Basic Z3JlZzpzZWtyZXQ= > * Request completely sent off * Received HTTP/0.9 when not allowed * closing connection #0 === server log === REQ GET /zoo.git/info/refs?service=git-receive-pack -> 0
Thinking
The server processed the request, but the response never arrived. And there's no traceback in the log either. That's weird. If an exception had occurred, BaseHTTPRequestHandler.handle_error should output a traceback to stderr... unless the exception is happening in a place where stderr isn't being captured... but I'm redirecting with `> srv.log 2>&1`.
Wait a sec. Hmm, `python3 -u srv.py` — unbuffered. The log shows the REQ line. After that, nothing.
Let me add a try/except to _run and print any exception. No wait — let me think about `self.send_response(status)`.
Ah, wait. I got it!!! Inside `_run`, for the 401 branch I'm calling `self.send_response(401)` etc. But in the success path... `self.send_response(status)` — `send_response` calls `self.log_request(code)`, which calls `log_request` → `log_message` (overridden, pass). No problem there.
Hmm, so what about `self.send_header(k.strip(), v.strip())` for `Content-Length: 57`... no problem.
Hmm, hold on, could the problem be `wfile.write(payload)` — wfile is buffered, and it gets flushed at the end of handle_one_request... it should be flushed.
Let me add exception catching and see what's happening.
Tool 🔧 bash {"command": "cd /tmp/dbg && cat > srv2.py <<'EOF'\nimport http.server, subprocess, os, base64, sys, traceback\n\nclass H(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):\n def log_message(self, *a): pass\n def _run(self):\n try:\n auth = self.headers.get(\"Authorization\", \"\")\n expected = \"Basic \" + base64.b64encode(b\"greg:sekret\").decode()\n if auth != expected:\n self.send_response(401)\n self.send_header(\"WWW-Authenticate\", 'Basic realm=\"git\"')\n self.end_headers()\n return\n length = int(self.headers.get(\"Content-Length\", 0) or 0)\n body = self.rfile.read(length) if length else b\"\"\n service = \"git-receive-pack\" if self.command == \"POST\" else \"git-upload-pack\"\n env = dict(os.environ,\n REQUEST_METHOD=self.command,\n PATH_INFO=self.path.split(\"?\")[0],\n GIT_PROJECT_ROOT=\"/tmp/dbg/root\",\n GIT_HTTP_EXPORT_ALL=\"1\",\n GIT_HTTP_SERVICE=service,\n REMOTE_USER=\"greg\")\n p = subprocess.run([\"git\", \"http-backend\"], input=body, env=env, capture_output=True)\n out = p.stdout\n hdr, _, payload = out.partition(b\"\\r\\n\\r\\n\")\n print(\"REQ\", self.command, self.path, \"->\", p.returncode, file=sys.stderr, flush=True)\n status = 200\n for line in hdr.decode().splitlines():\n k, _, v = line.partition(\":\")\n if k.strip().lower() == \"status\":\n status = int(v.strip().split()[0])\n continue\n if k.strip():\n self.send_header(k.strip(), v.strip())\n self.send_response(status)\n self.end_headers()\n self.wfile.write(payload)\n print(\"RESP SENT\", status, len(payload), file=sys.stderr, flush=True)\n except Exception:\n traceback.print_exc(file=sys.stderr)\n print(\"EXC\", file=sys.stderr, flush=True)\n do_GET = _run\n do_POST = _run\n\nhttp.server.HTTPServer((\"127.0.0.1\", 8799), H).serve_forever()\nEOF\nrm -f srv.log && (python3 -u srv2.py > srv.log 2>&1 & echo $! > srv.pid) && sleep 1\ncurl -s -H \"Authorization: Basic $(echo -n greg:sekret | base64)\" \"http://127.0.0.1:8799/zoo.git/info/refs?service=git-receive-pack\" | head -c 200; echo\necho \"=== server log ===\"; cat srv.log\nkill $(cat srv.pid) 2>/dev/null; true", "timeout": 60}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /tmp/dbg && cat > srv2.py <<'EOF'\nimport http.server, subprocess, os, base64, sys, traceback\n\nclass H(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):\n def log_message(self, *a): pass\n def _run(self):\n try:\n auth = self.headers.get(\"Authorization\", \"\")\n expected = \"Basic \" + base64.b64encode(b\"greg:sekret\").decode()\n if auth != expected:\n self.send_response(401)\n self.send_header(\"WWW-Authenticate\", 'Basic realm=\"git\"')\n self.end_headers()\n return\n length = int(self.headers.get(\"Content-Length\", 0) or 0)\n body = self.rfile.read(length) if length else b\"\"\n service = \"git-receive-pack\" if self.command == \"POST\" else \"git-upload-pack\"\n env = dict(os.environ,\n REQUEST_METHOD=self.command,\n PATH_INFO=self.path.split(\"?\")[0],\n GIT_PROJECT_ROOT=\"/tmp/dbg/root\",\n GIT_HTTP_EXPORT_ALL=\"1\",\n GIT_HTTP_SERVICE=service,\n REMOTE_USER=\"greg\")\n p = subprocess.run([\"git\", \"http-backend\"], input=body, env=env, capture_output=True)\n out = p.stdout\n hdr, _, payload = out.partition(b\"\\r\\n\\r\\n\")\n print(\"REQ\", self.command, self.path, \"->\", p.returncode, file=sys.stderr, flush=True)\n status = 200\n for line in hdr.decode().splitlines():\n k, _, v = line.partition(\":\")\n if k.strip().lower() == \"status\":\n status = int(v.strip().split()[0])\n continue\n if k.strip():\n self.send_header(k.strip(), v.strip())\n self.send_response(status)\n self.end_headers()\n self.wfile.write(payload)\n print(\"RESP SENT\", status, len(payload), file=sys.stderr, flush=True)\n except Exception:\n traceback.print_exc(file=sys.stderr)\n print(\"EXC\", file=sys.stderr, flush=True)\n do_GET = _run\n do_POST = _run\n\nhttp.server.HTTPServer((\"127.0.0.1\", 8799), H).serve_forever()\nEOF\nrm -f srv.log && (python3 -u srv2.py > srv.log 2>&1 & echo $! > srv.pid) && sleep 1\ncurl -s -H \"Authorization: Basic $(echo -n greg:sekret | base64)\" \"http://127.0.0.1:8799/zoo.git/info/refs?service=git-receive-pack\" | head -c 200; echo\necho \"=== server log ===\"; cat srv.log\nkill $(cat srv.pid) 2>/dev/null; true", "timeout": 60}
Result
=== server log === REQ GET /zoo.git/info/refs?service=git-receive-pack -> 0 RESP SENT 200 57
Thinking
The server is currently sending the response (RESP SENT 200 57), but curl's output was empty (the first line before "=== server log ===" is blank). Hmm — curl -s didn't output anything, but the server is saying it sent 57 bytes.
Wait a sec... 57 bytes is the payload (ref advertisement: "568dcb0611db9344b8afae2055517f45f22c2\trefs/heads/main\n" — that's 57 bytes). So the payload was sent, but curl didn't display it??
Oh, wait. I got it now!!! `self.send_response(status)` — in Python's http.server, `send_response` writes the status line and the Server/Date headers. But — the order of my code: first I'm calling `self.send_header(...)` for all the CGI headers, and then calling `self.send_response(status)` after that!
`send_header` before `send_response`: send_header just appends to `_headers_buffer`... no wait, that's wrong. Let me recall the implementation:
```python
def send_response(self, code, message=None):
self.log_request(code)
self.send_response_only(code, message)
self.send_header('Server', self.version_string())
self.send_header('Date', self.date_time_string())
def send_header(self, keyword, value):
if self.request_version != 'HTTP/0.9':
if not hasattr(self, '_headers_buffer'):
self._headers_buffer = []
self._headers_buffer.append(("%s: %s\r\n" % (keyword, value)).encode('latin-1', 'strict'))
def end_headers(self):
if self.request_version != 'HTTP/0.9':
self._headers_buffer.append(b"\r\n")
self.flush_headers()
```
So send_header buffers, and end_headers flushes everything. The order of the buffer: the send_header calls come first (Expires, Pragma, ...), then send_response appends the status line + Server + Date, and end_headers appends \r\n and flushes.
So the response on the wire looks like this:
```
Expires: Fri, 01 Jan 1980 00:00:00 GMT
Pragma: no-cache
...
HTTP/1.0 200 OK
Server: ...
Date: ...
<payload>
```
The status line is not at the beginning → curl treats this as an HTTP/0.9 response → "Received HTTP/0.9 when not allowed" (curl rejects 0.9 responses by default).
Fix: call `self.send_response(status)` first, then send_header, and finally end_headers.
Now — the same bug exists in my Go test too! Let me check the Go test code:
```go
hdr, payload, _ := bytes.Cut(out, []byte("\r\n\r\n"))
status := 200
for _, line := range strings.Split(string(hdr), "\r\n") {
k, v, ok := strings.Cut(line, ": ")
if !ok {
continue
}
if strings.EqualFold(k, "Status") {
_, _ = fmt.Sscanf(v, "%d", &status)
continue
}
w.Header().Set(k, v)
}
w.WriteHeader(status)
_, _ = w.Write(payload)
```
In Go's net/http, `w.Header().Set(...)` before `w.WriteHeader(status)` is fine — the Header map is written out together with WriteHeader. So the Go test is correct (unlike the Python one).
So then, why did the Go test's push fail with return code 22 (4xx)?? The GET info/refs should have succeeded (the clone worked — upload-pack GETs!). The clone succeeded in the Go test, so GET + auth is working. The push failed: "Cannot access URL http://127.0.0.1:33069/zoo.git/, return code 22".
For a push, git does the following:
1. GET /zoo.git/info/refs?service=git-receive-pack (advertisement)
2. POST /zoo.git/git-receive-pack (pack data)
Return code 22 = HTTP error on one of these. The GET should work (same as the clone's upload-pack GET). So probably the POST is failing.
What's different in the POST handling? `cmd.Stdin = r.Body` — I'm passing r.Body as stdin. `cmd.Output()` — captures stdout. For POST, http-backend reads the pack from stdin and writes to the repo.
Hmm wait — `cmd.Output()` closes stdin after... no, Output() sets Stdout and runs; stdin stays open as r.Body. When the HTTP request body ends, r.Body returns EOF. OK.
Hmm, what about the `Content-Length` header for the POST response? http-backend's output for receive-pack:
```
Status: 200 OK (or omitted)
Content-Type: application/x-git-receive-pack-result
Content-Length: N
<payload>
```
My Go handler: `w.Header().Set(k, v)` for each header, then WriteHeader(status), then Write(payload). Go's http server automatically computes Content-Length for the Write (or uses chunked). No problem.
Hmm, so why 404/4xx? Let me add logging to the Go test's server to check which request is failing and what http-backend says. No, faster approach: fix the Python server (send_response first), and run the full push flow manually against it. If push works there, then reproduce the Go test's POST handling...
No wait, let me reconsider the Go test's failure. "error: Cannot access URL http://127.0.0.1:33069/zoo.git/, return code 22" — note the trailing slash on the URL. This message comes from git-http-push when the POST to git-receive-pack fails.
Hmm — one possibility: in the Go test, the POST request's `r.URL.Path` = `/zoo.git/git-receive-pack`. PATH_INFO is set correctly. GIT_PROJECT_ROOT=remoteRoot. The repo exists.
Another possibility: **the bare repo isn't writable by http-backend**... no, same user.
Another one: `cmd.Output()` — if http-backend writes a lot to stderr... no problem.
Hmm wait, actually — let me reconsider. In the Go test, the push is done from `sh(projectDir, "... git push -q origin issue-38-greg")`. The push goes through the gitconfig's extraHeader. The GET advertisement (receive-pack) — does it include the auth header? extraHeader applies to all requests to the matching base. Yes.
Let me add debug output to the Go test's server: log the method, path, auth header, http-backend's rc + stderr, and the status being written. Run it and check.
The Python server had the status line after headers (curl rejects that) — but Go's `net/http` handles `Header().Set` before `WriteHeader` correctly, so the Go test needs its own debugging. Let me instrument the Go test's server:
Tool 🔧 edit_file {"find": "\t\tcmd.Stdin = r.Body\n\n\t\tout, err := cmd.Output()\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\thttp.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}", "replace": "\t\tcmd.Stdin = r.Body\n\n\t\tout, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tt.Logf(\"http-backend %s %s: %v\", r.Method, r.URL.Path, err)\n\t\t\thttp.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}", "path": "/project/internal/agentrun/sandbox_test.go"}
Arguments
{"find": "\t\tcmd.Stdin = r.Body\n\n\t\tout, err := cmd.Output()\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\thttp.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}", "replace": "\t\tcmd.Stdin = r.Body\n\n\t\tout, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tt.Logf(\"http-backend %s %s: %v\", r.Method, r.URL.Path, err)\n\t\t\thttp.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}", "path": "/project/internal/agentrun/sandbox_test.go"}
Result
1 occurrences replaced
Thinking
Wait, `cmd.Output()` and `cmd.CombinedOutput()` — if I use CombinedOutput, stderr gets mixed into stdout, and it breaks the header/payload parsing! http-backend's stderr is normally empty on success, but mixing them is risky. Let me revert to Output() and capture stderr separately for logging purposes.
Tool 🔧 edit_file {"find": "\t\tcmd.Stdin = r.Body\n\n\t\tout, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tt.Logf(\"http-backend %s %s: %v\", r.Method, r.URL.Path, err)\n\t\t\thttp.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}", "replace": "\t\tvar stderr strings.Builder\n\t\tcmd.Stdin = r.Body\n\t\tcmd.Stderr = &stderr\n\n\t\tout, err := cmd.Output()\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tt.Logf(\"http-backend %s %s: %v: %s\", r.Method, r.URL.Path, err, stderr.String())\n\t\t\thttp.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tt.Logf(\"http-backend %s %s auth=%q rc=0\", r.Method, r.URL.Path, r.Header.Get(\"Authorization\"))", "path": "/project/internal/agentrun/sandbox_test.go"}
Arguments
{"find": "\t\tcmd.Stdin = r.Body\n\n\t\tout, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tt.Logf(\"http-backend %s %s: %v\", r.Method, r.URL.Path, err)\n\t\t\thttp.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}", "replace": "\t\tvar stderr strings.Builder\n\t\tcmd.Stdin = r.Body\n\t\tcmd.Stderr = &stderr\n\n\t\tout, err := cmd.Output()\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tt.Logf(\"http-backend %s %s: %v: %s\", r.Method, r.URL.Path, err, stderr.String())\n\t\t\thttp.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tt.Logf(\"http-backend %s %s auth=%q rc=0\", r.Method, r.URL.Path, r.Header.Get(\"Authorization\"))", "path": "/project/internal/agentrun/sandbox_test.go"}
Result
1 occurrences replaced
Thinking
Wait, `cmd.Output()` already captures stdout, and I'm setting `cmd.Stderr = &stderr` — but if you set Stderr and use Output(), it works (Output uses its own buffer for stdout). Okay, good.
Also, I need to log the 401 path too. Let me add a log there as well. Then run the test with -v.
Tool 🔧 edit_file {"find": "\t\tif r.Header.Get(\"Authorization\") != wantAuth {\n\t\t\tw.Header().Set(\"WWW-Authenticate\", `Basic realm=\"git\"`)\n\t\t\thttp.Error(w, \"Unauthorized\", http.StatusUnauthorized)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}", "replace": "\t\tif r.Header.Get(\"Authorization\") != wantAuth {\n\t\t\tt.Logf(\"401 %s %s auth=%q\", r.Method, r.URL.Path, r.Header.Get(\"Authorization\"))\n\t\t\tw.Header().Set(\"WWW-Authenticate\", `Basic realm=\"git\"`)\n\t\t\thttp.Error(w, \"Unauthorized\", http.StatusUnauthorized)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}", "path": "/project/internal/agentrun/sandbox_test.go"}
Arguments
{"find": "\t\tif r.Header.Get(\"Authorization\") != wantAuth {\n\t\t\tw.Header().Set(\"WWW-Authenticate\", `Basic realm=\"git\"`)\n\t\t\thttp.Error(w, \"Unauthorized\", http.StatusUnauthorized)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}", "replace": "\t\tif r.Header.Get(\"Authorization\") != wantAuth {\n\t\t\tt.Logf(\"401 %s %s auth=%q\", r.Method, r.URL.Path, r.Header.Get(\"Authorization\"))\n\t\t\tw.Header().Set(\"WWW-Authenticate\", `Basic realm=\"git\"`)\n\t\t\thttp.Error(w, \"Unauthorized\", http.StatusUnauthorized)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}", "path": "/project/internal/agentrun/sandbox_test.go"}
Result
1 occurrences replaced
Thinking
Wait, `cmd.Output()` already captures stdout, and I'm setting `cmd.Stderr = &stderr` — but if you set Stderr and use Output(), it works (Output uses its own buffer for stdout). Okay, good.
Also, I need to log the 401 path too. Let me add a log there as well. Then run the test with -v.
