Thinking
Let's start by understanding the task. This issue is about git credentials in the sandbox. The concern is that the sandbox (the container where I run) is given a Git token that has full API access to the Forgejo instance. The request is to think of a clever way to enable the agent to perform git operations (push, pull, fetch) without exposing a broad API key to the sandbox.
This is an architecture-level design question. First, let's explore the project to understand how the sandbox currently works and how git authentication is currently set up.
Let's take a look at the repository structure.
Tool
🔧 list_files
{"path": ".", "recursive": true}
Arguments
{"path": ".", "recursive": true}
Result
/project/README.md
/project/cmd
/project/cmd/zoo
/project/cmd/zoo/main.go
/project/docker
/project/docker/Dockerfile
/project/docker/group
/project/docker/passwd
/project/docker/shadow
/project/docker/uid1000-sudo
/project/go.mod
/project/go.sum
/project/internal
/project/internal/agentrun
/project/internal/agentrun/context.go
/project/internal/agentrun/docker.go
/project/internal/agentrun/docker_integration_test.go
/project/internal/agentrun/forgejo.go
/project/internal/agentrun/loop.go
/project/internal/agentrun/roster.go
/project/internal/agentrun/roster_test.go
/project/internal/agentrun/run.go
/project/internal/agentrun/sandboxgit.go
/project/internal/agentrun/sandboxgit_test.go
/project/internal/agentrun/seed_test.go
/project/internal/agentrun/system.md
/project/internal/config
/project/internal/config/config.go
/project/internal/config/config_test.go
/project/internal/forgejo
/project/internal/forgejo/client.go
/project/internal/forgejo/client_test.go
/project/internal/forgejo/event.go
/project/internal/forgejo/poll.go
/project/internal/forgejo/poll_test.go
/project/internal/forgejo/repo_filter.go
/project/internal/forgejo/repo_filter_test.go
/project/internal/forgejo/watcher.go
/project/internal/forgejo/watcher_test.go
/project/internal/forgejo/webhook.go
/project/internal/forgejo/webhook_test.go
/project/internal/livelog
/project/internal/livelog/hub.go
/project/internal/livelog/hub_test.go
/project/internal/llm
/project/internal/llm/client.go
/project/internal/llm/streamer.go
/project/internal/llm/streamer_test.go
/project/internal/llm/types.go
/project/internal/scheduler
/project/internal/scheduler/scheduler.go
/project/internal/scheduler/scheduler_test.go
/project/internal/store
/project/internal/store/schema.sql
/project/internal/store/store.go
/project/internal/store/store_test.go
/project/internal/tools
/project/internal/tools/bash.go
/project/internal/tools/context.go
/project/internal/tools/edit-file.go
/project/internal/tools/forgejo.go
/project/internal/tools/grep_search.go
/project/internal/tools/list_files.go
/project/internal/tools/move_file.go
/project/internal/tools/read_file.go
/project/internal/tools/registry.go
/project/internal/tools/remove_file.go
/project/internal/tools/shell.go
/project/internal/tools/tools_test.go
/project/internal/tools/write_file.go
/project/internal/web
/project/internal/web/templates.go
/project/internal/web/web.go
/project/internal/web/web_test.go
/project/zoo.hcl.example
Tool
🔧 bash
{"command": "cd /project && git log --oneline -10 && git branch -a"}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /project && git log --oneline -10 && git branch -a"}
Result
98298f6 Merge pull request 'Fix excessive vertical space in job view blocks (#53)' (#55) from issue-53-greg into main
b75b64d Fix excessive vertical space in job view blocks
10c3dce Better Docker/git inter.
315f993 Add docker image build.
5717258 Merge pull request 'forgejo: repository allowlist with wildcard patterns' (#40) from issue-39-greg into main
823ae62 fix(forgejo): resolve test helper collision after merging main
bccf930 Merge branch 'main' into issue-39-greg
1365ea8 Merge pull request 'Pass the agent's git credential to the sandbox, clone inside it' (#49) from issue-48-greg into main
7c60789 Remove the git tool and Context.Git per review
c3d3720 Pass the agent's git credential to the sandbox, clone inside it
* issue-56-greg
main
remotes/origin/main
Thinking
Let's take a look at the main files: `sandboxgit.go` (which seems to be the current mechanism for passing git credentials to the sandbox), `docker.go`, `config.go`, and `run.go`.
Tool
🔧 read_file
{"path": "internal/agentrun/sandboxgit.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 200}
Arguments
{"path": "internal/agentrun/sandboxgit.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 200}
Result
{"path":"internal/agentrun/sandboxgit.go","content":"package agentrun\n\nimport (\n\t\"context\"\n\t\"encoding/base64\"\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"net/url\"\n\t\"strings\"\n)\n\n// This file makes git \"just work\" inside the agent's container: the\n// initial clone happens in the sandbox, and the sandbox's git\n// credential is written to the container's system gitconfig so every\n// subsequent remote operation (pull, fetch, push, ...) authenticates\n// without any per-invocation plumbing. Zoo itself never runs git\n// outside the sandbox.\n\n// shellQuote wraps s in single quotes for safe interpolation into a\n// `sh -c` command string, escaping any embedded single quotes.\nfunc shellQuote(s string) string {\n\treturn \"'\" + strings.ReplaceAll(s, \"'\", `'\\''`) + \"'\"\n}\n\n// shellGitCmd renders `git \u003cargs...\u003e` as one sh -c command line with\n// every argument quoted, for docker exec.\nfunc shellGitCmd(args ...string) string {\n\tparts := make([]string, 0, len(args)+1)\n\tparts = append(parts, \"git\")\n\n\tfor _, a := range args {\n\t\tparts = append(parts, shellQuote(a))\n\t}\n\n\treturn strings.Join(parts, \" \")\n}\n\n// runSandboxGit runs `git \u003cargs...\u003e` inside containerID (in its\n// working directory, /project) and returns its combined output. A\n// non-zero exit code is an error carrying the output.\nfunc runSandboxGit(ctx context.Context, rt *dockerRuntime, containerID string, args ...string) (string, error) {\n\tout, exitCode, err := rt.exec(ctx, containerID, shellGitCmd(args...))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn out, err\n\t}\n\n\tif exitCode != 0 {\n\t\treturn out, fmt.Errorf(\"git %s: exit %d: %s\", args[0], exitCode, out)\n\t}\n\n\treturn out, nil\n}\n\n// gitAuthHeader returns the value of an Authorization header that\n// authenticates git's smart-HTTP requests as user with token.\nfunc gitAuthHeader(user, token string) string {\n\tauth := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(user + \":\" + token))\n\n\treturn \"Authorization: Basic \" + auth\n}\n\n// forgeHost returns the scheme+host prefix of cloneURL, e.g.\n// \"https://code.stdio.dk\" for \"https://code.stdio.dk/abrander/zoo.git\".\n// On a parse failure it falls back to the full URL, which is a valid\n// (narrower) prefix match too.\nfunc forgeHost(cloneURL string) string {\n\tu, err := url.Parse(cloneURL)\n\tif err != nil || u.Host == \"\" {\n\t\treturn cloneURL\n\t}\n\n\treturn u.Scheme + \"://\" + u.Host\n}\n\n// configureSandboxGit writes the container's system gitconfig so git\n// works inside the sandbox without further setup:\n//\n// - safe.directory '*', so the bind-mounted /project is accepted\n// regardless of which UID the container runs git as;\n// - user.name / user.email, so commits are attributed to the agent;\n// - http.\u003chost\u003e.extraHeader carrying the run's Forgejo credential,\n// scoped to the forge host the repository lives on, so\n// clone/fetch/pull/push all authenticate transparently — including\n// for submodules and other repos on the same forge. The token is\n// only valid on that forge anyway, so the host scope grants no\n// extra access; git never sends it anywhere else;\n// - push.autoSetupRemote, so a bare `git push` on the fresh working\n// branch pushes it to origin and sets the upstream — after which\n// a bare `git pull` works too.\n//\n// The credential lives in the container's own filesystem (ephemeral,\n// torn down with the container), never in the bind-mounted working\n// tree: the origin remote keeps the plain cloneURL, so the token can't\n// leak into the repo's .git/config, into a work dir zoo keeps on\n// failure, or anywhere the host can read it back.\nfunc configureSandboxGit(ctx context.Context, rt *dockerRuntime, containerID, cloneURL, user, token, name, email string) error {\n\tif _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"config\", \"--global\", \"--add\", \"safe.directory\", \"*\"); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure safe.directory: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tif _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"config\", \"--global\", \"user.name\", name); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure user.name: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tif _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"config\", \"--global\", \"user.email\", email); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure user.email: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tif _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"config\", \"--global\", \"http.\"+forgeHost(cloneURL)+\".extraHeader\", gitAuthHeader(user, token)); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure git credential: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tif _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"config\", \"--global\", \"push.autoSetupRemote\", \"true\"); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure push.autoSetupRemote: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}\n\n// cloneAndBranch clones cloneURL into /project inside the container\n// and checks out a fresh branch off defaultBranch. The clone\n// authenticates via the http.\u003chost\u003e.extraHeader configured by\n// configureSandboxGit, and the origin remote is left with the plain\n// cloneURL: no credential ends up in the working tree.\nfunc cloneAndBranch(ctx context.Context, rt *dockerRuntime, containerID, cloneURL, defaultBranch, branch string) error {\n\tif _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"clone\", \"--branch\", defaultBranch, \"--single-branch\", cloneURL, \"/project\"); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"clone: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tif _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"checkout\", \"-b\", branch); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"checkout branch %q: %w\", branch, err)\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}\n\n// clonePRHead clones cloneURL into /project inside the container and\n// checks out the pull request's head as a local branch named headRef,\n// so commits the agent makes push straight to the PR. The head is\n// fetched via the PR's refs/pull/\u003cn\u003e/head ref rather than by branch\n// name, which also works for PRs opened from a fork, where the head\n// branch doesn't exist in the base repo.\nfunc clonePRHead(ctx context.Context, rt *dockerRuntime, containerID, cloneURL, defaultBranch, headRef string, index int64) error {\n\tif _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"clone\", \"--branch\", defaultBranch, \"--single-branch\", cloneURL, \"/project\"); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"clone: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tfetchRef := fmt.Sprintf(\"refs/pull/%d/head\", index)\n\n\tif _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"fetch\", \"--no-tags\", \"origin\", fetchRef); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"fetch PR %d head: %w\", index, err)\n\t}\n\n\tif _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"checkout\", \"-B\", headRef, \"FETCH_HEAD\"); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"checkout PR head %q: %w\", headRef, err)\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}","start_line":1,"end_line":158,"total_lines":158,"truncated":false}
Tool
🔧 read_file
{"path": "internal/agentrun/docker.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 250}
Arguments
{"path": "internal/agentrun/docker.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 250}
Result
{"path":"internal/agentrun/docker.go","content":"package agentrun\n\nimport (\n\t\"context\"\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"io\"\n\t\"time\"\n\n\t\"github.com/docker/docker/api/types/container\"\n\t\"github.com/docker/docker/client\"\n)\n\n// containerCPUs and containerMemory bound each agent container's\n// resource usage; there's no per-agent config knob for this yet (see\n// TODO.md), so every run gets the same sane default.\nconst (\n\tcontainerNanoCPUs = 2_000_000_000 // 2 CPUs\n\tcontainerMemory = 2 \u003c\u003c 30 // 2 GiB\n)\n\ntype dockerRuntime struct {\n\tcli *client.Client\n}\n\nfunc newDockerRuntime() (*dockerRuntime, error) {\n\tcli, err := client.NewClientWithOpts(client.FromEnv, client.WithAPIVersionNegotiation())\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"docker client: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\treturn \u0026dockerRuntime{cli: cli}, nil\n}\n\n// createContainer creates and starts a container from image with the\n// given bind mounts, kept alive with `sleep infinity` regardless of the\n// image's own entrypoint so it can be repeatedly `exec`'d into.\nfunc (d *dockerRuntime) createContainer(ctx context.Context, image string, binds []string, name string) (string, error) {\n\tresp, err := d.cli.ContainerCreate(ctx,\n\t\t\u0026container.Config{\n\t\t\tImage: image,\n\t\t\tEntrypoint: []string{\"sleep\"},\n\t\t\tCmd: []string{\"infinity\"},\n\t\t\tWorkingDir: \"/project\",\n\t\t},\n\t\t\u0026container.HostConfig{\n\t\t\tBinds: binds,\n\t\t\tResources: container.Resources{\n\t\t\t\tNanoCPUs: containerNanoCPUs,\n\t\t\t\tMemory: containerMemory,\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t},\n\t\tnil, nil, name)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"create container: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tif err := d.cli.ContainerStart(ctx, resp.ID, container.StartOptions{}); err != nil {\n\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"start container: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\treturn resp.ID, nil\n}\n\n// exec runs command via `sh -c` inside containerID and returns its\n// combined stdout+stderr (a TTY is attached so the two streams merge\n// without needing to demultiplex Docker's stdcopy framing) plus its exit\n// code.\nfunc (d *dockerRuntime) exec(ctx context.Context, containerID, command string) (string, int, error) {\n\tcreated, err := d.cli.ContainerExecCreate(ctx, containerID, container.ExecOptions{\n\t\tCmd: []string{\"sh\", \"-c\", command},\n\t\t// A TTY is attached (see doc comment above), which makes git's\n\t\t// isatty-based color.ui=auto default to enabling ANSI color codes\n\t\t// that pollute the captured job log. NO_COLOR covers tools that\n\t\t// honor that convention; the GIT_CONFIG_* override forces git's\n\t\t// own color.ui to \"never\" regardless of tty detection, since git\n\t\t// does not honor NO_COLOR itself.\n\t\t//\n\t\t// The same isatty check makes git launch a pager for diff/log/show,\n\t\t// and the pager (waiting on a stdin nothing ever attaches or\n\t\t// closes) then blocks forever with no way to time it out — see\n\t\t// exec's read loop below. GIT_PAGER/PAGER=cat disable that.\n\t\t// GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT=0 closes the same class of hang for\n\t\t// credential prompts on a private remote.\n\t\tEnv: []string{\n\t\t\t\"NO_COLOR=1\",\n\t\t\t\"GIT_CONFIG_COUNT=1\",\n\t\t\t\"GIT_CONFIG_KEY_0=color.ui\",\n\t\t\t\"GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_0=never\",\n\t\t\t\"GIT_PAGER=cat\",\n\t\t\t\"PAGER=cat\",\n\t\t\t\"GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT=0\",\n\t\t},\n\t\tTty: true,\n\t\tAttachStdout: true,\n\t\tAttachStderr: true,\n\t})\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn \"\", 0, fmt.Errorf(\"exec create: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tattached, err := d.cli.ContainerExecAttach(ctx, created.ID, container.ExecAttachOptions{Tty: true})\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn \"\", 0, fmt.Errorf(\"exec attach: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\tdefer attached.Close()\n\n\t// Once hijacked, this stream is a raw connection that ctx cancellation\n\t// no longer reaches — a wedged child process (pager, credential\n\t// prompt, anything else reading a stdin nobody attaches) would\n\t// otherwise block this read forever, past the run's deadline, with no\n\t// way to recover the job. Race the read against ctx and force-remove\n\t// the container to sever the connection if it fires.\n\ttype readResult struct {\n\t\toutput []byte\n\t\terr error\n\t}\n\n\treadDone := make(chan readResult, 1)\n\n\tgo func() {\n\t\toutput, err := io.ReadAll(attached.Reader)\n\t\treadDone \u003c- readResult{output, err}\n\t}()\n\n\tvar output []byte\n\n\tselect {\n\tcase res := \u003c-readDone:\n\t\tif res.err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn \"\", 0, fmt.Errorf(\"exec read output: %w\", res.err)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\toutput = res.output\n\n\tcase \u003c-ctx.Done():\n\t\tkillCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second)\n\t\tdefer cancel()\n\n\t\t_ = d.cli.ContainerRemove(killCtx, containerID, container.RemoveOptions{Force: true})\n\t\t\u003c-readDone\n\n\t\treturn \"\", 0, ctx.Err()\n\t}\n\n\tinspect, err := d.cli.ContainerExecInspect(ctx, created.ID)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn string(output), 0, fmt.Errorf(\"exec inspect: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\treturn string(output), inspect.ExitCode, nil\n}\n\n// remove force-stops and removes containerID, ignoring \"already gone\"\n// errors so cleanup is safe to call unconditionally.\nfunc (d *dockerRuntime) remove(ctx context.Context, containerID string) error {\n\ttimeout := 5\n\t_ = d.cli.ContainerStop(ctx, containerID, container.StopOptions{Timeout: \u0026timeout})\n\n\tif err := d.cli.ContainerRemove(ctx, containerID, container.RemoveOptions{Force: true}); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"remove container: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}\n\nfunc (d *dockerRuntime) kill(ctx context.Context, containerID string) {\n\t_ = d.cli.ContainerKill(ctx, containerID, \"KILL\")\n}","start_line":1,"end_line":168,"total_lines":168,"truncated":false}
Thinking
Next, let's look at run.go and config.go to understand how tokens are passed around, and how the sandbox is set up.
Tool
🔧 read_file
{"path": "internal/agentrun/run.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 250}
Arguments
{"path": "internal/agentrun/run.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 250}
Result
{"path":"internal/agentrun/run.go","content":"// Package agentrun creates the throwaway per-job environment an agent\n// runs in: a Docker container with the agent's git working tree cloned\n// inside it (authenticated with the agent's own Forgejo token), the\n// triggering event written to /event, and the tool-calling loop\n// (internal/llm + internal/tools) driven against it.\npackage agentrun\n\nimport (\n\t\"context\"\n\t_ \"embed\"\n\t\"encoding/json\"\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"log/slog\"\n\t\"os\"\n\t\"path/filepath\"\n\t\"strings\"\n\t\"sync\"\n\t\"time\"\n\n\t\"github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/config\"\n\t\"github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/forgejo\"\n\t\"github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/livelog\"\n\t\"github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/llm\"\n\t\"github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/store\"\n)\n\n//go:embed system.md\nvar defaultSystemPrompt string\n\n// DefaultTimeout bounds a single agent run's wall-clock time if the\n// caller doesn't override it.\nconst DefaultTimeout = 120 * time.Minute\n\ntype Runner struct {\n\tdocker *dockerRuntime\n\tforgejo *forgejo.Client\n\tstore *store.Store\n\thub *livelog.Hub\n\tcfg *config.Config\n\tlogger *slog.Logger\n\ttimeout time.Duration\n\tkeepOnFailure bool\n\n\tagentClientsMu sync.Mutex\n\tagentClients map[string]*forgejo.Client\n}\n\nfunc NewRunner(cfg *config.Config, fg *forgejo.Client, st *store.Store, hub *livelog.Hub, logger *slog.Logger, timeout time.Duration, keepOnFailure bool) (*Runner, error) {\n\tdocker, err := newDockerRuntime()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\tif timeout \u003c= 0 {\n\t\ttimeout = DefaultTimeout\n\t}\n\n\treturn \u0026Runner{\n\t\tdocker: docker,\n\t\tforgejo: fg,\n\t\tstore: st,\n\t\thub: hub,\n\t\tcfg: cfg,\n\t\tlogger: logger,\n\t\ttimeout: timeout,\n\t\tkeepOnFailure: keepOnFailure,\n\t\tagentClients: make(map[string]*forgejo.Client),\n\t}, nil\n}\n\n// forgejoAs returns a Forgejo client that authenticates as the given\n// agent (using the agent's own token from config). This lets each agent\n// act as themselves on Forgejo without needing a global token with sudo\n// privileges. Clients are built once per agent and cached, since\n// constructing one costs an extra API round trip.\n//\n// If the agent has no token configured, falls back to the shared zoo\n// identity so existing deployments without per-agent tokens still work.\nfunc (r *Runner) forgejoAs(agentName, token string) *forgejo.Client {\n\tr.agentClientsMu.Lock()\n\tdefer r.agentClientsMu.Unlock()\n\n\tif c, ok := r.agentClients[agentName]; ok {\n\t\treturn c\n\t}\n\n\tvar c *forgejo.Client\n\tif token != \"\" {\n\t\tc = r.forgejo.As(token)\n\t} else {\n\t\t// Fallback: use shared identity. Optionally log a warning\n\t\t// if we ever want to enforce per-agent tokens.\n\t\tc = r.forgejo\n\t}\n\n\tr.agentClients[agentName] = c\n\n\treturn c\n}\n\n// Run implements scheduler.Runner.\nfunc (r *Runner) Run(ctx context.Context, jobID string, agent config.AgentConfig, llmCfg config.LLM, dockerImage string, ev forgejo.Event) error {\n\tctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, r.timeout)\n\tdefer cancel()\n\n\tlogger := r.logger.With(\"job\", jobID, \"agent\", agent.Name)\n\n\trepoInfo, err := r.forgejo.RepositoryInfo(ev.Owner, ev.Repo)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"look up repository: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tworkDir, err := os.MkdirTemp(\"\", \"zoo-run-*\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"create work dir: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tsucceeded := false\n\n\tdefer func() {\n\t\tif succeeded || !r.keepOnFailure {\n\t\t\tos.RemoveAll(workDir)\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tlogger.Warn(\"keeping work dir after failure\", \"dir\", workDir)\n\t\t}\n\t}()\n\n\t// The container bind-mounts projectDir as /project and does the\n\t// initial clone into it, so the (empty) directory must exist on the\n\t// host before the container is created — otherwise Docker would\n\t// create it itself, root-owned.\n\tprojectDir := filepath.Join(workDir, \"project\")\n\n\tif err := os.MkdirAll(projectDir, 0o755); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"create project dir: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\t// A pr:review run works on the PR's own head branch, so the agent's\n\t// commits push straight to the PR. Every other event kind branches\n\t// off the default branch as usual.\n\tvar review *forgejo.ReviewDetail\n\tbranch := fmt.Sprintf(\"issue-%d-%s\", ev.Index, agent.Name)\n\n\tif ev.Kind == forgejo.EventPRReview {\n\t\t// Always fetch the current head ref, not just when the event\n\t\t// lacks one (the polling path doesn't carry it): the webhook's\n\t\t// copy could be stale if the PR's head branch was renamed since\n\t\t// the review, and the push target depends on it.\n\t\theadRef := ev.HeadRef\n\n\t\tif prInfo, err := r.forgejo.PullRequestInfo(ev.Owner, ev.Repo, ev.Index); err != nil {\n\t\t\tlogger.Warn(\"fetch pull request head failed; falling back to the event's head ref\", \"error\", err)\n\t\t} else if prInfo.HeadRef != \"\" {\n\t\t\theadRef = prInfo.HeadRef\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif headRef == \"\" {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"pr:review event has no pull request head branch to check out\")\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tbranch = headRef\n\n\t\t// Fetch the full review (verdict, body, inline comments) so the\n\t\t// agent sees all the feedback, not just the triggering event. A\n\t\t// failure degrades to no review detail rather than failing the\n\t\t// run: the agent can still do its job, just without the inline\n\t\t// comments.\n\t\treview, err = r.forgejo.ReviewDetail(ev.Owner, ev.Repo, ev.Index, ev.ReviewID)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tlogger.Warn(\"fetch review detail failed; agent will not see inline review comments\", \"error\", err)\n\t\t\treview = nil\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\troster := buildRoster(r.forgejo, r.cfg.Agents, logger)\n\tgitName, gitEmail := gitIdentity(agent.Name, roster)\n\n\t// The credential the sandbox's git uses for remote operations: the\n\t// agent's own Forgejo token when configured, so its git activity is\n\t// attributed to its own account, falling back to the shared zoo\n\t// identity for deployments without per-agent tokens (mirroring\n\t// forgejoAs).\n\tgitUser, gitToken := \"zoo\", r.forgejo.Token()\n\n\tif agent.Token != \"\" {\n\t\tgitUser, gitToken = agent.Name, agent.Token\n\t}\n\n\teventPath := filepath.Join(workDir, \"event.json\")\n\tif err := os.WriteFile(eventPath, ev.Raw, 0o644); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"write event file: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tcontainerID, err := r.docker.createContainer(ctx, dockerImage, []string{\n\t\tprojectDir + \":/project\",\n\t\teventPath + \":/event:ro\",\n\t}, fmt.Sprintf(\"zoo-issue-%d-%s\", ev.Index, agent.Name))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"start container: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tdefer func() {\n\t\tcleanupCtx, cleanupCancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 30*time.Second)\n\t\tdefer cleanupCancel()\n\t\tif err := r.docker.remove(cleanupCtx, containerID); err != nil {\n\t\t\tlogger.Warn(\"failed to remove container\", \"container\", containerID, \"error\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t}()\n\n\t// Git must simply work inside the sandbox: safe.directory, commit\n\t// identity, and the remote credential all go into the container's\n\t// system gitconfig (see configureSandboxGit).\n\tif err := configureSandboxGit(ctx, r.docker, containerID, repoInfo.CloneURL, gitUser, gitToken, gitName, gitEmail); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure git in container: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\t// The initial clone happens inside the sandbox, so the working tree\n\t// is owned by the container's user and git never runs on the host.\n\tif ev.Kind == forgejo.EventPRReview {\n\t\tif err := clonePRHead(ctx, r.docker, containerID, repoInfo.CloneURL, repoInfo.DefaultBranch, branch, ev.Index); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"prepare git working tree: %w\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t} else {\n\t\tif err := cloneAndBranch(ctx, r.docker, containerID, repoInfo.CloneURL, repoInfo.DefaultBranch, branch); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"prepare git working tree: %w\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tlogAppend := func(stream, line string) {\n\t\tif err := r.store.AppendLog(context.Background(), jobID, stream, line); err != nil {\n\t\t\tlogger.Warn(\"failed to append log\", \"error\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\trunCtx := \u0026runContext{\n\t\tdocker: r.docker,\n\t\tcontainerID: containerID,\n\t\tforgejo: \u0026runForgejoActions{\n\t\t\tclient: r.forgejoAs(agent.Name, agent.Token),\n\t\t\towner: ev.Owner,\n\t\t\trepo: ev.Repo,\n\t\t\tindex: ev.Index,\n\t\t\tlogger: logger,\n\t\t},\n\t}\n\n\tllmClient := llm.NewClient(llmCfg)\n\n\tsystemPrompt := defaultSystemPrompt + identitySection(agent.Name, roster)\n","start_line":1,"end_line":250,"total_lines":437,"truncated":true}
Tool
🔧 read_file
{"path": "internal/config/config.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 250}
Arguments
{"path": "internal/config/config.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 250}
Result
{"path":"internal/config/config.go","content":"// Package config loads and validates zoo's HCL configuration file.\npackage config\n\nimport (\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"strings\"\n\n\t\"github.com/hashicorp/hcl/v2/hclsimple\"\n)\n\n// Known event kinds. issue:assigned and pr:review are resolved\n// dynamically (agent name must match the Forgejo assignee's username,\n// or the pull request author's username, respectively) so they never\n// carry an `agent` attribute; the rest map statically to one\n// configured agent.\nconst (\n\tEventIssueNew = \"issue:new\"\n\tEventIssueComment = \"issue:comment\"\n\tEventIssueAssigned = \"issue:assigned\"\n\tEventPRNew = \"pr:new\"\n\tEventPRReview = \"pr:review\"\n)\n\nvar staticEventKinds = map[string]bool{\n\tEventIssueNew: true,\n\tEventIssueComment: true,\n\tEventPRNew: true,\n}\n\ntype Config struct {\n\tLLMs []LLM `hcl:\"llm,block\"`\n\tForgejo Forgejo `hcl:\"forgejo,block\"`\n\tEnvironment Environment `hcl:\"environment,block\"`\n\tAgents []Agent `hcl:\"agent,block\"`\n\tEvents []Event `hcl:\"event,block\"`\n\tWeb *Web `hcl:\"web,block\"`\n}\n\n// Web configures the dashboard's optional bearer-token gate. Leave the\n// block out of zoo.hcl entirely to run without one (fine on localhost;\n// put a real gate or a proxy in front for anything else).\ntype Web struct {\n\tToken string `hcl:\"token,optional\"`\n}\n\ntype LLM struct {\n\tName string `hcl:\"name,label\"`\n\tOpenAI string `hcl:\"openai\"`\n\tToken string `hcl:\"token\"`\n\tModel string `hcl:\"model\"`\n}\n\ntype Forgejo struct {\n\tURL string `hcl:\"url\"`\n\tToken string `hcl:\"token\"`\n\tWebhookSecret string `hcl:\"webhook_secret,optional\"`\n\n\t// Repos is the allowlist of repository patterns to watch, e.g.\n\t// [\"acme/*\", \"acme/widgets\"]. Patterns are \"owner/repo\" pairs with\n\t// glob wildcards; \"*\" watches everything on the instance. An empty\n\t// list keeps the historical behavior of watching every repository\n\t// the token can see.\n\tRepos []string `hcl:\"repos,optional\"`\n}\n\ntype Environment struct {\n\tDockerImage string `hcl:\"docker_image\"`\n\tMaxLive int `hcl:\"max_live_agents\"`\n}\n\ntype Agent struct {\n\tName string `hcl:\"name,label\"`\n\tLLM string `hcl:\"llm\"`\n\tToken string `hcl:\"token,optional\"`\n}\n\ntype Event struct {\n\tKind string `hcl:\"name,label\"`\n\tAgent string `hcl:\"agent,optional\"`\n\tInstructions string `hcl:\"instructions,optional\"`\n}\n\n// Load reads and validates the config file at path.\nfunc Load(path string) (*Config, error) {\n\tvar cfg Config\n\n\tif err := hclsimple.DecodeFile(path, nil, \u0026cfg); err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"parse config: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tif err := cfg.Validate(); err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"invalid config: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\treturn \u0026cfg, nil\n}\n\n// Validate checks that the config is internally consistent: every\n// reference between blocks resolves, and required values are set.\nfunc (c *Config) Validate() error {\n\tllmNames := make(map[string]bool, len(c.LLMs))\n\tfor _, l := range c.LLMs {\n\t\tif l.OpenAI == \"\" || l.Token == \"\" || l.Model == \"\" {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"llm %q: openai, token, and model are required\", l.Name)\n\t\t}\n\t\tllmNames[l.Name] = true\n\t}\n\n\tif c.Forgejo.URL == \"\" || c.Forgejo.Token == \"\" {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"forgejo: url and token are required\")\n\t}\n\n\tfor _, p := range c.Forgejo.Repos {\n\t\tif err := validRepoPattern(p); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"forgejo: %w\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif c.Environment.MaxLive \u003c 1 {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"environment: max_live_agents must be \u003e= 1, got %d\", c.Environment.MaxLive)\n\t}\n\n\tif c.Environment.DockerImage == \"\" {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"environment: docker_image is required\")\n\t}\n\n\tagentNames := make(map[string]bool, len(c.Agents))\n\tfor _, a := range c.Agents {\n\t\tif !llmNames[a.LLM] {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"agent %q: references undeclared llm %q\", a.Name, a.LLM)\n\t\t}\n\t\tagentNames[a.Name] = true\n\t}\n\n\tseenEventKinds := make(map[string]bool, len(c.Events))\n\tfor _, e := range c.Events {\n\t\tif seenEventKinds[e.Kind] {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"event %q: declared more than once\", e.Kind)\n\t\t}\n\t\tseenEventKinds[e.Kind] = true\n\n\t\tswitch {\n\t\tcase e.Kind == EventIssueAssigned:\n\t\t\tif e.Agent != \"\" {\n\t\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"event %q: must not set agent; the agent whose name matches the Forgejo assignee's username is triggered dynamically\", e.Kind)\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\tcase e.Kind == EventPRReview:\n\t\t\tif e.Agent != \"\" {\n\t\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"event %q: must not set agent; the agent whose name matches the pull request author's username is triggered dynamically\", e.Kind)\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\tcase staticEventKinds[e.Kind]:\n\t\t\tif e.Agent == \"\" {\n\t\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"event %q: agent is required\", e.Kind)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif !agentNames[e.Agent] {\n\t\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"event %q: references undeclared agent %q\", e.Kind, e.Agent)\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\tdefault:\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"event %q: unknown event kind\", e.Kind)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}\n\n// validRepoPattern checks the shape of a forgejo `repos` entry. It must\n// be a non-empty \"owner/repo\" pair (or a bare owner name, or \"*\") — at\n// most one slash, none at either end. Glob syntax within the segments\n// is validated later by forgejo.NewRepoFilter.\nfunc validRepoPattern(p string) error {\n\tif p == \"\" {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"repos: pattern must not be empty\")\n\t}\n\n\tif strings.Count(p, \"/\") \u003e 1 {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"repos: pattern %q must be \\\"owner/repo\\\" (at most one \\\"/\\\")\", p)\n\t}\n\n\tif strings.HasPrefix(p, \"/\") || strings.HasSuffix(p, \"/\") {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"repos: pattern %q must not start or end with \\\"/\\\"\", p)\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}\n\n// AgentConfig holds an agent's full configuration including its\n// Forgejo token (if configured).\ntype AgentConfig struct {\n\tName string\n\tLLM string\n\tToken string\n}\n\n// AgentByName returns the agent config with the given name, if declared.\nfunc (c *Config) AgentByName(name string) (AgentConfig, bool) {\n\tfor _, a := range c.Agents {\n\t\tif a.Name == name {\n\t\t\treturn AgentConfig{\n\t\t\t\tName: a.Name,\n\t\t\t\tLLM: a.LLM,\n\t\t\t\tToken: a.Token,\n\t\t\t}, true\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn AgentConfig{}, false\n}\n\n// LLMByName returns the llm config with the given name, if declared.\nfunc (c *Config) LLMByName(name string) (LLM, bool) {\n\tfor _, l := range c.LLMs {\n\t\tif l.Name == name {\n\t\t\treturn l, true\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn LLM{}, false\n}\n\n// EventAgent returns the statically configured agent name for the given\n// event kind, if one is declared and set.\nfunc (c *Config) EventAgent(kind string) (string, bool) {\n\tfor _, e := range c.Events {\n\t\tif e.Kind == kind {\n\t\t\treturn e.Agent, e.Agent != \"\"\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn \"\", false\n}\n\n// EventInstructions returns the configured freeform instructions for the\n// given event kind, e.g. \"Please review this pull request and respond\n// appropriately.\" Returns \"\" if the event isn't declared or has none.\nfunc (c *Config) EventInstructions(kind string) string {\n\tfor _, e := range c.Events {\n\t\tif e.Kind == kind {\n\t\t\treturn e.Instructions\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn \"\"\n}","start_line":1,"end_line":246,"total_lines":246,"truncated":false}
Thinking
Let's read the rest of run.go and the other related files:
- The rest of run.go (lines 250-437)
- forgejo.go (client)
- sandboxgit_test.go
- docker_integration_test.go
Tool
🔧 read_file
{"end_line": 437, "path": "internal/agentrun/run.go", "start_line": 250}
Arguments
{"end_line": 437, "path": "internal/agentrun/run.go", "start_line": 250}
Result
{"path":"internal/agentrun/run.go","content":"\n\tinstructions := r.cfg.EventInstructions(ev.Kind)\n\n\t// Fetch the full comment thread so the agent sees everything that's\n\t// been said on the issue/PR, not just the triggering event (which\n\t// only carries the latest comment, if any). A failure degrades to\n\t// no comments rather than failing the run: the agent can still do\n\t// its job, just without prior context.\n\tcomments, err := r.forgejo.ListIssueComments(ev.Owner, ev.Repo, ev.Index)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlogger.Warn(\"fetch issue comments failed; agent will not see prior comments\", \"error\", err)\n\t\tcomments = nil\n\t}\n\n\tmessages := []llm.Message{\n\t\t{Role: \"system\", Content: systemPrompt},\n\t\t{Role: \"user\", Content: seedMessage(ev, branch, repoInfo.DefaultBranch, instructions, comments, review)},\n\t}\n\n\thooks := r.streamHooks(jobID, logAppend)\n\n\t_, err = runLoop(ctx, llmClient, runCtx, messages, hooks)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"agent loop: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tsucceeded = true\n\n\treturn nil\n}\n\n// streamHooks builds the Hooks a single Run passes to runLoop: every\n// delta is published live to the hub for connected dashboard viewers,\n// and once a reasoning/content block or tool call is complete, it's\n// persisted to the store as one row and the hub's replay buffer for\n// jobID is checkpointed — so a viewer connecting from this point on\n// sees it via the persisted history instead of a live replay, and is\n// never shown it twice.\nfunc (r *Runner) streamHooks(jobID string, logAppend func(stream, line string)) Hooks {\n\tvar reasoningBuf, contentBuf strings.Builder\n\n\treasoningOpen, contentOpen := false, false\n\n\treturn Hooks{\n\t\tOnReasoningDelta: func(delta string) {\n\t\t\tif !reasoningOpen {\n\t\t\t\treasoningOpen = true\n\t\t\t\treasoningBuf.Reset()\n\t\t\t\tr.hub.Publish(jobID, livelog.Event{Type: livelog.ReasoningStart})\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\treasoningBuf.WriteString(delta)\n\t\t\tr.hub.Publish(jobID, livelog.Event{Type: livelog.ReasoningDelta, Text: delta})\n\t\t},\n\t\tOnContentDelta: func(delta string) {\n\t\t\tif !contentOpen {\n\t\t\t\tcontentOpen = true\n\t\t\t\tcontentBuf.Reset()\n\t\t\t\tr.hub.Publish(jobID, livelog.Event{Type: livelog.ContentStart})\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tcontentBuf.WriteString(delta)\n\t\t\tr.hub.Publish(jobID, livelog.Event{Type: livelog.ContentDelta, Text: delta})\n\t\t},\n\t\tOnTurnEnd: func() {\n\t\t\tif reasoningOpen {\n\t\t\t\tr.hub.Publish(jobID, livelog.Event{Type: livelog.ReasoningEnd})\n\t\t\t\tlogAppend(\"reasoning\", reasoningBuf.String())\n\t\t\t\tr.hub.Checkpoint(jobID)\n\t\t\t\treasoningOpen = false\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tif contentOpen {\n\t\t\t\tr.hub.Publish(jobID, livelog.Event{Type: livelog.ContentEnd})\n\t\t\t\tlogAppend(\"content\", contentBuf.String())\n\t\t\t\tr.hub.Checkpoint(jobID)\n\t\t\t\tcontentOpen = false\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t},\n\t\tOnTool: func(name, arguments, result string, toolErr bool) {\n\t\t\tr.hub.Publish(jobID, livelog.Event{\n\t\t\t\tType: livelog.Tool,\n\t\t\t\tName: name,\n\t\t\t\tArguments: arguments,\n\t\t\t\tResult: result,\n\t\t\t\tError: toolErr,\n\t\t\t})\n\n\t\t\tline, err := json.Marshal(store.ToolLogEntry{Name: name, Arguments: arguments, Result: result, Error: toolErr})\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tr.logger.Warn(\"failed to marshal tool log entry\", \"job\", jobID, \"error\", err)\n\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\tlogAppend(\"tool\", string(line))\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tr.hub.Checkpoint(jobID)\n\t\t},\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc seedMessage(ev forgejo.Event, branch, defaultBranch, instructions string, comments []forgejo.IssueComment, review *forgejo.ReviewDetail) string {\n\traw, _ := json.MarshalIndent(json.RawMessage(ev.Raw), \"\", \" \")\n\n\tvar instructionsSection string\n\tif instructions != \"\" {\n\t\tinstructionsSection = fmt.Sprintf(\"Instructions for this event, from zoo.hcl:\\n%s\\n\\n\", instructions)\n\t}\n\n\t// A pr:review run works on the PR's own head branch, not a fresh\n\t// branch off the default branch.\n\tbranchLine := fmt.Sprintf(\"Your working branch is %q, checked out from the default branch %q.\\n\\n\", branch, defaultBranch)\n\tif ev.Kind == forgejo.EventPRReview {\n\t\tbranchLine = fmt.Sprintf(\"Your working branch is %q, the pull request's head branch — commits you push here update the pull request directly.\\n\\n\", branch)\n\t}\n\n\tvar reviewSection string\n\tif review != nil {\n\t\treviewSection = renderReviewSection(review)\n\t}\n\n\tvar commentsSection string\n\tif len(comments) \u003e 0 {\n\t\tvar b strings.Builder\n\t\tfmt.Fprintf(\u0026b, \"Comments (%d):\\n\\n\", len(comments))\n\n\t\tfor i, c := range comments {\n\t\t\tfmt.Fprintf(\u0026b, \"%d. %s (%s):\\n%s\\n\\n\", i+1, c.Author, c.Created.Format(time.RFC3339), c.Body)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tcommentsSection = b.String()\n\t}\n\n\treturn fmt.Sprintf(\n\t\t\"You were triggered by a %q event on %s/%s.\\n\\n\"+\n\t\t\t\"%s%s\"+\n\t\t\t\"%sTitle: %s\\n\\nBody:\\n%s\\n\\n%sFull event payload:\\n```json\\n%s\\n```\",\n\t\tev.Kind, ev.Owner, ev.Repo, instructionsSection, branchLine, reviewSection, ev.Title, ev.Body, commentsSection, raw)\n}\n\n// renderReviewSection renders the submitted review as a briefing\n// section: the verdict, the review body, and each inline comment with\n// its location and id (the id lets the agent refer to a specific\n// comment in its reply).\nfunc renderReviewSection(review *forgejo.ReviewDetail) string {\n\tvar b strings.Builder\n\n\tfmt.Fprintf(\u0026b, \"Review submitted by %s:\\n\", review.Reviewer)\n\tfmt.Fprintf(\u0026b, \" Verdict: %s\\n\", humanReviewState(review.State))\n\n\tif review.Body != \"\" {\n\t\tb.WriteString(\" Review body:\\n\")\n\t\tfor _, line := range strings.Split(review.Body, \"\\n\") {\n\t\t\tfmt.Fprintf(\u0026b, \" %s\\n\", line)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif len(review.Comments) \u003e 0 {\n\t\tfmt.Fprintf(\u0026b, \" Inline comments (%d):\\n\", len(review.Comments))\n\n\t\tfor i, c := range review.Comments {\n\t\t\twhere := c.Path\n\t\t\tif c.Line \u003e 0 {\n\t\t\t\twhere = fmt.Sprintf(\"%s:%d\", c.Path, c.Line)\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tfmt.Fprintf(\u0026b, \" %d. [%s] %s (comment id %d):\\n\", i+1, where, c.Author, c.ID)\n\t\t\tfor _, line := range strings.Split(c.Body, \"\\n\") {\n\t\t\t\tfmt.Fprintf(\u0026b, \" %s\\n\", line)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn b.String() + \"\\n\"\n}\n\n// humanReviewState maps a Forgejo review state to a readable verdict.\nfunc humanReviewState(state string) string {\n\tswitch state {\n\tcase \"APPROVED\":\n\t\treturn \"approved\"\n\tcase \"REQUEST_CHANGES\":\n\t\treturn \"changes requested\"\n\tcase \"COMMENT\":\n\t\treturn \"comment\"\n\tdefault:\n\t\treturn state\n\t}\n}","start_line":250,"end_line":437,"total_lines":437,"truncated":false}
Tool
🔧 read_file
{"path": "internal/agentrun/sandboxgit_test.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 200}
Arguments
{"path": "internal/agentrun/sandboxgit_test.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 200}
Result
{"path":"internal/agentrun/sandboxgit_test.go","content":"package agentrun\n\nimport (\n\t\"encoding/base64\"\n\t\"strings\"\n\t\"testing\"\n)\n\nfunc TestSandboxShellQuote(t *testing.T) {\n\tcases := map[string]string{\n\t\t\"simple\": \"'simple'\",\n\t\t\"it's a branch\": `'it'\\''s a branch'`,\n\t\t\"with space\": \"'with space'\",\n\t\t\"$(rm -rf /)\": \"'$(rm -rf /)'\",\n\t\t\"a\\\"b\\\\c\": \"'a\\\"b\\\\c'\",\n\t\t\"\": \"''\",\n\t\t\"HEAD~1\": \"'HEAD~1'\",\n\t\t\"https://h/a/b.git\": \"'https://h/a/b.git'\",\n\t}\n\n\tfor in, want := range cases {\n\t\tif got := shellQuote(in); got != want {\n\t\t\tt.Errorf(\"shellQuote(%q) = %q, want %q\", in, got, want)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc TestShellGitCmdQuotesEveryArg(t *testing.T) {\n\tgot := shellGitCmd(\"clone\", \"--branch\", \"main\", \"--single-branch\", \"https://h/a/b.git\", \"/project\")\n\n\twant := \"git 'clone' '--branch' 'main' '--single-branch' 'https://h/a/b.git' '/project'\"\n\n\tif got != want {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"shellGitCmd = %q, want %q\", got, want)\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc TestShellGitCmdSubcommandWithArgs(t *testing.T) {\n\tgot := shellGitCmd(\"commit\", \"-m\", \"fix: handle it's edge case\")\n\n\tif !strings.HasPrefix(got, \"git 'commit' '-m' \") {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"shellGitCmd = %q, want prefix git 'commit' '-m' \", got)\n\t}\n\n\t// The message must be one quoted word with the embedded quote\n\t// escaped, so sh passes it through verbatim.\n\tif want := `'fix: handle it'\\''s edge case'`; !strings.HasSuffix(got, want) {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"shellGitCmd = %q, want suffix %q\", got, want)\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc TestForgeHost(t *testing.T) {\n\tcases := map[string]string{\n\t\t\"https://code.stdio.dk/abrander/zoo.git\": \"https://code.stdio.dk\",\n\t\t\"http://forgejo.local:3000/acme/widgets\": \"http://forgejo.local:3000\",\n\t\t\"https://h/a/b.git?x=1\": \"https://h\",\n\t\t// Not a URL with a host: fall back to the full string, which is\n\t\t// still a valid (narrower) prefix match.\n\t\t\"/bare\": \"/bare\",\n\t\t\"not a url\": \"not a url\",\n\t}\n\n\tfor in, want := range cases {\n\t\tif got := forgeHost(in); got != want {\n\t\t\tt.Errorf(\"forgeHost(%q) = %q, want %q\", in, got, want)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc TestGitAuthHeader(t *testing.T) {\n\tgot := gitAuthHeader(\"greg\", \"s3cr3t\")\n\n\twant := \"Authorization: Basic \" + base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(\"greg:s3cr3t\"))\n\n\tif got != want {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"gitAuthHeader = %q, want %q\", got, want)\n\t}\n}","start_line":1,"end_line":78,"total_lines":78,"truncated":false}
Thinking
Next, let's look at the forgejo client to understand what the token is used for, and check the Dockerfile to see how the sandbox image is built.
Tool
🔧 read_file
{"path": "internal/forgejo/client.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 150}
Arguments
{"path": "internal/forgejo/client.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 150}
Result
{"path":"internal/forgejo/client.go","content":"// Package forgejo wraps the Forgejo SDK and turns webhook deliveries and\n// polling results into a common Event stream for the scheduler.\npackage forgejo\n\nimport (\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"time\"\n\n\tsdk \"codeberg.org/mvdkleijn/forgejo-sdk/forgejo/v2\"\n\n\t\"github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/config\"\n)\n\n// Client is zoo's single shared Forgejo identity, used both for the\n// event sources (webhook/poll) and for actions agents/scheduler take\n// (comments, labels, PRs).\ntype Client struct {\n\tsdk *sdk.Client\n\n\tbaseURL string\n\ttoken string\n}\n\nfunc NewClient(cfg config.Forgejo) (*Client, error) {\n\tc, err := sdk.NewClient(cfg.URL, sdk.SetToken(cfg.Token))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"forgejo client: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\treturn \u0026Client{sdk: c, baseURL: cfg.URL, token: cfg.Token}, nil\n}\n\n// Token returns the shared zoo Forgejo identity's token, e.g. for\n// authenticating a host-side git clone/push against Forgejo (see\n// internal/agentrun) without ever writing the credential into a working\n// tree an agent's container can read.\nfunc (c *Client) Token() string {\n\treturn c.token\n}\n\n// As returns a new Client that authenticates as the given token.\n// This is used to create per-agent clients so each agent acts as\n// themselves on Forgejo, without needing a global token with sudo\n// privileges.\nfunc (c *Client) As(token string) *Client {\n\tclient, _ := sdk.NewClient(c.baseURL, sdk.SetToken(token))\n\treturn \u0026Client{sdk: client, baseURL: c.baseURL, token: token}\n}\n\n// Sudo returns a new Client that impersonates username (via Forgejo's\n// \"Sudo:\" header) on every API call it makes, using the same underlying\n// token. Actions an agent takes through it — comments, labels, PRs,\n// assignment — are attributed to that agent's own Forgejo account\n// instead of the shared zoo identity. The token must belong to a user\n// with sudo scope/admin rights for this to work; Forgejo rejects the\n// header otherwise.\n//\n// Deprecated: use As(token) with a per-agent token instead. Kept for\n// backward compatibility during migration.\nfunc (c *Client) Sudo(username string) (*Client, error) {\n\tsudoClient, err := sdk.NewClient(c.baseURL, sdk.SetToken(c.token), sdk.SetSudo(username))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"forgejo client sudo %q: %w\", username, err)\n\t}\n\n\treturn \u0026Client{sdk: sudoClient, baseURL: c.baseURL, token: c.token}, nil\n}\n\n// CreateIssueComment posts a comment on the given issue or pull request\n// (Forgejo/Gitea treat PRs as issues for commenting purposes).\nfunc (c *Client) CreateIssueComment(owner, repo string, index int64, body string) error {\n\t_, _, err := c.sdk.CreateIssueComment(owner, repo, index, sdk.CreateIssueCommentOption{Body: body})\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"comment on %s/%s#%d: %w\", owner, repo, index, err)\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}\n\n// IssueComment is one comment on an issue or pull request, in the\n// shape zoo needs when briefing an agent: who said what, and when.\ntype IssueComment struct {\n\tAuthor string\n\tBody string\n\tCreated time.Time\n}\n\n// ListIssueComments fetches every comment on the given issue or pull\n// request, oldest first. PRs are issues under the hood in Forgejo, so\n// the same endpoint serves both. Pages are walked until exhausted so\n// the result isn't capped by the server's default page size.\nfunc (c *Client) ListIssueComments(owner, repo string, index int64) ([]IssueComment, error) {\n\tconst pageSize = 50\n\n\tvar all []*sdk.Comment\n\n\tfor page := 1; ; page++ {\n\t\tbatch, _, err := c.sdk.ListIssueComments(owner, repo, index, sdk.ListIssueCommentOptions{\n\t\t\tListOptions: sdk.ListOptions{Page: page, PageSize: pageSize},\n\t\t})\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"list comments on %s/%s#%d (page %d): %w\", owner, repo, index, page, err)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tall = append(all, batch...)\n\n\t\tif len(batch) \u003c pageSize {\n\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tout := make([]IssueComment, 0, len(all))\n\tfor _, cm := range all {\n\t\tauthor := \"\"\n\t\tif cm.Poster != nil {\n\t\t\tauthor = cm.Poster.UserName\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tout = append(out, IssueComment{Author: author, Body: cm.Body, Created: cm.Created})\n\t}\n\n\treturn out, nil\n}\n\n// AddLabel attaches the label with the given name to an issue/PR,\n// creating the label (with a default color) on the repo first if it\n// doesn't already exist.\nfunc (c *Client) AddLabel(owner, repo string, index int64, name string) error {\n\tid, err := c.labelID(owner, repo, name)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\t_, _, err = c.sdk.AddIssueLabels(owner, repo, index, sdk.IssueLabelsOption{Labels: []int64{id}})\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"add label %q to %s/%s#%d: %w\", name, owner, repo, index, err)\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}\n\n// RemoveLabel detaches the label with the given name from an issue/PR, if\n// both the label and the attachment exist.\nfunc (c *Client) RemoveLabel(owner, repo string, index int64, name string) error {\n\tlabels, _, err := c.sdk.GetIssueLabels(owner, repo, index, sdk.ListLabelsOptions{})\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"list labels on %s/%s#%d: %w\", owner, repo, index, err)\n\t}\n\n\tfor _, l := range labels {","start_line":1,"end_line":150,"total_lines":432,"truncated":true}
Tool
🔧 read_file
{"path": "docker/Dockerfile", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 100}
Arguments
{"path": "docker/Dockerfile", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 100}
Result
{"path":"docker/Dockerfile","content":"FROM debian:unstable\n\nRUN apt-get update \u0026\u0026 \\\n apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \\\n ca-certificates \\\n clang \\\n cpp \\\n curl \\\n forgejo-cli \\\n g++ \\\n gcc \\\n git \\\n gnupg \\\n golang-go \\\n libc6-dev \\\n make \\\n mercurial \\\n netbase \\\n openssh-client \\\n pkg-config \\\n procps \\\n sq \\\n subversion \\\n sudo \\\n wget \\\n \u0026\u0026 \\\n rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*\n\nADD --chmod=0644 passwd /etc/passwd\nADD --chmod=0644 group /etc/group\nADD --chmod=0640 shadow /etc/shadow\nADD --chmod=0644 uid1000-sudo /etc/sudoers.d/uid1000\n\nRUN mkdir -p /home/user \u0026\u0026 \\\n chown 1000:1000 /home/user\n\nUSER 1000:1000","start_line":1,"end_line":37,"total_lines":37,"truncated":false}
Thinking
Now I understand the current setup:
1. Zoo runs a Docker container for each agent execution.
2. The agent's Forgejo token (or the shared zoo token) is written into the container's git config as `http.<host>.extraHeader = Authorization: Basic base64(user:token)`.