Tool 🔧 bash {"command": "cd /project && go test ./internal/agentrun/ -run 'TestSandboxGitCommandsRemoteOps' -v 2>&1 | head -30", "timeout": 120}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /project && go test ./internal/agentrun/ -run 'TestSandboxGitCommandsRemoteOps' -v 2>&1 | head -30", "timeout": 120}
Result
=== RUN TestSandboxGitCommandsRemoteOps
sandbox_test.go:128: http-backend GET /zoo.git/info/refs auth="Basic Z3JlZzpzZWtyZXQ=" rc=0
sandbox_test.go:128: http-backend GET /zoo.git/HEAD auth="Basic Z3JlZzpzZWtyZXQ=" rc=0
sandbox_test.go:128: http-backend GET /zoo.git/objects/dc/2340106ca579bc8369c1b73c59f903704fb7ae auth="Basic Z3JlZzpzZWtyZXQ=" rc=0
sandbox_test.go:128: http-backend GET /zoo.git/objects/aa/a96ced2d9a1c8e72c56b253a0e2fe78393feb7 auth="Basic Z3JlZzpzZWtyZXQ=" rc=0
sandbox_test.go:128: http-backend GET /zoo.git/objects/ce/013625030ba8dba906f756967f9e9ca394464a auth="Basic Z3JlZzpzZWtyZXQ=" rc=0
sandbox_test.go:128: http-backend GET /zoo.git/info/refs auth="Basic Z3JlZzpzZWtyZXQ=" rc=0
sandbox_test.go:128: http-backend GET /zoo.git/HEAD auth="Basic Z3JlZzpzZWtyZXQ=" rc=0
sandbox_test.go:128: http-backend PROPFIND /zoo.git/ auth="Basic Z3JlZzpzZWtyZXQ=" rc=0
sandbox_test.go:169: sh -c "echo world >> hello.txt && git add . && git commit -q -m 'agent change' && git push -q origin issue-38-greg": exit status 1: error: Cannot access URL http://127.0.0.1:42645/zoo.git/, return code 22
fatal: git-http-push failed
error: failed to push some refs to 'http://127.0.0.1:42645/zoo.git'
--- FAIL: TestSandboxGitCommandsRemoteOps (0.10s)
FAIL
FAIL github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/agentrun 0.101s
FAIL
Thinking
Very interesting! The requests are:
1. `GET /zoo.git/info/refs` (no `?service=` — dumb protocol fallback!)
2. `GET /zoo.git/HEAD`
3. `GET /zoo.git/objects/...` (loose objects!)
4. `GET /zoo.git/info/refs`
5. `GET /zoo.git/HEAD`
6. `PROPFIND /zoo.git/` ← WebDAV PROPFIND?!
So git fell back to the **dumb HTTP protocol** — meaning the smart protocol's `info/refs?service=git-receive-pack` request failed (404?), so git tried dumb, and then tried WebDAV (PROPFIND).
Wait, but the clone succeeded (upload-pack). The log shows `GET /zoo.git/info/refs` without the `?service=git-upload-pack` query... hmm, actually, the first two lines (info/refs, HEAD, objects) look like a dumb-protocol clone... but the clone succeeded. Hmm, wait — if the clone had used the dumb protocol, it would have needed to fetch all the objects — and indeed, GETs for objects are showing up! So the clone also used the dumb protocol?!
So that means the smart protocol's `info/refs?service=git-upload-pack` request must have failed. Why?
`PATH_INFO=r.URL.Path` = `/zoo.git/info/refs` — the query string is excluded. GIT_HTTP_SERVICE=git-upload-pack. This should work...
Oh, wait. I think I get it. `r.URL.Path` — for the request `GET /zoo.git/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack`, `r.URL.Path` = `/zoo.git/info/refs`. Correct.
Hmm, but the log only shows `GET /zoo.git/info/refs` (my log prints r.URL.Path, so the query isn't shown). So I can't tell from the log whether the ?service= request came in.
Let me think about why the smart request would fail... http-backend for `info/refs` with `GIT_HTTP_SERVICE=git-upload-pack`: it works (I've tested it manually — the od dump above was exactly that, and it returned the advertisement).
Hmm, wait — did the smart request even reach the handler in the first place? Let me log r.URL.RawQuery.
Actually — hold on. Let me look at the sequence again:
1. GET /zoo.git/info/refs (dumb, no service)
2. GET /zoo.git/HEAD
3. GET objects ×3
4. GET /zoo.git/info/refs
5. GET /zoo.git/HEAD
6. PROPFIND /zoo.git/
This is the clone (steps 1–3: dumb clone) — wait, but the clone succeeded, and then the push's advertisement (step 4: info/refs), HEAD (5), and then PROPFIND (6) — the push's dumb fallback...
So the smart protocol never worked at all, and everything was using the dumb protocol. The clone succeeded via dumb (fetching loose objects one by one — the repo is small). The push failed. Because the dumb protocol can't push (dumb push requires the server to support POST to git-receive-pack, i.e., a smart server. Dumb push = "dumb HTTP push" is not supported — actually, git can push to a dumb server only if the server supports the dumb push protocol, but that's... no, dumb push doesn't exist. Push requires git-receive-pack = smart protocol).
So the real question is: why did `info/refs?service=git-upload-pack` fail?
Let me log RawQuery and see what's happening. Maybe... oh, wait. I think I get it!!!
`PATH_INFO` — for the smart request, the path is `/zoo.git/info/refs`. http-backend handles `info/refs` with GIT_HTTP_SERVICE set → advertisement. That works (proven manually).
Hmm, so what's different in the Go server? Let me look at the Go handler again:
```go
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Header.Get("Authorization") != wantAuth {
...401...
}
service := "git-upload-pack"
if r.Method == http.MethodPost {
service = "git-receive-pack"
}
...
```
For GET info/refs?service=git-upload-pack: service=git-upload-pack. No problem.
Hmm, wait — what about `Content-Length` in the response? My Go handler sets the CGI headers via w.Header().Set — including `Content-Length: 57` from http-backend's output! Then Go's http server... if I set Content-Length and write exactly that many bytes, no problem. But wait — for the info/refs advertisement, http-backend's output includes `Content-Length: 57` (the payload size). I set that header, then w.Write(payload) — 57 bytes. Consistent.
Hmm, so what's failing?? Let me log the status code being written and RawQuery. Actually — wait. Let me look at the od dump again:
```
Content-Length: 57
Content-Type: text/plain
```
Content-Type is **text/plain**?! For a smart advertisement, it should be `application/x-git-upload-pack-advertisement`. `text/plain` is what http-backend returns when... it doesn't recognize the service! When GIT_HTTP_SERVICE is unset or unrecognized, http-backend serves a dumb `info/refs` as text/plain!
So in my manual test, I set GIT_HTTP_SERVICE=git-upload-pack and got text/plain?? Let me look at the od dump again... it says `Content-Type: text/plain`. Hmm, so even in the manual test, http-backend was serving the dumb protocol!
Why? GIT_HTTP_SERVICE=git-upload-pack was set... let me check the http-backend source: it checks the `GIT_HTTP_SERVICE` environment variable. If set and valid ("git-upload-pack" or "git-receive-pack"), it runs the smart protocol. Otherwise, it serves dumb.
Wait, in the manual test I set `GIT_HTTP_SERVICE=git-upload-pack` in the env prefix... and got text/plain. Hmm!
Oh, wait. I got it!!! In the manual test:
```sh
GIT_PROJECT_ROOT=/tmp/dbg/root GIT_HTTP_EXPORT_ALL=1 PATH_INFO=/zoo.git/info/refs GIT_HTTP_SERVICE=git-upload-pack REMOTE_USER=greg REQUEST_METHOD=GET git http-backend </dev/null
```
Hmm, this should work... unless the repo isn't exported? GIT_HTTP_EXPORT_ALL=1 is set.
Hmm, wait, let me look at the od dump again: the payload is `568dcb0611db9344b8afae2055517f45f22c2\trefs/heads/main\n` — that's a dumb-format ref list (raw hex sha + tab + refname). A smart advertisement would start with `001e# service=git-upload-pack\n0000` (pkt-line). So yes — even in the manual test, it was dumb!
So http-backend ignored GIT_HTTP_SERVICE. Why?
Let me check git's http-backend.c:
```c
static int service_ok(const char *service)
{
if (strcmp(service, "git-upload-pack") &&
strcmp(service, "git-receive-pack"))
return 0;
return 1;
}
int main(int argc, const char **argv)
{
...
service = getenv("GIT_HTTP_SERVICE");
if (service && !service_ok(service)) {
/*
* We don't know this service.
*/
...
}
```
Hmm, wait, actually I recall it like this:
```c
service = getenv("GIT_HTTP_SERVICE");
if (service) {
if (!service_ok(service)) {
...404...
}
}
```
Hmm, but I got a 200 with dumb content. So service was treated as unset??
Oh, wait. I got it!!! `REQUEST_METHOD=GET` — for the smart protocol, http-backend requires... no, that's not it.
Hmm, let me look at the actual http-backend code (git 2.47):
```c
int main(int argc, const char **argv)
{
...
service = getenv("GIT_HTTP_SERVICE");
if (service && !service_ok(service)) {
/*
* We don't know this service.
*/
...
}
```
Hmm, no. Let me actually read the source... I don't have it at hand. Let me test empirically: run http-backend with GIT_HTTP_SERVICE=git-upload-pack and see if the output changes.
The clone fell back to the **dumb** protocol (text/plain refs, loose object GETs) — push can't work over dumb. Even my manual http-backend test returned dumb format despite `GIT_HTTP_SERVICE`. Let me investigate:
Tool 🔧 bash {"command": "cd /tmp/dbg && echo \"--- with GIT_HTTP_SERVICE ---\"\nGIT_PROJECT_ROOT=/tmp/dbg/root GIT_HTTP_EXPORT_ALL=1 PATH_INFO=/zoo.git/info/refs GIT_HTTP_SERVICE=git-upload-pack REMOTE_USER=greg REQUEST_METHOD=GET git http-backend </dev/null 2>&1 | head -c 200 | od -c | head -8\necho \"--- without ---\"\nGIT_PROJECT_ROOT=/tmp/dbg/root GIT_HTTP_EXPORT_ALL=1 PATH_INFO=/zoo.git/info/refs REMOTE_USER=greg REQUEST_METHOD=GET git http-backend </dev/null 2>&1 | head -c 200 | od -c | head -8"}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /tmp/dbg && echo \"--- with GIT_HTTP_SERVICE ---\"\nGIT_PROJECT_ROOT=/tmp/dbg/root GIT_HTTP_EXPORT_ALL=1 PATH_INFO=/zoo.git/info/refs GIT_HTTP_SERVICE=git-upload-pack REMOTE_USER=greg REQUEST_METHOD=GET git http-backend </dev/null 2>&1 | head -c 200 | od -c | head -8\necho \"--- without ---\"\nGIT_PROJECT_ROOT=/tmp/dbg/root GIT_HTTP_EXPORT_ALL=1 PATH_INFO=/zoo.git/info/refs REMOTE_USER=greg REQUEST_METHOD=GET git http-backend </dev/null 2>&1 | head -c 200 | od -c | head -8"}
Result
--- with GIT_HTTP_SERVICE --- 0000000 E x p i r e s : F r i , 0 1 0000020 J a n 1 9 8 0 0 0 : 0 0 : 0000040 0 0 G M T \r \n P r a g m a : 0000060 n o - c a c h e \r \n C a c h e - 0000100 C o n t r o l : n o - c a c h 0000120 e , m a x - a g e = 0 , m u 0000140 s t - r e v a l i d a t e \r \n C 0000160 o n t e n t - L e n g t h : 5 --- without --- 0000000 E x p i r e s : F r i , 0 1 0000020 J a n 1 9 8 0 0 0 : 0 0 : 0000040 0 0 G M T \r \n P r a g m a : 0000060 n o - c a c h e \r \n C a c h e - 0000100 C o n t r o l : n o - c a c h 0000120 e , m a x - a g e = 0 , m u 0000140 s t - r e v a l i d a t e \r \n C 0000160 o n t e n t - L e n g t h : 5
Thinking
Both are identical — even when GIT_HTTP_SERVICE is set, it's still in dumb mode. In other words, http-backend is ignoring GIT_HTTP_SERVICE...
Let me check the git source for http-backend. From memory of http-backend.c:
```c
static int service_ok(const char *service)
{
if (strcmp(service, "git-upload-pack") &&
strcmp(service, "git-receive-pack"))
return 0;
return 1;
}
```
And inside main:
```c
service = getenv("GIT_HTTP_SERVICE");
if (service && !service_ok(service)) {
/*
* We don't know this service.
*/
...
}
```
Hmm, wait — I just remembered! The smart protocol decision in http-backend is based on **the query string of the request**, not just the environment variable... no wait, that's not right. Let me actually look at the source. Is git's source available? Let me check if there's a git source package... or let me check the behavior of `git http-backend`:
Actually — I just remembered! In http-backend.c:
```c
int main(int argc, const char **argv)
{
...
service = getenv("GIT_HTTP_SERVICE");
if (service && !service_ok(service)) {
...
}
...
if (!strcmp(path, "info/refs")) {
...
}
```
Hmm, no. Okay, let me think about what determines smart vs dumb in http-backend:
From the git documentation (git-http-backend):
> If the request is a GET and the path ends in info/refs?service=<service>, the service is...
The actual logic (from http-backend.c, I'm now recalling with more confidence):
```c
/*
* If the request is for a smart service, run the service
*/
service = getenv("GIT_HTTP_SERVICE");
if (service && service_ok(service)) {
...run upload-pack/receive-pack...
}
```
Hmm, but in my test it's clearly not being executed. Let me debug directly: run http-backend with strace? Or check the environment variable passing...
Wait a moment. Let me check the environment variable name. Is it `GIT_HTTP_SERVICE`? Let me verify with the git documentation... From the git-http-backend man page:
> **GIT_HTTP_EXPORT_ALL** ...
> **GIT_PROJECT_ROOT** ...
> **GIT_HTTP_SERVICE** ... hmm
Actually, I'm not 100% sure that's the correct environment variable name. Let me check the man page in the container.
Both identical — http-backend ignores my env var. Let me check the man page for the correct variable name:
Tool 🔧 bash {"command": "man git-http-backend 2>/dev/null | col -b | grep -B3 -A8 -i \"service\" | head -50; echo \"===\"; man git-http-backend 2>/dev/null | col -b | grep -i \"GIT_\" | head -20"}
Arguments
{"command": "man git-http-backend 2>/dev/null | col -b | grep -B3 -A8 -i \"service\" | head -50; echo \"===\"; man git-http-backend 2>/dev/null | col -b | grep -i \"GIT_\" | head -20"}
Result
sh: 1: col: not found === sh: 1: col: not found
Thinking
Let's check the git-http-backend documentation a different way.
Tool 🔧 bash {"command": "man git-http-backend 2>/dev/null | sed 's/.\\x08//g' | grep -iA6 \"smart\" | head -40; echo \"===ENV===\"; man git-http-backend 2>/dev/null | sed 's/.\\x08//g' | grep -iB2 -A6 \"GIT_HTTP\" | head -60"}
Arguments
{"command": "man git-http-backend 2>/dev/null | sed 's/.\\x08//g' | grep -iA6 \"smart\" | head -40; echo \"===ENV===\"; man git-http-backend 2>/dev/null | sed 's/.\\x08//g' | grep -iB2 -A6 \"GIT_HTTP\" | head -60"}
Result
===ENV===
Thinking
The man page isn't available (or is empty). Let me check the git source, or try `git http-backend --help`:
Tool 🔧 bash {"command": "git http-backend --help 2>&1 | head -30; echo \"===\"; ls /usr/share/doc/git*/ 2>/dev/null | head; dpkg -L git 2>/dev/null | grep -i doc | head"}
Arguments
{"command": "git http-backend --help 2>&1 | head -30; echo \"===\"; ls /usr/share/doc/git*/ 2>/dev/null | head; dpkg -L git 2>/dev/null | grep -i doc | head"}
Result
warning: failed to exec 'man': No such file or directory fatal: no man viewer handled the request === /usr/share/doc/git-man/: changelog.Debian.gz changelog.gz copyright /usr/share/doc/git/: NEWS.Debian.gz README.Debian README.emacs README.md /usr/share/doc /usr/share/doc/git /usr/share/doc/git/NEWS.Debian.gz /usr/share/doc/git/README.Debian /usr/share/doc/git/README.emacs /usr/share/doc/git/README.md /usr/share/doc/git/README.source /usr/share/doc/git/RelNotes /usr/share/doc/git/RelNotes/1.5.0.1.txt /usr/share/doc/git/RelNotes/1.5.0.2.txt
Thinking
No man page. Let me think about the source of http-backend.c. I'll try to recall the actual code from git's repository (I've read it before):
```c
#include "cache.h"
#include "run-command.h"
#include "path.h"
#include "quote.c"
#include "url.h"
#include "http.h"
#include "attr.h"
#include "config.h"
#include "env.h"
static const char *http_enable_env_key = "GIT_HTTP_EXPORT_ALL";
static const char *http_export_all_git_env_key = "GIT_HTTP_EXPORT_ALL";
static const char *http_project_git_env_key = "GIT_PROJECT_ROOT";
static const char *http_service_env_key = "GIT_HTTP_SERVICE";
...
```
Hmm, wait. I remember there was a check like this:
```c
static int is_git_directory(const char *path)
...
```
And the main flow:
```c
int main(int argc, const char **argv)
{
...
/*
* If the request is for a smart service, run the service.
*/
service = getenv("GIT_HTTP_SERVICE");
if (service && service_ok(service)) {
...
}
```
Hmm, I keep going in circles. Let me test empirically what http-backend is looking at. I'll try different environment variable names:
- GIT_HTTP_SERVICE=git-upload-pack (tried — no effect)
Hmm, wait, wait. Let me look at the actual git source. I can download it... no, there's no guarantee of network. Hmm, is there network? The container might have internet access. Let me check if I can fetch the source... actually, let me first try a simple empirical probe: maybe the smart protocol requires `PATH_INFO` to be exactly `info/refs` (which it is), and the service is passed via the **query string** of PATH_INFO? No — the CGI spec separates the query string into QUERY_STRING.
That's it! Let me look at the real source of git's http-backend.c (v2.47). From my memory of the actual file:
```c
int main(int argc, const char **argv)
{
char *path, *base, *repo, *service, *url, *p;
...
service = getenv("GIT_HTTP_SERVICE");
if (service && !service_ok(service)) {
/*
* We don't know this service.
*/
...
}
...
```
Hmm, no. Okay, another thought — maybe the problem is that http-backend determines smart/dumb based on whether the **query string** contains `service=`. In the CGI world, the query string is in the `QUERY_STRING` environment variable! Maybe http-backend is checking QUERY_STRING, not GIT_HTTP_SERVICE!
Let me test: QUERY_STRING="service=git-upload-pack".
Let me probe empirically — maybe it reads the service from `QUERY_STRING`:
Tool 🔧 bash {"command": "cd /tmp/dbg && echo \"--- QUERY_STRING probe ---\"\nGIT_PROJECT_ROOT=/tmp/dbg/root GIT_HTTP_EXPORT_ALL=1 PATH_INFO=/zoo.git/info/refs QUERY_STRING=\"service=git-upload-pack\" REMOTE_USER=greg REQUEST_METHOD=GET git http-backend </dev/null 2>&1 | head -c 120 | od -c | head -6"}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /tmp/dbg && echo \"--- QUERY_STRING probe ---\"\nGIT_PROJECT_ROOT=/tmp/dbg/root GIT_HTTP_EXPORT_ALL=1 PATH_INFO=/zoo.git/info/refs QUERY_STRING=\"service=git-upload-pack\" REMOTE_USER=greg REQUEST_METHOD=GET git http-backend </dev/null 2>&1 | head -c 120 | od -c | head -6"}
Result
--- QUERY_STRING probe --- 0000000 E x p i r e s : F r i , 0 1 0000020 J a n 1 9 8 0 0 0 : 0 0 : 0000040 0 0 G M T \r \n P r a g m a : 0000060 n o - c a c h e \r \n C a c h e - 0000100 C o n t r o l : n o - c a c h 0000120 e , m a x - a g e = 0 , m u
Thinking
still in dumb mode. Hmm. Let me look at the actual git source code. I'll check if there's a way to get it — maybe there's a git source tarball in the container, or maybe I can access the internet.
Tool 🔧 bash {"command": "cd /tmp && timeout 15 curl -sL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/git/git/v2.47.3/http-backend.c -o http-backend.c 2>&1; ls -la http-backend.c 2>/dev/null && grep -n \"GIT_HTTP_SERVICE\\|QUERY_STRING\\|service\" http-backend.c | head -30", "timeout": 30}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /tmp && timeout 15 curl -sL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/git/git/v2.47.3/http-backend.c -o http-backend.c 2>&1; ls -la http-backend.c 2>/dev/null && grep -n \"GIT_HTTP_SERVICE\\|QUERY_STRING\\|service\" http-backend.c | head -30", "timeout": 30}
Result
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 20215 Aug 24 09:00 http-backend.c
33:struct rpc_service {
40:static struct rpc_service rpc_service[] = {
49: const char *query = getenv("QUERY_STRING");
170: forbidden(hdr, "Unsupported service: getanyfile");
251: for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(rpc_service); i++) {
252: struct rpc_service *svc = &rpc_service[i];
262:static struct rpc_service *select_service(struct strbuf *hdr, const char *name)
265: struct rpc_service *svc = NULL;
269: forbidden(hdr, "Unsupported service: '%s'", name);
271: for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(rpc_service); i++) {
272: struct rpc_service *s = &rpc_service[i];
280: forbidden(hdr, "Unsupported service: '%s'", name);
469:static void run_service(const char **argv, int buffer_input)
537: const char *service_name = get_parameter("service");
542: if (service_name) {
543: const char *argv[] = {NULL /* service name */,
546: struct rpc_service *svc = select_service(hdr, service_name);
555: packet_write_fmt(1, "# service=git-%s\n", svc->name);
560: run_service(argv, 0);
646:static void service_rpc(struct strbuf *hdr, char *service_name)
649: struct rpc_service *svc = select_service(hdr, service_name);
653: if (strcmp(service_name, "git-upload-archive"))
669: run_service(argv.v, svc->buffer_input);
719:static struct service_cmd {
723:} services[] = {
736: {"POST", "/git-upload-pack$", service_rpc},
737: {"POST", "/git-upload-archive$", service_rpc},
738: {"POST", "/git-receive-pack$", service_rpc}
741:static int bad_request(struct strbuf *hdr, const struct service_cmd *c)
761: struct service_cmd *cmd = NULL;
Thinking
I have the source. Let's take a look at the main flow — specifically how it determines whether it's smart or dumb, and what `get_parameter("service")` does (line 49: `const char *query = getenv("QUERY_STRING")` — so it's parsing the service from QUERY_STRING!).
Tool 🔧 bash {"command": "cd /tmp && sed -n '40,70p' http-backend.c && echo \"=====\" && sed -n '525,575p' http-backend.c && echo \"=====\" && sed -n '740,800p' http-backend.c"}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /tmp && sed -n '40,70p' http-backend.c && echo \"=====\" && sed -n '525,575p' http-backend.c && echo \"=====\" && sed -n '740,800p' http-backend.c"}
Result
static struct rpc_service rpc_service[] = {
{ "upload-pack", "uploadpack", 1, 1 },
{ "receive-pack", "receivepack", 0, -1 },
{ "upload-archive", "uploadarchive", 0, -1 },
};
static struct string_list *get_parameters(void)
{
if (!query_params) {
const char *query = getenv("QUERY_STRING");
CALLOC_ARRAY(query_params, 1);
while (query && *query) {
char *name = url_decode_parameter_name(&query);
char *value = url_decode_parameter_value(&query);
struct string_list_item *i;
i = string_list_lookup(query_params, name);
if (!i)
i = string_list_insert(query_params, name);
else
free(i->util);
i->util = value;
}
}
return query_params;
}
static const char *get_parameter(const char *name)
{
struct string_list_item *i;
=====
if (o->type == OBJ_TAG) {
o = deref_tag(the_repository, o, name, 0);
if (!o)
return 0;
strbuf_addf(buf, "%s\t%s^{}\n", oid_to_hex(&o->oid),
name_nons);
}
return 0;
}
static void get_info_refs(struct strbuf *hdr, char *arg UNUSED)
{
const char *service_name = get_parameter("service");
struct strbuf buf = STRBUF_INIT;
hdr_nocache(hdr);
if (service_name) {
const char *argv[] = {NULL /* service name */,
"--http-backend-info-refs",
".", NULL};
struct rpc_service *svc = select_service(hdr, service_name);
strbuf_addf(&buf, "application/x-git-%s-advertisement",
svc->name);
hdr_str(hdr, content_type, buf.buf);
end_headers(hdr);
if (determine_protocol_version_server() != protocol_v2) {
packet_write_fmt(1, "# service=git-%s\n", svc->name);
packet_flush(1);
}
argv[0] = svc->name;
run_service(argv, 0);
} else {
select_getanyfile(hdr);
refs_for_each_namespaced_ref(get_main_ref_store(the_repository),
NULL, show_text_ref, &buf);
send_strbuf(hdr, "text/plain", &buf);
}
strbuf_release(&buf);
}
static int show_head_ref(const char *refname, const char *referent UNUSED, const struct object_id *oid,
int flag, void *cb_data)
{
struct strbuf *buf = cb_data;
=====
static int bad_request(struct strbuf *hdr, const struct service_cmd *c)
{
const char *proto = getenv("SERVER_PROTOCOL");
if (proto && !strcmp(proto, "HTTP/1.1")) {
http_status(hdr, 405, "Method Not Allowed");
hdr_str(hdr, "Allow",
!strcmp(c->method, "GET") ? "GET, HEAD" : c->method);
} else
http_status(hdr, 400, "Bad Request");
hdr_nocache(hdr);
end_headers(hdr);
return 0;
}
int cmd_main(int argc UNUSED, const char **argv UNUSED)
{
const char *method = getenv("REQUEST_METHOD");
const char *proto_header;
char *dir;
struct service_cmd *cmd = NULL;
char *cmd_arg = NULL;
int i;
struct strbuf hdr = STRBUF_INIT;
set_die_routine(die_webcgi);
set_die_is_recursing_routine(die_webcgi_recursing);
if (!method)
die("No REQUEST_METHOD from server");
if (!strcmp(method, "HEAD"))
method = "GET";
dir = getdir();
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(services); i++) {
struct service_cmd *c = &services[i];
regex_t re;
regmatch_t out[1];
int ret;
if (regcomp(&re, c->pattern, REG_EXTENDED))
die("Bogus regex in service table: %s", c->pattern);
ret = regexec(&re, dir, 1, out, 0);
regfree(&re);
if (!ret) {
size_t n;
if (strcmp(method, c->method))
return bad_request(&hdr, c);
cmd = c;
n = out[0].rm_eo - out[0].rm_so;
cmd_arg = xmemdupz(dir + out[0].rm_so + 1, n - 1);
dir[out[0].rm_so] = 0;
break;
}
}
if (!cmd)
Thinking
Now I get it! The service is obtained from `get_parameter("service")`, which parses **`QUERY_STRING`** — not from `GIT_HTTP_SERVICE`. So the CGI server has to pass `QUERY_STRING=service=git-upload-pack` (the raw query string).
My Go test was setting `GIT_HTTP_SERVICE` (the wrong variable — that's for the Apache module's config, not for the CGI env). The correct one is: `QUERY_STRING` = the raw query string from the request (`r.URL.RawQuery`).
So in the Go test's handler:
```go
cmd.Env = append(os.Environ(),
"REQUEST_METHOD="+r.Method,
"PATH_INFO="+r.URL.Path,
"QUERY_STRING="+r.URL.RawQuery,
"GIT_PROJECT_ROOT="+remoteRoot,
"GIT_HTTP_EXPORT_ALL=1",
"REMOTE_USER="+username,
)
```
And remove GIT_HTTP_SERVICE.
Also, note that the services table has `{"POST", "/git-receive-pack$", service_rpc}` — for POST, PATH_INFO must end with /git-receive-pack. And for GET info/refs, the pattern is probably `{"GET", "/info/refs$", ...}`.
Let me quickly verify with a manual probe using QUERY_STRING, then fix the Go test.
Found it — the service comes from `QUERY_STRING` (parsed via `get_parameter("service")`), not `GIT_HTTP_SERVICE`. Verify and fix the test:
Tool 🔧 bash {"command": "cd /tmp/dbg && GIT_PROJECT_ROOT=/tmp/dbg/root GIT_HTTP_EXPORT_ALL=1 PATH_INFO=/zoo.git/info/refs QUERY_STRING=\"service=git-upload-pack\" REMOTE_USER=greg REQUEST_METHOD=GET git http-backend </dev/null 2>&1 | head -c 150 | od -c | head -6"}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /tmp/dbg && GIT_PROJECT_ROOT=/tmp/dbg/root GIT_HTTP_EXPORT_ALL=1 PATH_INFO=/zoo.git/info/refs QUERY_STRING=\"service=git-upload-pack\" REMOTE_USER=greg REQUEST_METHOD=GET git http-backend </dev/null 2>&1 | head -c 150 | od -c | head -6"}
Result
0000000 E x p i r e s : F r i , 0 1 0000020 J a n 1 9 8 0 0 0 : 0 0 : 0000040 0 0 G M T \r \n P r a g m a : 0000060 n o - c a c h e \r \n C a c h e - 0000100 C o n t r o l : n o - c a c h 0000120 e , m a x - a g e = 0 , m u
Thinking
Hmm, still can't tell from the first 150 bytes (the header is long). Let me check the Content-Type line and the payload.
Tool 🔧 bash {"command": "cd /tmp/dbg && GIT_PROJECT_ROOT=/tmp/dbg/root GIT_HTTP_EXPORT_ALL=1 PATH_INFO=/zoo.git/info/refs QUERY_STRING=\"service=git-upload-pack\" REMOTE_USER=greg REQUEST_METHOD=GET git http-backend </dev/null 2>&1 | grep -a \"Content-Type\"; GIT_PROJECT_ROOT=/tmp/dbg/root GIT_HTTP_EXPORT_ALL=1 PATH_INFO=/zoo.git/info/refs QUERY_STRING=\"service=git-upload-pack\" REMOTE_USER=greg REQUEST_METHOD=GET git http-backend </dev/null 2>&1 | tail -c 60 | od -c | head -5"}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /tmp/dbg && GIT_PROJECT_ROOT=/tmp/dbg/root GIT_HTTP_EXPORT_ALL=1 PATH_INFO=/zoo.git/info/refs QUERY_STRING=\"service=git-upload-pack\" REMOTE_USER=greg REQUEST_METHOD=GET git http-backend </dev/null 2>&1 | grep -a \"Content-Type\"; GIT_PROJECT_ROOT=/tmp/dbg/root GIT_HTTP_EXPORT_ALL=1 PATH_INFO=/zoo.git/info/refs QUERY_STRING=\"service=git-upload-pack\" REMOTE_USER=greg REQUEST_METHOD=GET git http-backend </dev/null 2>&1 | tail -c 60 | od -c | head -5"}
Result
Content-Type: application/x-git-upload-pack-advertisement 0000000 c k _ d e t a i l e d n o - d 0000020 o n e o b j e c t - f o r m a 0000040 t = s h a 1 a g e n t = g i t 0000060 / 2 . 4 7 . 3 \n 0 0 0 0 0000074
Thinking
`Content-Type: application/x-git-upload-pack-advertisement` — the smart protocol is working with `QUERY_STRING=service=git-upload-pack`.
Next, I'll fix the Go test: replace `GIT_HTTP_SERVICE` with `QUERY_STRING=r.URL.RawQuery`.
Smart protocol confirmed. Fix the test's CGI env:
Tool 🔧 edit_file {"find": "\t\tcmd := exec.Command(\"git\", \"http-backend\")\n\t\tcmd.Env = append(os.Environ(),\n\t\t\t\"REQUEST_METHOD=\"+r.Method,\n\t\t\t\"PATH_INFO=\"+r.URL.Path,\n\t\t\t\"GIT_PROJECT_ROOT=\"+remoteRoot,\n\t\t\t\"GIT_HTTP_EXPORT_ALL=1\",\n\t\t\t\"GIT_HTTP_SERVICE=\"+service,\n\t\t\t\"REMOTE_USER=\"+username,\n\t\t)", "replace": "\t\tcmd := exec.Command(\"git\", \"http-backend\")\n\t\tcmd.Env = append(os.Environ(),\n\t\t\t\"REQUEST_METHOD=\"+r.Method,\n\t\t\t\"PATH_INFO=\"+r.URL.Path,\n\t\t\t\"QUERY_STRING=\"+r.URL.RawQuery,\n\t\t\t\"GIT_PROJECT_ROOT=\"+remoteRoot,\n\t\t\t\"GIT_HTTP_EXPORT_ALL=1\",\n\t\t\t\"REMOTE_USER=\"+username,\n\t\t)", "path": "/project/internal/agentrun/sandbox_test.go"}
Arguments
{"find": "\t\tcmd := exec.Command(\"git\", \"http-backend\")\n\t\tcmd.Env = append(os.Environ(),\n\t\t\t\"REQUEST_METHOD=\"+r.Method,\n\t\t\t\"PATH_INFO=\"+r.URL.Path,\n\t\t\t\"GIT_PROJECT_ROOT=\"+remoteRoot,\n\t\t\t\"GIT_HTTP_EXPORT_ALL=1\",\n\t\t\t\"GIT_HTTP_SERVICE=\"+service,\n\t\t\t\"REMOTE_USER=\"+username,\n\t\t)", "replace": "\t\tcmd := exec.Command(\"git\", \"http-backend\")\n\t\tcmd.Env = append(os.Environ(),\n\t\t\t\"REQUEST_METHOD=\"+r.Method,\n\t\t\t\"PATH_INFO=\"+r.URL.Path,\n\t\t\t\"QUERY_STRING=\"+r.URL.RawQuery,\n\t\t\t\"GIT_PROJECT_ROOT=\"+remoteRoot,\n\t\t\t\"GIT_HTTP_EXPORT_ALL=1\",\n\t\t\t\"REMOTE_USER=\"+username,\n\t\t)", "path": "/project/internal/agentrun/sandbox_test.go"}
Result
1 occurrences replaced
Thinking
Also, the `service` variable is currently unused. Let's delete it:
```go
service := "git-upload-pack"
if r.Method == http.MethodPost {
service = "git-receive-pack"
}
```
This is no longer being used. Let's delete these lines.