3. This token is a full Forgejo API token — it can do everything on the instance (create issues, delete repos, etc.).
The issue (from abrander, a real human): "I'm starting to feel a bit uneasy about the sandbox getting the Git token. That token can be used to do everything on the Forgejo instance. Would it make sense to somehow special-case 'git push', 'git pull', and other things that require auth? Think of something clever that lets the agent work without exposing the API key to the sandbox."
So this is an architecture question. The task: design (and ideally implement) a mechanism where the sandbox doesn't hold a full API token, yet git operations still work.
Let me think about the options:
**Option A: Scoped token (Forgejo access token with limited scope)**
Forgejo/Gitea access tokens have a scope system: "read:repository", "write:repository", "admin:repository", etc. A token scoped to only `write:repository` (or read+write) can't do admin operations. However, it's still a bearer token usable via the API — with write:repository scope, you can push to any repo the user has write access to, create branches, delete branches, etc. It can't create issues or comment. This reduces the blast radius but the token is still usable from the sandbox for git-scope API operations. Also, the scope is per-user, not per-repo. Still, it's a big improvement and is the standard approach. But the issue asks for something cleverer: "special-case git push, git pull and other things that require auth."
**Option B: Git credential proxy / git-remote-helper**
The clever approach: intercept git's network operations. Git supports `git config http.<url>.proxy` — a local HTTP proxy inside the container. Zoo (on the host) runs a small HTTP proxy that:
- Accepts only git smart-HTTP requests (GET/POST to `/<owner>/<repo>.git/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack` or `git-receive-pack`).
- Injects the Authorization header itself (the token lives on the host, not in the sandbox).
- Forwards to the real Forgejo.
- Refuses any other URL/path (e.g., API endpoints).
The sandbox's git config points `http.<host>.proxy` at the proxy (e.g., `http://127.0.0.1:PORT` or the docker host gateway). The token never enters the container. The proxy is per-run, bound to a random port, and only allows the specific repo (or repos on the same host) that the run is working on.
This is the "special-case git push/pull" the issue is asking for: the sandbox can only do git smart-HTTP operations, and only against the target repo, and the token is only ever used by zoo itself.
Implementation details:
- The container needs network access to the proxy. Options:
- Run the proxy on the host and expose it on a random localhost port; from inside the container, the host is reachable via `host.docker.internal` (on Docker Desktop) or via the gateway IP (on Linux, `172.17.0.1` for the default bridge). Hmm, portability.
- Better: use a dedicated Docker network? Or run the proxy as a sidecar container on the same network.
- Even better: run the proxy inside the same container? No — then the token would be in the container's memory... well, actually, if zoo execs the proxy process inside the container, the token would be visible via /proc/<pid>/environ. Not good.
- Alternative: use a unix socket mounted from the host into the container. Git's proxy config supports `socks5h://` and `http://` proxies; can git's http proxy use a unix socket? Git's `http.proxy` supports `http://`, `https://`, `socks5://`, `socks5h://`, and also `http+unix://`? Let me think. Actually, git supports unix socket proxies: `http.proxy = http+unix:///path/to/sock.sock` — yes! Git supports unix domain socket proxies via the `http+unix://` scheme (used for e.g. `http://localhost/` via a socket). Let me recall: git's http.c supports `http://`, `https://`, `socks5://`, `socks5h://`, and `http+unix://` (added in git 2.3? actually `http+unix://` was added in Git 2.3.0? I think unix socket proxy support for http was added around git 2.3, via libcurl's `CURLPROTO_UNIX`... hmm, actually I recall `http+unix://` support was added in Git 2.3.0 (2015): "http: support proxies over unix sockets" — the format is `http+unix:///path/to/socket`. Yes, that's right.
So: zoo creates a unix socket on the host (inside the per-run workdir), starts an HTTP proxy listener on it, and bind-mounts the socket into the container at, say, /run/zoo/git-proxy.sock. The container's git config: `http.<host>.proxy = http+unix:///run/zoo/git-proxy.sock`. Git inside the container connects over the unix socket; the proxy on the host injects the auth header and forwards to the real forge URL.
This is clean: no port exposure, no network config needed, the token never leaves the host, and the socket is per-run and torn down with the run.
- What the proxy allows:
- Only the target repo's path: `/<owner>/<repo>.git/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack|git-receive-pack` and the smart-HTTP pack endpoints `/git-upload-pack` and `/git-receive-pack` (POST). Forgejo's git HTTP endpoints: `GET /owner/repo.git/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack`, `POST /owner/repo.git/git-upload-pack`, and for push: `GET /owner/repo.git/info/refs?service=git-receive-pack`, `POST /owner/repo.git/git-receive-pack`.
- Strip any Authorization header the client sends (to prevent the agent from sending something weird), and inject the run's credential.
- Reject everything else with 403/404.
- Submodules: the current comment says the host-scoped extraHeader "also covers submodules and other repos on the same forge." With the proxy approach, we can either allow the whole forge host (any repo the agent's token can access) or restrict to the specific repo. The issue's concern is the token's API power, not git access to other repos. Since git operations are inherently limited to what git can do (clone/fetch/push), allowing any repo on the forge via git is fine and preserves submodule support. But to be safe, we could allow any repo on the forge host for git smart-HTTP — the token's git scope is already limited by the token's permissions.
Actually, let me think about what's most useful: the agent might need to clone other repos (e.g., for reference, or submodules). Restricting to only the current repo would break submodules and cross-repo fetches. The security boundary we care about is: no API access, no arbitrary repo push? Hmm — with a full token, the agent could `git push` to any repo it has write access to. With a git-only proxy, the agent can still `git push` to any repo its token has write access to (via the proxy). Is that acceptable? The issue says "we only need to be able to perform git operations (push, pull, fetch)" (leon's comment). So allowing git operations on any repo the token can access is in scope. But we could also make it configurable: default to allowing the forge host, with an option to restrict to a single repo.
Let's keep it simple: allow git smart-HTTP for the forge host (any path under it that looks like a git endpoint). Actually, to be even more precise, the proxy can validate that the path matches `^/[^/]+/[^/]+(\.git)?/(info/refs|git-upload-pack|git-receive-pack)$`. This is the set of git smart-HTTP endpoints. Anything else (API paths like `/api/v1/...`) is rejected. This is the key property: the sandbox can only speak git-HTTP, not the API.
**Option C: git-remote-helper (git-receive-pack/upload-pack wrapper)**
Use a custom remote helper binary inside the container that talks to zoo on the host (via unix socket or docker exec) for fetch/push. More moving parts, and it would need to be installed in the image. The proxy approach is less invasive.
**Option D: Per-repo scoped token + git-only**
Combining: use a token scoped to `write:repository` (git operations) rather than a full token. Even if the token leaks, the damage is limited to git operations. This is a defense-in-depth complement. But it requires the user to create a separate token, and per-agent tokens would also need scoping. Worth mentioning in the design, but the proxy is the primary mechanism.
**Option E: Run git operations on the host (special-case git push/pull via a tool)**
The issue literally suggests "special-casing git push, git pull and other things that require auth." One interpretation: remove git network access from the sandbox entirely, and have zoo (the host) perform push/pull/fetch on the agent's behalf — e.g., the agent's `bash` tool runs `git push`, but the sandbox's git is configured with a fake remote, and zoo intercepts... that's basically the proxy approach, but implemented as a remote helper or a wrapper.
Actually, there's an even simpler variant of E: keep the token in the host's git config, run `git push`/`git pull` via `docker exec` from the host... no wait, git runs inside the container.
Hmm, but there's a subtle point: if the sandbox has no credentials at all, then `git push` from the agent's bash tool would fail with an auth error. The agent expects git to "just work" (the system prompt says "git remote operations are authenticated for you"). So the proxy approach preserves that UX: git works transparently, and the token stays on the host.
I think the proxy approach (B) is the clever answer. Let me check how the current code does the clone: `runSandboxGit` runs `git clone` inside the container via docker exec. With the proxy, that would work unchanged — git inside the container would use the proxy for the network.
Wait — one important detail: the container's git config `http.<host>.proxy` — the `<host>` here is the forge host (e.g., `code.stdio.dk`), and the proxy value is `http+unix:///run/zoo/git-proxy.sock`. Git connects to the unix socket and sends an absolute-form request (`GET https://code.stdio.dk/abrander/zoo.git/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack HTTP/1.1` with a `Host: code.stdio.dk` header). The proxy on the host parses the absolute-form URL, validates it, injects the auth, and forwards to the real host.
Let me verify git's unix socket proxy support: git's documentation for `http.proxy`: "The URL of the proxy to use for HTTP or HTTPS... The value can be a URL, or `socks5://`... Git also supports proxies over unix sockets: `http+unix:///path/to/socket`." Yes, I'm fairly confident: since Git 2.3, `http.proxy` supports the `http+unix://` scheme (commit "http: add support for unix socket proxies"?). Let me double-check my memory: the git 2.3.0 release notes mention "git http-proxy can now use unix sockets"... I recall the format `http+unix:///path/to/socket.sock` from git's documentation:
From git's documentation (http.proxy):
> "The URL of the proxy to use for HTTP or HTTPS... The value can be a URL, or a socks5:// URL... You can also use a unix socket: http+unix:///path/to/socket"
Yes — git's documentation says: "The value can be a URL, or a URL with a `socks5://` or `socks5h://` scheme... Git also supports proxies over unix sockets: `http+unix:///path/to/socket`." I'm confident this exists (it's used for e.g. `git-http-backend` behind a unix-socket proxy, and in CI systems).
Alternatively, we could avoid the unix socket entirely: run the proxy on the host and expose it on a random TCP port on the docker bridge gateway. But on Linux, finding the gateway IP is annoying (though we could inspect the container's network settings via the docker API — `NetworkSettings.Gateway`). On Docker Desktop (macOS/Windows), `host.docker.internal` works. Unix socket is cleaner and more portable: no port, no firewall, no IP discovery, and the socket file is per-run inside the workdir.
Bind-mounting a unix socket into a container: Docker supports bind-mounting socket files (e.g., the docker daemon socket is mounted this way). Yes, `Binds: ["/path/to/sock:/run/zoo/git.sock"]` works.
One concern: the container runs as UID 1000 (USER 1000:1000 in the Dockerfile). The socket file on the host is created by the zoo process (running as some user, probably root or the zoo user). The socket needs to be writable by UID 1000 inside the container. Socket permissions: we can chmod the socket to 0777 (or 0666) after creation. Since it's a per-run ephemeral socket inside a temp dir, that's acceptable. Actually, for a unix socket, the client needs write permission on the socket file. We'll set it to 0777.
Another concern: the proxy must be reachable before the clone. Order: create container → start proxy → configure git → clone. The proxy can be started before the container is created (the socket just needs to exist for the bind mount — actually, for a bind mount, the file must exist at container creation time). So: create the socket (net.Listen on a unix socket) → create container with the bind → configure git → clone.
Cleanup: close the listener, remove the socket file.
Now, what about `git push`? Push uses `git-receive-pack` over HTTP POST. The proxy must handle POST with a body (chunked or content-length) and stream the response. A generic HTTP reverse proxy that rewrites the host and injects the Authorization header can handle all of this. We can implement it with `httputil.NewSingleHostReverseProxy` — but we need to validate the path and set the target from the request's absolute-form URL. Since the request comes via the unix socket in absolute form, `r.URL` is absolute (Host set). We can validate `r.URL.Host == forgeHost` and the path pattern, then forward.
Implementation sketch (a new file `internal/agentrun/gitproxy.go`):
```go
// gitproxy is a per-run HTTP proxy that lets the sandbox's git speak
// smart-HTTP to the forge without holding a credential.
type gitProxy struct {
ln net.Listener
forge string // e.g. "https://code.stdio.dk"
user string
token string
logger *slog.Logger
client *http.Client // with TLS config
}
func startGitProxy(ctx, workDir, forge, user, token string) (*gitProxy, error) {
sockPath := filepath.Join(workDir, "git-proxy.sock")
// remove stale
ln, err := net.Listen("unix", sockPath)
os.Chmod(sockPath, 0o777)
...
}
```
The handler:
```go
func (p *gitProxy) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// r.URL is absolute-form: scheme://host/path?query
u := r.URL
if u.Scheme != "https" && u.Scheme != "http" { reject }
if u.Host != p.forgeHost { reject 403 }
if !gitSmartHTTPPath(u.Path) { reject 403 }
// strip client auth, inject ours
r.Host = u.Host
r.Header.Del("Authorization")
r.Header.Set("Authorization", "Basic " + b64(user:token))
// forward
}
```
For forwarding, the easiest and most robust way: use `httputil.ReverseProxy` with a custom Director that sets `r.URL.Scheme/Host/Path` to the target (relative), and uses a transport that dials the real host. Since the original request is absolute-form, the ReverseProxy's Director needs to convert to origin-form. Let me write it:
```go
proxy := &httputil.ReverseProxy{
Director: func(req *http.Request) {
req.URL.Scheme = u.Scheme
req.URL.Host = u.Host
req.URL.Path = u.Path
req.URL.RawQuery = u.RawQuery
req.Host = u.Host
req.Header.Set("Authorization", ...)
},
Transport: p.transport,
}
```
Hmm, but the Director receives the same request; the original URL is absolute. Setting the fields to the same values makes it origin-form. That works.
Actually, a simpler approach: since we've already validated that the target host equals the forge host, we can just set the Authorization header and let ReverseProxy handle it — ReverseProxy by default forwards the request to `proxyURL` (a single host). With `httputil.NewSingleHostReverseProxy(target)`, the Director sets `req.URL.Scheme = target.Scheme`, `req.URL.Host = target.Host`, and `req.URL.Path = singleJoiningSlash(target.Path, req.URL.Path)`. With an absolute-form request, `req.URL.Path` is the path part (e.g., `/abrander/zoo.git/info/refs`) — good, and the query is preserved. So `NewSingleHostReverseProxy(mustParse("https://code.stdio.dk"))` works: it takes the path from the request and the host from the target.
But wait: for a request arriving over a unix socket, does Go's http server parse it as absolute-form? Yes: when a client sends `GET https://host/path HTTP/1.1` (absolute-form, required for HTTP proxies), Go's server sets `r.URL` to the full URL (Scheme and Host set), and `r.Host` to the Host header. Git sends absolute-form to a proxy.
So the flow:
1. Zoo creates a unix socket listener in the workdir.
2. Zoo creates the container with a bind `sockPath:/run/zoo/git.sock` (ro? A socket needs rw for connecting... a bind mount of a socket: the client inside the container connects to it; the mount doesn't need to be writable for connecting, but the file's permission bits matter. Let's mount it rw to be safe... actually, connecting to a unix socket requires write permission on the socket file, not on the mount. Mounting `:ro` might break it? A read-only bind mount of a socket — the file mode is still 0777, so write permission on the file is allowed... hmm, on a read-only mount, the kernel's permission check for socket connect: `sock_file_permission` checks `MAY_WRITE` on the inode, and a read-only mount would fail that. To be safe, mount it rw.)
3. Zoo configures the container's git: `http.<forgeHost>.proxy = http+unix:///run/zoo/git.sock`, plus safe.directory, user.name/email, push.autoSetupRemote. No extraHeader with the token.
4. The clone proceeds as before; git talks to the proxy; the proxy authenticates.
5. On run end: close the listener, remove the socket.
What about `http.<host>` matching? Git matches `http.<host>` config by the URL's host. The clone URL is `https://code.stdio.dk/...`, so the host is `code.stdio.dk`. We set `http.code.stdio.dk.proxy`.
Edge case: what if the forge URL is `http://` (not https)? The proxy supports both; we validate the scheme matches the forge's scheme.
Now — does the sandbox image's git version support `http+unix://`? The Dockerfile uses `debian:unstable`, so git is recent (2.4x+). Unix socket proxy support has been around since git 2.3 (2015). No problem.
Let me also think about whether the agent could abuse the proxy:
- The agent can point git at any URL on the forge host → git operations on any repo the token can access. Acceptable (git scope).
- The agent can't use the proxy for non-git paths (API) → the token can't be used for API calls from the sandbox.
- The agent can't read the token: it's not in the container's filesystem, not in env vars (env vars are set per-exec in docker.go — no token there), not in /proc (the proxy runs in the zoo process on the host).
- The agent could try to connect to the socket directly with curl and send an API request → the proxy rejects non-git paths.
- The agent could try to send its own Authorization header → the proxy strips and replaces it.
- SSRF: the proxy only forwards to the forge host (validated).
Another consideration: `git push` requires the `git-receive-pack` POST; Forgejo may also use `GET /info/refs?service=git-receive-pack`. Both are covered by the path pattern.
What about `git ls-remote`? Same info/refs endpoint. Good.
What about the `forgejo-cli` installed in the sandbox image? It's an API client — the agent could use it, but without a token it can't authenticate. No problem.
Now, is there anything else that uses the token inside the sandbox? Let me search for other places where the token is passed to the container. In run.go, the token is only used in `configureSandboxGit`. Let me also check `docker_integration_test.go` and `seed_test.go` to see the test setup, and check the `Token()` usage in the forgejo client.
Also, let me check how the clone URL is obtained (`RepositoryInfo`) — `repoInfo.CloneURL`. Let me look at the rest of forgejo/client.go for RepositoryInfo.
Also, I should check the README for documentation on how this works, and zoo.hcl.example.
Now, about the "design question" aspect: this issue is a question ("would it make sense to...?"). The right response is:
1. A design comment explaining the approach (proxy-based credential injection).
2. An implementation (a PR) — since I'm a senior developer/architect and the repo is a Go project with tests. The issue asks to "think of something clever that lets the agent work without exposing the API key to the sandbox." Implementing it would be the best response.
Let me also consider whether to keep the token in the git config as a fallback... no — the whole point is to remove it. But what about deployments where the proxy can't be used? The proxy is implemented by zoo itself, so it always works. No fallback needed.
Wait, one more consideration: the current `configureSandboxGit` sets `http.<host>.extraHeader` with the token. We replace that with `http.<host>.proxy`. The comment says the host scope "covers submodules and other repos on the same forge" — with the proxy, we preserve that property (any git path on the forge host is allowed).
Let me also think about the PR head fetch: `git fetch origin refs/pull/N/head` — same smart-HTTP endpoints. Good.
Now, let me also think about the `docker exec` env: `GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT=0` etc. remain.
Implementation plan:
1. New file `internal/agentrun/gitproxy.go`:
- `type gitProxy struct { ln net.Listener; proxy *httputil.ReverseProxy; sockPath string; ... }`
- `func newGitProxy(ctx, dir, forgeURL, user, token string, logger) (*gitProxy, error)` — create the socket, start serving in a goroutine.
- `func (p *gitProxy) Close() error`
- `func (p *gitProxy) SocketPath() string`
- `func (p *gitProxy) GitConfigValue() string` → `http+unix://<sockPath>` (the path inside the container)
- Handler: validate scheme/host/path, strip client auth, inject the run's credential, forward via ReverseProxy.
2. Modify `configureSandboxGit` in `sandboxgit.go`: replace the extraHeader config with a proxy config; change the signature to take the proxy URL instead of user/token. Keep `gitAuthHeader`? It's used in the proxy now (the proxy builds the header). Move `gitAuthHeader` to gitproxy.go or keep it in sandboxgit.go — it's package-level, so either works. Let's move it to gitproxy.go where it's used, and update the tests.
3. Modify `run.go`:
- Before creating the container: start the git proxy in the workdir.
- Add a bind for the socket: `sockPath + ":/run/zoo/git.sock"`.
- Defer the proxy's Close.
- Pass the proxy's config value to configureSandboxGit.
Wait — order: the socket file must exist before `createContainer` (for the bind mount). `newGitProxy` creates the listener (which creates the socket file). So: create workDir → start proxy → create container (with the socket bind) → configure git → clone.
4. Update tests:
- `sandboxgit_test.go`: remove/adjust the `gitAuthHeader` test (move it to a gitproxy test), keep the shellQuote/forgeHost tests.
- Add `gitproxy_test.go`: test path validation (git endpoint allowed, API rejected, wrong host rejected), auth header injection, and if possible an end-to-end test with a fake forge server.
- `docker_integration_test.go`: let me read it to see what it covers.
5. Update the README if it documents the credential flow.
Let me read the remaining relevant files: the rest of forgejo/client.go (RepositoryInfo), docker_integration_test.go, seed_test.go, README.md, zoo.hcl.example, and check for other references to extraHeader/Token().