Tool 🔧 edit_file {"find": "\t\tservice := \"git-upload-pack\"\n\t\tif r.Method == http.MethodPost {\n\t\t\tservice = \"git-receive-pack\"\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tcmd := exec.Command(\"git\", \"http-backend\")", "replace": "\t\tcmd := exec.Command(\"git\", \"http-backend\")", "path": "/project/internal/agentrun/sandbox_test.go"}
Arguments
{"find": "\t\tservice := \"git-upload-pack\"\n\t\tif r.Method == http.MethodPost {\n\t\t\tservice = \"git-receive-pack\"\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tcmd := exec.Command(\"git\", \"http-backend\")", "replace": "\t\tcmd := exec.Command(\"git\", \"http-backend\")", "path": "/project/internal/agentrun/sandbox_test.go"}
Result
1 occurrences replaced
Thinking
Wait, but for POST requests (git-receive-pack), the smart protocol is selected via the services table: `{"POST", "/git-receive-pack$", service_rpc}` — this matches on PATH_INFO, and then `service_rpc` uses `get_parameter("service")`... let me check `service_rpc`:
```c
static void service_rpc(struct strbuf *hdr, char *service_name)
{
struct rpc_service *svc = select_service(hdr, service_name);
...
}
```
And `cmd_arg` is extracted from the regex match of PATH_INFO (e.g., "git-receive-pack"). So for POST /zoo.git/git-receive-pack, cmd_arg = "git-receive-pack", and service_rpc runs receive-pack. The QUERY_STRING for the POST is usually empty (git sends the pack body as POST data, no query). No problem.
Let's run the tests.
Tool 🔧 bash {"command": "cd /project && go test ./internal/agentrun/ -run 'TestSandboxGitCommandsRemoteOps' -v 2>&1 | head -25", "timeout": 120}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /project && go test ./internal/agentrun/ -run 'TestSandboxGitCommandsRemoteOps' -v 2>&1 | head -25", "timeout": 120}
Result
=== RUN TestSandboxGitCommandsRemoteOps
sandbox_test.go:123: http-backend GET /zoo.git/info/refs auth="Basic Z3JlZzpzZWtyZXQ=" rc=0
sandbox_test.go:123: http-backend POST /zoo.git/git-upload-pack auth="Basic Z3JlZzpzZWtyZXQ=" rc=0
sandbox_test.go:164: sh -c "git clone --branch 'main' --single-branch 'http://127.0.0.1:32801/zoo.git' '/tmp/TestSandboxGitCommandsRemoteOps2581488580/004'": exit status 128: Cloning into '/tmp/TestSandboxGitCommandsRemoteOps2581488580/004'...
error: RPC failed; HTTP 415 curl 22 The requested URL returned error: 415
fatal: the remote end hung up unexpectedly
--- FAIL: TestSandboxGitCommandsRemoteOps (0.06s)
FAIL
FAIL github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/agentrun 0.064s
FAIL
Thinking
Progress! The smart protocol advertisement is now working (GET info/refs → then POST /zoo.git/git-upload-pack). But the POST is returning **415 Unsupported Media Type**.
415 = "Unsupported Media Type" — this comes from http-backend's `bad_request`... no wait, 415 specifically. Let me search for 415 in the source:
Tool 🔧 bash {"command": "cd /tmp && grep -n \"415\\|Unsupported Media\" http-backend.c | head; grep -n \"Content-Type\\|content_type\" http-backend.c | head -20"}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /tmp && grep -n \"415\\|Unsupported Media\" http-backend.c | head; grep -n \"Content-Type\\|content_type\" http-backend.c | head -20"}
Result
635: http_status(hdr, 415, "Unsupported Media Type"); 25:static const char content_type[] = "Content-Type"; 177: hdr_str(hdr, content_type, type); 198: hdr_str(hdr, content_type, the_type); 550: hdr_str(hdr, content_type, buf.buf); 627:static void check_content_type(struct strbuf *hdr, const char *accepted_type) 639: "Expected POST with Content-Type '%s'," 659: check_content_type(hdr, buf.buf); 665: hdr_str(hdr, content_type, buf.buf);
Thinking
`check_content_type` — the POST needs the correct `Content-Type` header: `application/x-git-upload-pack-request` (for upload-pack) or `application/x-git-receive-pack-request` (for receive-pack). My Go handler isn't forwarding the request's Content-Type to http-backend. http-backend checks the `CONTENT_TYPE` environment variable (CGI).
Let me verify:
Tool 🔧 bash {"command": "cd /tmp && sed -n '627,668p' http-backend.c"}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /tmp && sed -n '627,668p' http-backend.c"}
Result
static void check_content_type(struct strbuf *hdr, const char *accepted_type)
{
const char *actual_type = getenv("CONTENT_TYPE");
if (!actual_type)
actual_type = "";
if (strcmp(actual_type, accepted_type)) {
http_status(hdr, 415, "Unsupported Media Type");
hdr_nocache(hdr);
end_headers(hdr);
format_write(1,
"Expected POST with Content-Type '%s',"
" but received '%s' instead.\n",
accepted_type, actual_type);
exit(0);
}
}
static void service_rpc(struct strbuf *hdr, char *service_name)
{
struct strvec argv = STRVEC_INIT;
struct rpc_service *svc = select_service(hdr, service_name);
struct strbuf buf = STRBUF_INIT;
strvec_push(&argv, svc->name);
if (strcmp(service_name, "git-upload-archive"))
strvec_push(&argv, "--stateless-rpc");
strvec_push(&argv, ".");
strbuf_reset(&buf);
strbuf_addf(&buf, "application/x-git-%s-request", svc->name);
check_content_type(hdr, buf.buf);
hdr_nocache(hdr);
strbuf_reset(&buf);
strbuf_addf(&buf, "application/x-git-%s-result", svc->name);
hdr_str(hdr, content_type, buf.buf);
end_headers(hdr);
Thinking
Confirmed: the CGI environment variable `CONTENT_TYPE` must be set from the request's Content-Type header. Fix for the Go test: add `"CONTENT_TYPE="+r.Header.Get("Content-Type")`.
Tool 🔧 edit_file {"find": "\t\tcmd := exec.Command(\"git\", \"http-backend\")\n\t\tcmd.Env = append(os.Environ(),\n\t\t\t\"REQUEST_METHOD=\"+r.Method,\n\t\t\t\"PATH_INFO=\"+r.URL.Path,\n\t\t\t\"QUERY_STRING=\"+r.URL.RawQuery,\n\t\t\t\"GIT_PROJECT_ROOT=\"+remoteRoot,\n\t\t\t\"GIT_HTTP_EXPORT_ALL=1\",\n\t\t\t\"REMOTE_USER=\"+username,\n\t\t)", "replace": "\t\tcmd := exec.Command(\"git\", \"http-backend\")\n\t\tcmd.Env = append(os.Environ(),\n\t\t\t\"REQUEST_METHOD=\"+r.Method,\n\t\t\t\"PATH_INFO=\"+r.URL.Path,\n\t\t\t\"QUERY_STRING=\"+r.URL.RawQuery,\n\t\t\t\"CONTENT_TYPE=\"+r.Header.Get(\"Content-Type\"),\n\t\t\t\"GIT_PROJECT_ROOT=\"+remoteRoot,\n\t\t\t\"GIT_HTTP_EXPORT_ALL=1\",\n\t\t\t\"REMOTE_USER=\"+username,\n\t\t)", "path": "/project/internal/agentrun/sandbox_test.go"}
Arguments
{"find": "\t\tcmd := exec.Command(\"git\", \"http-backend\")\n\t\tcmd.Env = append(os.Environ(),\n\t\t\t\"REQUEST_METHOD=\"+r.Method,\n\t\t\t\"PATH_INFO=\"+r.URL.Path,\n\t\t\t\"QUERY_STRING=\"+r.URL.RawQuery,\n\t\t\t\"GIT_PROJECT_ROOT=\"+remoteRoot,\n\t\t\t\"GIT_HTTP_EXPORT_ALL=1\",\n\t\t\t\"REMOTE_USER=\"+username,\n\t\t)", "replace": "\t\tcmd := exec.Command(\"git\", \"http-backend\")\n\t\tcmd.Env = append(os.Environ(),\n\t\t\t\"REQUEST_METHOD=\"+r.Method,\n\t\t\t\"PATH_INFO=\"+r.URL.Path,\n\t\t\t\"QUERY_STRING=\"+r.URL.RawQuery,\n\t\t\t\"CONTENT_TYPE=\"+r.Header.Get(\"Content-Type\"),\n\t\t\t\"GIT_PROJECT_ROOT=\"+remoteRoot,\n\t\t\t\"GIT_HTTP_EXPORT_ALL=1\",\n\t\t\t\"REMOTE_USER=\"+username,\n\t\t)", "path": "/project/internal/agentrun/sandbox_test.go"}
Result
1 occurrences replaced
Thinking
Wait, but for POST requests, the body is sent as the request body, and `cmd.Stdin = r.Body` — that's already set up. And the Content-Type header from git is `application/x-git-upload-pack-request`. Good.
Let's run it once more.
Tool 🔧 bash {"command": "cd /project && go test ./internal/agentrun/ -run 'TestSandboxGitCommandsRemoteOps' -v 2>&1 | head -25", "timeout": 120}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /project && go test ./internal/agentrun/ -run 'TestSandboxGitCommandsRemoteOps' -v 2>&1 | head -25", "timeout": 120}
Result
=== RUN TestSandboxGitCommandsRemoteOps
sandbox_test.go:124: http-backend GET /zoo.git/info/refs auth="Basic Z3JlZzpzZWtyZXQ=" rc=0
sandbox_test.go:124: http-backend POST /zoo.git/git-upload-pack auth="Basic Z3JlZzpzZWtyZXQ=" rc=0
sandbox_test.go:124: http-backend GET /zoo.git/info/refs auth="Basic Z3JlZzpzZWtyZXQ=" rc=0
sandbox_test.go:124: http-backend POST /zoo.git/git-receive-pack auth="Basic Z3JlZzpzZWtyZXQ=" rc=0
sandbox_test.go:124: http-backend GET /zoo.git/info/refs auth="Basic Z3JlZzpzZWtyZXQ=" rc=0
sandbox_test.go:124: http-backend POST /zoo.git/git-upload-pack auth="Basic Z3JlZzpzZWtyZXQ=" rc=0
sandbox_test.go:165: sh -c "echo more >> hello.txt && git add . && git commit -q -m 'other change' && git push -q origin main": exit status 1: error: src refspec main does not match any
error: failed to push some refs to 'http://127.0.0.1:41741/zoo.git'
--- FAIL: TestSandboxGitCommandsRemoteOps (0.14s)
FAIL
FAIL github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/agentrun 0.146s
FAIL
Thinking
Big progress! The clone succeeded (smart protocol: GET info/refs + POST git-upload-pack), and the agent's branch push also succeeded (GET info/refs + POST git-receive-pack)!
Next failure: the second clone (`git clone -q <url> <other>`) — wait, no. The failing command is `sh(other, "echo more >> hello.txt && ... git push -q origin main")` — "src refspec main does not match any".
Why? The second clone: `git clone -q <cloneURL> <other>` — a full clone. The remote's HEAD is… the bare repo's HEAD points to `refs/heads/master` (git 2.47's `git init --bare` default is master, since init.defaultBranch isn't set)! But the only branch that exists is `main`. So `git clone` checks out HEAD → master → doesn't exist → git falls back to… hmm, actually, when HEAD points to a nonexistent branch, `git clone` usually checks out the default… Let me think: `git clone` of a repo whose HEAD points to a nonexistent ref: git issues a warning and… in recent git, does it check out the branch HEAD points to, and if that doesn't exist, does it fail? No wait — the clone succeeded (no error was reported on the clone step… wait, did it really succeed? The sequence is:
1. GET info/refs + POST upload-pack → first clone (projectDir) ✓
2. GET info/refs + POST receive-pack → push of issue-38-greg ✓
3. GET info/refs + POST upload-pack → second clone (other) ✓ (succeeded, no error)
4. push main from `other` → "src refspec main does not match any"
So the second clone succeeded, but the local `main` branch doesn't exist in `other`! Because the remote's HEAD → master (nonexistent), git clone checked out… hmm, what did it check out? When HEAD is dangling, `git clone` checks out the branch HEAD points to, and if that doesn't exist, does it check out the first available branch? No…
Actually, in recent git: when cloning a repo whose HEAD points to a nonexistent ref, git clone issues a warning ("remote HEAD refers to nonexistent ref, unable to checkout") and leaves you in a detached state / with no branch. So `other` has no local `main` branch → "src refspec main does not match any".
Fix: point the bare repo's HEAD at main: `git -C bare symbolic-ref HEAD refs/heads/main`. This mimics a properly configured remote (Forgejo repos always have a valid HEAD).
Let's add this to the test.
The clone and agent push now work. The second clone has no local `main` because the bare repo's HEAD points to a nonexistent `master` (git's init default). Fix the fixture:
Tool 🔧 edit_file {"find": "\tgit(\"\", \"git\", \"init\", \"-q\", \"--bare\", bare)\n\n\tseed := t.TempDir()", "replace": "\tgit(\"\", \"git\", \"init\", \"-q\", \"--bare\", bare)\n\tgit(\"\", \"git\", \"-C\", bare, \"symbolic-ref\", \"HEAD\", \"refs/heads/main\")\n\n\tseed := t.TempDir()", "path": "/project/internal/agentrun/sandbox_test.go"}
Arguments
{"find": "\tgit(\"\", \"git\", \"init\", \"-q\", \"--bare\", bare)\n\n\tseed := t.TempDir()", "replace": "\tgit(\"\", \"git\", \"init\", \"-q\", \"--bare\", bare)\n\tgit(\"\", \"git\", \"-C\", bare, \"symbolic-ref\", \"HEAD\", \"refs/heads/main\")\n\n\tseed := t.TempDir()", "path": "/project/internal/agentrun/sandbox_test.go"}
Result
1 occurrences replaced
Thinking
Wait, `git -C bare symbolic-ref HEAD refs/heads/main` — my `git` helper takes (dir, args...) and sets cmd.Dir = dir. So it should be `git(bare, "git", "symbolic-ref", "HEAD", "refs/heads/main")`. Let me fix it.
Tool 🔧 edit_file {"find": "\tgit(\"\", \"git\", \"init\", \"-q\", \"--bare\", bare)\n\tgit(\"\", \"git\", \"-C\", bare, \"symbolic-ref\", \"HEAD\", \"refs/heads/main\")", "replace": "\tgit(\"\", \"git\", \"init\", \"-q\", \"--bare\", bare)\n\tgit(bare, \"git\", \"symbolic-ref\", \"HEAD\", \"refs/heads/main\")", "path": "/project/internal/agentrun/sandbox_test.go"}
Arguments
{"find": "\tgit(\"\", \"git\", \"init\", \"-q\", \"--bare\", bare)\n\tgit(\"\", \"git\", \"-C\", bare, \"symbolic-ref\", \"HEAD\", \"refs/heads/main\")", "replace": "\tgit(\"\", \"git\", \"init\", \"-q\", \"--bare\", bare)\n\tgit(bare, \"git\", \"symbolic-ref\", \"HEAD\", \"refs/heads/main\")", "path": "/project/internal/agentrun/sandbox_test.go"}
Result
1 occurrences replaced
Thinking
Wait, the `git` helper is `func(dir string, args ...string)`, and it runs `exec.Command(args[0], args[1:]...)` with `cmd.Dir = dir`. So `git(bare, "git", "symbolic-ref", "HEAD", "refs/heads/main")` runs `git symbolic-ref HEAD refs/heads/main` with cwd=bare. That's correct.
Let's try running it again.
Tool 🔧 bash {"command": "cd /project && go test ./internal/agentrun/ -run 'TestSandboxGitCommandsRemoteOps' -v 2>&1 | head -25", "timeout": 120}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /project && go test ./internal/agentrun/ -run 'TestSandboxGitCommandsRemoteOps' -v 2>&1 | head -25", "timeout": 120}
Result
=== RUN TestSandboxGitCommandsRemoteOps
sandbox_test.go:125: http-backend GET /zoo.git/info/refs auth="Basic Z3JlZzpzZWtyZXQ=" rc=0
sandbox_test.go:125: http-backend POST /zoo.git/git-upload-pack auth="Basic Z3JlZzpzZWtyZXQ=" rc=0
sandbox_test.go:125: http-backend GET /zoo.git/info/refs auth="Basic Z3JlZzpzZWtyZXQ=" rc=0
sandbox_test.go:125: http-backend POST /zoo.git/git-receive-pack auth="Basic Z3JlZzpzZWtyZXQ=" rc=0
sandbox_test.go:125: http-backend GET /zoo.git/info/refs auth="Basic Z3JlZzpzZWtyZXQ=" rc=0
sandbox_test.go:125: http-backend POST /zoo.git/git-upload-pack auth="Basic Z3JlZzpzZWtyZXQ=" rc=0
sandbox_test.go:125: http-backend GET /zoo.git/info/refs auth="Basic Z3JlZzpzZWtyZXQ=" rc=0
sandbox_test.go:125: http-backend POST /zoo.git/git-receive-pack auth="Basic Z3JlZzpzZWtyZXQ=" rc=0
sandbox_test.go:125: http-backend GET /zoo.git/info/refs auth="Basic Z3JlZzpzZWtyZXQ=" rc=0
sandbox_test.go:125: http-backend POST /zoo.git/git-upload-pack auth="Basic Z3JlZzpzZWtyZXQ=" rc=0
--- PASS: TestSandboxGitCommandsRemoteOps (0.20s)
PASS
ok github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/agentrun 0.200s
Thinking
The end-to-end test passed:
1. Clone (smart protocol, authenticated) ✓
2. Agent's branch push ✓
3. Second clone + push to main ✓
4. `git pull` in the first sandbox fetched the remote commit ✓
Next, I'll remove the debug `t.Logf` lines from the test (they're noisy), and run the full test suite + gofmt.
The end-to-end test passes — clone, push, and pull all work with only the gitconfig credential. Now remove the debug logging and run the full suite:
Tool 🔧 edit_file {"find": "\t\tif r.Header.Get(\"Authorization\") != wantAuth {\n\t\t\tt.Logf(\"401 %s %s auth=%q\", r.Method, r.URL.Path, r.Header.Get(\"Authorization\"))\n\t\t\tw.Header().Set(\"WWW-Authenticate\", `Basic realm=\"git\"`)\n\t\t\thttp.Error(w, \"Unauthorized\", http.StatusUnauthorized)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}", "replace": "\t\tif r.Header.Get(\"Authorization\") != wantAuth {\n\t\t\tw.Header().Set(\"WWW-Authenticate\", `Basic realm=\"git\"`)\n\t\t\thttp.Error(w, \"Unauthorized\", http.StatusUnauthorized)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}", "path": "/project/internal/agentrun/sandbox_test.go"}
Arguments
{"find": "\t\tif r.Header.Get(\"Authorization\") != wantAuth {\n\t\t\tt.Logf(\"401 %s %s auth=%q\", r.Method, r.URL.Path, r.Header.Get(\"Authorization\"))\n\t\t\tw.Header().Set(\"WWW-Authenticate\", `Basic realm=\"git\"`)\n\t\t\thttp.Error(w, \"Unauthorized\", http.StatusUnauthorized)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}", "replace": "\t\tif r.Header.Get(\"Authorization\") != wantAuth {\n\t\t\tw.Header().Set(\"WWW-Authenticate\", `Basic realm=\"git\"`)\n\t\t\thttp.Error(w, \"Unauthorized\", http.StatusUnauthorized)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}", "path": "/project/internal/agentrun/sandbox_test.go"}
Result
1 occurrences replaced
Tool 🔧 edit_file {"find": "\t\tvar stderr strings.Builder\n\t\tcmd.Stdin = r.Body\n\t\tcmd.Stderr = &stderr\n\n\t\tout, err := cmd.Output()\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tt.Logf(\"http-backend %s %s: %v: %s\", r.Method, r.URL.Path, err, stderr.String())\n\t\t\thttp.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tt.Logf(\"http-backend %s %s auth=%q rc=0\", r.Method, r.URL.Path, r.Header.Get(\"Authorization\"))", "replace": "\t\tcmd.Stdin = r.Body\n\n\t\tout, err := cmd.Output()\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\thttp.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}", "path": "/project/internal/agentrun/sandbox_test.go"}
Arguments
{"find": "\t\tvar stderr strings.Builder\n\t\tcmd.Stdin = r.Body\n\t\tcmd.Stderr = &stderr\n\n\t\tout, err := cmd.Output()\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tt.Logf(\"http-backend %s %s: %v: %s\", r.Method, r.URL.Path, err, stderr.String())\n\t\t\thttp.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tt.Logf(\"http-backend %s %s auth=%q rc=0\", r.Method, r.URL.Path, r.Header.Get(\"Authorization\"))", "replace": "\t\tcmd.Stdin = r.Body\n\n\t\tout, err := cmd.Output()\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\thttp.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}", "path": "/project/internal/agentrun/sandbox_test.go"}
Result
1 occurrences replaced
Thinking
Wait, I removed `var stderr strings.Builder` and `cmd.Stderr = &stderr` — but `strings` might no longer be used... no wait, `strings` is still used in the header parsing loop (`strings.Split`, `strings.Cut`, `strings.EqualFold`). OK.
Alright, let's run the full test suite + gofmt + vet:
Tool 🔧 bash {"command": "cd /project && gofmt -l internal/ && go build ./... && go vet ./... && go test ./... 2>&1 | tail -12", "timeout": 300}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /project && gofmt -l internal/ && go build ./... && go vet ./... && go test ./... 2>&1 | tail -12", "timeout": 300}
Result
internal/scheduler/scheduler_test.go ? github.com/abrander/zoo/cmd/zoo [no test files] ok github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/agentrun 0.187s ok github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/config (cached) ok github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/forgejo (cached) ok github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/livelog (cached) ok github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/llm (cached) ok github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/scheduler (cached) ok github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/store (cached) ok github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/tools (cached) ok github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/web (cached)
Thinking
All tests pass. The gofmt flag on `internal/scheduler/scheduler_test.go` is pre-existing (confirmed earlier — no diff against HEAD).
Now, let me do a final review of the complete new/changed files to make sure everything is consistent. I'll re-read the final versions of sandbox.go, sandbox_test.go, and the Run function in run.go.
All green (the gofmt flag on `scheduler_test.go` is pre-existing). Final review of the key files:
Tool 🔧 read_file {"path": "/project/internal/agentrun/sandbox.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 130}
Arguments
{"path": "/project/internal/agentrun/sandbox.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 130}
Result
{"path":"/project/internal/agentrun/sandbox.go","content":"package agentrun\r\n\r\nimport (\r\n\t\"context\"\r\n\t\"encoding/base64\"\r\n\t\"fmt\"\r\n\t\"net/url\"\r\n\r\n\t\"github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/tools\"\r\n)\r\n\r\n// basicAuthHeader builds the value of the Authorization header git\r\n// sends to Forgejo for every remote operation: the account the token\r\n// belongs to (username) and the token itself, base64-encoded per the\r\n// HTTP Basic scheme. Forgejo accepts a personal access token as the\r\n// password, but matching the token owner keeps the credential\r\n// unambiguous in server logs.\r\nfunc basicAuthHeader(username, token string) string {\r\n\tauth := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(username + \":\" + token))\r\n\r\n\treturn \"Authorization: Basic \" + auth\r\n}\r\n\r\n// gitAuthBases returns the URL bases to scope the sandbox's git\r\n// Authorization header to: the Forgejo host (with port) over both\r\n// http and https, so remote operations work regardless of which\r\n// scheme the agent's remotes use. Git matches http.\u003cbase\u003e.* config\r\n// against the full URL, scheme included — hence the scheme-prefixed\r\n// bases. Non-http(s) clone URLs (ssh, local paths) authenticate\r\n// through other means and need no header, so they report ok=false.\r\nfunc gitAuthBases(cloneURL string) ([]string, bool) {\r\n\tu, err := url.Parse(cloneURL)\r\n\tif err != nil || (u.Scheme != \"http\" \u0026\u0026 u.Scheme != \"https\") || u.Host == \"\" {\r\n\t\treturn nil, false\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\treturn []string{\"http://\" + u.Host, \"https://\" + u.Host}, true\r\n}\r\n\r\n// sandboxGitStep is one shell command setupSandboxGit runs in the\r\n// container, with a label for error messages.\r\ntype sandboxGitStep struct {\r\n\tlabel string\r\n\tcmd string\r\n}\r\n\r\n// sandboxGitCommands returns the steps setupSandboxGit runs, in order:\r\n// the git environment (safe.directory, commit identity, Forgejo\r\n// credential) and the clone + branch checkout into projectDir. Split\r\n// out from setupSandboxGit so tests can exercise the exact commands\r\n// without a Docker daemon.\r\nfunc sandboxGitCommands(projectDir, cloneURL, username, token, name, email, defaultBranch, branch string) []sandboxGitStep {\r\n\tsteps := []sandboxGitStep{\r\n\t\t{\"configure git safe.directory\", \"git config --system --add safe.directory '*'\"},\r\n\t\t{\"configure git user.name\", \"git config --global user.name \" + tools.ShellQuote(name)},\r\n\t\t{\"configure git user.email\", \"git config --global user.email \" + tools.ShellQuote(email)},\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tif bases, ok := gitAuthBases(cloneURL); ok {\r\n\t\tfor _, base := range bases {\r\n\t\t\tsteps = append(steps, sandboxGitStep{\r\n\t\t\t\t\"configure git credential\",\r\n\t\t\t\t\"git config --global http.\" + base + \".extraHeader \" + tools.ShellQuote(basicAuthHeader(username, token)),\r\n\t\t\t})\r\n\t\t}\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\treturn append(steps,\r\n\t\tsandboxGitStep{\"clone repository\", \"git clone --branch \" + tools.ShellQuote(defaultBranch) + \" --single-branch \" + tools.ShellQuote(cloneURL) + \" \" + tools.ShellQuote(projectDir)},\r\n\t\tsandboxGitStep{\"checkout branch \" + branch, \"git checkout -b \" + tools.ShellQuote(branch)},\r\n\t)\r\n}\r\n\r\n// setupSandboxGit prepares the container's git environment and clones\r\n// the repo into /project — entirely inside the sandbox, so the host\r\n// never runs git. It configures, in the container's global gitconfig:\r\n//\r\n// - the agent's commit identity (user.name / user.email), and\r\n// - an Authorization header scoped to the Forgejo host, so every\r\n// remote operation the agent runs in the sandbox (clone, fetch,\r\n// pull, push) authenticates with the given token and simply works.\r\n//\r\n// safe.directory is set at --system scope so it holds regardless of\r\n// which user a later exec runs as; identity and the credential use\r\n// --global (the container runs as one user throughout its life).\r\n//\r\n// Errors carry the step's label, never the command itself: the\r\n// credential step embeds the token (base64-encoded) and must not leak\r\n// it into the job log.\r\nfunc setupSandboxGit(ctx context.Context, docker *dockerRuntime, containerID, cloneURL, username, token, name, email, defaultBranch, branch string) error {\r\n\tfor _, s := range sandboxGitCommands(\"/project\", cloneURL, username, token, name, email, defaultBranch, branch) {\r\n\t\tout, exitCode, err := docker.exec(ctx, containerID, s.cmd)\r\n\t\tif err != nil {\r\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"%s: %w\", s.label, err)\r\n\t\t}\r\n\r\n\t\tif exitCode != 0 {\r\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"%s: exit %d: %s\", s.label, exitCode, out)\r\n\t\t}\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\treturn nil\r\n}\r","start_line":1,"end_line":103,"total_lines":103,"truncated":false}
Thinking
sandbox.go looks good. One more thing to double-check: the `git checkout -b` step — this runs with the container's WorkingDir = /project (set in createContainer). In the test, we run it from projectDir. Consistent. ✓
Now, one more thing I want to reconsider: **the `git config --global` steps and `--system` safe.directory** — in the container, exec runs as the image's default user (root for golang:latest). `git config --global` → /root/.gitconfig. All execs (including the agent's bash tool) run as the same default user. ✓
Another check — **`GIT_CONFIG_COUNT` environment variable** in docker.exec: it sets color.ui=never via env. This takes precedence over file config for that key only. Doesn't affect extraHeader. ✓ (Verified by reasoning; the e2e test doesn't set these env vars, but the mechanism is per-key so it's fine.)
Next, let me also re-check the final state of the Run function in run.go, and the remaining files I haven't re-read since editing (the final state of tools/git.go, the final state of tools/context.go).
Tool 🔧 read_file {"end_line": 200, "path": "/project/internal/agentrun/run.go", "start_line": 100}
Arguments
{"end_line": 200, "path": "/project/internal/agentrun/run.go", "start_line": 100}
Result
{"path":"/project/internal/agentrun/run.go","content":"}\r\n\r\n// Run implements scheduler.Runner.\r\nfunc (r *Runner) Run(ctx context.Context, jobID string, agent config.AgentConfig, llmCfg config.LLM, dockerImage string, ev forgejo.Event) error {\r\n\tctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, r.timeout)\r\n\tdefer cancel()\r\n\r\n\tlogger := r.logger.With(\"job\", jobID, \"agent\", agent.Name)\r\n\r\n\trepoInfo, err := r.forgejo.RepositoryInfo(ev.Owner, ev.Repo)\r\n\tif err != nil {\r\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"look up repository: %w\", err)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tworkDir, err := os.MkdirTemp(\"\", \"zoo-run-*\")\r\n\tif err != nil {\r\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"create work dir: %w\", err)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tsucceeded := false\r\n\r\n\tdefer func() {\r\n\t\tif succeeded || !r.keepOnFailure {\r\n\t\t\tos.RemoveAll(workDir)\r\n\t\t} else {\r\n\t\t\tlogger.Warn(\"keeping work dir after failure\", \"dir\", workDir)\r\n\t\t}\r\n\t}()\r\n\r\n\tbranch := fmt.Sprintf(\"issue-%d-%s\", ev.Index, agent.Name)\r\n\tprojectDir := filepath.Join(workDir, \"project\")\r\n\r\n\tif err := os.MkdirAll(projectDir, 0o755); err != nil {\r\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"create project dir: %w\", err)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\troster := buildRoster(r.forgejo, r.cfg.Agents, logger)\r\n\tgitName, gitEmail := gitIdentity(agent.Name, roster)\r\n\r\n\teventPath := filepath.Join(workDir, \"event.json\")\r\n\tif err := os.WriteFile(eventPath, ev.Raw, 0o644); err != nil {\r\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"write event file: %w\", err)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tcontainerID, err := r.docker.createContainer(ctx, dockerImage, []string{\r\n\t\tprojectDir + \":/project\",\r\n\t\teventPath + \":/event:ro\",\r\n\t}, fmt.Sprintf(\"zoo-issue-%d-%s\", ev.Index, agent.Name))\r\n\tif err != nil {\r\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"start container: %w\", err)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tdefer func() {\r\n\t\tcleanupCtx, cleanupCancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 30*time.Second)\r\n\t\tdefer cleanupCancel()\r\n\t\tif err := r.docker.remove(cleanupCtx, containerID); err != nil {\r\n\t\t\tlogger.Warn(\"failed to remove container\", \"container\", containerID, \"error\", err)\r\n\t\t}\r\n\t}()\r\n\r\n\t// The clone happens inside the sandbox, and the sandbox's git is\r\n\t// authenticated with the agent's own token when one is configured\r\n\t// (so its commits and pushes are attributed to its own identity,\r\n\t// matching forgejoAs), falling back to the shared zoo identity —\r\n\t// whose Forgejo account is \"zoo\" — for agents without one.\r\n\tgitUsername, gitToken := \"zoo\", r.forgejo.Token()\r\n\tif agent.Token != \"\" {\r\n\t\tgitUsername, gitToken = agent.Name, agent.Token\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tif err := setupSandboxGit(ctx, r.docker, containerID, repoInfo.CloneURL, gitUsername, gitToken, gitName, gitEmail, repoInfo.DefaultBranch, branch); err != nil {\r\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"prepare git working tree in sandbox: %w\", err)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tlogAppend := func(stream, line string) {\r\n\t\tif err := r.store.AppendLog(context.Background(), jobID, stream, line); err != nil {\r\n\t\t\tlogger.Warn(\"failed to append log\", \"error\", err)\r\n\t\t}\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\trunCtx := \u0026runContext{\r\n\t\tdocker: r.docker,\r\n\t\tcontainerID: containerID,\r\n\t\tforgejo: \u0026runForgejoActions{\r\n\t\t\tclient: r.forgejoAs(agent.Name, agent.Token),\r\n\t\t\towner: ev.Owner,\r\n\t\t\trepo: ev.Repo,\r\n\t\t\tindex: ev.Index,\r\n\t\t\tlogger: logger,\r\n\t\t},\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tllmClient := llm.NewClient(llmCfg)\r\n\r\n\tsystemPrompt := defaultSystemPrompt + identitySection(agent.Name, roster)\r\n\r\n\tinstructions := r.cfg.EventInstructions(ev.Kind)\r\n\r\n\t// Fetch the full comment thread so the agent sees everything that's\r\n\t// been said on the issue/PR, not just the triggering event (which\r\n\t// only carries the latest comment, if any). A failure degrades to\r","start_line":100,"end_line":200,"total_lines":320,"truncated":true}
Thinking
The Run function looks correct. Next, let me check the final state of the git tool and its tests, then think about the remaining concerns:
1. **The `git` tool's description in the LLM tool definition**: "Run a git subcommand with optional arguments against the project's working tree" — no problem.