Tool
🔧 read_file
{"end_line": 432, "path": "internal/forgejo/client.go", "start_line": 150}
Arguments
{"end_line": 432, "path": "internal/forgejo/client.go", "start_line": 150}
Result
{"path":"internal/forgejo/client.go","content":"\tfor _, l := range labels {\n\t\tif l.Name == name {\n\t\t\t_, err := c.sdk.DeleteIssueLabel(owner, repo, index, l.ID)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"remove label %q from %s/%s#%d: %w\", name, owner, repo, index, err)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\treturn nil\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}\n\nfunc (c *Client) labelID(owner, repo, name string) (int64, error) {\n\tlabels, _, err := c.sdk.ListRepoLabels(owner, repo, sdk.ListLabelsOptions{})\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn 0, fmt.Errorf(\"list labels on %s/%s: %w\", owner, repo, err)\n\t}\n\n\tfor _, l := range labels {\n\t\tif l.Name == name {\n\t\t\treturn l.ID, nil\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tcreated, _, err := c.sdk.CreateLabel(owner, repo, sdk.CreateLabelOption{\n\t\tName: name,\n\t\tColor: \"#ee0000\",\n\t})\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn 0, fmt.Errorf(\"create label %q on %s/%s: %w\", name, owner, repo, err)\n\t}\n\n\treturn created.ID, nil\n}\n\n// CreatePullRequest opens a PR from head into base.\nfunc (c *Client) CreatePullRequest(owner, repo, head, base, title, body string) error {\n\t_, _, err := c.sdk.CreatePullRequest(owner, repo, sdk.CreatePullRequestOption{\n\t\tHead: head,\n\t\tBase: base,\n\t\tTitle: title,\n\t\tBody: body,\n\t})\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"create pull request %s/%s %s-\u003e%s: %w\", owner, repo, head, base, err)\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}\n\n// RequestReview asks the given users to review the pull request.\nfunc (c *Client) RequestReview(owner, repo string, index int64, reviewers []string) error {\n\t_, err := c.sdk.CreateReviewRequests(owner, repo, index, sdk.PullReviewRequestOptions{Reviewers: reviewers})\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"request review on %s/%s#%d: %w\", owner, repo, index, err)\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}\n\n// Review states an agent can submit, in the friendly names the tools\n// expose. SubmitReview maps them onto the SDK's ReviewStateType.\nconst (\n\tReviewStateApproved = \"approved\"\n\tReviewStateChangesRequest = \"changes_requested\"\n\tReviewStateComment = \"comment\"\n)\n\n// SubmitReview submits a review on the pull request with the given\n// verdict and body. state is one of ReviewStateApproved,\n// ReviewStateChangesRequest, or ReviewStateComment. A body is required\n// for anything other than an approval (Forgejo enforces this too).\nfunc (c *Client) SubmitReview(owner, repo string, index int64, state, body string) error {\n\tvar sdkState sdk.ReviewStateType\n\n\tswitch state {\n\tcase ReviewStateApproved:\n\t\tsdkState = sdk.ReviewStateApproved\n\tcase ReviewStateChangesRequest:\n\t\tsdkState = sdk.ReviewStateRequestChanges\n\tcase ReviewStateComment:\n\t\tsdkState = sdk.ReviewStateComment\n\tdefault:\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"submit review on %s/%s#%d: unknown review state %q\", owner, repo, index, state)\n\t}\n\n\tif _, _, err := c.sdk.CreatePullReview(owner, repo, index, sdk.CreatePullReviewOptions{State: sdkState, Body: body}); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"submit review on %s/%s#%d: %w\", owner, repo, index, err)\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}\n\n// ReviewCommentDetail is one inline comment on a pull request review,\n// in the shape zoo needs when briefing an agent: where it points, what\n// it says, and its id (so the agent can refer to it in its reply).\ntype ReviewCommentDetail struct {\n\tID int64\n\tPath string\n\tLine int\n\tBody string\n\tAuthor string\n}\n\n// ReviewDetail is the review context zoo briefs an agent with when a\n// pr:review event fires: the review's verdict and body, plus its inline\n// comments.\ntype ReviewDetail struct {\n\tID int64\n\tState string\n\tBody string\n\tReviewer string\n\tComments []ReviewCommentDetail\n}\n\n// ReviewDetail fetches a pull request review and its inline comments.\n// The webhook payload carries the review but not its inline comments,\n// so this is how a reacting agent gets the full feedback.\nfunc (c *Client) ReviewDetail(owner, repo string, index, reviewID int64) (*ReviewDetail, error) {\n\treview, _, err := c.sdk.GetPullReview(owner, repo, index, reviewID)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"get review %d on %s/%s#%d: %w\", reviewID, owner, repo, index, err)\n\t}\n\n\tcomments, _, err := c.sdk.ListPullReviewComments(owner, repo, index, reviewID)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"list comments on review %d of %s/%s#%d: %w\", reviewID, owner, repo, index, err)\n\t}\n\n\tdetail := \u0026ReviewDetail{\n\t\tID: review.ID,\n\t\tState: string(review.State),\n\t\tBody: review.Body,\n\t}\n\n\tif review.Reviewer != nil {\n\t\tdetail.Reviewer = review.Reviewer.UserName\n\t}\n\n\tfor _, cm := range comments {\n\t\tauthor := \"\"\n\t\tif cm.Reviewer != nil {\n\t\t\tauthor = cm.Reviewer.UserName\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tline := int(cm.LineNum)\n\t\tif cm.OldLineNum != 0 \u0026\u0026 cm.LineNum == 0 {\n\t\t\tline = int(cm.OldLineNum)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tdetail.Comments = append(detail.Comments, ReviewCommentDetail{\n\t\t\tID: cm.ID,\n\t\t\tPath: cm.Path,\n\t\t\tLine: line,\n\t\t\tBody: cm.Body,\n\t\t\tAuthor: author,\n\t\t})\n\t}\n\n\treturn detail, nil\n}\n\n// PullRequestInfo is the branch metadata agentrun needs to check out a\n// pull request's head.\ntype PullRequestInfo struct {\n\tHeadRef string\n\tBaseRef string\n}\n\n// PullRequestInfo returns the pull request's head and base branch refs.\nfunc (c *Client) PullRequestInfo(owner, repo string, index int64) (PullRequestInfo, error) {\n\tpr, _, err := c.sdk.GetPullRequest(owner, repo, index)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn PullRequestInfo{}, fmt.Errorf(\"get pull request %s/%s#%d: %w\", owner, repo, index, err)\n\t}\n\n\tinfo := PullRequestInfo{}\n\tif pr.Head != nil {\n\t\tinfo.HeadRef = pr.Head.Ref\n\t}\n\tif pr.Base != nil {\n\t\tinfo.BaseRef = pr.Base.Ref\n\t}\n\n\treturn info, nil\n}\n\n// CloseIssue closes the given issue or pull request.\nfunc (c *Client) CloseIssue(owner, repo string, index int64) error {\n\treturn c.setIssueState(owner, repo, index, sdk.StateClosed)\n}\n\n// ReopenIssue reopens the given issue or pull request.\nfunc (c *Client) ReopenIssue(owner, repo string, index int64) error {\n\treturn c.setIssueState(owner, repo, index, sdk.StateOpen)\n}\n\n// RepositoryInfo returns the pieces of repo metadata agentrun needs to\n// clone and branch off of the right place.\ntype RepositoryInfo struct {\n\tDefaultBranch string\n\tCloneURL string\n}\n\nfunc (c *Client) RepositoryInfo(owner, repo string) (RepositoryInfo, error) {\n\tr, _, err := c.sdk.GetRepo(owner, repo)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn RepositoryInfo{}, fmt.Errorf(\"get repo %s/%s: %w\", owner, repo, err)\n\t}\n\n\treturn RepositoryInfo{DefaultBranch: r.DefaultBranch, CloneURL: r.CloneURL}, nil\n}\n\nfunc (c *Client) setIssueState(owner, repo string, index int64, state sdk.StateType) error {\n\t_, _, err := c.sdk.EditIssue(owner, repo, index, sdk.EditIssueOption{State: \u0026state})\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"set state %q on %s/%s#%d: %w\", state, owner, repo, index, err)\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}\n\n// AgentProfile is what zoo reads off an agent's Forgejo account: its bio\n// (surfaced in the system prompt), the name/email used to set git commit\n// authorship inside that agent's container, and its avatar URL (surfaced\n// on the dashboard).\ntype AgentProfile struct {\n\tDescription string\n\tFullName string\n\tEmail string\n\tAvatarURL string\n}\n\n// AgentProfile fetches the Forgejo profile of the user account named\n// username. Agent config labels double as their Forgejo usernames (see\n// issue:assigned resolution), so this is how an agent's \"what it does\"\n// text, and its commit identity, are authored: by editing that account's\n// profile on Forgejo, not in zoo.hcl.\nfunc (c *Client) AgentProfile(username string) (AgentProfile, error) {\n\tu, _, err := c.sdk.GetUserInfo(username)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn AgentProfile{}, fmt.Errorf(\"get user %q: %w\", username, err)\n\t}\n\n\tp := AgentProfile{\n\t\tDescription: u.Description,\n\t\tFullName: u.FullName,\n\t\tEmail: u.Email,\n\t\tAvatarURL: u.AvatarURL,\n\t}\n\n\treturn p, nil\n}\n\n// AssignIssue sets the sole assignee of an issue/PR to username. Used by\n// the assign_issue tool so agents can hand work off to each other: the\n// resulting issue:assigned event (webhook or poll) triggers whichever\n// agent's config label matches username.\nfunc (c *Client) AssignIssue(owner, repo string, index int64, username string) error {\n\t_, _, err := c.sdk.EditIssue(owner, repo, index, sdk.EditIssueOption{Assignees: []string{username}})\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"assign %s/%s#%d to %q: %w\", owner, repo, index, username, err)\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}\n\n// IssueTitle fetches the title of an issue or pull request from Forgejo.\n// Returns an empty string (not an error) if the client is nil or the\n// issue cannot be fetched — the caller should degrade gracefully.\nfunc (c *Client) IssueTitle(owner, repo string, index int64) string {\n\tif c == nil || c.sdk == nil {\n\t\treturn \"\"\n\t}\n\n\tissue, _, err := c.sdk.GetIssue(owner, repo, index)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn \"\"\n\t}\n\n\treturn issue.Title\n}","start_line":150,"end_line":432,"total_lines":432,"truncated":false}
Tool
🔧 read_file
{"path": "internal/agentrun/docker_integration_test.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 200}
Arguments
{"path": "internal/agentrun/docker_integration_test.go", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 200}
Result
{"path":"internal/agentrun/docker_integration_test.go","content":"//go:build docker\n\n// Run with: go test -tags docker ./internal/agentrun/...\n// Requires a reachable Docker daemon (DOCKER_HOST or the default socket).\npackage agentrun\n\nimport (\n\t\"context\"\n\t\"os\"\n\t\"os/exec\"\n\t\"path/filepath\"\n\t\"strings\"\n\t\"testing\"\n\t\"time\"\n)\n\nfunc TestDockerRuntimeExecRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {\n\trt, err := newDockerRuntime()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"docker client: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 60*time.Second)\n\tdefer cancel()\n\n\tcontainerID, err := rt.createContainer(ctx, \"debian:unstable\", nil, \"zoo-test-run\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"create container: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tdefer rt.remove(context.Background(), containerID)\n\n\toutput, exitCode, err := rt.exec(ctx, containerID, \"echo hello-from-zoo\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"exec: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tif exitCode != 0 {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"expected exit code 0, got %d\", exitCode)\n\t}\n\tif !strings.Contains(output, \"hello-from-zoo\") {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"unexpected output: %q\", output)\n\t}\n\n\t_, exitCode, err = rt.exec(ctx, containerID, \"exit 3\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"exec: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tif exitCode != 3 {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"expected exit code 3, got %d\", exitCode)\n\t}\n}\n\n// TestDockerRuntimeGitSafeDirectory reproduces the \"detected dubious\n// ownership\" error git raises against a bind-mounted repo owned by a\n// different UID than the container runs as, and confirms the `git\n// config --system --add safe.directory '*'` fix Run() applies (see\n// run.go) actually clears it, against the same golang:latest image\n// zoo.hcl now defaults to.\nfunc TestDockerRuntimeGitSafeDirectory(t *testing.T) {\n\tprojectDir := t.TempDir()\n\n\tfor _, args := range [][]string{\n\t\t{\"init\", \"-q\", projectDir},\n\t\t{\"-C\", projectDir, \"commit\", \"-q\", \"--allow-empty\", \"-m\", \"init\"},\n\t} {\n\t\tif out, err := exec.Command(\"git\", args...).CombinedOutput(); err != nil {\n\t\t\tt.Fatalf(\"git %v: %v: %s\", args, err, out)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\trt, err := newDockerRuntime()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"docker client: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 60*time.Second)\n\tdefer cancel()\n\n\tcontainerID, err := rt.createContainer(ctx, \"golang:latest\", []string{projectDir + \":/project\"}, \"zoo-test-git\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"create container: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tdefer rt.remove(context.Background(), containerID)\n\n\toutput, _, err := rt.exec(ctx, containerID, \"git status\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"exec: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tif !strings.Contains(output, \"dubious ownership\") {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"expected the bind mount to reproduce dubious ownership before the fix, got: %s\", output)\n\t}\n\n\toutput, exitCode, err := rt.exec(ctx, containerID, \"git config --system --add safe.directory '*'\")\n\tif err != nil || exitCode != 0 {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"configure safe.directory: err=%v exit=%d: %s\", err, exitCode, output)\n\t}\n\n\toutput, exitCode, err = rt.exec(ctx, containerID, \"git status\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"exec: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tif exitCode != 0 || strings.Contains(output, \"dubious ownership\") {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"expected git status to succeed after the fix, got exit=%d: %s\", exitCode, output)\n\t}\n}\n\n// TestDockerRuntimeSandboxGit exercises the in-sandbox git setup\n// Run() performs (see sandboxgit.go): the system gitconfig round-trip\n// (including the http.\u003curl\u003e.extraHeader key whose subsection is a URL\n// full of dots and colons), the initial clone + branch done inside the\n// container, the commit identity taken from the system gitconfig, and\n// that the credential never lands in the bind-mounted working tree.\n// The clone uses a local path remote (no http involved), so the test\n// needs no reachable Forgejo; the header mechanism itself is core git\n// behavior.\nfunc TestDockerRuntimeSandboxGit(t *testing.T) {\n\ttmp := t.TempDir()\n\n\t// A bare \"remote\" on the host, plus the empty directory the\n\t// container will clone into (Run() creates it before the container\n\t// exists, for the same reason).\n\tseedDir := filepath.Join(tmp, \"seed\")\n\tbareDir := filepath.Join(tmp, \"remote.git\")\n\tprojectDir := filepath.Join(tmp, \"project\")\n\n\trun := func(dir string, args ...string) {\n\t\tcmd := exec.Command(\"git\", args...)\n\t\tcmd.Dir = dir\n\n\t\tif out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput(); err != nil {\n\t\t\tt.Fatalf(\"git %v: %v: %s\", args, err, out)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\trun(\"\", \"init\", \"-q\", \"-b\", \"main\", seedDir)\n\trun(seedDir, \"config\", \"user.name\", \"zoo-test\")\n\trun(seedDir, \"config\", \"user.email\", \"zoo@test\")\n\n\tif err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(seedDir, \"file.txt\"), []byte(\"hello\\n\"), 0o644); err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"write seed file: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\n\trun(seedDir, \"add\", \".\")\n\trun(seedDir, \"commit\", \"-q\", \"-m\", \"init\")\n\trun(\"\", \"clone\", \"-q\", \"--bare\", seedDir, bareDir)\n\n\tif err := os.MkdirAll(projectDir, 0o755); err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"create project dir: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\n\trt, err := newDockerRuntime()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"docker client: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 120*time.Second)\n\tdefer cancel()\n\n\tcontainerID, err := rt.createContainer(ctx, \"golang:latest\", []string{\n\t\tbareDir + \":/bare\",\n\t\tprojectDir + \":/project\",\n\t}, \"zoo-test-sandbox-git\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"create container: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tdefer rt.remove(context.Background(), containerID)\n\n\tconst (\n\t\tcloneURL = \"https://forgejo.example/acme/widgets.git\"\n\t\tuser = \"greg\"\n\t\ttoken = \"super-secret-token\"\n\t)\n\n\tif err := configureSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, cloneURL, user, token, \"Greg Coolio\", \"greg@noreply.localhost\"); err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"configureSandboxGit: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\n\t// The credential must round-trip through the system gitconfig,\n\t// which is what makes plain `git pull`/`git push` authenticate.\n\twantHeader := gitAuthHeader(user, token)\n\n\tout, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"config\", \"--system\", \"--get\", \"http.\"+forgeHost(cloneURL)+\".extraHeader\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"read back credential: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tif got := strings.TrimSpace(out); got != wantHeader {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"credential round-trip = %q, want %q\", got, wantHeader)\n\t}\n\n\tif err := cloneAndBranch(ctx, rt, containerID, \"/bare\", \"main\", \"issue-1-greg\"); err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"cloneAndBranch: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\n\t// The clone happened inside the container: the fresh branch is\n\t// checked out in /project.\n\tout, err = runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"branch\", \"--show-current\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"branch --show-current: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tif got := strings.TrimSpace(out); got != \"issue-1-greg\" {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"branch = %q, want issue-1-greg\", got)","start_line":1,"end_line":200,"total_lines":224,"truncated":true}
Thinking
Let's read the rest of docker_integration_test.go and check the README to get a grasp of the overall picture.
Tool
🔧 read_file
{"end_line": 224, "path": "internal/agentrun/docker_integration_test.go", "start_line": 200}
Arguments
{"end_line": 224, "path": "internal/agentrun/docker_integration_test.go", "start_line": 200}
Result
{"path":"internal/agentrun/docker_integration_test.go","content":"\t\tt.Fatalf(\"branch = %q, want issue-1-greg\", got)\n\t}\n\n\t// Commits must pick up the identity from the system gitconfig.\n\tif _, exitCode, err := rt.exec(ctx, containerID, \"echo more \u003e\u003e file.txt \u0026\u0026 git add file.txt \u0026\u0026 git commit -qm 'from sandbox'\"); err != nil || exitCode != 0 {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"commit in sandbox: err=%v exit=%d\", err, exitCode)\n\t}\n\n\tout, err = runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"log\", \"-1\", \"--format=%an %ae\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"log: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tif got := strings.TrimSpace(out); got != \"Greg Coolio greg@noreply.localhost\" {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"commit author = %q, want %q\", got, \"Greg Coolio greg@noreply.localhost\")\n\t}\n\n\t// The token must not leak into the bind-mounted working tree.\n\tout, _, err = rt.exec(ctx, containerID, \"grep -r super-secret-token /project || true\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"grep: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tif strings.Contains(out, \"super-secret-token\") {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"token leaked into the working tree: %s\", out)\n\t}\n}","start_line":200,"end_line":224,"total_lines":224,"truncated":false}
Tool
🔧 read_file
{"path": "README.md", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 200}
Arguments
{"path": "README.md", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 200}
Result
{"path":"README.md","content":"# 🐾 Zoo\n\n**Autonomous AI agents that work your Forgejo issues \u0026 pull requests.**\n\nZoo watches a [Forgejo](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo) instance for issue and pull request events, then dispatches them to configured AI agents running in isolated Docker containers. Each agent has its own role, LLM model, and personality — like a menagerie working together to keep your projects moving.\n\n---\n\n## ✨ Features\n\n- **Multi-agent orchestration** — Assign different tasks to specialized agents (reviewers, managers, developers).\n- **Event-driven routing** — Configure which agent handles `issue:new`, `pr:new`, `issue:comment`, `issue:assigned`, and more.\n- **LLM flexibility** — Plug in any OpenAI-compatible API; each agent gets its own model choice.\n- **Isolated execution** — Agents run in Docker containers with full filesystem access but no persistence between runs.\n- **Live dashboard** — Real-time web UI showing active agents, logs, and job history.\n- **Webhook \u0026 polling support** — React to events instantly via webhooks, or fall back to polling.\n\n---\n\n## 🚀 Quick Start\n\n### Prerequisites\n\n| Requirement | Version |\n|-------------|---------|\n| Go | 1.26+ |\n| Docker | Latest |\n| Forgejo | Any (self-hosted or codeberg.dk) |\n| LLM endpoint | OpenAI-compatible API |\n\n### Configuration\n\nCopy the example config and customize it:\n\n```bash\ncp zoo.hcl.example zoo.hcl\n```\n\nEdit `zoo.hcl` with your Forgejo credentials, LLM tokens, and agent definitions. See the [configuration reference](#-configuration-reference) below.\n\n### Running\n\n```bash\ngo build -o zoo ./cmd/zoo\n./zoo\n```\n\nThe daemon starts on port `:8080` by default. Open your browser to see the dashboard.\n\n---\n\n## 👥 Meet the Agents\n\nThe example configuration includes four agents, each with a distinct role:\n\n| Agent | Role | Suggested LLM | Handles |\n|----------|-----------------------|---------------------|----------------------------------|\n| **leon** | Engineering Manager | Qwen 3.8 | New issues, comments |\n| **greg** | Senior Developer | Qwen 3.8 | Pull request reviews |\n| **anna** | UI/UX Designer | Qwen 3.6 | Design-related issues \u0026 PRs |\n| **mika** | Junior Developer | Qwen 3.6 | Assigned issues |\n\nYou can add, remove, or reassign agents freely in your `zoo.hcl`.\n\n---\n\n## ⚙️ Configuration Reference\n\nAll settings live in a single HCL file (`zoo.hcl`). Here's what each section controls:\n\n### LLM Definitions\n\nDefine one or more LLM endpoints. Agents reference these by name.\n\n```hcl\nllm \"Qwen 3.6\" {\n openai = \"https://your-llm-endpoint\"\n token = \"YOUR_API_TOKEN\"\n model = \"model-name\"\n}\n```\n\n### Forgejo Connection\n\n```hcl\nforgejo {\n url = \"https://code.stdio.dk\"\n token = \"ZOO_SERVICE_TOKEN\"\n webhook_secret = \"SHARED_SECRET\" # optional if using polling\n}\n```\n\n### Environment\n\n```hcl\nenvironment {\n docker_image = \"golang:latest\" # base image for agent containers\n max_live_agents = 5 # concurrent agent limit\n}\n```\n\n### Agent Definition\n\n```hcl\nagent \"anna\" {\n llm = \"Qwen 3.6\"\n token = \"ANNA_FORGEJO_TOKEN\"\n}\n```\n\nThe optional `token` is the agent's own Forgejo token. When set, the\nagent acts as itself on Forgejo (comments, PRs, ...) and its sandbox's\ngit authenticates with it too — the initial clone and all remote git\noperations (pull, push, ...) run inside the container with that\ncredential. Without it, the shared `forgejo.token` is used.\n\n### Event Routing\n\nMap event types to agents with optional custom instructions:\n\n```hcl\nevent \"issue:new\" {\n agent = \"leon\"\n instructions = \"Triage this issue.\"\n}\n\nevent \"issue:assigned\" {\n // No `agent` — dynamically matches the assignee's username\n instructions = \"Please handle this issue.\"\n}\n\nevent \"pr:new\" {\n agent = \"greg\"\n instructions = \"Review this pull request.\"\n}\n```\n\n---\n\n## 🔧 Command-Line Flags\n\n| Flag | Default | Description |\n|-------------------|-----------------|----------------------------------------------|\n| `-config` | `zoo.hcl` | Path to the configuration file |\n| `-db` | `zoo.db` | SQLite database path |\n| `-listen` | `:8080` | HTTP listen address |\n| `-run-timeout` | (see source) | Max wall-clock time per agent run |\n| `-keep-on-failure`| `false` | Preserve container after failure for debugging |\n\n---\n\n## 📁 Project Structure\n\n```\n├── cmd/zoo/main.go # Entry point\n├── internal/\n│ ├── agentrun/ # Docker-based agent execution\n│ ├── config/ # HCL config loader \u0026 validator\n│ ├── forgejo/ # Webhook receiver \u0026 event poller\n│ ├── livelog/ # Real-time log streaming hub\n│ ├── llm/ # LLM client \u0026 streaming\n│ ├── scheduler/ # Event-to-agent dispatcher\n│ ├── store/ # SQLite state management\n│ ├── tools/ # Agent tool registry\n│ └── web/ # Dashboard HTTP server\n└── zoo.hcl.example # Configuration template\n```\n\n---\n\n## 🛠 Development\n\n### Running Tests\n\n```bash\ngo test ./...\n```\n\n### Adding a New Agent\n\n1. Define the agent in `zoo.hcl`:\n\n ```hcl\n agent \"newagent\" {\n llm = \"Qwen 3.6\"\n token = \"NEW_AGENT_TOKEN\"\n }\n ```\n\n2. Add an event route:\n\n ```hcl\n event \"issue:new\" {\n agent = \"newagent\"\n }\n ```\n\n3. Update your Forgejo profile with the agent's role description.\n\n### Adding a New Tool","start_line":1,"end_line":200,"total_lines":223,"truncated":true}
Thinking
Let's check the rest of the README and the TODO.md that was mentioned in the comments in docker.go.
Tool
🔧 read_file
{"end_line": 223, "path": "README.md", "start_line": 200}
Arguments
{"end_line": 223, "path": "README.md", "start_line": 200}
Result
{"path":"README.md","content":"### Adding a New Tool\n\nTools are registered in `internal/tools/registry.go`. Each tool is a Go function that operates on the agent's `/project` directory. See existing tools for patterns.\n\n---\n\n## 🤝 Contributing\n\nContributions are welcome! Please:\n\n1. Fork the repository\n2. Create a feature branch\n3. Make your changes\n4. Open a pull request\n\n---\n\n## 📄 License\n\nThis project is available as open source under the terms of the [MIT License](LICENSE).\n\n---\n\n*Made with ❤️ by the [zoo](https://code.stdio.dk/abrander/zoo) team.*","start_line":200,"end_line":223,"total_lines":223,"truncated":false}
Tool
🔧 bash
{"command": "cd /project && ls -la && cat TODO.md 2>/dev/null; grep -rn \"extraHeader\\|gitAuthHeader\\|Token()\" --include=\"*.go\" . | grep -v \"_test.go\""}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /project && ls -la && cat TODO.md 2>/dev/null; grep -rn \"extraHeader\\|gitAuthHeader\\|Token()\" --include=\"*.go\" . | grep -v \"_test.go\""}
Result
total 64
drwxr-xr-x 6 user user 4096 Aug 25 21:55 .
drwxr-xr-x 1 root root 4096 Aug 25 21:55 ..
drwxr-xr-x 7 user user 4096 Aug 25 21:55 .git
-rw-r--r-- 1 user user 22 Aug 25 21:55 .gitignore
-rw-r--r-- 1 user user 6387 Aug 25 21:55 README.md
drwxr-xr-x 3 user user 4096 Aug 25 21:55 cmd
drwxr-xr-x 2 user user 4096 Aug 25 21:55 docker
-rw-r--r-- 1 user user 2628 Aug 25 21:55 go.mod
-rw-r--r-- 1 user user 16578 Aug 25 21:55 go.sum
drwxr-xr-x 11 user user 4096 Aug 25 21:55 internal
-rw-r--r-- 1 user user 3092 Aug 25 21:55 zoo.hcl.example
./internal/forgejo/client.go:37:func (c *Client) Token() string {
./internal/agentrun/sandboxgit.go:53:// gitAuthHeader returns the value of an Authorization header that
./internal/agentrun/sandboxgit.go:55:func gitAuthHeader(user, token string) string {
./internal/agentrun/sandboxgit.go:80:// - http.<host>.extraHeader carrying the run's Forgejo credential,
./internal/agentrun/sandboxgit.go:108: if _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, "config", "--global", "http."+forgeHost(cloneURL)+".extraHeader", gitAuthHeader(user, token)); err != nil {
./internal/agentrun/sandboxgit.go:121:// authenticates via the http.<host>.extraHeader configured by
./internal/agentrun/run.go:183: gitUser, gitToken := "zoo", r.forgejo.Token()
Thinking
Now I have a grasp of the whole picture. Let me design the solution.
## Design
**Problem**: The sandbox container receives the agent's (or zoo's) full Forgejo API token in its git config (`http.<host>.extraHeader`). Any process inside the container (including the LLM-driven agent, which can execute arbitrary bash) can read that token and use it to do anything on the Forgejo instance — creating issues, deleting repositories, reading private repos, etc.
**Solution**: A per-run **git HTTP proxy** on the host.
- Zoo starts a small HTTP proxy bound to a **unix domain socket** inside the per-run working directory (ephemeral, deleted with the run).
- The socket is bind-mounted into the container at a fixed path (`/run/zoo/git.sock`).
- The container's git config gets `http.<forge-host>.proxy = http+unix:///run/zoo/git.sock` instead of an `extraHeader` with the token. Git (which has supported unix-socket proxies since 2.3) transparently routes all HTTP(S) traffic for the forge host through the socket.
- The proxy only accepts **git smart-HTTP requests** (`info/refs?service=git-upload-pack|git-receive-pack`, `git-upload-pack`, `git-receive-pack` paths) addressed to the forge host, strips any client-supplied `Authorization` header, injects the run's credential, and forwards to the real forge. Everything else — API paths, other hosts, other schemes — is rejected.
- The token never enters the container: not on the filesystem, not in env vars, not in any process's memory inside the sandbox. It exists only in zoo's process on the host and is only ever used for git smart-HTTP.
**Security properties**:
1. The sandbox cannot use the token against the Forgejo API — the proxy only speaks git smart-HTTP.
2. The sandbox cannot read the token — it's not in the container at all.
3. The sandbox cannot use the proxy for anything other than git against the forge host — host + path validation.
4. The proxy is per-run and ephemeral — torn down with the run; no port is exposed (unix socket, no TCP listener at all).
5. Git operations work exactly as before: clone, pull, fetch, push, submodules, PR head refs — all go through the same smart-HTTP endpoints.
**Trade-offs / notes**:
- The agent can still git-push to any repo the token has write access to (that's inherent to "the agent does git work with the agent's identity" — leon's comment says that's the required scope).
- Defense in depth: recommend scoping the token to `write:repository` (git only) in Forgejo — even if the proxy design is bypassed, the token can't do API operations. This is a config recommendation, not code.
**Implementation**:
1. `internal/agentrun/gitproxy.go` (new):
- `gitProxy` struct: `ln net.Listener`, `sockPath string`, `forgeHost string`, `authHeader string`, `proxy *httputil.ReverseProxy`, `logger *slog.Logger`.
- `newGitProxy(dir, forgeURL, user, token string, logger *slog.Logger) (*gitProxy, error)`:
- Parse forgeURL → scheme + host.
- `net.Listen("unix", filepath.Join(dir, "git-proxy.sock"))`, chmod 0777.
- Build an `httputil.ReverseProxy` with a Director that sets the target scheme/host and injects auth, plus a Transport with TLS.
- Serve in a goroutine.
- `SocketPath() string`
- `ProxyValue() string` → `http+unix://` + the container-side path? Hmm — the container-side path is a constant `/run/zoo/git.sock`. Let me have `ProxyValue()` return the git config value for the container path. Actually cleaner: the caller knows the container path (it's the one setting up the bind mount). Let me define a package-level constant `gitProxyContainerPath = "/run/zoo/git.sock"` and have `ProxyValue()` return `"http+unix://" + gitProxyContainerPath`.
- `Close() error` — close the listener and remove the socket file.
- `ServeHTTP`:
- Validate `r.URL` is absolute form with scheme http/https and host == forgeHost (case-insensitive? hosts are case-insensitive; compare with strings.EqualFold).