2. **The git tool's doc comment** — updated. ✓
3. **One remaining question**: the `git` tool's allowlist includes `fetch`, `pull`, `push`, `ls-remote` — these all work now. Should I add more subcommands (e.g., `remote`, `tag`, `merge`, `rebase`, `stash`)? The issue says "enable the agent to do its own git operations — even against the remote." The existing allowlist already covers remote operations. The agent can also use `bash` for arbitrary git commands (bash runs inside the container, and git is available). So the allowlist isn't a constraint on capability — it's just a convenience tool. Let's leave it as is (surgical change).
4. **The `git pull` requirement**: verified in e2e tests. ✓
5. **What about the `zoo.hcl.example` file?** Let me check if it mentions anything about git/token that needs updating.
Let me check zoo.hcl.example.
Tool 🔧 read_file {"path": "/project/zoo.hcl.example", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 80}
Arguments
{"path": "/project/zoo.hcl.example", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 80}
Result
{"path":"/project/zoo.hcl.example","content":"# zoo.hcl - Configuration for the zoo daemon.\r\n#\r\n# Copy this file to zoo.hcl (gitignored) and fill in real values.\r\n\r\nllm \"Qwen 3.6\" {\r\n openai = \"https://code.stdio.dk\"\r\n token = \"TOKEN\"\r\n model = \"Qwen3.6\"\r\n}\r\n\r\nllm \"Qwen 3.8\" {\r\n openai = \"https://code.stdio.dk\"\r\n token = \"TOKEN\"\r\n model = \"Qwen3.8\"\r\n}\r\n\r\nforgejo {\r\n url = \"https://code.stdio.dk\"\r\n token = \"ZOO_SERVICE_TOKEN\"\r\n # Shared secret configured on the Forgejo webhook. Required to accept\r\n # webhook deliveries; polling works without it.\r\n webhook_secret = \"EXAMPLE_WEBHOOK_SECRET\"\r\n}\r\n\r\nenvironment {\r\n docker_image = \"golang:latest\"\r\n max_live_agents = 5\r\n}\r\n\r\nagent \"anna\" {\r\n llm = \"Qwen 3.6\"\r\n token = \"ANNA_FORGEJO_TOKEN\"\r\n}\r\n\r\nagent \"greg\" {\r\n llm = \"Qwen 3.8\"\r\n token = \"GREG_FORGEJO_TOKEN\"\r\n}\r\n\r\n# \"leon\" doubles as the expected Forgejo assignee username for\r\n# issue:assigned events - see the event block below.\r\nagent \"leon\" {\r\n llm = \"Qwen 3.8\"\r\n token = \"LEON_FORGEJO_TOKEN\"\r\n}\r\n\r\nagent \"mika\" {\r\n llm = \"Qwen 3.6\"\r\n token = \"MIKA_FORGEJO_TOKEN\"\r\n}\r\n\r\nevent \"issue:new\" {\r\n agent = \"leon\"\r\n}\r\n\r\nevent \"issue:assigned\" {\r\n // No `agent` here: the agent whose name matches the Forgejo\r\n // assignee's username is triggered.\r\n instructions = \"Please handle this issue.\"\r\n}\r\n\r\nevent \"issue:comment\" {\r\n agent = \"leon\"\r\n instructions = \"Please review what this comment says and respond appropriately.\"\r\n}\r\n\r\nevent \"pr:new\" {\r\n agent = \"greg\"\r\n instructions = \"Please review this pull request and respond appropriately.\"\r\n}\r","start_line":1,"end_line":70,"total_lines":70,"truncated":false}
Thinking
The example in zoo.hcl already has per-agent tokens — no changes needed there.
Alright, let me think about the remaining risks and edge cases:
1. **Token in the container's gitconfig**: `/root/.gitconfig` inside the container — ephemeral, deleted along with the container. ✓
2. **What if the agent's token doesn't have write access to the repo?** In that case, push will fail with 403 — the agent will see the error. That's the correct behavior (the agent's own token determines the permissions).
3. **What if `agent.Token` is set but the agent's Forgejo username differs from the config label?** The roster code assumes label == username ("the agent config label doubles as the Forgejo username"). Consistent with existing assumptions.
4. **`git pull` when the agent is on a branch without upstream**: `git pull` will error with "There is no tracking information for the current branch" — that's normal git behavior, and the agent can use `git pull origin main`. No problem.
5. **The `git` tool's `context.Background()`**: existing pattern (all tools do this). No change.
6. **What about the `ls-remote` subcommand?** It works with the header. ✓
7. **Security review**: The token is now inside the sandbox (intentional, per the issue). The scope of the Authorization header is limited to the Forgejo host (both schemes) — it's not leaked to third-party hosts that the agent might git-fetch from. The token is not included in the clone URL. Error messages use step labels, not raw commands. The job log records tool calls (arguments/results) — the git tool's arguments don't include the token. The bash tool's commands are recorded — if the agent runs `cat /root/.gitconfig` via bash, the token will show up in the job log — but that's the agent's own choice, and the token is meant to be available inside the sandbox.
8. **One more thing to double-check**: `docker.go`'s exec environment sets `GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT=0` — good, so if auth fails, git will fail immediately rather than hanging.
9. **The `safe.directory '*'` step** — kept as the first step. ✓
10. **What about `git config --global` when HOME is not set inside the container?** The container runs as root, and HOME=/root is set by the image's entrypoint... wait, the container's entrypoint is overridden to `sleep infinity`, but the environment variables (HOME) come from the image config. golang:latest has HOME=/root. ✓ (And the existing code already depended on root's environment for --system config.)
11. **The `git clone` step when the repo is large**: the exec has no explicit timeout other than the run's ctx (120 min). Same as before (the host-side clone also had the run's ctx). ✓
12. **`--single-branch`**: kept. ✓
Now — one more important review point. Let me re-check the `tools/git.go` file in its entirety and make sure the doc comments and code are consistent:
The example config already documents per-agent tokens — no change needed. Let me review the final git tool and its test:
Tool 🔧 read_file {"path": "/project/internal/tools/git.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 80}
Arguments
{"path": "/project/internal/tools/git.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 80}
Result
{"path":"/project/internal/tools/git.go","content":"package tools\r\n\r\nimport (\r\n\t\"context\"\r\n\t\"fmt\"\r\n\t\"slices\"\r\n\t\"strings\"\r\n\r\n\t\"github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/llm\"\r\n)\r\n\r\n// gitAllowed intentionally excludes remote-mutating subcommands other\r\n// than push: agents are expected to commit and push their own branch,\r\n// not touch remotes/config/etc.\r\nvar gitAllowed = []string{\r\n\t\"add\",\r\n\t\"branch\",\r\n\t\"checkout\",\r\n\t\"commit\",\r\n\t\"diff\",\r\n\t\"fetch\",\r\n\t\"log\",\r\n\t\"ls-remote\",\r\n\t\"pull\",\r\n\t\"push\",\r\n\t\"show\",\r\n\t\"status\",\r\n\t\"rm\",\r\n}\r\n\r\ntype gitParams struct {\r\n\tSubcommand string `json:\"subcommand\"`\r\n\tArgs []string `json:\"args\"`\r\n}\r\n\r\nfunc init() {\r\n\ttool := llm.NewTool(\r\n\t\t\"git\",\r\n\t\t\"Run a git subcommand with optional arguments against the project's working tree\")\r\n\r\n\ttool.AddEnumProperty(\"subcommand\", \"The git subcommand to run\", gitAllowed, true)\r\n\ttool.AddStringArrayProperty(\"args\", \"Additional arguments to pass to the git subcommand, e.g. ['HEAD~1', 'HEAD']\", false)\r\n\r\n\tRegister(tool, git)\r\n}\r\n\r\n// git runs subcommand via Context.Exec inside the run's container,\r\n// against the bind-mounted working tree at /project. Remote operations\r\n// (fetch, pull, push) authenticate through the Authorization header the\r\n// runner puts in the container's global gitconfig (see\r\n// internal/agentrun.Run), so they work from inside the sandbox.\r\nfunc git(ctx Context, params gitParams) (string, error) {\r\n\tif !slices.Contains(gitAllowed, params.Subcommand) {\r\n\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"git subcommand '%s' is not allowed. Only %s are permitted\", params.Subcommand, strings.Join(gitAllowed, \", \"))\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tcmd := \"git \" + params.Subcommand\r\n\r\n\tfor _, arg := range params.Args {\r\n\t\tcmd += \" \" + ShellQuote(arg)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\toutput, err := ctx.Exec(context.Background(), cmd)\r\n\tif err != nil {\r\n\t\treturn \"\", err\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tif output == \"\" {\r\n\t\tswitch params.Subcommand {\r\n\t\tcase \"diff\":\r\n\t\t\treturn \"No changes detected.\", nil\r\n\r\n\t\tcase \"status\":\r\n\t\t\treturn \"No status output.\", nil\r\n\t\t}\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\treturn strings.TrimSpace(output), nil\r\n}\r","start_line":1,"end_line":79,"total_lines":79,"truncated":false}
Thinking
The git tool looks fine. Next, let me check the final version of sandbox_test.go as a whole to make sure it's clean:
Tool 🔧 read_file {"path": "/project/internal/agentrun/sandbox_test.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 210}
Arguments
{"path": "/project/internal/agentrun/sandbox_test.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 210}
Result
{"path":"/project/internal/agentrun/sandbox_test.go","content":"package agentrun\r\n\r\nimport (\r\n\t\"bytes\"\r\n\t\"encoding/base64\"\r\n\t\"fmt\"\r\n\t\"net/http\"\r\n\t\"net/http/httptest\"\r\n\t\"os\"\r\n\t\"os/exec\"\r\n\t\"path/filepath\"\r\n\t\"reflect\"\r\n\t\"strings\"\r\n\t\"testing\"\r\n\r\n\t\"github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/tools\"\r\n)\r\n\r\nfunc TestGitAuthBases(t *testing.T) {\r\n\tcases := []struct {\r\n\t\turl string\r\n\t\tbases []string\r\n\t\tok bool\r\n\t}{\r\n\t\t{\"https://code.stdio.dk/abrander/zoo.git\", []string{\"http://code.stdio.dk\", \"https://code.stdio.dk\"}, true},\r\n\t\t{\"http://localhost:3000/abrander/zoo.git\", []string{\"http://localhost:3000\", \"https://localhost:3000\"}, true},\r\n\t\t{\"git@code.stdio.dk:abrander/zoo.git\", nil, false},\r\n\t\t{\"file:///srv/git/zoo.git\", nil, false},\r\n\t\t{\"relative/path\", nil, false},\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tfor _, tc := range cases {\r\n\t\tbases, ok := gitAuthBases(tc.url)\r\n\t\tif ok != tc.ok || !reflect.DeepEqual(bases, tc.bases) {\r\n\t\t\tt.Errorf(\"gitAuthBases(%q) = (%v, %v), want (%v, %v)\", tc.url, bases, ok, tc.bases, tc.ok)\r\n\t\t}\r\n\t}\r\n}\r\n\r\nfunc TestBasicAuthHeader(t *testing.T) {\r\n\twant := \"Authorization: Basic \" + base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(\"greg:tok123\"))\r\n\r\n\tif got := basicAuthHeader(\"greg\", \"tok123\"); got != want {\r\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"basicAuthHeader = %q, want %q\", got, want)\r\n\t}\r\n}\r\n\r\n// TestSandboxGitCommandsRemoteOps runs the exact commands\r\n// setupSandboxGit runs in the container (minus the --system\r\n// safe.directory step, which needs root) against a local repository\r\n// served over HTTP with basic auth, and verifies that clone, push, and\r\n// pull all work with only the gitconfig credential — the \"git pull\r\n// must simply work\" guarantee.\r\nfunc TestSandboxGitCommandsRemoteOps(t *testing.T) {\r\n\tif _, err := exec.LookPath(\"git\"); err != nil {\r\n\t\tt.Skip(\"git not available\")\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tconst (\r\n\t\tusername = \"greg\"\r\n\t\ttoken = \"sekret\"\r\n\t)\r\n\r\n\tgit := func(dir string, args ...string) {\r\n\t\tcmd := exec.Command(args[0], args[1:]...)\r\n\t\tcmd.Dir = dir\r\n\r\n\t\tout, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()\r\n\t\tif err != nil {\r\n\t\t\tt.Fatalf(\"%v: %v: %s\", args, err, out)\r\n\t\t}\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\t// A bare \"remote\" repo with one commit on main, standing in for\r\n\t// Forgejo's git endpoint.\r\n\tremoteRoot := t.TempDir()\r\n\tbare := filepath.Join(remoteRoot, \"zoo.git\")\r\n\r\n\tgit(\"\", \"git\", \"init\", \"-q\", \"--bare\", bare)\r\n\tgit(bare, \"git\", \"symbolic-ref\", \"HEAD\", \"refs/heads/main\")\r\n\r\n\tseed := t.TempDir()\r\n\tgit(\"\", \"git\", \"init\", \"-q\", \"-b\", \"main\", seed)\r\n\tgit(seed, \"git\", \"config\", \"user.name\", \"seed\")\r\n\tgit(seed, \"git\", \"config\", \"user.email\", \"seed@zoo.local\")\r\n\tif err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(seed, \"hello.txt\"), []byte(\"hello\\n\"), 0o644); err != nil {\r\n\t\tt.Fatal(err)\r\n\t}\r\n\tgit(seed, \"git\", \"add\", \".\")\r\n\tgit(seed, \"git\", \"commit\", \"-q\", \"-m\", \"initial\")\r\n\tgit(seed, \"git\", \"push\", \"-q\", bare, \"main\")\r\n\r\n\t// Serve the bare repo over HTTP, demanding basic auth.\r\n\twantAuth := \"Basic \" + base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(username+\":\"+token))\r\n\r\n\tsrv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\r\n\t\tif r.Header.Get(\"Authorization\") != wantAuth {\r\n\t\t\tw.Header().Set(\"WWW-Authenticate\", `Basic realm=\"git\"`)\r\n\t\t\thttp.Error(w, \"Unauthorized\", http.StatusUnauthorized)\r\n\t\t\treturn\r\n\t\t}\r\n\r\n\t\tcmd := exec.Command(\"git\", \"http-backend\")\r\n\t\tcmd.Env = append(os.Environ(),\r\n\t\t\t\"REQUEST_METHOD=\"+r.Method,\r\n\t\t\t\"PATH_INFO=\"+r.URL.Path,\r\n\t\t\t\"QUERY_STRING=\"+r.URL.RawQuery,\r\n\t\t\t\"CONTENT_TYPE=\"+r.Header.Get(\"Content-Type\"),\r\n\t\t\t\"GIT_PROJECT_ROOT=\"+remoteRoot,\r\n\t\t\t\"GIT_HTTP_EXPORT_ALL=1\",\r\n\t\t\t\"REMOTE_USER=\"+username,\r\n\t\t)\r\n\t\tcmd.Stdin = r.Body\r\n\r\n\t\tout, err := cmd.Output()\r\n\t\tif err != nil {\r\n\t\t\thttp.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)\r\n\t\t\treturn\r\n\t\t}\r\n\r\n\t\thdr, payload, _ := bytes.Cut(out, []byte(\"\\r\\n\\r\\n\"))\r\n\t\tstatus := 200\r\n\r\n\t\tfor _, line := range strings.Split(string(hdr), \"\\r\\n\") {\r\n\t\t\tk, v, ok := strings.Cut(line, \": \")\r\n\t\t\tif !ok {\r\n\t\t\t\tcontinue\r\n\t\t\t}\r\n\r\n\t\t\tif strings.EqualFold(k, \"Status\") {\r\n\t\t\t\t_, _ = fmt.Sscanf(v, \"%d\", \u0026status)\r\n\r\n\t\t\t\tcontinue\r\n\t\t\t}\r\n\r\n\t\t\tw.Header().Set(k, v)\r\n\t\t}\r\n\r\n\t\tw.WriteHeader(status)\r\n\t\t_, _ = w.Write(payload)\r\n\t}))\r\n\tdefer srv.Close()\r\n\r\n\t// A temp HOME so the steps' `git config --global` writes there\r\n\t// instead of the test runner's real gitconfig.\r\n\thome := t.TempDir()\r\n\tprojectDir := t.TempDir()\r\n\r\n\tsh := func(dir, command string) string {\r\n\t\tcmd := exec.Command(\"sh\", \"-c\", command)\r\n\t\tcmd.Dir = dir\r\n\t\tcmd.Env = []string{\r\n\t\t\t\"HOME=\" + home,\r\n\t\t\t\"PATH=\" + os.Getenv(\"PATH\"),\r\n\t\t\t\"GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT=0\",\r\n\t\t}\r\n\r\n\t\tout, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()\r\n\t\tif err != nil {\r\n\t\t\tt.Fatalf(\"sh -c %q: %v: %s\", command, err, out)\r\n\t\t}\r\n\r\n\t\treturn string(out)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tcloneURL := srv.URL + \"/zoo.git\"\r\n\r\n\t// The container's WorkingDir is /project, so the steps (notably the\r\n\t// branch checkout) run from the working tree.\r\n\tfor _, s := range sandboxGitCommands(projectDir, cloneURL, username, token, \"Greg Coolio\", \"greg@zoo.local\", \"main\", \"issue-38-greg\") {\r\n\t\tif s.label == \"configure git safe.directory\" {\r\n\t\t\tcontinue // --system scope needs root; orthogonal to auth\r\n\t\t}\r\n\r\n\t\tsh(projectDir, s.cmd)\r\n\t}\r\n\r\n\t// The agent commits on its branch and pushes it.\r\n\tsh(projectDir, \"echo world \u003e\u003e hello.txt \u0026\u0026 git add . \u0026\u0026 git commit -q -m 'agent change' \u0026\u0026 git push -q origin issue-38-greg\")\r\n\r\n\t// A second sandbox (fresh clone, same credential) pushes to main.\r\n\tother := t.TempDir()\r\n\tsh(\"\", \"git clone -q \"+tools.ShellQuote(cloneURL)+\" \"+tools.ShellQuote(other))\r\n\tsh(other, \"echo more \u003e\u003e hello.txt \u0026\u0026 git add . \u0026\u0026 git commit -q -m 'other change' \u0026\u0026 git push -q origin main\")\r\n\r\n\t// And the pull that must simply work.\r\n\tout := sh(projectDir, \"git checkout -q main \u0026\u0026 git pull \u0026\u0026 cat hello.txt\")\r\n\tif !strings.Contains(out, \"more\") {\r\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"git pull did not bring in the remote commit, output: %s\", out)\r\n\t}\r\n}\r","start_line":1,"end_line":191,"total_lines":191,"truncated":false}
Thinking
The test file looks fine. One small point: `git("", "git", "init", "-q", "--bare", bare)` — when dir is "", cmd.Dir remains "" (the test process's cwd), but since `git init <path>` takes an absolute path, it's fine.
Another consideration: `git init -q -b main seed` — the `-b` flag requires git ≥ 2.28. The docker-tagged integration tests already assume a modern git (golang:latest image). For the plain tests, if git is old, it'll fail rather than skip… Acceptable — the environment here (and CI) has modern git. Actually, hmm, should I be more defensive? The test already skips when git isn't present. For old git, `git init -b` will fail with "unknown switch" → t.Fatalf. This is an edge case, and the repo's own development environment (golang:latest, git 2.47) is fine.
Now, let me also reconsider the `git` helper's name shadowing: inside the test, `git := func(...)` shadows the "git" binary name — that's fine since we call it as `git(dir, "git", ...)`.
One more thing to double-check: in `TestSandboxGitCommandsRemoteOps`, the second clone `sh("", "git clone -q ...")` — dir="" means the test process's cwd. The clone target is the absolute path `other`. No problem.
Now — let me think once more about whether there are any issues with the **order of steps** in `sandboxGitCommands`:
1. `git config --system --add safe.directory '*'` — needs to happen before any git operation on the bind-mounted tree (the clone). ✓ (first)
2. user.name/user.email — before the clone (not strictly needed for the clone, but needed for later commits). ✓
3. Credentials — before the clone (the clone needs auth). ✓
4. Clone. ✓
5. checkout -b. ✓
Good.
**Another potential issue**: `git config --system --add safe.directory '*'` — if the container image doesn't have git at all, this will fail with a clear error ("configure git safe.directory: ..."). Same as before. ✓
**What about the `event.json` bind mount** — no change. ✓
Now, let me also reconsider the **`git` tool's description** for the LLM: "Run a git subcommand with optional arguments against the project's working tree". Now that git runs inside the container, this is accurate.
And the **system.md** update — let me re-read the final version:
Let me verify the final system.md and check the whole diff once more, then look at the full test file list:
Tool 🔧 read_file {"path": "/project/internal/agentrun/system.md", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 45}
Arguments
{"path": "/project/internal/agentrun/system.md", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 45}
Result
{"path":"/project/internal/agentrun/system.md","content":"You are an autonomous coding agent working inside `zoo`, a system that\r\ntriggers you from Forgejo (a Gitea-family forge) issue/PR events.\r\n\r\n**Your environment**\r\n\r\n- Your working tree is at `/project`, checked out on a fresh branch off\r\n the repository's default branch. Only `/project` persists; nothing\r\n outside it survives between tool calls.\r\n- The event that triggered you (issue or pull request JSON) is available\r\n at `/event` inside the container, and is also included below.\r\n- You have a real git remote configured with push access. When you're\r\n done, `git add`/`git commit`/`git push` your branch — that's how your\r\n work gets saved. Nothing is persisted automatically.\r\n\r\n**Tools**\r\n\r\n- `bash`, `git`, `read_file`, `write_file`, `list_files`, `grep_search`,\r\n `move_file`, `remove_file` operate on the project container.\r\n- `comment`, `open_pull_request`, `request_review`, `add_label`,\r\n `remove_label`, `close_issue`, `reopen_issue`, `assign_issue` act\r\n directly on the Forgejo issue/PR that triggered this run — use\r\n `comment` to report back to the person who filed it, and\r\n `open_pull_request` once you've pushed a branch with your changes.\r\n\r\nBelow, in \"Your identity\" and \"Other agents\", you'll find your own role\r\n(from your Forgejo profile) and a roster of the other agents zoo runs,\r\neach with their own role. If a task in front of you clearly belongs to\r\nsomeone else's role, use `assign_issue` to hand it off rather than\r\ndoing it yourself.\r\n\r\n**Git**\r\n\r\nYou may use normal git commands to manage your working tree. Remote\r\ngit operations (pull, fetch, push, etc.) are pre-authenticated in the\r\nsandbox and simply work — the `git` tool or `bash` both run inside it.\r\n\r\n**Guidelines**\r\n\r\n- Make surgical changes: modify only what's necessary for the task in\r\n the triggering event.\r\n- Before finishing, verify your changes (re-read the file, run tests or\r\n a build if the project has them).\r\n- Always leave a `comment` summarizing what you did (or why you couldn't\r\n finish), and use `open_pull_request` when you have a change ready for\r\n review. Don't leave the issue without a response.\r","start_line":1,"end_line":45,"total_lines":45,"truncated":false}
Tool 🔧 bash {"command": "cd /project && go test ./... 2>&1 | grep -v \"no test files\" && gofmt -l internal/agentrun internal/tools internal/forgejo; echo \"gofmt clean: $?\"", "timeout": 300}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /project && go test ./... 2>&1 | grep -v \"no test files\" && gofmt -l internal/agentrun internal/tools internal/forgejo; echo \"gofmt clean: $?\"", "timeout": 300}
Result
ok github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/agentrun (cached) ok github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/config (cached) ok github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/forgejo (cached) ok github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/livelog (cached) ok github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/llm (cached) ok github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/scheduler (cached) ok github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/store (cached) ok github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/tools (cached) ok github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/web (cached) gofmt clean: 0
Thinking
Everything's clean. Next, let me run the new tests one more time with the race detector enabled, and also run the agentrun tests in verbose mode to confirm that all the tests in the package pass:
All clean. Let me run the full agentrun + tools tests with the race detector as a final check:
Tool 🔧 bash {"command": "cd /project && go test -race ./internal/agentrun/ ./internal/tools/ -v 2>&1 | grep -E \"^(=== RUN|--- (PASS|FAIL|SKIP)|PASS|FAIL|ok)\" | head -40", "timeout": 300}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /project && go test -race ./internal/agentrun/ ./internal/tools/ -v 2>&1 | grep -E \"^(=== RUN|--- (PASS|FAIL|SKIP)|PASS|FAIL|ok)\" | head -40", "timeout": 300}
Result
=== RUN TestIdentitySectionIncludesSelfAndOthers --- PASS: TestIdentitySectionIncludesSelfAndOthers (0.00s) === RUN TestIdentitySectionNoOthers --- PASS: TestIdentitySectionNoOthers (0.00s) === RUN TestGitIdentityFromProfile --- PASS: TestGitIdentityFromProfile (0.00s) === RUN TestGitIdentityFallsBackWhenProfileIncomplete --- PASS: TestGitIdentityFallsBackWhenProfileIncomplete (0.00s) === RUN TestGitIdentityUnknownAgent --- PASS: TestGitIdentityUnknownAgent (0.00s) === RUN TestGitAuthBases --- PASS: TestGitAuthBases (0.00s) === RUN TestBasicAuthHeader --- PASS: TestBasicAuthHeader (0.00s) === RUN TestSandboxGitCommandsRemoteOps --- PASS: TestSandboxGitCommandsRemoteOps (0.19s) === RUN TestSeedMessageIncludesInstructions --- PASS: TestSeedMessageIncludesInstructions (0.00s) === RUN TestSeedMessageOmitsEmptyInstructions --- PASS: TestSeedMessageOmitsEmptyInstructions (0.00s) === RUN TestSeedMessageIncludesAllComments --- PASS: TestSeedMessageIncludesAllComments (0.00s) === RUN TestSeedMessageOmitsEmptyComments --- PASS: TestSeedMessageOmitsEmptyComments (0.00s) PASS ok github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/agentrun 1.205s === RUN TestShellQuote --- PASS: TestShellQuote (0.00s) === RUN TestReadFileParsesMetaAndContent --- PASS: TestReadFileParsesMetaAndContent (0.00s) === RUN TestGitRejectsDisallowedSubcommand --- PASS: TestGitRejectsDisallowedSubcommand (0.00s) === RUN TestGitPassesSubcommandAndArgsThrough --- PASS: TestGitPassesSubcommandAndArgsThrough (0.00s) === RUN TestCommentToolCallsForgejo --- PASS: TestCommentToolCallsForgejo (0.00s) === RUN TestAssignIssueToolCallsForgejo --- PASS: TestAssignIssueToolCallsForgejo (0.00s) === RUN TestGrepSearchUsesExtendedRegex --- PASS: TestGrepSearchUsesExtendedRegex (0.00s)
Thinking
All tests pass with the race detector enabled.
Alright, let me commit and push, then open a PR and comment on the issue.
Let me write a good commit message. Following the repo's style (looking at git log: "Include full issue comment thread in the agent's seed message", "fix(tools): make grep_search actually use regex (ERE)", "Move max_live_agents into the environment block") — imperative mood, concise.
Commit message:
```
Move git into the sandbox: clone in-container, pass the token via gitconfig
The host used to clone the repo and run the agent's git commands
outside the container (only push was authenticated, via a
per-invocation -c override). The sandbox itself had no credential, so
remote operations could not work from inside it.
Now the container is created first and setupSandboxGit does everything
inside it: safe.directory, the agent's commit identity, an
Authorization header scoped to the Forgejo host (both schemes) in the
container's global gitconfig, and the clone + branch checkout. The
git tool runs via Exec like every other tool, and no git runs on the
host at all.
The sandbox authenticates with the agent's own token when configured
(matching forgejoAs), falling back to the shared zoo identity.
TestSandboxGitCommandsRemoteOps runs the exact setup commands against
a local repo served over HTTP with basic auth and verifies clone,
push, and pull all work with only the gitconfig credential.
```
Hmm, this is good. Let me commit and push.
All tests pass with `-race`. Time to commit and push:
Tool 🔧 bash {"command": "cd /project && git add -A && git status --short"}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /project && git add -A && git status --short"}
Result
D internal/agentrun/clone.go M internal/agentrun/context.go M internal/agentrun/run.go A internal/agentrun/sandbox.go A internal/agentrun/sandbox_test.go M internal/agentrun/system.md M internal/forgejo/client.go M internal/tools/context.go M internal/tools/git.go M internal/tools/grep_search.go M internal/tools/list_files.go M internal/tools/move_file.go M internal/tools/read_file.go M internal/tools/remove_file.go M internal/tools/shell.go M internal/tools/tools_test.go
Thinking
Everything's staged. Let's commit with a descriptive message.
Tool 🔧 bash {"command": "cd /project && git commit -q -F - <<'EOF'\nMove git into the sandbox: clone in-container, pass the token via gitconfig\n\nThe host used to clone the repo and run the agent's git commands\noutside the container (only push was authenticated, via a\nper-invocation -c override). The sandbox itself held no credential, so\nremote operations could not work from inside it.\n\nNow the container is created first and setupSandboxGit does everything\ninside it: safe.directory, the agent's commit identity, an\nAuthorization header scoped to the Forgejo host (both schemes) in the\ncontainer's global gitconfig, and the clone + branch checkout. The git\ntool runs via Exec like every other tool, and no git runs on the host\nat all.\n\nThe sandbox authenticates with the agent's own token when configured\n(matching forgejoAs), falling back to the shared zoo identity.\n\nTestSandboxGitCommandsRemoteOps runs the exact setup commands against\na local repo served over HTTP with basic auth and verifies that clone,\npush, and pull all work with only the gitconfig credential.\nEOF\ngit log --oneline -2 && git push -q origin issue-38-greg && echo pushed", "timeout": 120}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /project && git commit -q -F - <<'EOF'\nMove git into the sandbox: clone in-container, pass the token via gitconfig\n\nThe host used to clone the repo and run the agent's git commands\noutside the container (only push was authenticated, via a\nper-invocation -c override). The sandbox itself held no credential, so\nremote operations could not work from inside it.\n\nNow the container is created first and setupSandboxGit does everything\ninside it: safe.directory, the agent's commit identity, an\nAuthorization header scoped to the Forgejo host (both schemes) in the\ncontainer's global gitconfig, and the clone + branch checkout. The git\ntool runs via Exec like every other tool, and no git runs on the host\nat all.\n\nThe sandbox authenticates with the agent's own token when configured\n(matching forgejoAs), falling back to the shared zoo identity.\n\nTestSandboxGitCommandsRemoteOps runs the exact setup commands against\na local repo served over HTTP with basic auth and verifies that clone,\npush, and pull all work with only the gitconfig credential.\nEOF\ngit log --oneline -2 && git push -q origin issue-38-greg && echo pushed", "timeout": 120}
Result
ERROR CALLING TOOL: command failed: command exited with status 128
Thinking
The commit failed with exit code 128. Let me check what happened — it might be a git identity issue in this container (user.name/user.email not set), or maybe a hook. Let me run the commit on its own and check the error.
Tool 🔧 bash {"command": "cd /project && git config user.name; git config user.email; git commit -m \"test\" 2>&1 | head -5; git status --short | head -3"}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /project && git config user.name; git config user.email; git commit -m \"test\" 2>&1 | head -5; git status --short | head -3"}
Result
Greg Coolio greg@example.com On branch issue-38-greg nothing to commit, working tree clean
Thinking
Interesting — "nothing to commit, working tree clean" — so the commit actually succeeded (the heredoc commit went through), and the subsequent `git log` + `git push` chain... no wait, the whole command failed with 128. Let me check: the commit with -F - should have succeeded, and then `git log --oneline -2 && git push -q origin issue-38-greg` — maybe the push failed (128 = git fatal). Let me check the log and try the push on its own.
The commit actually succeeded — the push must have failed. Let me check:
Tool 🔧 bash {"command": "cd /project && git log --oneline -2; echo \"---\"; git push origin issue-38-greg 2>&1 | head -10", "timeout": 120}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /project && git log --oneline -2; echo \"---\"; git push origin issue-38-greg 2>&1 | head -10", "timeout": 120}
Result
0a346ec (HEAD -> issue-38-greg) Move git into the sandbox: clone in-container, pass the token via gitconfig 42fe9d9 (origin/main, origin/HEAD, main) Merge pull request 'Include full issue comment thread in the agent's seed message' (#34) from issue-33-greg into main --- fatal: could not read Username for 'https://code.stdio.dk': terminal prompts disabled
Thinking
The commit succeeded, but the push failed: "could not read Username for 'https://code.stdio.dk': terminal prompts disabled".
Interesting — so the remote is `https://code.stdio.dk/...`, and this sandbox doesn't have git credentials configured! Wait — but this is the sandbox I'm running in, and it's supposed to have the token passed to it… but this is a deployed zoo that's running an old version (the host-side git version), so my sandbox doesn't have the gitconfig credentials — that's exactly the bug this issue is describing! The deployed system is running old code where git runs on the host side, and my sandbox has no credentials.
Hmm, wait, but how am I supposed to push my own branch then? The system prompt says "you have a real git remote configured with push access. When you're done, `git add`/`git commit`/`git push` your branch — that's how your work gets saved."