- Validate the path is a git smart-HTTP endpoint: regex `^/[^/]+/[^/]+(\.git)?/(info/refs|git-upload-pack|git-receive-pack)$`.
- `info/refs` must have `service=git-upload-pack` or `service=git-receive-pack`? Plain `info/refs` without service is dumb HTTP. Forgejo's smart HTTP requires the service param for clone/fetch/push. Should we allow `info/refs` without service? Dumb protocol isn't used by git clients by default (git uses smart). To be strict, require the service param on info/refs. Hmm, but `git ls-remote` uses `info/refs?service=git-upload-pack`. Let me require: path ends with `info/refs` AND query has `service=git-upload-pack` or `service=git-receive-pack`; OR path ends with `git-upload-pack` (POST); OR path ends with `git-receive-pack` (POST).
- Also allow the repo path with or without `.git` suffix, and any owner/repo (submodules, cross-repo fetches).
- Reject with 403 (or 404) and a short message.
- Strip `Authorization` from the request, set the run's auth header.
- Forward.
- `gitAuthHeader(user, token)` moves here (or stays; it's used by the proxy). Move to gitproxy.go and update tests.
2. `internal/agentrun/sandboxgit.go`:
- `configureSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, cloneURL, proxyValue, name, email)` — replace user/token params with proxyValue; set `http.<host>.proxy` instead of `extraHeader`. Update the doc comment.
- Remove `gitAuthHeader` (moved), keep `forgeHost`, `shellQuote`, `shellGitCmd`, `runSandboxGit`, `cloneAndBranch`, `clonePRHead`.
3. `internal/agentrun/run.go`:
- After creating workDir/projectDir: start the git proxy: `gitProxy, err := newGitProxy(workDir, repoInfo.CloneURL, gitUser, gitToken, logger)`.
- Add bind `gitProxy.SocketPath() + ":" + gitProxyContainerPath`.
- `defer gitProxy.Close()` (with a cleanup ctx? Close is local — no ctx needed).
- Pass `gitProxy.ProxyValue()` to configureSandboxGit.
4. Tests:
- `gitproxy_test.go` (new, no docker needed):
- Test path validation: `gitSmartHTTPPath`-style function — make the validator a pure function `validGitSmartHTTPPath(path, rawQuery string) bool` for unit testing.
- End-to-end test with `httptest.NewServer` as a fake forge: start the proxy with a unix socket, use an `http.Client` with a custom transport that dials the unix socket, send an absolute-form request `GET https://forge.example/acme/widgets.git/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack`, and verify the fake forge receives the request with the injected Authorization header and the client's original Authorization is stripped.
- Test rejection: API path `/api/v1/repos` → 403; wrong host → 403; info/refs without service → 403.
- Test that the token never appears in the socket path / config value.
- `sandboxgit_test.go`: remove `TestGitAuthHeader` (moved to gitproxy_test.go).
- `docker_integration_test.go`: update `TestDockerRuntimeSandboxGit` to use the proxy: start a git proxy pointing at… hmm, the integration test uses a local path remote (`/bare`), not HTTP, so the proxy isn't exercised for the clone. But `configureSandboxGit` now sets `http.<host>.proxy` — the test should verify the proxy value round-trips in the system gitconfig. We could also add a full end-to-end: a fake forge HTTP server on the host + proxy + container clone over HTTP through the proxy. That would be a great integration test! Let me think:
- Start an `httptest.Server` (TCP) that serves a bare git repo via smart HTTP? Writing a smart HTTP server is non-trivial… actually, we can use `git http-backend` CGI! The container image has git; the host has git. `git http-backend` is a CGI script that can serve a bare repo over smart HTTP. We can run it via a small CGI handler in the test. That's a bit heavy but doable:
```go
http.Handle("/", http.StripPrefix("/acme/widgets.git/", http.FileServer?))
```
No — http-backend is a CGI binary: `git http-backend` with env vars GIT_PROJECT_ROOT, GIT_HTTP_EXPORT_ALL=1, PATH_INFO. We can wrap it:
```go
mux.HandleFunc("/", func(w, r) {
cmd := exec.Command("git", "http-backend")
cmd.Env = append(os.Environ(), "GIT_PROJECT_ROOT="+root, "GIT_HTTP_EXPORT_ALL=1", "PATH_INFO="+strings.TrimPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/acme/widgets.git"), "REQUEST_METHOD="+r.Method, ...)
...
})
```
That's fiddly (CGI protocol: request body, headers). There's a simpler way: `git daemon`? No, that's the git protocol, not HTTP.
Alternative: use `http-backend` via `os/exec` with the CGI env — I've seen this pattern in tests. It's about 40 lines. Worth it? It would prove the whole chain: container git → unix socket proxy (host) → auth injection → fake forge → clone works, and the token is not in the container. That's the crown jewel of this feature. Let me try; if it's too fiddly, fall back to a simpler integration test (proxy value round-trip + fake forge that just checks headers and returns 403/404 — no actual clone).
Actually, a simpler yet still meaningful integration test: the fake forge server just records the request (path, Authorization header) and returns a minimal valid smart-HTTP response? A minimal `info/refs` response for a single branch:
```
001e# service=git-upload-pack\n0000<pkt-line ref>0000...
```
Then git proceeds to POST `git-upload-pack` with a want list; the server would need to respond with a packfile. Generating a valid packfile by hand is painful. So a real clone needs http-backend.
Let me do the http-backend CGI approach — it's standard and robust. The host running the test has git (the test already shells out to git).
Wait, actually — do I want to put this in the `//go:build docker` file? Yes, it needs docker. OK.
Hmm, but let me reconsider the scope. The issue is a design question. A full implementation with unit tests + one solid docker integration test is the right deliverable. The http-backend CGI in the integration test is a nice-to-have; let me attempt it and see if it works in this environment (is docker available in my container? let me check — `docker` CLI and daemon). My sandbox may not have a docker daemon. Let me check. If not, I can still write the test (it's behind the `docker` build tag) but I can't run it here. I should at least verify it compiles (`go vet`/`go build` with the tag).
- Also update the `Token()` doc comment in forgejo/client.go? The comment says "e.g. for authenticating a host-side git clone/push against Forgejo (see internal/agentrun) without ever writing the credential into a working tree an agent's container can read." Still mostly accurate — the token is used by the git proxy. Let me tweak the wording slightly.
5. README: update the agent token section to describe the proxy mechanism (the token never enters the sandbox; git operations are proxied).
Now, let me double-check git's `http+unix://` proxy syntax. From git's docs (git-config, http.proxy):
> http.proxy
> The URL of the proxy to use for HTTP or HTTPS. ... The value can be a URL, or a `socks5://` or `socks5h://` URL...
>
> Actually, the exact doc text (git ≥ 2.3): "The URL of the proxy to use for HTTP or HTTPS. This overrides the http_proxy and https_proxy environment variables." And there's a section about unix sockets: I recall the doc says:
>
> "The value can be a URL, or a `socks5://` or `socks5h://` URL... Git also supports proxies over unix sockets: `http+unix:///path/to/socket`."
Hmm, let me be careful. I know for a fact that git supports `http+unix://` in `http.proxy` — it's in the git docs:
From https://git-scm.com/docs/git-config:
```
http.proxy
The URL of the proxy to use for HTTP or HTTPS. This overrides the
http_proxy and https_proxy environment variables.
...
http.<url>.proxy
The proxy to use for HTTP or HTTPS URLs matching <url>. ...
```
And in the "PROXY DISCOVERY" section:
```
If http.proxy is set, git will use that proxy...
```
Hmm, and I specifically recall: "git can use a proxy over a unix socket: http+unix:///path/to/socket" — yes, this is documented in git-config under http.proxy:
> "The value can be a URL, or a URL with a socks5:// or socks5h:// scheme... You can also use a unix socket: http+unix:///path/to/socket"
I'm confident enough; and the sandbox image uses debian:unstable's git (2.4x), which definitely supports it. I can verify empirically in my own sandbox if git is available here — I can test `git config http.localhost.proxy http+unix:///tmp/x.sock` and see if git accepts the value (it'll fail to connect, but it should parse). Even better: I can write a small test in this container that runs git against a fake forge served over a unix socket proxy — no docker needed! That would be a great verification. Let me check what's available in my environment (git version, docker).
Actually, wait — I should also double-check how git handles the `http.<host>` subsection matching with a proxy value: `http.code.stdio.dk.proxy = http+unix:///run/zoo/git.sock`. Yes.
Another design question: should the proxy be bound to a unix socket, or should we run a TCP listener on the host and use `host.docker.internal`? Unix socket is strictly better (no port exposure, no host-gateway discovery, works on both Linux and Docker Desktop). Let's go with unix socket.
Another consideration: **multiple concurrent runs** — each run has its own workDir → its own socket → its own proxy with its own credential. No sharing.
**What about `git` operations to other hosts** (e.g. a submodule on github.com)? Currently, with the extraHeader scoped to the forge host, submodules on other hosts would fail to authenticate anyway (no credential) — same as before. The proxy only handles the forge host; other hosts go direct (no proxy configured for them) — same behavior as today. Good, no regression.
**What about the `forgejo-cli` in the sandbox?** It needs an API token; the agent doesn't have one. It was probably there for other purposes. Not our concern.
Now, one subtlety about ReverseProxy and absolute-form requests: when a request comes in over a unix socket as a proxy request, `r.URL` is absolute (`https://code.stdio.dk/abrander/zoo.git/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack`). `httputil.NewSingleHostReverseProxy(target)`'s Director does:
```go
func director(req *http.Request) {
targetQuery := target.RawQuery
req.URL.Scheme = target.Scheme
req.URL.Host = target.Host
req.URL.Path, req.URL.RawQuery = singleJoiningSlash(target.Path, req.URL.Path)
if targetQuery == "" || req.URL.RawQuery == "" {
req.URL.RawQuery = targetQuery + req.URL.RawQuery
}
...
}
```
With target = `https://code.stdio.dk` (no path), `req.URL.Path` stays as-is, and the query stays as-is.
But we also need to set the `Host` header: ReverseProxy sets `req.Host`… actually, ReverseProxy by default sets the outgoing `Host` header to `req.URL.Host` (it uses `req.WriteProxied`? Let me recall: `ReverseProxy.ServeHTTP` → `p.getDirector()(req)`, then `outreq := req.Clone(ctx)`, then `outreq.Host = req.URL.Host`? Hmm. Let me recall the actual code:
```go
func (p *ReverseProxy) ServeHTTP(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
...
outreq := req.Clone(ctx)
if req.ContentLength == 0 {
outreq.Body = http.NoBody
...
}
if outreq.ContentLength == -1 {
...
}
if _, ok := outreq.Header["User-Agent"]; !ok {
outreq.Header.Set("User-Agent", "Go-http-client/1.1")
}
...
transport := p.Transport
...
res, err := transport.RoundTrip(outreq)
```
And the default Director (from NewSingleHostReverseProxy) sets `req.URL.Scheme/Host/Path`. The `Host` header on the cloned request: `req.Clone` copies headers including `Host`? No — `Host` is a field on Request, not in Header. `req.Clone` copies the Host field. For a proxy request, `req.Host` is the Host header sent by the client (git sends `Host: code.stdio.dk`). When the outgoing request is written, `http.Request.write` uses `r.Host` if set, else `r.URL.Host`. Since the client sent the correct Host header, it's fine. But to be safe, in my Director I'll explicitly set `req.Host = target.Host`.
Also, `X-Forwarded-For` etc. — ReverseProxy adds X-Forwarded-For. Harmless.
One more: **response streaming** for large pushes (git-receive-pack responses can be large; upload-pack packfiles can be large). ReverseProxy streams the response body (io.Copy). Good. And request body for push: ReverseProxy handles it; for `ContentLength == -1` (chunked), it sets `Transfer-Encoding: chunked`. Git typically sends Content-Length for upload-pack POSTs (it buffers the request). For receive-pack, git also sends a complete body with Content-Length. Fine.
**Timeouts**: the http.Server for the unix socket — should I set ReadTimeout/WriteTimeout? A push can take a while, but it's bounded by the run's timeout. The default http.Server has no timeouts; the run's ctx cancellation kills the container and the whole run. But the proxy's Serve goroutine: when the run ends, we Close() the listener; in-flight requests? The container is removed first (defer order: the container's remove is deferred after the proxy's Close is deferred… let me get the order right: defers run LIFO. In Run(): first `defer containerRemove` is registered, then `defer proxyClose` — so proxyClose runs before containerRemove. In-flight git requests when the container is being torn down: the client side dies; the proxy's RoundTrip to forge completes or fails; no problem. Let me also pass ctx to the Serve goroutine and stop serving on ctx.Done() — actually, closing the listener is enough for new connections; in-flight ones finish. Keep it simple: `Close()` closes the listener and removes the socket.
Hmm, one more: `http.Server` vs `net.Listener` + `http.Serve`. I'll use `http.Server{Handler: p}` and `srv.Serve(ln)` in a goroutine, and `srv.Close()` in Close().
**Socket permissions**: `os.Chmod(sockPath, 0o777)` after listen. The container runs as uid 1000; the host's zoo process runs as whatever user — the socket is created with the default umask (probably 022 → 0755, not writable by others). Chmod to 0777. Since it's in a per-run temp dir (0700? MkdirTemp creates with 0700), only the zoo user can traverse the directory — but the container's uid 1000 may differ from the host's zoo user! Wait — the bind mount: the container sees the socket file; the permission check happens in the container's namespace against the file's mode bits (and the mount). The directory containing the socket is on the host (not mounted), so the container only sees the socket file itself at /run/zoo/git.sock. /run inside the container — writable? The container runs as uid 1000; /run is root-owned 755. We bind-mount the socket at /run/zoo/git.sock — Docker creates the /run/zoo directory as root on mount. The socket file's mode 0777 allows connect by uid 1000.
Wait, does Docker allow bind-mounting a unix socket file? Yes — that's exactly how people mount /var/run/docker.sock into containers.
**Now, the git config key**: `http.<host>.proxy`. With host = `code.stdio.dk`. The value `http+unix:///run/zoo/git.sock`.
Hmm, wait — one more consideration. Git's proxy URL parsing: `http+unix:///run/zoo/git.sock` — the scheme is `http+unix`, the host is empty, the path is `/run/zoo/git.sock`. Git handles this.
**What about the `GIT_CONFIG_COUNT` env in exec?** docker.go's exec sets `GIT_CONFIG_COUNT=1`, `GIT_CONFIG_KEY_0=color.ui`, `GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_0=never`. This is an env-var-based config that overrides… env config has higher priority than system config but lower than command-line. It only sets color.ui, so it doesn't interfere with http.proxy from the system config. Fine.
**Where does the clone get the proxy from?** The system gitconfig (`/etc/gitconfig`) — configureSandboxGit uses `git config --global`… wait, inside the container, `--global` writes to `~/.gitconfig` (HOME=/home/user, uid 1000). The integration test reads it back with `--system`. Hmm, the test comment says "system gitconfig" but configureSandboxGit uses `--global`. Let me re-check: `runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, "config", "--global", ...)` — yes, `--global`. The docker integration test reads `http.<host>.extraHeader` with `--system`… and it presumably passed? Let me look again:
```go
out, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, "config", "--system", "--get", "http."+forgeHost(cloneURL)+".extraHeader")
```
Hmm, this reads `--system` but configure writes `--global`. Unless HOME is set such that global == system? In the container, HOME=/home/user (from the Dockerfile? no — that's the custom image in docker/Dockerfile; the integration test uses `golang:latest`). In golang:latest, HOME=/root? The container runs as root by default (golang:latest's default user is root). So `--global` → `/root/.gitconfig`. And `--system` → `/etc/gitconfig`. These are different! So the test should fail… unless the test is currently failing/skipped, or I'm misreading.
Wait, let me re-read the test. Lines 168-172:
```go
wantHeader := gitAuthHeader(user, token)
out, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, "config", "--system", "--get", "http."+forgeHost(cloneURL)+".extraHeader")
```
Hmm. And configureSandboxGit (sandboxgit.go line 108) uses `--global`. So the read-back with `--system` should return empty → the test should fail. Unless… the test file is stale/broken, or I'm misreading. Let me grep for `--system` vs `--global` in both files to double-check.
Actually, wait — the test comment says "the system gitconfig round-trip (including the http.<url>.extraHeader key whose subsection is a URL full of dots and colons)". And the TestDockerRuntimeGitSafeDirectory test uses `git config --system --add safe.directory '*'` and its comment says "confirms the `git config --system --add safe.directory '*'` fix Run() applies (see run.go)". But configureSandboxGit uses `--global` for safe.directory too! So either the test is out of sync with the code, or… hmm.
These docker-tagged tests may not run in CI (they need a docker daemon), so they may have rotted. Let me check if docker is available in my environment so I can run them. If not, I'll fix the inconsistency as part of my changes (make the test read `--global` to match the code, or switch the code to `--system`?).
Which is better, `--global` or `--system`? `--global` writes to $HOME/.gitconfig of the user git runs as. In the custom image (docker/Dockerfile), USER 1000:1000, HOME=/home/user. In golang:latest, root, HOME=/root. Both work. `--system` writes to /etc/gitconfig — requires root (the container may run as non-root → permission denied). The custom image runs as uid 1000 (non-root!), so `--system` would fail there (can't write to /etc/gitconfig without root… actually, the image has sudo configured for uid 1000 — docker/uid1000-sudo — so it can sudo, but plain git config --system as uid 1000 would fail). So `--global` is the right choice for the code; the test's `--system` read is a bug. Since I'm touching this test anyway (the credential mechanism changes), I'll fix it to `--global`.
Let me verify: does the container in the integration test (golang:latest) run as root? Yes, by default. So `--global` → /root/.gitconfig, readable. The test's `--system` read → /etc/gitconfig → empty → the test as written should fail. So the test is currently broken (or has never been run). I'll fix it.
Now — let me check if docker is available in my sandbox so I can run the docker-tagged tests.
Also let me check the Go version and that the project builds.
**Plan of action**:
1. Check the environment (git version, docker availability, go).
2. Write `gitproxy.go`.
3. Update `sandboxgit.go` (configureSandboxGit signature + docs; move gitAuthHeader).
4. Update `run.go` (start proxy, bind socket, pass proxy value).
5. Update tests: sandboxgit_test.go (remove the gitAuthHeader test → move to gitproxy_test.go), new gitproxy_test.go with unit + e2e (unix socket, absolute-form request, fake forge via httptest), update docker_integration_test.go (fix --system→--global, adapt to proxy config, and if possible a full clone-through-proxy test with git http-backend).
6. Update README + forgejo client Token() doc comment.
7. Run `go build ./...`, `go vet ./...`, `go test ./...` (and the docker-tagged tests if docker is available).
8. Commit, push, open a PR, and comment on the issue with the design explanation.
Let's start with the environment check.
Let me check the environment and understand the full picture before designing the solution.
Tool
🔧 bash
{"command": "cd /project && go version && git --version && (docker info >/dev/null 2>&1 && echo \"docker: available\" || echo \"docker: NOT available\") && which git http-backend 2>/dev/null; git http-backend --help 2>&1 | head -3"}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /project && go version && git --version && (docker info >/dev/null 2>&1 && echo \"docker: available\" || echo \"docker: NOT available\") && which git http-backend 2>/dev/null; git http-backend --help 2>&1 | head -3"}
Result
go version go1.26.7 linux/amd64
git version 2.55.0
docker: NOT available
/usr/bin/git
warning: failed to exec 'man': No such file or directory
fatal: no man viewer handled the request
Tool
🔧 bash
{"command": "cd /project && grep -rn \"system\\|global\" internal/agentrun/sandboxgit.go internal/agentrun/docker_integration_test.go | grep -n \"config\" ; grep -rn \"git\" README.md | head -20"}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /project && grep -rn \"system\\|global\" internal/agentrun/sandboxgit.go internal/agentrun/docker_integration_test.go | grep -n \"config\" ; grep -rn \"git\" README.md | head -20"}
Result
1:internal/agentrun/sandboxgit.go:13:// credential is written to the container's system gitconfig so every
2:internal/agentrun/sandboxgit.go:74:// configureSandboxGit writes the container's system gitconfig so git
4:internal/agentrun/sandboxgit.go:96: if _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, "config", "--global", "--add", "safe.directory", "*"); err != nil {
5:internal/agentrun/sandboxgit.go:100: if _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, "config", "--global", "user.name", name); err != nil {
6:internal/agentrun/sandboxgit.go:104: if _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, "config", "--global", "user.email", email); err != nil {
7:internal/agentrun/sandboxgit.go:108: if _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, "config", "--global", "http."+forgeHost(cloneURL)+".extraHeader", gitAuthHeader(user, token)); err != nil {
8:internal/agentrun/sandboxgit.go:112: if _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, "config", "--global", "push.autoSetupRemote", "true"); err != nil {
9:internal/agentrun/docker_integration_test.go:55:// config --system --add safe.directory '*'` fix Run() applies (see
10:internal/agentrun/docker_integration_test.go:92: output, exitCode, err := rt.exec(ctx, containerID, "git config --system --add safe.directory '*'")
11:internal/agentrun/docker_integration_test.go:107:// Run() performs (see sandboxgit.go): the system gitconfig round-trip
12:internal/agentrun/docker_integration_test.go:110:// container, the commit identity taken from the system gitconfig, and
13:internal/agentrun/docker_integration_test.go:177: // The credential must round-trip through the system gitconfig,
14:internal/agentrun/docker_integration_test.go:181: out, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, "config", "--system", "--get", "http."+forgeHost(cloneURL)+".extraHeader")
15:internal/agentrun/docker_integration_test.go:203: // Commits must pick up the identity from the system gitconfig.
113:git authenticates with it too — the initial clone and all remote git
Thinking
Docker isn't available in my sandbox, so I can't run tests with the docker tag. But I can do the following:
1. Verify that `git http+unix://` proxy support works in this container (git 2.55) with a local end-to-end test — this validates the core mechanism without docker.
2. Write a unit test for the proxy using a unix socket + an httptest fake forge — runnable without docker.
3. Write a docker integration test (with a build tag) that can't be run here, but at least make sure it compiles.
First, let me empirically validate the core assumption: that git uses `http+unix://` proxies. I'll write a quick throwaway test:
- Start a small Go HTTP server on a unix socket (a proxy that forwards to a local TCP server).
- Have the TCP server serve a bare repo via `git http-backend` CGI.
- Run `git clone https://fake.host/acme/widgets.git` with `http.fake.host.proxy=http+unix:///tmp/proxy.sock` set.
Actually, even simpler for a first check: a proxy that just echoes back a minimal smart-HTTP info/refs response… no, a real clone needs http-backend. Let me write the full thing as a Go test program in /tmp (outside /project so it doesn't pollute the repo).
Plan for the validation program:
1. Create a bare repo in /tmp/fakeforge/acme/widgets.git with a commit on main.
2. HTTP server on 127.0.0.1:PORT that serves `git http-backend` CGI for /acme/widgets.git/*.
3. Proxy on a unix socket: accepts absolute-form requests, validates the host is fake.host, injects Authorization, and forwards to 127.0.0.1:PORT.
4. In a temp directory, `git clone https://fake.host/acme/widgets.git` with env `GIT_CONFIG_COUNT` or a global config `http.fake.host.proxy=http+unix:///tmp/p.sock`.
5. Verify the clone succeeded and that the fake forge saw the Authorization header.
Let me write this as a standalone Go program in /tmp.
Actually — even better: I could write it as an actual test in the repo (gitproxy_test.go). It doesn't need docker! The proxy itself is just a unix-socket HTTP server, and I can run real `git` (available in my container, and probably in CI too) against it. A test that runs real git through the proxy against a fake forge served by `git http-backend` is a powerful, docker-free integration test.
But wait — does CI have git? The project's own tests already shell out to git in docker_integration_test.go (host-side `exec.Command("git", ...)`), so git is assumed to be present in the dev environment. But that test is behind the `docker` build tag. If I put the http-backend test in a non-docker-tagged test file, it'll run in normal `go test ./...` — which requires git on the machine running the tests. Hmm, is that acceptable? The repo's normal test suite is currently pure unit tests (no external deps). Adding a hard git dependency to the default test run could break CI if git isn't installed.
Options:
- Put the git-based e2e test behind a build tag like `//go:build git` — but then it won't run by default.
- Or: make the test skip gracefully if git isn't available (`exec.LookPath("git")` → t.Skip). That's the standard Go pattern. Let's do that: the test runs if git is present, skips otherwise.
And the http-backend CGI part: the fake forge handler runs `git http-backend` as a CGI. Let me recall the CGI contract:
- Env vars: REQUEST_METHOD, PATH_INFO, GIT_PROJECT_ROOT, GIT_HTTP_EXPORT_ALL, QUERY_STRING, CONTENT_TYPE, CONTENT_LENGTH, plus HTTP_* for headers.
- Input: request body on stdin.
- Output: CGI headers (Status:, Content-Type:, etc.) followed by the body.
`git http-backend` is at `git http-backend` (a builtin, run as `git http-backend`). It reads PATH_INFO like `/acme/widgets.git/info/refs`.
Let me write the handler:
```go
func httpBackendHandler(projectRoot string) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
cmd := exec.Command("git", "http-backend")
cmd.Env = append(os.Environ(),
"REQUEST_METHOD="+r.Method,
"PATH_INFO="+r.URL.Path,
"QUERY_STRING="+r.RawQuery,
"GIT_PROJECT_ROOT="+projectRoot,
"GIT_HTTP_EXPORT_ALL=1",
"REMOTE_ADDR="+r.RemoteAddr,
)
if r.ContentLength > 0 {
cmd.Env = append(cmd.Env, "CONTENT_LENGTH="+strconv.FormatInt(r.ContentLength, 10))
}
for k, vs := range r.Header {
name := "HTTP_" + strings.ToUpper(strings.NewReplacer("-", "_").Replace(k))
cmd.Env = append(cmd.Env, name+"="+strings.Join(vs, ","))
}
cmd.Stdin = r.Body
var out bytes.Buffer
cmd.Stdout = &out
var stderr bytes.Buffer
cmd.Stderr = &stderr
if err := cmd.Run(); err != nil {
http.Error(w, "http-backend: "+err.Error()+" "+stderr.String(), 500)
return
}
// Parse CGI response: headers until blank line, then body.
resp, err := http.ReadResponse(bufio.NewReader(bytes.NewReader(out.Bytes())), r)
...
})
}
```
Hmm, `http.ReadResponse` needs a request for context. This works: `http.ReadResponse(reader, r)`. Then copy resp.Header and write the body.
Actually, `git http-backend` might output `Status: 200 OK` and `Content-Type: application/x-git-upload-pack-result` etc. http.ReadResponse handles the Status header.
This is a well-trodden path (used in git's own t/http-* tests, and in various CI systems). OK.
But wait — do I really need a real clone in the test? What's the minimum to prove the mechanism?
The core security claim: **the sandbox's git authenticates via the proxy, and the token never enters the sandbox**. In a docker-less test, I can't prove "never enters the sandbox" (no container), but I can prove:
1. The proxy only forwards git smart-HTTP paths for the forge host (unit test, no git needed).
2. The proxy injects the credential and strips client-supplied auth (unit test with a raw HTTP client over a unix socket).
3. Real git, configured with `http.<host>.proxy=http+unix://...`, can clone/fetch/push through the proxy to a real (fake) forge (e2e test, needs git).
Test 3 is the one that validates the `http+unix://` mechanism end-to-end. It's worth doing. And push: `git http-backend` supports receive-pack if the repo allows it (GIT_PROJECT_ROOT + a bare repo; push works if the repo is exported and the user has write permission — http-backend runs as the test user, and the repo is owned by the test user, so push works).
OK, let me also think about whether the e2e test should live in the `docker`-tagged file or in a regular file. It doesn't need docker, so a regular file with a git LookPath skip.
Now, another design decision: **the path validation regex**. Forgejo's git HTTP endpoints:
- `GET /owner/repo.git/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack` (clone/fetch/ls-remote)
- `POST /owner/repo.git/git-upload-pack`
- `GET /owner/repo.git/info/refs?service=git-receive-pack` (push negotiation)
- `POST /owner/repo.git/git-receive-pack`
Also, the repo path might not have the `.git` suffix (Forgejo accepts both). Owner/repo segments: no slashes, non-empty.
What about `git update-server-info`? That's for dumb HTTP — not needed for smart clients.
Let me define:
```go
var gitSmartHTTPPaths = map[string]bool{
"info/refs": true,
"git-upload-pack": true,
"git-receive-pack": true,
}
// isGitSmartHTTPRequest reports whether path (of the form /owner/repo[/...])
// is one of git's smart-HTTP endpoints.
func isGitSmartHTTPPath(path string) bool {
// /owner/repo(.git)?/endpoint
segments := strings.Split(strings.Trim(path, "/"), "/")
if len(segments) != 3 { return false }
repo := segments[1]
if strings.HasSuffix(repo, ".git") { repo = strings.TrimSuffix(repo, ".git") }
if segments[0] == "" || repo == "" { return false }
return gitSmartHTTPPaths[segments[2]]
}
```
And for `info/refs`, require `service` to be one of {git-upload-pack, git-receive-pack}:
```go
func isGitSmartHTTPRequest(path, rawQuery string) bool {
if !isGitSmartHTTPPath(path) { return false }
if endpoint == "info/refs" {
q, _ := url.ParseQuery(rawQuery)
svc := q.Get("service")
return svc == "git-upload-pack" || svc == "git-receive-pack"
}
return true
}
```
Should I also validate the method? `git-upload-pack`/`git-receive-pack` are POST; `info/refs` is GET. Should I enforce it? Git always does this. Enforcing method adds strictness; but being too strict risks breaking legitimate git behavior (e.g., does git ever GET git-upload-pack? No). I'll enforce it: info/refs → GET, *-pack → POST. Hmm, actually let me be a bit lenient and not enforce method — no wait. Security-wise, method enforcement is nice-to-have; the path+host restriction is the core. If git does something unexpected, I don't want to break the agent's workflow. Let me not enforce method, only path+service. Hmm… but a malicious agent could POST to info/refs — harmless (http-backend would just return the ref list, which is the same as a GET). OK, no method enforcement.
**Host validation**: compare `r.URL.Host` to the forge host case-insensitively. Also, the scheme must match the forge's scheme (if the forge is https, reject http requests to the same host? If the forge is https://code.stdio.dk, a request to http://code.stdio.dk would be forwarded to… my ReverseProxy target is the forge URL; the Director sets the scheme from the target, so even if the client says http, it gets forwarded as https. Actually that's fine — the target is fixed. But strictly, I should validate the scheme matches to avoid confusion. Let me validate `u.Scheme == forgeScheme`.)
**Stripping client auth**: `r.Header.Del("Authorization")` then `r.Header.Set("Authorization", p.authHeader)`. Also strip `Proxy-Authorization`? Git doesn't send that. For cleanliness, delete both.
**Logging**: log rejected requests (with path) at warn level, forwarded requests at debug. Keep it light.
**Now the code**:
```go
package agentrun
import (
"context"
"crypto/tls"
"encoding/base64"
"fmt"
"log/slog"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/http/httputil"
"net/url"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
)
// gitProxyContainerPath is where the per-run git proxy socket is
// bind-mounted into the agent's container.
const gitProxyContainerPath = "/run/zoo/git.sock"
// gitProxy is a per-run HTTP proxy that stands between the sandbox's
// git and the Forgejo instance. ...
type gitProxy struct {
srv *http.Server
ln net.Listener
sockPath string
forgeURL *url.URL
authHeader string
logger *slog.Logger
}
func newGitProxy(dir string, forgeURL, user, token string, logger *slog.Logger) (*gitProxy, error) {
u, err := url.Parse(forgeURL)
if err != nil || u.Host == "" || (u.Scheme != "http" && u.Scheme != "https") {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("git proxy: invalid forge URL %q", forgeURL)
}
sockPath := filepath.Join(dir, "git-proxy.sock")
if err := os.Remove(sockPath); err != nil && !os.IsNotExist(err) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("git proxy: remove stale socket: %w", err)
}
ln, err := net.Listen("unix", sockPath)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("git proxy: listen: %w", err)
}
if err := os.Chmod(sockPath, 0o777); err != nil {
ln.Close()
return nil, fmt.Errorf("git proxy: chmod socket: %w", err)
}
p := &gitProxy{
ln: ln,
sockPath: sockPath,
forgeURL: u,
authHeader: "Basic " + base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(user+":"+token)),
logger: logger,
}
p.srv = &http.Server{Handler: p}
go p.srv.Serve(ln)
return p, nil
}
```
Wait — one issue: `http.Server.Serve(ln)` with a unix listener: Go's http server works fine over a unix listener.
Handler:
```go
func (p *gitProxy) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
u := r.URL
if u.Scheme != p.forgeURL.Scheme || !strings.EqualFold(u.Host, p.forgeURL.Host) {
p.reject(w, "not for this forge")
return
}
if !isGitSmartHTTPRequest(u.Path, u.RawQuery) {
p.reject(w, "not a git smart-HTTP endpoint")
return
}
r.Header.Del("Authorization")
r.Header.Del("Proxy-Authorization")
r.Header.Set("Authorization", p.authHeader)
r.Host = p.forgeURL.Host
p.forward(w, r)
}
```
For forwarding, use a ReverseProxy built once in newGitProxy:
```go
p.proxy = &httputil.ReverseProxy{
Director: func(req *http.Request) {
req.URL.Scheme = p.forgeURL.Scheme
req.URL.Host = p.forgeURL.Host
req.Host = p.forgeURL.Host
},
Transport: &http.Transport{
TLSClientConfig: &tls.Config{}, // default
},
}
```
Hmm — the default Transport is fine (uses the system cert pool). Let me just not set a Transport (nil → http.DefaultTransport). Simpler.
Wait, but there's a subtlety with ReverseProxy and absolute-form URLs: after the Director sets Scheme/Host, the URL is origin-form. Path: `req.URL.Path` — for an absolute-form request, r.URL.Path is the path portion. Good. RawQuery is preserved.
One pitfall: `httputil.ReverseProxy` sets `X-Forwarded-For`. Fine.
Another pitfall: the response — ReverseProxy copies status + headers and streams the body. For git, the response to info/refs is `application/x-git-upload-pack-advertisement`. Fine.
Error handling: if the forge returns an error, ReverseProxy passes it through. If the connection to the forge fails, ReverseProxy returns 502. Git will show "fatal: unable to access ...". Acceptable.
reject:
```go
func (p *gitProxy) reject(w http.ResponseWriter, reason string) {
p.logger.Warn("git proxy: rejected request", "reason", reason)
http.Error(w, "zoo git proxy: "+reason, http.StatusForbidden)
}
```
Hmm, wait, logging every rejected request at Warn might be noisy if the agent tries something weird — but that's exactly what we want to see (an agent probing the proxy). Keep it at Warn.
Close:
```go
func (p *gitProxy) Close() error {
err := p.srv.Close()
_ = os.Remove(p.sockPath)
return err
}
```
srv.Close closes the listener and active connections.
Accessors:
```go
func (p *gitProxy) SocketPath() string { return p.sockPath }
// ProxyValue is the value for git's http.<host>.proxy setting: a
// unix-socket proxy URL pointing at the socket as the container sees it.
func (p *gitProxy) ProxyValue() string { return "http+unix://" + gitProxyContainerPath }
```
gitAuthHeader — move here:
```go
// gitAuthHeader returns the value of an Authorization header that
// authenticates git's smart-HTTP requests as user with token.
func gitAuthHeader(user, token string) string {
return "Basic " + base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(user+":"+token))
}
```
And use it in newGitProxy.
**isGitSmartHTTPRequest** — a pure function, unit-testable:
```go
// gitSmartHTTPEndpoints are the path endpoints git's smart-HTTP
// protocol uses: the ref advertisement (info/refs) and the pack
// transfer endpoints for fetch (upload-pack) and push (receive-pack).
var gitSmartHTTPEndpoints = map[string]bool{
"info/refs": true,
"git-upload-pack": true,
"git-receive-pack": true,
}
// isGitSmartHTTPRequest reports whether a request for path (with the
// given raw query string) is one of git's smart-HTTP endpoints on a
// repository: /owner/repo(.git)?/<endpoint>. Anything else — the
// Forgejo API, static files, other services — is not something the
// proxy will forward.
func isGitSmartHTTPRequest(path, rawQuery string) bool {
segments := strings.Split(strings.Trim(path, "/"), "/")
if len(segments) != 3 || segments[0] == "" || segments[1] == "" {
return false
}
endpoint := segments[2]
if !gitSmartHTTPEndpoints[endpoint] {
return false
}
// The ref advertisement is only used by git with a service
// parameter naming the pack protocol; a bare info/refs is the
// dumb-HTTP protocol, which git clients don't use.
if endpoint == "info/refs" {
q, err := url.ParseQuery(rawQuery)
if err != nil {
return false
}
svc := q.Get("service")
return svc == "git-upload-pack" || svc == "git-receive-pack"
}
return true
}
```
Wait, edge case: `strings.Trim(path, "/")` on a path like `//` → "" → Split gives [""] → len 1 → false. Good. Path `/a/b.git/info/refs` → segments [a, b.git, info/refs] → good.
Hmm, what about a repo name containing a slash? Forgejo repos are owner/repo, so no.
**Changes to configureSandboxGit**:
```go
// configureSandboxGit writes the container's gitconfig so git works
// inside the sandbox without further setup:
//
// - safe.directory '*', ...
// - user.name / user.email, ...
// - http.<host>.proxy pointing at the per-run git proxy socket
// (see gitProxy): every remote operation (clone, fetch, pull,
// push, ...) for the forge host is routed through it, and the
// proxy injects the run's credential on the host side — the
// token never enters the container;
// - push.autoSetupRemote, ...
func configureSandboxGit(ctx context.Context, rt *dockerRuntime, containerID, cloneURL, proxyValue, name, email string) error {
...
if _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, "config", "--global", "http."+forgeHost(cloneURL)+".proxy", proxyValue); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("configure git proxy: %w", err)
}
...
}
```
**Changes to run.go**:
```go
// The git proxy stands between the sandbox's git and the forge:
// it injects the run's credential on the host side, so the token
// never enters the container (see gitProxy). The socket must
// exist before the container is created, since it's bind-mounted.
gitProxy, err := newGitProxy(workDir, repoInfo.CloneURL, gitUser, gitToken, logger)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("start git proxy: %w", err)
}
defer func() {
if err := gitProxy.Close(); err != nil {
logger.Warn("failed to close git proxy", "error", err)
}
}()
```
And the container creation:
```go
containerID, err := r.docker.createContainer(ctx, dockerImage, []string{
projectDir + ":/project",
eventPath + ":/event:ro",
gitProxy.SocketPath() + ":" + gitProxyContainerPath,
}, fmt.Sprintf("zoo-issue-%d-%s", ev.Index, agent.Name))
```
And:
```go
if err := configureSandboxGit(ctx, r.docker, containerID, repoInfo.CloneURL, gitProxy.ProxyValue(), gitName, gitEmail); err != nil {
```
Order in Run(): workDir creation → projectDir → (review handling) → roster/gitIdentity → gitUser/gitToken → eventPath → **gitProxy start** → createContainer → configureSandboxGit → clone.
Wait, where exactly is gitUser/gitToken computed? After `roster := buildRoster(...)`. And the container is created after eventPath is written. So I'll insert the proxy start right before createContainer.
Hmm, one consideration: `newGitProxy` needs `repoInfo.CloneURL` — available from the top. Good.
**Cleanup order**: defers in Run():
1. `defer func() { if succeeded || !r.keepOnFailure { os.RemoveAll(workDir) } ... }()` — registered first (runs last).
2. `defer func() { ... r.docker.remove(cleanupCtx, containerID) ... }()` — registered after container creation (runs before workDir removal).
3. `defer gitProxy.Close()` — if registered after container creation, it runs before container removal.
Wait, that's the wrong order: the proxy should be closed after the container is removed (the container's git might still be using the socket during teardown — actually, the container is stopped first, so its processes die; then the proxy close is fine either way). But the socket file is in workDir, and workDir removal happens last — the proxy's Close removes the socket file, then workDir removal removes the rest. If the proxy is closed before the container is removed: the container's processes can no longer connect to the socket (the listener is closed) — but the container is being stopped/removed anyway, so no live git operations. Either order works. Let me register the proxy close right after the container creation defer, so it runs before the container removal…
Hmm wait, actually let me think again: LIFO. If I register proxyClose right after the containerRemove defer:
- proxyClose runs first, then containerRemove, then workDir removal.
That's fine: closing the proxy stops new connections; the container is still up for a moment but is about to be stopped. No problem.
Alternatively, register the proxy close before the container removal defer (i.e., write the proxy code before the container code): then containerRemove runs first, then proxyClose. That's also fine, and arguably cleaner (tear down the container first, then the proxy). Let me start the proxy before container creation (the socket must exist for the bind mount) and register its Close defer right there — before the container's defer. So the LIFO order is: containerRemove (registered later) runs first, then proxyClose, then workDir removal.
Wait, no. Let me lay out the sequence in the code:
```go
workDir := MkdirTemp
defer removeWorkDir() // defer #1 (runs last)
projectDir := ...
...
gitProxy := newGitProxy(...)
defer gitProxy.Close() // defer #2 (runs 2nd-to-last)
eventPath := ...
containerID := createContainer(...)
defer removeContainer() // defer #3 (runs first)
configureSandboxGit(...)
clone...
```
LIFO: removeContainer → gitProxy.Close → removeWorkDir. The socket file is removed by the proxy's Close, before workDir removal.
**Now the tests**.
`gitproxy_test.go` (no build tag, git-based tests skip if git is missing):
```go
package agentrun
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"fmt"
"io"
"log/slog"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"net/url"
"os"
"os/exec"
"path/filepath"
"strconv"
"strings"
"testing"
)
func testLogger(t *testing.T) *slog.Logger {
return slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(io.Discard, nil))
}
```
Unit tests:
```go
func TestIsGitSmartHTTPRequest(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
path string
query string
want bool
}{
{"/acme/widgets.git/info/refs", "service=git-upload-pack", true},
{"/acme/widgets.git/info/refs", "service=git-receive-pack", true},
{"/acme/widgets/info/refs", "service=git-upload-pack", true},
{"/acme/widgets.git/git-upload-pack", "", true},
{"/acme/widgets.git/git-receive-pack", "", true},
{"/acme/widgets.git/info/refs", "", false}, // no service → dumb HTTP
{"/acme/widgets.git/info/refs", "service=git-upload-pack&x=1", true},
{"/api/v1/repos", "", false},
{"/api/v1/repos/acme/widgets", "", false},
{"/acme/widgets.git", "", false},
{"/acme/widgets.git/info/refs/extra", "service=git-upload-pack", false},
{"/", "", false},
{"/acme/widgets.git/git-upload-pack/extra", "", false},
}
...
}
```
Proxy e2e (no git, raw HTTP over unix socket):
```go
// startTestProxy starts a git proxy in dir targeting the fake forge
// at forgeURL (the httptest server's URL with the host swapped to
// "forge.example").
```
Hmm, let me design the fake forge: an `httptest.Server` that records requests and returns a canned response. For the raw-HTTP test, the response content doesn't matter much (git isn't involved) — I just check what the fake forge received.
```go
func TestGitProxyInjectsCredentialAndStripsClientAuth(t *testing.T) {
var gotAuth, gotPath, gotHost string
forge := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
gotAuth = r.Header.Get("Authorization")
gotPath = r.URL.RequestURI()
gotHost = r.Host
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/x-git-upload-pack-advertisement")
fmt.Fprint(w, "0000")
}))
defer forge.Close()
forgeURL := forge.URL // http://127.0.0.1:PORT
// The proxy targets the forge; the container's git would address
// it as https://forge.example — for this test, target the real
// test server URL directly.
dir := t.TempDir()
p, err := newGitProxy(dir, forgeURL, "greg", "s3cr3t", testLogger(t))
...
defer p.Close()
// A client that speaks proxy-style (absolute-form) requests over
// the unix socket.
client := &http.Client{
Transport: &http.Transport{
DialContext: func(ctx context.Context, _, _ string) (net.Conn, error) {
var d net.Dialer
return d.DialContext(ctx, "unix", p.SocketPath())
},
},
}
// Absolute-form request URL.
reqURL := forgeURL + "/acme/widgets.git/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack"
req, _ := http.NewRequest("GET", reqURL, nil)
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Basic client-own-credential")
resp, err := client.Do(req)
...
// The forge must have seen the proxy's credential, not the client's.
want := gitAuthHeader("greg", "s3cr3t")
if gotAuth != want { ... }
}
```
Wait — when Go's http.Client sends to a unix socket via a custom DialContext, does it send an absolute-form request? Go's client sends origin-form (path only) unless the request URL has a scheme+host and the transport is a proxy… hmm. Go's http.Transport sends absolute-form only when using a proxy (ProxyConnect / proxy URL). With a custom DialContext that dials a unix socket, the client sends origin-form: `GET /acme/widgets.git/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack HTTP/1.1` with a `Host: 127.0.0.1:PORT` header.
But git, when using a proxy, sends absolute-form: `GET https://forge.example/acme/widgets.git/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack HTTP/1.1` with `Host: forge.example`.
So in the raw-HTTP test, my Go client won't naturally send absolute-form… actually, Go's http client: when `req.URL` is absolute (has scheme+host) and the transport's proxy function returns a proxy, it uses absolute-form. With a custom DialContext (no proxy), it uses origin-form and sets the Host header from the URL.
To simulate git correctly, I should write raw bytes to the socket:
```go
conn, err := net.Dial("unix", p.SocketPath())
fmt.Fprintf(conn, "GET https://forge.example/acme/widgets.git/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: forge.example\r\nAuthorization: Basic client-own\r\n\r\n")
```
And read the response. This exactly mimics git's proxy request.
But then the proxy's target must be `https://forge.example`… which doesn't exist. Hmm. For the raw-socket test, the target host must be the fake forge's actual address (127.0.0.1:port). So the absolute-form URL should be `http://127.0.0.1:PORT/acme/...` and the proxy is created with forgeURL = forge.URL. The client sends:
```
GET http://127.0.0.1:PORT/acme/widgets.git/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:PORT
Authorization: Basic client-own
```
The proxy validates host == 127.0.0.1:PORT (the forge host) ✓, path ✓, strips client auth, injects the proxy's auth, and forwards to the target (same host). The fake forge records the Authorization. This works and is faithful to git's wire format.
And the git e2e test: the proxy targets `https://forge.example`… but the fake forge listens on 127.0.0.1:port over plain HTTP. The proxy would try to connect to forge.example → DNS failure.
Options for the git e2e test:
1. Point the proxy at the real test server: forgeURL = forge.URL (http://127.0.0.1:port). Git's clone URL must have a host that matches the proxy's forge host: `http://127.0.0.1:PORT/acme/widgets.git`. Git config: `http.127.0.0.1:PORT.proxy`? Hmm — the http.<url> matching: the subsection is a URL pattern; `http.127.0.0.1:PORT.proxy` — does git's config parsing handle a host:port subsection? The existing code uses `forgeHost(cloneURL)` = scheme://host as the subsection (e.g., `https://code.stdio.dk`) — wait, really? Let me re-read:
```go
runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, "config", "--global", "http."+forgeHost(cloneURL)+".extraHeader", ...)
```
where `forgeHost("https://code.stdio.dk/abrander/zoo.git")` = `"https://code.stdio.dk"`. So the config key is `http.https://code.stdio.dk.extraHeader`! The subsection is the full scheme://host. Git's http.<url> matching: "the <url> section is matched by URL prefix" — `http.https://code.stdio.dk.extraHeader` applies to URLs starting with `https://code.stdio.dk`. Yes, that's the documented pattern (git docs: `http.https://mydomain.com/.cookieAuth`). OK, so the key is `http.https://127.0.0.1:PORT.proxy` for the test.
So in the e2e test:
- The fake forge = an httptest server serving git http-backend for /acme/widgets.git.
- Proxy: newGitProxy(dir, forge.URL, "greg", "s3cr3t", logger) — target http://127.0.0.1:PORT.
- Git config (via env or a temp HOME): `http.https://...` no wait — the clone URL is `http://127.0.0.1:PORT/acme/widgets.git`, so the config key is `http.http://127.0.0.1:PORT.proxy = http+unix://<sock>`.
Hmm, wait, but the real flow uses `http.<scheme://host>.proxy`. For the test: `http.http://127.0.0.1:PORT.proxy`. Git's config key with a colon in the subsection — the existing code already does this with extraHeader (host:port appears in the integration test's comment: "the http.<url>.extraHeader key whose subsection is a URL full of dots and colons"). OK.
- Run `git clone http://127.0.0.1:PORT/acme/widgets.git /tmp/clone` with GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL pointing at a temp gitconfig (or env GIT_CONFIG_COUNT). Using env:
```
GIT_CONFIG_COUNT=1
GIT_CONFIG_KEY_0=http.http://127.0.0.1:PORT.proxy
GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_0=http+unix:///path/sock
```
Wait, but docker.go's exec also sets GIT_CONFIG_COUNT=1 for color.ui — that's in the container, unrelated to this host-side test.
Hmm, but does `git clone` honor GIT_CONFIG_* env vars? Yes, since git 2.31.
Actually, simpler: write a temp gitconfig file and set the GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL env var.
- Verify: the clone succeeded; the fake forge saw the Authorization header == gitAuthHeader("greg","s3cr3t") on the info/refs request.
- Also test push: commit in the clone, `git push origin HEAD:refs/heads/pushed` — the fake forge (http-backend) accepts the push (running as the test user, the repo is writable). Verify the branch exists in the bare repo. This exercises the git-receive-pack path!
That's a solid e2e test. It needs `git` on PATH → skip if not present.
Now, does `git http-backend` exist in this container? `git http-backend` is a builtin — `git --help` showed a man warning, but the builtin should work. Let me verify: `git http-backend` with no env vars → should print an error like "fatal: Invalid HTTP request from..." or complain about missing PATH_INFO. Let me test it in the container.
Also — important: does git 2.55 support `http+unix://` proxies? Let me verify empirically with a quick manual test before writing all the code.
Also, I need to double-check: when git uses a unix-socket proxy, does it send absolute-form? Yes — any proxy gets an absolute-form request (that's how HTTP proxies work).
Let me also think about **the `Host` header git sends**: git sets Host to the URL's host (e.g., `code.stdio.dk`). My proxy ignores r.Host and uses the URL's host. Good.
**Another edge**: git may send `Proxy-Connection: keep-alive` or `Connection: keep-alive` headers. ReverseProxy handles them.
**Keep-alive over the unix socket**: Go's server handles it.
**Now the docker integration test update**:
`TestDockerRuntimeSandboxGit` currently:
1. Creates a bare remote on the host, a project directory.
2. Creates a container with the bare + project bind mounts.
3. configureSandboxGit with a fake https URL + token.
4. Reads back the extraHeader from the gitconfig (with --system — a bug, should be --global).
5. Clones from /bare (a local path — no HTTP).
6. Verifies branch, commit identity, and that the token isn't in the working tree.
New version:
1. Same setup.
2. Additionally: start a git proxy (targeting a fake forge URL, e.g., https://forgejo.example/acme/widgets.git — no real server needed since the clone uses a local path).
3. Bind the proxy socket into the container.
4. configureSandboxGit with the proxy value.
5. Read back `http.https://forgejo.example.proxy` from the global gitconfig == "http+unix:///run/zoo/git.sock".
6. Clone from /bare, verify branch/identity.
7. Verify the token isn't in the working tree, and not in the container's gitconfig either (grep the gitconfig for the token).
And optionally, a full clone-through-the-proxy docker test using http-backend on the host: the container's git clones `http://host.docker.internal:PORT/...`? Hmm — from the container to the host: on Linux, the host is reachable at the bridge gateway (172.17.0.1); on Docker Desktop, host.docker.internal. This is platform-dependent — annoying for a portable test. The proxy target is the forge URL; the fake forge runs on the host. The container's git would need to reach the proxy (unix socket — fine), and the proxy reaches the fake forge on the host (127.0.0.1 — fine, the proxy runs on the host!). So the container never talks to the forge directly — only the proxy does. So the clone URL's host can be anything (e.g., `forge.example`), as long as the proxy's target is the real fake forge address…
Wait, no. The proxy validates that the request's host == the forge host (the host of the target URL). If the target is `http://127.0.0.1:PORT`, the clone URL must be `http://127.0.0.1:PORT/acme/widgets.git` (host must match). From inside the container, git doesn't connect to 127.0.0.1:PORT directly — it connects to the unix socket proxy, which forwards to 127.0.0.1:PORT on the host. So the container never needs network access to the host! The clone URL `http://127.0.0.1:PORT/...` is just an address that git hands to the proxy.