Let me check the git remote configuration and see if there's a credential helper or token somewhere:
The commit went through but push fails — my own sandbox has no git credential (the deployed zoo still runs the old host-side code — exactly the bug this issue describes). Let me inspect what's available:
Tool 🔧 bash {"command": "cd /project && git remote -v; echo \"---\"; git config -l --show-origin 2>/dev/null | head -20; echo \"---\"; ls -la /root/.gitconfig /etc/gitconfig 2>&1; echo \"---\"; env | grep -i -E \"token|git\" | sed 's/=.*/=<redacted>/' | head"}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /project && git remote -v; echo \"---\"; git config -l --show-origin 2>/dev/null | head -20; echo \"---\"; ls -la /root/.gitconfig /etc/gitconfig 2>&1; echo \"---\"; env | grep -i -E \"token|git\" | sed 's/=.*/=<redacted>/' | head"}
Result
origin https://code.stdio.dk/abrander/zoo.git (fetch) origin https://code.stdio.dk/abrander/zoo.git (push) --- file:/etc/gitconfig safe.directory=* file:.git/config core.repositoryformatversion=0 file:.git/config core.filemode=true file:.git/config core.bare=false file:.git/config core.logallrefupdates=true file:.git/config remote.origin.url=https://code.stdio.dk/abrander/zoo.git file:.git/config remote.origin.fetch=+refs/heads/main:refs/remotes/origin/main file:.git/config branch.main.remote=origin file:.git/config branch.main.merge=refs/heads/main file:.git/config user.name=Greg Coolio file:.git/config user.email=greg@example.com command line: color.ui=never --- -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 22 Aug 24 08:27 /etc/gitconfig -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 0 Aug 24 08:43 /root/.gitconfig --- GIT_CONFIG_COUNT=<redacted> GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_0=<redacted> GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT=<redacted> GIT_CONFIG_KEY_0=<redacted> GIT_PAGER=<redacted>
Thinking
Confirmed: my sandbox has no git credentials at all:
- `/root/.gitconfig` is empty (0 bytes)
- `/etc/gitconfig` only has safe.directory
- No token in environment variables
- The remote is a plain https URL
This is the old deployment (host-side git). In other words, I can't push from inside the sandbox — which is exactly the problem this issue is asking to fix.
So then, how does the deployed zoo normally save the agent's work? In the old code, the `git` tool runs on the host side, and the host has the token. In my current run, the deployed zoo is running the old code, so the `git` tool should run on the host side with the token for push... but wait, I'm trying to push directly via bash (not through the git tool). The bash tool runs inside the container — no credentials.
The system prompt says: "For remote (pull, fetch, push, etc.) git operations, use the `git` tool." — the git tool (host-side in the old deployment) authenticates the push!
So, I should push using the `git` tool: `git push origin issue-38-greg`. Let's try that.
My sandbox has no credentials (old deployment). The `git` tool is the authenticated path — let me push through it:
Tool 🔧 git {"subcommand": "push", "args": ["origin", "issue-38-greg"]}
Arguments
{"subcommand": "push", "args": ["origin", "issue-38-greg"]}
Result
To https://code.stdio.dk/abrander/zoo.git * [new branch] issue-38-greg -> issue-38-greg
Thinking
The push succeeded via the git tool (host-side, authenticated). This confirms the following:
1. My branch has been pushed.
2. The old behavior (host-side git) is what's currently running in the production environment — which is exactly what this issue is asking to change.
Next, I'll open a PR and post a comment on the issue.
Pushed. Now open the PR:
Tool 🔧 open_pull_request {"head": "issue-38-greg", "base": "main", "title": "Pass the token to the sandbox: clone and all git operations inside the container", "body": "## What\n\nImplements #38: the agent's token is passed to the sandbox, the initial clone happens inside it, and no git runs on the host anymore.\n\n## How\n\n**`internal/agentrun/sandbox.go` (new)** — `setupSandboxGit` prepares the container's git environment and clones the repo, entirely via `docker exec`:\n\n1. `git config --system --add safe.directory '*'` (unchanged, still first)\n2. `git config --global user.name` / `user.email` (moved from host-side local config)\n3. `git config --global http.<base>.extraHeader 'Authorization: Basic …'` — the token, scoped to the Forgejo host only (both `http://` and `https://` bases, since git matches `http.<base>.*` against the full URL, scheme included — verified empirically). This is the \"populate .gitconfig\" part: with it, **every** remote op the agent runs in the sandbox — clone, fetch, pull, push — authenticates and simply works.\n4. `git clone --branch <default> --single-branch <url> /project` + `git checkout -b <branch>`\n\n**Token selection** mirrors `forgejoAs`: the agent's own token when configured (pushes attributed to its identity), falling back to the shared zoo identity for agents without one.\n\n**`internal/agentrun/run.go`** — `Run()` now creates the container first, then sets up git inside it. The host-side `cloneAndBranch`/`runGit`/`runGitAuthed` helpers (`clone.go`) are deleted; the host never runs git.\n\n**`internal/tools/git.go` + `context.go`** — the `git` tool now runs via `Exec` inside the container like every other tool (args shell-quoted); the obsolete `Context.Git` host-side method is removed from the interface. `shellQuote` is exported as `tools.ShellQuote` since agentrun needs it too.\n\n**Security notes**\n- The credential is scoped to the Forgejo host, so if an agent clones a third-party repo in the sandbox, the token is not sent to it.\n- The token never appears in the clone URL or in error messages (setup steps report labels, not raw commands).\n- It lives in the container's own `/root/.gitconfig` (ephemeral, removed with the container), not in the bind-mounted working tree.\n\n## Verification\n\n- `go build`, `go vet`, full `go test ./...` (plus `-race`) — green.\n- New `TestSandboxGitCommandsRemoteOps` runs the **exact** setup commands against a local bare repo served over HTTP with basic auth (via `git http-backend`) and verifies clone, branch push, and `git pull` all succeed with only the gitconfig credential — the \"git pull must simply work\" guarantee.\n- Docker-tagged integration tests are unaffected (they exercise `dockerRuntime` directly); no Docker daemon in this environment to run them here.\n\nOne behavior change to be aware of: agents without a per-agent token get the shared `zoo` identity for git (as before); agents *with* a token now push as themselves, consistent with their Forgejo API actions."}
Arguments
{"head": "issue-38-greg", "base": "main", "title": "Pass the token to the sandbox: clone and all git operations inside the container", "body": "## What\n\nImplements #38: the agent's token is passed to the sandbox, the initial clone happens inside it, and no git runs on the host anymore.\n\n## How\n\n**`internal/agentrun/sandbox.go` (new)** — `setupSandboxGit` prepares the container's git environment and clones the repo, entirely via `docker exec`:\n\n1. `git config --system --add safe.directory '*'` (unchanged, still first)\n2. `git config --global user.name` / `user.email` (moved from host-side local config)\n3. `git config --global http.<base>.extraHeader 'Authorization: Basic …'` — the token, scoped to the Forgejo host only (both `http://` and `https://` bases, since git matches `http.<base>.*` against the full URL, scheme included — verified empirically). This is the \"populate .gitconfig\" part: with it, **every** remote op the agent runs in the sandbox — clone, fetch, pull, push — authenticates and simply works.\n4. `git clone --branch <default> --single-branch <url> /project` + `git checkout -b <branch>`\n\n**Token selection** mirrors `forgejoAs`: the agent's own token when configured (pushes attributed to its identity), falling back to the shared zoo identity for agents without one.\n\n**`internal/agentrun/run.go`** — `Run()` now creates the container first, then sets up git inside it. The host-side `cloneAndBranch`/`runGit`/`runGitAuthed` helpers (`clone.go`) are deleted; the host never runs git.\n\n**`internal/tools/git.go` + `context.go`** — the `git` tool now runs via `Exec` inside the container like every other tool (args shell-quoted); the obsolete `Context.Git` host-side method is removed from the interface. `shellQuote` is exported as `tools.ShellQuote` since agentrun needs it too.\n\n**Security notes**\n- The credential is scoped to the Forgejo host, so if an agent clones a third-party repo in the sandbox, the token is not sent to it.\n- The token never appears in the clone URL or in error messages (setup steps report labels, not raw commands).\n- It lives in the container's own `/root/.gitconfig` (ephemeral, removed with the container), not in the bind-mounted working tree.\n\n## Verification\n\n- `go build`, `go vet`, full `go test ./...` (plus `-race`) — green.\n- New `TestSandboxGitCommandsRemoteOps` runs the **exact** setup commands against a local bare repo served over HTTP with basic auth (via `git http-backend`) and verifies clone, branch push, and `git pull` all succeed with only the gitconfig credential — the \"git pull must simply work\" guarantee.\n- Docker-tagged integration tests are unaffected (they exercise `dockerRuntime` directly); no Docker daemon in this environment to run them here.\n\nOne behavior change to be aware of: agents without a per-agent token get the shared `zoo` identity for git (as before); agents *with* a token now push as themselves, consistent with their Forgejo API actions."}
Result
Pull request opened
Thinking
The PR has been opened. Next, I'll post a comment on the issue summarizing what was done (the issue is #38, and the PR references it).
Now comment on the issue to report back:
Tool 🔧 comment {"body": "Done — PR opened: **Pass the token to the sandbox: clone and all git operations inside the container**\n\nWhat changed:\n\n1. **Clone happens inside the sandbox.** The container is created first; `setupSandboxGit` (new `internal/agentrun/sandbox.go`) then runs `git clone --branch <default> --single-branch <url> /project` + `git checkout -b <branch>` via `docker exec`. The host-side `cloneAndBranch`/`runGit` helpers are gone — the host never runs git anymore.\n\n2. **The token is in the sandbox's gitconfig.** After container start, the runner writes into the container's global gitconfig:\n ```\n http.https://code.stdio.dk.extraHeader = Authorization: Basic <base64(user:token)>\n http.http://code.stdio.dk.extraHeader = Authorization: Basic <base64(user:token)>\n ```\n (plus the agent's `user.name`/`user.email`, and the existing `safe.directory`). With that in place, `git pull` — and fetch/push/clone — simply works from inside the sandbox. One gotcha I verified empirically: git matches `http.<base>.*` against the *full URL including scheme*, so the base must be `https://code.stdio.dk`, not just the host — a bare host silently matches nothing.\n\n3. **Which token:** the agent's own token when configured (so pushes are attributed to the agent, matching how Forgejo API actions already work via `forgejoAs`), falling back to the shared `zoo` identity for agents without one.\n\n4. **The `git` tool now runs inside the container** via `Exec` like every other tool; the old host-side `Context.Git` path (with its per-invocation `-c` auth override for push) is deleted.\n\nSecurity: the credential is scoped to the Forgejo host only (so it's not leaked to third-party remotes an agent might clone), never appears in the clone URL or in error messages (setup errors carry step labels, not raw commands), and lives in the container's ephemeral `/root/.gitconfig` rather than the bind-mounted working tree.\n\nVerification: full `go test ./...` + `-race` green, including a new `TestSandboxGitCommandsRemoteOps` that runs the exact setup commands against a local repo served over HTTP with basic auth (`git http-backend`) and proves clone, push, and pull all work with only the gitconfig credential. Docker isn't available in my sandbox, so the docker-tagged integration tests couldn't run here — they're unaffected (they test `dockerRuntime` directly)."}
Arguments
{"body": "Done — PR opened: **Pass the token to the sandbox: clone and all git operations inside the container**\n\nWhat changed:\n\n1. **Clone happens inside the sandbox.** The container is created first; `setupSandboxGit` (new `internal/agentrun/sandbox.go`) then runs `git clone --branch <default> --single-branch <url> /project` + `git checkout -b <branch>` via `docker exec`. The host-side `cloneAndBranch`/`runGit` helpers are gone — the host never runs git anymore.\n\n2. **The token is in the sandbox's gitconfig.** After container start, the runner writes into the container's global gitconfig:\n ```\n http.https://code.stdio.dk.extraHeader = Authorization: Basic <base64(user:token)>\n http.http://code.stdio.dk.extraHeader = Authorization: Basic <base64(user:token)>\n ```\n (plus the agent's `user.name`/`user.email`, and the existing `safe.directory`). With that in place, `git pull` — and fetch/push/clone — simply works from inside the sandbox. One gotcha I verified empirically: git matches `http.<base>.*` against the *full URL including scheme*, so the base must be `https://code.stdio.dk`, not just the host — a bare host silently matches nothing.\n\n3. **Which token:** the agent's own token when configured (so pushes are attributed to the agent, matching how Forgejo API actions already work via `forgejoAs`), falling back to the shared `zoo` identity for agents without one.\n\n4. **The `git` tool now runs inside the container** via `Exec` like every other tool; the old host-side `Context.Git` path (with its per-invocation `-c` auth override for push) is deleted.\n\nSecurity: the credential is scoped to the Forgejo host only (so it's not leaked to third-party remotes an agent might clone), never appears in the clone URL or in error messages (setup errors carry step labels, not raw commands), and lives in the container's ephemeral `/root/.gitconfig` rather than the bind-mounted working tree.\n\nVerification: full `go test ./...` + `-race` green, including a new `TestSandboxGitCommandsRemoteOps` that runs the exact setup commands against a local repo served over HTTP with basic auth (`git http-backend`) and proves clone, push, and pull all work with only the gitconfig credential. Docker isn't available in my sandbox, so the docker-tagged integration tests couldn't run here — they're unaffected (they test `dockerRuntime` directly)."}
Result
Comment posted
Thinking
Everything is done:
1. ✅ Implemented the changes
2. ✅ All tests passing (build, vet, test, race)
3. ✅ Committed and pushed the branch
4. ✅ Opened a PR
5. ✅ Commented on the issue
Let me do a final sanity check on the state of the working tree and confirm that the PR was created correctly.
Final sanity check:
Tool 🔧 bash {"command": "cd /project && git status --short; git log --oneline -2; git ls-remote origin issue-38-greg 2>/dev/null || echo \"(remote check needs auth - push already confirmed)\""}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /project && git status --short; git log --oneline -2; git ls-remote origin issue-38-greg 2>/dev/null || echo \"(remote check needs auth - push already confirmed)\""}
Result
0a346ec (HEAD -> issue-38-greg) Move git into the sandbox: clone in-container, pass the token via gitconfig 42fe9d9 (origin/main, origin/HEAD, main) Merge pull request 'Include full issue comment thread in the agent's seed message' (#34) from issue-33-greg into main (remote check needs auth - push already confirmed)
Thinking
Everything is in order:
- Working tree is clean
- Commit `0a346ec` on `issue-38-greg`
- Branch has been pushed (confirmed via git tool: "* [new branch] issue-38-greg -> issue-38-greg")
- PR opened
- Issue commented on
The task is complete. Let me summarize what I did.
The issue is fully handled. Summary of what was done:
## Issue #38: Pass the token to the sandbox ✅
**PR opened** from `issue-38-greg` → `main`, with a comment left on the issue.
### Changes
**`internal/agentrun/sandbox.go` (new)** — `setupSandboxGit` runs everything inside the container via `docker exec`:
1. `safe.directory` (unchanged, still `--system`)
2. Agent's `user.name`/`user.email` (moved from host-side local config to container global gitconfig)
3. **The token**: `http.<base>.extraHeader = Authorization: Basic …` in the container's global gitconfig, scoped to the Forgejo host over both schemes — this is the "populate .gitconfig" part that makes `git pull`/`fetch`/`push` simply work
4. `git clone` + `git checkout -b` — **the initial clone now happens inside the sandbox**
**Token selection** mirrors the existing `forgejoAs` pattern: the agent's own token when configured (pushes attributed to the agent), falling back to the shared `zoo` identity.
**`run.go`** — container is created first, git setup happens inside it; host-side `clone.go` (`cloneAndBranch`/`runGit`/`runGitAuthed`) deleted. **No git runs on the host anymore.**
**`tools/git.go` + `context.go`** — the `git` tool now runs inside the container via `Exec` like every other tool; the obsolete host-side `Context.Git` method removed.
### Notable findings during verification
- Git matches `http.<base>.*` config against the **full URL including scheme** — a bare host base silently matches nothing (verified against a local header-logging server), so the base is `https://code.stdio.dk`, not `code.stdio.dk`.
- The credential is host-scoped (not leaked to third-party remotes), never in the clone URL or error messages, and lives in the container's ephemeral `/root/.gitconfig`, not the bind-mounted tree.
### Verification
- `go build`, `go vet`, `go test ./...` + `-race` — all green
- New `TestSandboxGitCommandsRemoteOps` runs the **exact** setup commands against a local bare repo served over HTTP with basic auth (`git http-backend`) and proves clone, branch push, and `git pull` all succeed with only the gitconfig credential
- Docker daemon isn't available in this sandbox, so the docker-tagged integration tests couldn't run here (they're unaffected — they test `dockerRuntime` directly)
An amusing confirmation of the issue's premise: my own sandbox (running the old deployed code) had no git credential at all — I had to push my branch through the host-side `git` tool, which is precisely what this PR eliminates.