So the docker e2e test:
1. A fake forge on the host (httptest + http-backend).
2. A proxy targeting forge.URL.
3. A container with the socket bind + project directory.
4. configureSandboxGit(cloneURL=forge.URL+"/acme/widgets.git", proxyValue).
5. cloneAndBranch → the container's git goes through the proxy → the fake forge.
6. Verify the clone contents + that the fake forge saw the credential.
This is a beautiful full-stack test, and it's platform-independent (no host networking needed from the container). Let me add it as a separate test function in the docker-tagged file.
Hmm, but the http-backend CGI helper is needed in both the non-docker e2e test and the docker test. Put the helper in gitproxy_test.go (no build tag) — the docker test file can use it (same package, both compiled under the docker tag… wait: if gitproxy_test.go has no build tag and docker_integration_test.go has `//go:build docker`, then under the docker tag both are compiled, and the helper is available. Under the default tag, only gitproxy_test.go. Good.)
Now, let me also double-check the **CGI details of `git http-backend`**:
- Needs `GIT_PROJECT_ROOT` (the directory containing the repos).
- `GIT_HTTP_EXPORT_ALL=1` to serve repos without a git-daemon-export-ok file.
- `PATH_INFO` = the path after the mount point, e.g., `/acme/widgets.git/info/refs`.
- `QUERY_STRING`.
- `REQUEST_METHOD`.
- `CONTENT_TYPE`, `CONTENT_LENGTH` for POST bodies.
- `REMOTE_ADDR`, `REMOTE_USER` (optional).
- HTTP headers as HTTP_*.
- stdin = the request body.
- stdout = the CGI response (Status: line, headers, blank line, body).
One gotcha: `git http-backend` for receive-pack (push) — it runs `git receive-pack` as the current user; the repo must be writable by that user. In the test, the repo is in t.TempDir() owned by the test user.
Another gotcha: http-backend checks the `Content-Length` header for POSTs; it reads the body from stdin up to CONTENT_LENGTH.
Let me write the CGI wrapper carefully:
```go
// serveGitHTTPBackend serves the bare repositories under projectRoot
// over smart HTTP, the same way a Forgejo/Gitea instance does, by
// shelling out to `git http-backend` as a CGI program. It's a test
// stand-in for a real forge: enough for git clone/fetch/push to work
// end-to-end through the git proxy.
func serveGitHTTPBackend(t *testing.T, projectRoot string) *httptest.Server {
t.Helper()
if _, err := exec.LookPath("git"); err != nil {
t.Skip("git not available")
}
return httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
cmd := exec.Command("git", "http-backend")
cmd.Env = append(os.Environ(),
"REQUEST_METHOD="+r.Method,
"PATH_INFO="+r.URL.Path,
"QUERY_STRING="+r.RawQuery,
"GIT_PROJECT_ROOT="+projectRoot,
"GIT_HTTP_EXPORT_ALL=1",
"REMOTE_ADDR="+r.RemoteAddr,
)
if r.ContentLength > 0 {
cmd.Env = append(cmd.Env, "CONTENT_LENGTH="+strconv.FormatInt(r.ContentLength, 10))
}
for key, values := range r.Header {
envKey := "HTTP_" + strings.ToUpper(strings.ReplaceAll(key, "-", "_"))
cmd.Env = append(cmd.Env, envKey+"="+strings.Join(values, ","))
}
cmd.Stdin = r.Body
var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
cmd.Stdout = &stdout
cmd.Stderr = &stderr
if err := cmd.Run(); err != nil {
t.Logf("http-backend %s %s: %v: %s", r.Method, r.URL.Path, err, stderr.String())
http.Error(w, "http-backend failed: "+stderr.String(), http.StatusBadGateway)
return
}
resp, err := http.ReadResponse(bufio.NewReader(&stdout), r)
if err != nil {
http.Error(w, "parse http-backend response: "+err.Error(), http.StatusBadGateway)
return
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
for k, vv := range resp.Header {
for _, v := range vv {
w.Header().Add(k, v)
}
}
w.WriteHeader(resp.StatusCode)
_, _ = io.Copy(w, resp.Body)
}))
}
```
Hmm, wait, one issue: `http.ReadResponse(reader, r)` — the second arg is the request that triggered this response, used for context (e.g., HTTP/2, trailers). Passing `r` is the documented usage.
Another subtlety: does `git http-backend` output a `Status:` header? Yes: "Status: 200 OK" etc. http.ReadResponse handles it.
Potential issue: the `Content-Type` header from http-backend, e.g., `application/x-git-upload-pack-advertisement`. Copied through. Good.
Now, the git e2e test (non-docker):
```go
// TestGitProxyEndToEndGit runs real git against a fake forge through
// the git proxy: clone (upload-pack) and push (receive-pack). This
// validates the whole mechanism git uses — http.<host>.proxy with an
// http+unix:// value — without needing Docker.
func TestGitProxyEndToEndGit(t *testing.T) {
if _, err := exec.LookPath("git"); err != nil {
t.Skip("git not available")
}
tmp := t.TempDir()
// Seed a bare repo the fake forge will serve.
seedDir := filepath.Join(tmp, "seed")
bareDir := filepath.Join(tmp, "forge") // GIT_PROJECT_ROOT
repoDir := filepath.Join(bareDir, "acme", "widgets.git")
...
gitRun(t, "", "init", "-q", "-b", "main", seedDir)
... commit ...
gitRun(t, "", "clone", "-q", "--bare", seedDir, repoDir)
forge := serveGitHTTPBackend(t, bareDir)
defer forge.Close()
var mu sync.Mutex
var auths []string
// Wrap the forge handler to record auth? serveGitHTTPBackend doesn't expose that…
```
Hmm, I need to record the Authorization header the forge receives. Let me restructure: `serveGitHTTPBackend` takes an optional `onRequest func(r *http.Request)` hook, or returns a server with a recorder. Simpler: have the function take a `record func(host, path, auth string)` callback. Or have the test build the server itself via a helper `newGitHTTPBackendHandler(projectRoot, record) http.Handler`. Let me make the helper return an http.Handler, and the test wraps it with httptest.NewServer + recording.
Let me restructure:
```go
// gitHTTPBackendHandler returns an http.Handler that serves the bare
// repositories under projectRoot over smart HTTP via `git http-backend`.
// If record is non-nil, it's called for every request with the
// request's Host, path and Authorization header.
func gitHTTPBackendHandler(projectRoot string, record func(host, path, auth string)) http.Handler
```
And the test:
```go
var mu sync.Mutex
var auths, paths []string
handler := gitHTTPBackendHandler(bareDir, func(host, path, auth string) {
mu.Lock()
defer mu.Unlock()
auths = append(auths, auth)
paths = append(paths, path)
})
forge := httptest.NewServer(handler)
```
Then:
```go
proxy, err := newGitProxy(tmp, forge.URL, "greg", "s3cr3t", testLogger(t))
defer proxy.Close()
// A gitconfig that routes the forge host through the proxy, the
// way configureSandboxGit does for the container.
gitconfig := filepath.Join(tmp, "gitconfig")
cloneURL := forge.URL + "/acme/widgets.git"
host := forgeHost(cloneURL) // "http://127.0.0.1:PORT"
os.WriteFile(gitconfig, []byte(fmt.Sprintf(
"[http \"%s\"]\n\tproxy = http+unix://%s\n", host, proxy.SocketPath())), 0o600)
cloneDir := filepath.Join(tmp, "clone")
cmd := exec.Command("git", "clone", "-q", cloneURL, cloneDir)
cmd.Env = append(os.Environ(), "GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL="+gitconfig, "GIT_CONFIG_SYSTEM="+filepath.Join(tmp, "nosystem"))
out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
if err != nil { t.Fatalf("clone: %v: %s", err, out) }
```
Wait — GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL: the env var is `GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL` (points to the global config file). Yes, git 2.32+. And GIT_CONFIG_SYSTEM to avoid picking up the host's system gitconfig (which might have a proxy setting? unlikely, but for hermeticity). Also, the host's global gitconfig might have credential helpers etc. — for hermeticity, set GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL to my temp file.
Hmm, wait: does `git clone` with a proxy value `http+unix://` work in git 2.55? I need to verify empirically. Let me do a quick manual test first.
Then push:
```go
// Push a new branch back through the proxy (receive-pack).
cmd = exec.Command("git", "-C", cloneDir, "push", "-q", "origin", "HEAD:refs/heads/pushed")
...
// Verify the branch landed in the bare repo.
cmd = exec.Command("git", "-C", repoDir, "rev-parse", "--verify", "refs/heads/pushed")
```
And verify the auth: all recorded auths == gitAuthHeader("greg", "s3cr3t"), and the paths include info/refs + git-upload-pack + git-receive-pack.
Also verify the token isn't in the gitconfig (trivially true) — the point is the credential only exists in the proxy.
Now — a potential gotcha: git might send `Accept: */*` and other headers; http-backend doesn't care.
Another gotcha: **http-backend and `Expect: 100-continue`** — git doesn't use Expect. OK.
**Chunked transfer encoding**: git's upload-pack POST usually has a Content-Length. If it's chunked, r.ContentLength == -1 → I don't set CONTENT_LENGTH → http-backend might misbehave. Git buffers the upload-pack request (it knows the size). receive-pack too. So Content-Length will be present. But to be safe, if r.ContentLength < 0, I could buffer the body and set CONTENT_LENGTH. Let me add that for robustness:
```go
var body io.Reader = r.Body
if r.ContentLength < 0 {
buf, err := io.ReadAll(r.Body)
...
body = bytes.NewReader(buf)
}
if r.ContentLength > 0 {
cmd.Env = append(cmd.Env, "CONTENT_LENGTH="+strconv.FormatInt(r.ContentLength, 10))
}
cmd.Stdin = body
```
Good.
Now, before writing all this, let me **manually verify the core git mechanism** in this container:
1. Create a bare repo.
2. A small Go program: an http-backend CGI server on a TCP port + a unix-socket proxy that forwards with an injected auth.
3. `git clone http://127.0.0.1:PORT/acme/widgets.git` with GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL pointing at a config with `http.http://127.0.0.1:PORT.proxy = http+unix:///tmp/p.sock`.
Actually — I can skip the manual proxy: does git support `http.<host>.proxy = http+unix://`? A simpler manual check: set the proxy to a unix socket with nothing listening → git should error with "Failed to connect to ... via unix socket" or similar, proving it parsed and attempted. And with a listener (my Go test program), the full clone works.
Let me write the manual test as a Go program in /tmp (not the repo), run it, and then write the real code.
Actually, the most efficient path: write the real `gitproxy.go` + `gitproxy_test.go` in the repo, run `go test ./internal/agentrun/ -run TestGitProxy -v` — the e2e test itself is the manual verification. If `http+unix://` doesn't work in git 2.55, the test will fail and I'll know. Let me do that.
But first, a quick sanity check that `git http-backend` works in this container:
Docker isn't available here, but git 2.55 is. Let me first verify the core mechanism I'm planning — git's `http+unix://` proxy support and `git http-backend` for a fake forge — before writing the real code.
Tool
🔧 bash
{"command": "cd /tmp && mkdir -p mechcheck && cd mechcheck && git init -q -b main seed && cd seed && echo hello > f.txt && git add . && git -c user.name=t -c user.email=t@t commit -qm init && cd .. && git clone -q --bare seed forge/acme/widgets.git && ls forge/acme/widgets.git | head -5 && echo \"--- http-backend probe ---\" && GIT_PROJECT_ROOT=/tmp/mechcheck/forge GIT_HTTP_EXPORT_ALL=1 PATH_INFO=/acme/widgets.git/info/refs REQUEST_METHOD=GET QUERY_STRING=\"service=git-upload-pack\" git http-backend 2>&1 | head -8"}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /tmp && mkdir -p mechcheck && cd mechcheck && git init -q -b main seed && cd seed && echo hello > f.txt && git add . && git -c user.name=t -c user.email=t@t commit -qm init && cd .. && git clone -q --bare seed forge/acme/widgets.git && ls forge/acme/widgets.git | head -5 && echo \"--- http-backend probe ---\" && GIT_PROJECT_ROOT=/tmp/mechcheck/forge GIT_HTTP_EXPORT_ALL=1 PATH_INFO=/acme/widgets.git/info/refs REQUEST_METHOD=GET QUERY_STRING=\"service=git-upload-pack\" git http-backend 2>&1 | head -8"}
Result
HEAD
config
description
hooks
info
--- http-backend probe ---
Expires: Fri, 01 Jan 1980 00:00:00 GMT
Pragma: no-cache
Cache-Control: no-cache, max-age=0, must-revalidate
Content-Type: application/x-git-upload-pack-advertisement
001e# service=git-upload-pack
000001111548be5aa66c87a059be2218043e9db498aaf5d0 HEAD�multi_ack thin-pack side-band side-band-64k ofs-delta shallow deepen-since deepen-not deepen-relative no-progress include-tag multi_ack_detailed no-done symref=HEAD:refs/heads/main object-format=sha1 agent=git/2.55.0-Linux
003d1548be5aa66c87a059be2218043e9db498aaf5d0 refs/heads/main
Thinking
`git http-backend` works (interestingly, it didn't output a `Status:` line here — hmm, the output starts directly with `Expires:`. Wait, CGI requires a Status line... actually, looking at the output, there's no `Status: 200 OK` line. Let me check: does `git http-backend` only output `Status:` when it's not 200? No wait — the CGI spec says the Status header is optional, and the default is 200. `http.ReadResponse` handles the absence of a Status line just fine (defaults to 200).
Alright, let me write a quick mechanism check: a unix socket proxy + git clone through it.
`git http-backend` works. Now the critical check — does git route through an `http+unix://` proxy? Let me write a quick throwaway program:
Tool
🔧 write_file
{"path": "/tmp/mechcheck/main.go", "content": "package main\n\nimport (\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"log\"\n\t\"net\"\n\t\"net/http\"\n\t\"net/http/httputil\"\n\t\"net/url\"\n\t\"os\"\n\t\"os/exec\"\n\t\"strconv\"\n\t\"strings\"\n\t\"bufio\"\n\t\"bytes\"\n)\n\nfunc main() {\n\tprojectRoot := \"/tmp/mechcheck/forge\"\n\tsockPath := \"/tmp/mechcheck/proxy.sock\"\n\tos.Remove(sockPath)\n\n\t// Fake forge: git http-backend as CGI.\n\tforge := http.NewServeMux()\n\tforge.HandleFunc(\"/\", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\tcmd := exec.Command(\"git\", \"http-backend\")\n\t\tcmd.Env = append(os.Environ(),\n\t\t\t\"REQUEST_METHOD=\"+r.Method,\n\t\t\t\"PATH_INFO=\"+r.URL.Path,\n\t\t\t\"QUERY_STRING=\"+r.RawQuery,\n\t\t\t\"GIT_PROJECT_ROOT=\"+projectRoot,\n\t\t\t\"GIT_HTTP_EXPORT_ALL=1\",\n\t\t\t\"REMOTE_ADDR=\"+r.RemoteAddr,\n\t\t)\n\t\tif r.ContentLength > 0 {\n\t\t\tcmd.Env = append(cmd.Env, \"CONTENT_LENGTH=\"+strconv.FormatInt(r.ContentLength, 10))\n\t\t}\n\t\tfor k, vs := range r.Header {\n\t\t\tcmd.Env = append(cmd.Env, \"HTTP_\"+strings.ToUpper(strings.ReplaceAll(k, \"-\", \"_\"))+\"=\"+strings.Join(vs, \",\"))\n\t\t}\n\t\tcmd.Stdin = r.Body\n\t\tvar out, errb bytes.Buffer\n\t\tcmd.Stdout, cmd.Stderr = &out, &errb\n\t\tif err := cmd.Run(); err != nil {\n\t\t\tfmt.Println(\"backend err:\", err, errb.String())\n\t\t\thttp.Error(w, \"backend failed\", 502)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\tresp, err := http.ReadResponse(bufio.NewReader(bytes.NewReader(out.Bytes())), r)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\thttp.Error(w, \"parse: \"+err.Error(), 502)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\tdefer resp.Body.Close()\n\t\tfor k, vv := range resp.Header {\n\t\t\tfor _, v := range vv {\n\t\t\t\tw.Header().Add(k, v)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\tw.WriteHeader(resp.StatusCode)\n\t\tbuf := new(bytes.Buffer)\n\t\tbuf.ReadFrom(resp.Body)\n\t\tw.Write(buf.Bytes())\n\t})\n\n\tln, err := net.Listen(\"tcp\", \"127.0.0.1:0\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Fatal(err)\n\t}\n\tforgeAddr := ln.Addr().String()\n\tgo http.Serve(ln, forge)\n\tforgeURL := \"http://\" + forgeAddr\n\tfmt.Println(\"forge at\", forgeURL)\n\n\t// Proxy on a unix socket: only forwards git smart-HTTP paths, injects auth.\n\tpln, err := net.Listen(\"unix\", sockPath)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Fatal(err)\n\t}\n\tos.Chmod(sockPath, 0o777)\n\n\ttarget, _ := url.Parse(forgeURL)\n\trp := &httputil.ReverseProxy{\n\t\tDirector: func(req *http.Request) {\n\t\t\treq.URL.Scheme = target.Scheme\n\t\t\treq.URL.Host = target.Host\n\t\t\treq.Host = target.Host\n\t\t\treq.Header.Del(\"Authorization\")\n\t\t\treq.Header.Set(\"Authorization\", \"Basic Z3JlZzp0b2tlbg==\")\n\t\t},\n\t}\n\tgo http.Serve(pln, rp)\n\n\t// Now: real git clone through the proxy.\n\tcloneURL := forgeURL + \"/acme/widgets.git\"\n\tgitcfg := \"/tmp/mechcheck/gitconfig\"\n\thost := target.Scheme + \"://\" + target.Host\n\tos.WriteFile(gitcfg, []byte(fmt.Sprintf(\"[http \\\"%s\\\"]\\n\\tproxy = http+unix://%s\\n\", host, sockPath)), 0o600)\n\n\tcmd := exec.Command(\"git\", \"clone\", \"-v\", cloneURL, \"/tmp/mechcheck/clone\")\n\tcmd.Env = append(os.Environ(), \"GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL=\"+gitcfg, \"GIT_CONFIG_SYSTEM=/tmp/mechcheck/nosys\")\n\tout, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()\n\tfmt.Println(string(out))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Fatal(\"clone failed:\", err)\n\t}\n\tfmt.Println(\"CLONE OK\")\n\n\t// And a push back.\n\tcmd = exec.Command(\"git\", \"-C\", \"/tmp/mechcheck/clone\", \"push\", \"-v\", \"origin\", \"HEAD:refs/heads/pushed\")\n\tcmd.Env = append(os.Environ(), \"GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL=\"+gitcfg, \"GIT_CONFIG_SYSTEM=/tmp/mechcheck/nosys\")\n\tout, err = cmd.CombinedOutput()\n\tfmt.Println(string(out))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Fatal(\"push failed:\", err)\n\t}\n\tfmt.Println(\"PUSH OK\")\n}\n"}
Arguments
{"path": "/tmp/mechcheck/main.go", "content": "package main\n\nimport (\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"log\"\n\t\"net\"\n\t\"net/http\"\n\t\"net/http/httputil\"\n\t\"net/url\"\n\t\"os\"\n\t\"os/exec\"\n\t\"strconv\"\n\t\"strings\"\n\t\"bufio\"\n\t\"bytes\"\n)\n\nfunc main() {\n\tprojectRoot := \"/tmp/mechcheck/forge\"\n\tsockPath := \"/tmp/mechcheck/proxy.sock\"\n\tos.Remove(sockPath)\n\n\t// Fake forge: git http-backend as CGI.\n\tforge := http.NewServeMux()\n\tforge.HandleFunc(\"/\", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\tcmd := exec.Command(\"git\", \"http-backend\")\n\t\tcmd.Env = append(os.Environ(),\n\t\t\t\"REQUEST_METHOD=\"+r.Method,\n\t\t\t\"PATH_INFO=\"+r.URL.Path,\n\t\t\t\"QUERY_STRING=\"+r.RawQuery,\n\t\t\t\"GIT_PROJECT_ROOT=\"+projectRoot,\n\t\t\t\"GIT_HTTP_EXPORT_ALL=1\",\n\t\t\t\"REMOTE_ADDR=\"+r.RemoteAddr,\n\t\t)\n\t\tif r.ContentLength > 0 {\n\t\t\tcmd.Env = append(cmd.Env, \"CONTENT_LENGTH=\"+strconv.FormatInt(r.ContentLength, 10))\n\t\t}\n\t\tfor k, vs := range r.Header {\n\t\t\tcmd.Env = append(cmd.Env, \"HTTP_\"+strings.ToUpper(strings.ReplaceAll(k, \"-\", \"_\"))+\"=\"+strings.Join(vs, \",\"))\n\t\t}\n\t\tcmd.Stdin = r.Body\n\t\tvar out, errb bytes.Buffer\n\t\tcmd.Stdout, cmd.Stderr = &out, &errb\n\t\tif err := cmd.Run(); err != nil {\n\t\t\tfmt.Println(\"backend err:\", err, errb.String())\n\t\t\thttp.Error(w, \"backend failed\", 502)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\tresp, err := http.ReadResponse(bufio.NewReader(bytes.NewReader(out.Bytes())), r)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\thttp.Error(w, \"parse: \"+err.Error(), 502)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\tdefer resp.Body.Close()\n\t\tfor k, vv := range resp.Header {\n\t\t\tfor _, v := range vv {\n\t\t\t\tw.Header().Add(k, v)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\tw.WriteHeader(resp.StatusCode)\n\t\tbuf := new(bytes.Buffer)\n\t\tbuf.ReadFrom(resp.Body)\n\t\tw.Write(buf.Bytes())\n\t})\n\n\tln, err := net.Listen(\"tcp\", \"127.0.0.1:0\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Fatal(err)\n\t}\n\tforgeAddr := ln.Addr().String()\n\tgo http.Serve(ln, forge)\n\tforgeURL := \"http://\" + forgeAddr\n\tfmt.Println(\"forge at\", forgeURL)\n\n\t// Proxy on a unix socket: only forwards git smart-HTTP paths, injects auth.\n\tpln, err := net.Listen(\"unix\", sockPath)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Fatal(err)\n\t}\n\tos.Chmod(sockPath, 0o777)\n\n\ttarget, _ := url.Parse(forgeURL)\n\trp := &httputil.ReverseProxy{\n\t\tDirector: func(req *http.Request) {\n\t\t\treq.URL.Scheme = target.Scheme\n\t\t\treq.URL.Host = target.Host\n\t\t\treq.Host = target.Host\n\t\t\treq.Header.Del(\"Authorization\")\n\t\t\treq.Header.Set(\"Authorization\", \"Basic Z3JlZzp0b2tlbg==\")\n\t\t},\n\t}\n\tgo http.Serve(pln, rp)\n\n\t// Now: real git clone through the proxy.\n\tcloneURL := forgeURL + \"/acme/widgets.git\"\n\tgitcfg := \"/tmp/mechcheck/gitconfig\"\n\thost := target.Scheme + \"://\" + target.Host\n\tos.WriteFile(gitcfg, []byte(fmt.Sprintf(\"[http \\\"%s\\\"]\\n\\tproxy = http+unix://%s\\n\", host, sockPath)), 0o600)\n\n\tcmd := exec.Command(\"git\", \"clone\", \"-v\", cloneURL, \"/tmp/mechcheck/clone\")\n\tcmd.Env = append(os.Environ(), \"GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL=\"+gitcfg, \"GIT_CONFIG_SYSTEM=/tmp/mechcheck/nosys\")\n\tout, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()\n\tfmt.Println(string(out))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Fatal(\"clone failed:\", err)\n\t}\n\tfmt.Println(\"CLONE OK\")\n\n\t// And a push back.\n\tcmd = exec.Command(\"git\", \"-C\", \"/tmp/mechcheck/clone\", \"push\", \"-v\", \"origin\", \"HEAD:refs/heads/pushed\")\n\tcmd.Env = append(os.Environ(), \"GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL=\"+gitcfg, \"GIT_CONFIG_SYSTEM=/tmp/mechcheck/nosys\")\n\tout, err = cmd.CombinedOutput()\n\tfmt.Println(string(out))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Fatal(\"push failed:\", err)\n\t}\n\tfmt.Println(\"PUSH OK\")\n}\n"}
Result
OK
Thinking
Wait, there's a problem with the ReverseProxy's Director: the incoming request is in absolute-form `http://127.0.0.1:PORT/acme/widgets.git/info/refs?service=...`. The Director sets Scheme/Host to the target, and the path is preserved. OK.
But there's one issue: the ReverseProxy's default behavior for the `Host` header — I'm setting req.Host = target.Host. OK.
Let's try running it.
Tool
🔧 bash
{"command": "cd /tmp/mechcheck && go mod init mechcheck >/dev/null 2>&1; go run main.go 2>&1 | tail -20"}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /tmp/mechcheck && go mod init mechcheck >/dev/null 2>&1; go run main.go 2>&1 | tail -20"}
Result
# command-line-arguments
./main.go:30:22: r.RawQuery undefined (type *http.Request has no field or method RawQuery)
Thinking
I need to investigate this further. Let me check the details.
`r.RawQuery` — the correct one is `r.URL.RawQuery`. Let me fix it.
Tool
🔧 edit_file
{"path": "/tmp/mechcheck/main.go", "find": "\"QUERY_STRING=\"+r.RawQuery,", "replace": "\"QUERY_STRING=\"+r.URL.RawQuery,"}
Arguments
{"path": "/tmp/mechcheck/main.go", "find": "\"QUERY_STRING=\"+r.RawQuery,", "replace": "\"QUERY_STRING=\"+r.URL.RawQuery,"}
Result
1 occurrences replaced
Thinking
Let's try running it one more time.
Tool
🔧 bash
{"command": "cd /tmp/mechcheck && go run main.go 2>&1 | tail -25"}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /tmp/mechcheck && go run main.go 2>&1 | tail -25"}
Result
forge at http://127.0.0.1:44265
Cloning into '/tmp/mechcheck/clone'...
fatal: Invalid proxy URL 'http+unix:///tmp/mechcheck/proxy.sock': unsupported proxy scheme 'http+unix'
fatal: remote helper 'http' aborted session
2026/08/25 22:07:29 clone failed:exit status 128
exit status 1
Thinking
Interesting! Git 2.55 says "unsupported proxy scheme 'http+unix'". Hmm. So `http+unix://` isn't supported as a value for `http.proxy` in this git build? Let me think.
I recall that git's http proxy support includes the following:
- `http://` and `https://` proxies
- `socks5://` and `socks5h://` proxies
And unix socket proxies... let me check git's source. In git's `http.c`, `setup_proxy()` parses the proxy URL. The supported schemes are: "http", "https", "socks5", "socks5h". Hmm, so where did I get `http+unix` from?
Ah, I remember — `http+unix://` is supported in **`http.receivepack`/`http.uploadpack`**? No, that's not right...
Actually, I think I'm confusing this with **git's `--proxy` for the remote helper `http`**... or with **libgit2**? Or maybe **`git config http.<url>.proxy` with a unix socket** — hmm.
Wait, I just remembered: unix socket proxy support was added for **`git http-proxy`**... no, that's not it. Let me think about who uses unix socket proxies with git:
1. **GitHub Actions / CI**: no.
2. **Docker's buildkit**: uses `http+unix://` for its own HTTP client (not git).
3. **gitolite / self-hosted git behind a unix socket**: the common pattern is to run `git-http-backend` behind nginx with `proxy_pass unix:` — the client still connects to nginx over TCP.
Hmm, so maybe git itself doesn't support unix socket proxies at all! Let me check git's source (http.c):
```c
static int setup_proxy(const char *proxy_config, const char *url, int is_upload)
{
...
if (!strcmp(scheme, "http") || !strcmp(scheme, "https")) {
...
} else if (!strcmp(scheme, "socks5") || !strcmp(scheme, "socks5h")) {
...
}
...
}
```
Hmm, wait, but I have a clear memory of seeing `http+unix://` in git's documentation... Let me search my memory of the git-config man page:
> **http.proxy**
> The URL of the proxy to use for HTTP or HTTPS. This overrides the http_proxy and https_proxy environment variables.
And I don't remember there being a unix socket option there.
Hmm, but wait — I definitely remember something about unix sockets and git... **`GIT_PROXY`**? No, that's not it. What about **git's "remote-https" with a unix socket via `GIT_SSL_CAINFO`**? No, that's not it either.
Ah, wait. I just remembered! It's **`git config core.proxyCommand`**! That's it! `core.proxyCommand` — "Command for git to execute (along with its version) when starting git remote-helpers over a proxy..." Hmm, no, that's for remote helpers.
Let me think again... Actually, I think the unix socket thing I'm remembering is from **`http.<url>.proxy`**... Let me actually check the git source in this container — is git's source available? No. Let me check the man page: `git config --get-all`... the man page isn't installed (the man viewer failed earlier).
Let me check what proxy schemes git 2.55 supports by looking at the error message: "unsupported proxy scheme 'http+unix'". So in this build, http+unix isn't supported.
Hmm, wait — maybe I'm thinking of **libcurl's** support: curl supports `--unix-socket`, and git uses libcurl for HTTP. But git's proxy URL parsing is done on the git side before libcurl, and git only passes `CURLOPT_PROXY` with http/socks5 schemes.
OK, so the unix socket proxy approach for git is out (at least in git 2.55; let me double-check whether it's supported in some version... let me search my memory of git's release notes:
- Git 2.3: "git http-proxy" no...
- I have a vague memory of a patch "http: support unix socket proxies" — hmm.
Let me check the actual git source on the web... I can't browse. Let me check whether this git build has any unix socket proxy support at all — maybe under a different scheme name? The error says "unsupported proxy scheme", which comes from http.c's setup_proxy. Let me look at git 2.55's http.c from memory:
```c
static int setup_proxy(const char *proxy_config, const char *url, int is_upload)
{
const char *p, *end, *scheme;
size_t scheme_len;
struct proxy_info *proxy;
...
if (strncasecmp(proxy_config, "http://", 7) == 0) {
...
}
...
}
```
Hmm, I don't really remember exactly. But empirically: git 2.55 rejects `http+unix`.
Wait, actually — hold on. I just clearly remembered! **`http+unix://` is supported in git's `http.proxy` since Git 2.3.0**... no, that's not right. Hmm, let me think about who documented `http+unix`:
I'm now remembering **Docker's documentation** about `DOCKER_BUILDKIT`... no, that's not it. **Podman**? **Zinc**?
OK, another thought — maybe I'm thinking of **git's `remote-https` helper + `GIT_HTTP_PROXY`**? No, that's not it.
Let me take an empirical approach: check what proxy schemes this git accepts. Try `socks5://` (it should be accepted as a scheme), and check the git changelog for "unix" + "proxy". Actually, the easiest thing is: `git help config` won't work (no man). Let me grep the git binary for the string "http+unix":
Interesting — git 2.55 rejects `http+unix`. Let me check what proxy schemes this git build actually supports:
Tool
🔧 bash
{"command": "strings /usr/bin/git 2>/dev/null | grep -i \"unix\" | grep -i \"proxy\\|http\" | head; echo ---; strings /usr/lib/git-core/git-http-fetch 2>/dev/null | grep -i \"proxy scheme\" ; ls /usr/lib/git-core/ 2>/dev/null | head -30; echo ---; strings /usr/bin/git | grep -i \"unsupported proxy\" "}
Arguments
{"command": "strings /usr/bin/git 2>/dev/null | grep -i \"unix\" | grep -i \"proxy\\|http\" | head; echo ---; strings /usr/lib/git-core/git-http-fetch 2>/dev/null | grep -i \"proxy scheme\" ; ls /usr/lib/git-core/ 2>/dev/null | head -30; echo ---; strings /usr/bin/git | grep -i \"unsupported proxy\" "}
Result
ERROR CALLING TOOL: command exited with status 1: ---
Invalid proxy URL '%s': unsupported proxy scheme '%s'
git
git-add
git-am
git-annotate
git-apply
git-archive
git-backfill
git-bisect
git-blame
git-branch
git-bugreport
git-bundle
git-cat-file
git-check-attr
git-check-ignore
git-check-mailmap
git-check-ref-format
git-checkout
git-checkout--worker
git-checkout-index
git-cherry
git-cherry-pick
git-clean
git-clone
git-column
git-commit
git-commit-graph
git-commit-tree
git-config
git-count-objects
---
Thinking
The error string "Invalid proxy URL '%s': unsupported proxy scheme '%s'" is inside the git binary itself (the http transport is built-in). Let's check which schemes git accepts. In git's http.c (recent versions), `setup_proxy` looks like this:
```c
static int setup_proxy(const char *proxy_config, const char *url, int is_upload)
{
const char *p, *end, *scheme;
size_t scheme_len;
struct proxy_info *proxy;
...
scheme = get_url_scheme...
```
Let's look for the scheme strings near the error in the binary:
Tool
🔧 bash
{"command": "strings /usr/bin/git | grep -B2 -A2 \"unsupported proxy\" ; echo ===; strings /usr/bin/git | grep -E \"^(socks5|socks5h|http|https|http\\+)\" | sort -u | head; echo ===; strings /usr/bin/git | grep -i \"proxy\" | grep -iv \"proxyCommand\\|proxy command\" | head -30"}
Arguments
{"command": "strings /usr/bin/git | grep -B2 -A2 \"unsupported proxy\" ; echo ===; strings /usr/bin/git | grep -E \"^(socks5|socks5h|http|https|http\\+)\" | sort -u | head; echo ===; strings /usr/bin/git | grep -i \"proxy\" | grep -iv \"proxyCommand\\|proxy command\" | head -30"}
Result
===
http-backend-info-refs
http.<url>.*
http.cookieFile
http.curloptResolve
http.delegation
http.emptyAuth
http.extraHeader
http.followRedirects
http.keepAliveCount
http.keepAliveIdle
===
core.gitProxy
http.proxy
http.proxyAuthMethod
http.proxySSLCAInfo
http.proxySSLCert
http.proxySSLKey
remote.<name>.proxy
remote.<name>.proxyAuthMethod
core.gitproxy
GIT_PROXY_COMMAND
cannot start proxy %s
proxyauthmethod
http.proxySSLCertPasswordProtected
Thinking
I can see `core.gitProxy` and `GIT_PROXY_COMMAND` — these are for remote helpers (gitproxy is a program that wraps remote helpers, used for example with `git-remote-gcrypt`... no, that's not right).
So, regarding the http transport, the supported proxy schemes in git's http.c are — let me try to recall the actual source of git 2.55's http.c:
```c
static int setup_proxy(const char *proxy_config, const char *url, int is_upload)
{
const char *p, *end, *scheme;
size_t scheme_len;
struct proxy_info *proxy;
if (!proxy_config || !*proxy_config)
return 0;
proxy = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*proxy));
if (strncasecmp(proxy_config, "http://", 7) == 0) {
proxy->method = CURLPROXY_HTTP;
proxy->url = proxy_config + 7;
} else if (strncasecmp(proxy_config, "https://", 8) == 0) {
proxy->method = CURLPROXY_HTTPS;
proxy->url = proxy_config + 8;
} else if (strncasecmp(proxy_config, "socks5://", 9) == 0) {
proxy->method = CURLPROXY_SOCKS5;
proxy->url = proxy_config + 9;
} else if (strncasecmp(proxy_config, "socks5h://", 10) == 0) {
proxy->method = CURLPROXY_SOCKS5_HOSTNAME;
proxy->url = proxy_config + 10;
} else {
...
die("Invalid proxy URL '%s': unsupported proxy scheme '%s'", ...);
}
```
So git's http transport supports http/https/socks5/socks5h proxies. No unix sockets. The `http+unix://` I was remembering must be from something else (Docker's buildkit HTTP client, or curl's `--unix-socket`, or maybe... whatever).
So, the unix-socket-proxy approach for git is dead. Let me rethink.
**Alternative approaches for getting the proxy into the container:**
1. **TCP proxy on the host + container→host connectivity.**
- Linux: the container can reach the host via the bridge gateway IP (e.g., 172.17.0.1). Zoo can discover it via the container's `NetworkSettings.Gateway` (docker API).
- Docker Desktop (macOS/Windows): `host.docker.internal` resolves to the host.
- So: zoo listens on a random TCP port on 127.0.0.1? No — the container can't reach the host's 127.0.0.1. It has to listen on the gateway IP (or 0.0.0.0). Listening on 0.0.0.0 exposes the proxy to the whole machine (other containers, other users). On a single-user dev machine that's probably fine, but it's sloppy. Listening on the specific gateway IP is better.
- Port: random high-numbered port, per run, ephemeral.
- Proxy value: `http://172.17.0.1:PORT` (or `http://host.docker.internal:PORT` on Docker Desktop).
- How to know which? Check whether the daemon is Docker Desktop? `host.docker.internal` works on Docker Desktop for all platforms, and on Linux too if you add an extra host entry (docker 20.10+? Actually, on Linux `host.docker.internal` isn't defined by default; you need `--add-host=host.docker.internal:host-gateway`). Zoo creates the container, so it can add `ExtraHosts: ["host.docker.internal:host-gateway"]` — this works on Linux (docker 20.10+) and is harmless on Docker Desktop (where it's already defined; would an explicit entry override it? On Docker Desktop, host-gateway maps to the host, so it's the same).
Hmm, wait, but there's a subtlety: `host-gateway` on Linux = the IP of the bridge interface (172.17.0.1 on the default bridge). If zoo listens on 127.0.0.1, the container can't reach it. Zoo has to listen on the gateway IP. Zoo can get it from the container's inspect (NetworkSettings.Networks[<net>].Gateway) — but the container is created with the default bridge; the gateway is known after creation. Order: create container (no proxy yet) → inspect → get gateway → start proxy on gateway:randomport → configure git → clone. This works!
But wait — is listening on the gateway IP a security concern? The gateway IP is the host's bridge interface; other containers on the same bridge network can also reach it. Any other container on the machine could use the proxy (with the run's credentials!) to do git operations. Hmm. That's a real (if small) leak: another container/process on the host could push to the forge as the agent. Mitigation: the proxy could validate the source IP == the container's IP. The container's IP is known from inspect. The proxy only accepts connections from that IP. That closes the hole (a local process on the host spoofing the container's IP would need to be on the same L2 segment... a local process on the host could bind to the container's IP? No — the container's IP isn't assigned to any host interface; a host process can't easily bind/connect from that source IP without raw sockets. Good enough.)
This is getting complicated. Let me keep thinking.
2. **Sidecar container running the proxy** on a user-defined Docker network:
- Zoo creates a per-run network (or uses a shared network), creates a proxy container (a tiny image that runs the proxy binary... but the proxy is written in Go inside zoo — we'd need a separate binary/image). More moving parts: a second image to build, network management, DNS. Rejected.
3. **Run the proxy inside the agent container, but keep the credentials on the host:**
- The proxy process inside the container needs the token in memory → visible in /proc/<pid>/environ or /proc/<pid>/mem → the agent (uid 1000) can read /proc of root processes? If the proxy runs as root inside the container and the agent runs as uid 1000, /proc/<pid>/environ is only readable by root (and the owner). The agent is uid 1000, not root... but the docker image has `sudo` for uid 1000 (docker/uid1000-sudo)! So the agent can `sudo cat /proc/<pid>/environ`. Hmm. If the image didn't have sudo... but I shouldn't depend on image details.
- Alternative: the proxy inside the container doesn't hold the token; it fetches per-request credentials from zoo on the host via a unix socket (a "credential broker"). So: the container runs a small proxy (a static binary baked into the image, or zoo execs a Go binary... the image is user-configurable (docker_image in zoo.hcl) — zoo can't assume its own binary is inside the image!). Rejected — the image is arbitrary (golang:latest in the README).
4. **git-remote-helper approach ("special-case git push/pull"):**
- The issue literally suggests special-casing git push/pull. What if the sandbox's git has no network credentials at all, and instead the remote is a custom protocol that zoo handles?
- E.g., origin URL = `zoo://owner/repo` with a `git-remote-zoo` helper... but the helper binary has to exist in the container (arbitrary image). Rejected.
- Or: the remote URL stays as https, but `http.<host>.proxy` points at... we're back to the proxy problem.
5. **Run git on the host, not in the sandbox (special-case all network git):**
- The agent does local git work in /project (bind-mounted). For network operations (push/pull/fetch), zoo intercepts: the agent's `git push` fails locally (no credentials, no network?)...
- How would the agent trigger a host-side push? The agent would have to call a special tool (e.g., a `git_push` tool) instead of `git push`. That changes the agent's workflow (the system prompt says git just works). The issue asks for something that "lets the agent work" — ideally transparently.
- Hybrid: keep git transparently working via a proxy (option 1) — the agent just runs `git push` and it works.
6. **TCP proxy on a unix socket exposed via a Docker "network namespace" trick?** No.
7. **`GIT_PROXY_COMMAND` / `core.gitProxy`**: these wrap remote helper invocations — the command runs inside the container. The command would need credentials or a channel to the host. Same problem as 3.
8. **TCP proxy via the Docker daemon socket?** No.
9. **Bind-mount a unix socket + a small proxy binary inside the container that listens on the socket and forwards to the host via a second unix socket...** — the proxy binary has to be in the image. Rejected.
Hmm, wait — actually, let me reconsider. What if the proxy runs on the host and listens on a unix socket, and the container's git reaches it via... git can't speak unix-socket proxies. Dead end, confirmed.
10. **TCP proxy on the host, listening on the gateway IP with source-IP pinning** (option 1). Let me evaluate feasibility more concretely:
- After `createContainer`, inspect the container → `NetworkSettings.Networks["bridge"].Gateway` and `.IPAddress`.
- Start the proxy on `gateway:0` (random port).
- The proxy accepts connections only from the container's IP (or from the gateway itself? no — the container's IP).
- Git config: `http.<host>.proxy = http://<gateway>:<port>`.
- Teardown: close the listener.
- Portability: works on Linux (default bridge). What if the user runs Docker with a custom network / non-bridge (e.g., `--network=none`? then the container has no network at all — but then git can't reach the proxy either... if the network is none, the whole approach fails; but in that case, git couldn't reach the forge directly today either, so no regression). What if zoo's container is on a user-defined network with a different gateway? Zoo creates the container without specifying a network → default bridge. The gateway is always present (bridge mode). On Docker Desktop, the "bridge" network also has a gateway (host-side). And `host.docker.internal` — with ExtraHosts `host-gateway`, on Docker Desktop host-gateway = the host's IP as seen from the container (e.g., 192.168.65.254 on the gvisor/vznetstack network). Listening on that IP on the host side... on Docker Desktop, the host's Linux VM has that IP, and zoo runs inside the VM (Docker Desktop runs zoo in... wait, where does zoo run? Zoo runs on the user's machine (macOS/Windows) and talks to the Docker daemon (which is a Linux VM). A TCP listener inside the VM can't be reached from the macOS host process!
Hmm, wait. On Docker Desktop, zoo (a macOS process) can't listen on an IP inside the VM. The proxy has to run where zoo runs. On Docker Desktop, the only way for a container to reach a process on the macOS host is `host.docker.internal` (which maps to the host via a special route). So the proxy would have to listen on the macOS host's interface that host.docker.internal maps to... that's `host.docker.internal` → the host's IP on the Docker bridge (e.g., 192.168.65.1? no...). Actually on Docker Desktop, `host.docker.internal` resolves to an IP (like 192.168.65.254) that routes to the macOS host. A macOS process listening on 0.0.0.0:port is reachable from the container via that IP:port. So on Docker Desktop: listen on 0.0.0.0 (or the specific host IP that host.docker.internal maps to — hard to discover portably) and use `http://host.docker.internal:port` as the proxy.
This is getting into platform-specific yak-shaving. Ugh.
11. **Reconsider: is a proxy really necessary? What about scoped tokens?**
- Forgejo access tokens support scopes: `read:repository`, `write:repository`, `admin:repository`, etc. A token with only `write:repository` (which covers git push/pull — the "repository" scope in Gitea/Forgejo covers git operations over HTTP) can't touch the API (issues, users, admin).
- Wait, is that true? In Gitea, the "write:repository" scope allows... let me recall Gitea's token scopes: `read:repository`, `write:repository`, `admin:repository`, `read:user`, `write:user`, etc. Git HTTP operations (clone/push) require at least `read:repository`/`write:repository` respectively. API calls to issues require `read:issues`? Hmm, actually Gitea's scopes are: read:repository, write:repository, admin:repository, read:user, write:user, admin:user, read:organization, write:organization, admin:organization, read:profile, write:profile, admin:profile... and git operations map to the repository scope. A token with only `write:repository` can do git clone/push but can't create issues (does that need... hmm, actually in Gitea, creating an issue is part of the repository API — does it need `write:repository`? Let me think. Gitea's scopes: "write:repository" = "Access write-only endpoints for repositories" — issues are part of the repository API! So `write:repository` might allow creating issues on repos the user can write to. Hmm.
Let me check Forgejo's documentation (from memory): Forgejo's access token scopes mirror Gitea's:
- read:repository — read access to repositories (git + API)
- write:repository — write access to repositories (git push + repository API: issues, PRs, labels...)
- admin:repository — admin access to repositories
So even a `write:repository` token can create issues/PRs on repos the user can write to. It can't manage users/orgs/admin. That's a meaningful reduction (no user/org/admin API), but the "can do everything on the Forgejo instance" concern is only partially addressed. And it still requires the user to manage a second token per agent. Also, the token in the sandbox could be used to push to any repo the user can write to — same as today.
Scoped tokens are a good defense-in-depth recommendation, but they don't fully solve the problem, and they're a user-side configuration change, not a zoo change.
12. **Reconsider the problem. What does the agent actually need?**
- clone/fetch/pull (read) and push (write) for the repo being worked on (plus submodules/other repos on the same forge for reads).
What if zoo did the git network operations itself (on the host) and the sandbox's git only did local operations? The "special-case git push/pull" interpretation:
- The sandbox's git has no credentials and no proxy. `git push` from the agent's bash would fail...
- ...unless zoo provides a tool: the agent calls a `git push`-equivalent tool, and zoo performs it on the host. But the agent's system prompt says "git remote operations are authenticated for you" — the agent runs `git push` in bash. To keep that UX, we'd need to intercept.
How to intercept `git push` in the sandbox and execute it on the host?
- **A git remote helper via a URL scheme** — the helper binary has to be in the container (arbitrary image). Rejected.
- **A `core.hooksPath` pre-push hook?** Hooks can't perform the push themselves; they can only allow/deny.
- **A fake `git` wrapper in PATH?** The image is arbitrary; zoo can't control PATH. Rejected.
- **A bind-mounted /project with a `.git/config` remote pointing at a local path**... and zoo syncs? Like: the agent commits locally; when the agent runs `git push`, it pushes to a local "staging" bare repo (no auth needed); zoo watches the staging repo and pushes to the forge on the host side. But `git push` to a local bare repo works without a proxy! And `git pull`/`fetch` — the agent would fetch from the staging repo, which zoo keeps in sync with the forge. Hmm, interesting, but: the agent's `git push` succeeds against the staging repo (fast), and the actual push to the forge happens asynchronously — the agent might think it pushed when it hasn't been pushed yet. Also, PR head updates, branch tracking, etc. get complicated. And the agent might do `git push --force`, delete branches, push tags — all have to be mirrored. This is a "git relay" — complex, with subtle failure modes. Rejected in favor of a direct approach.
13. **A TCP proxy with the container on a custom network created by zoo, with the proxy as...** — the proxy has to run on the host (to hold the token). Same as option 10.
14. **What about running the proxy in a separate container that zoo starts, with the token passed via env, on a per-run network?**
- The proxy container runs a small static binary. But zoo would need to build/publish that image... or use an existing image with a generic proxy that can be configured to inject headers: e.g., `squid`? Configuring squid to add an Authorization header per request — possible with `request_header add`? Squid can add headers. But squid is heavy and config is fiddly. Or `nginx` with `proxy_set_header Authorization` — but the nginx image has to be pulled; zoo would need to manage image availability. And passing the token to the proxy container's env = the token exists in another container's memory (the proxy container isn't the agent's sandbox, so that's acceptable! The agent can't reach into the proxy container).
- Actually wait — that's the key insight: the token only needs to be outside the agent's sandbox. A sidecar proxy container with the token in its env is fine security-wise (the agent can't access it; containers are isolated). But it requires: a proxy image (nginx/squid/caddy), a per-run network, DNS names, more docker API calls, image pulls. Caddy can do header injection with a config file (bind-mounted). Hmm, this is feasible but heavy. And it adds a dependency on pulling an image the user might not have.
Hmm, but wait — zoo already requires the user to provide the agent image (docker_image). Requiring a second image (the proxy) is an operational burden. The in-process host proxy (option 10) has no new dependencies.
15. **Reconsider option 10 (host TCP proxy + gateway IP) — the "just works" version:**
- Zoo inspects the container → gets the container IP + gateway.
- Zoo listens on `gateway:0` (a random port).
- The proxy validates: source IP == container IP (pinning), target host == forge host, path is git smart-HTTP.
- Git config: `http.<host>.proxy = http://gateway:port`.
- Docker Desktop: the gateway IP is inside the VM; zoo on macOS can't listen there. ✗
Unless zoo runs inside the VM... on Docker Desktop, users typically run zoo on the host OS (macOS/Windows) — the README says `go build && ./zoo`. So option 10 breaks on Docker Desktop. ✗ (unless we special-case with host.docker.internal + 0.0.0.0 listening, which is a security trade-off on a shared machine... on Docker Desktop, the VM is the user's own; listening on 0.0.0.0 inside the VM is only reachable from containers. Hmm, actually on Docker Desktop, a listener on 0.0.0.0 inside the VM is reachable from the container via host.docker.internal:port. And from the macOS host? The VM's 0.0.0.0 isn't exposed to the macOS host (no port forwarding unless published). So on Docker Desktop, listening on 0.0.0.0:randomport inside the VM is effectively container-only. But zoo runs on macOS, not in the VM! A macOS process can't listen inside the VM. Dead end. ✗✗
Wait, wait. Hold on. Where does zoo actually run in this deployment? Let me look at how zoo is deployed here: there's a docker/ directory with a Dockerfile for the agent image. Zoo itself — `cmd/zoo` — runs as a host process (go build ./cmd/zoo). On this machine (code.stdio.dk, Linux), zoo runs on the host and the docker daemon is local. Docker Desktop is a possible deployment target for other users, but the primary target is a Linux host.
Hmm, OK, the point is: I keep going back and forth. Let me step back and think about what the best design is given the constraints:
**Constraints:**
- The agent image is arbitrary (user-configured `docker_image`).
- Zoo runs as a host process next to the docker daemon (Linux is primary; Docker Desktop is possible).
- The token must not be readable from the agent's sandbox.
- Git operations must work transparently (the agent runs `git push` in bash).
**The only transparent mechanism git supports for intercepting HTTP is `http.proxy` (a TCP proxy: http/https/socks5/socks5h).** So the proxy has to be reachable from the container over TCP.
**How can a container reach a host process over TCP portably?**
- `host.docker.internal` — Docker Desktop: yes (built-in). Linux: no by default, but zoo can add `--add-host=host.docker.internal:host-gateway` when creating the container! Then what does `host-gateway` resolve to on Linux? The IP of the bridge gateway (e.g., 172.17.0.1) — an IP on the host. A host process listening on 127.0.0.1 can't be reached via 172.17.0.1. A host process listening on 0.0.0.0 (or 172.17.0.1) can.
- So: zoo listens on 0.0.0.0:randomport? Exposed to the whole machine (all interfaces, all containers, all local users). Bad on a shared host.
- Zoo listens on the gateway IP (172.17.0.1): reachable from containers on that bridge; other containers on the same bridge can also reach it (mitigated with source-IP pinning to the container's IP); not reachable from other local users (172.17.0.1 is a host interface, so actually a local user could connect to 172.17.0.1:port from the host! A local process connecting to 172.17.0.1:port would have source IP 172.17.0.1... hmm, source-IP pinning to the container IP would block that. OK.)
- Docker Desktop: zoo can't listen in the VM. ✗
Hmm, so the TCP host proxy works on Linux (the primary target) but not on Docker Desktop. Is that acceptable? The current design (token in git config) works everywhere. A regression on Docker Desktop is bad.
**What about a socks5 proxy?** Same reachability problem.
**Let me reconsider the sidecar proxy container (option 14) more seriously.**
- Zoo creates a per-run Docker network (or reuses one).
- Zoo creates a proxy container from a small image. Which image? Zoo could build it... no. Use an image the user already has? No guarantee.
- Alternative: run the proxy in a container from the same agent image, with the entrypoint overridden to run the proxy... the agent image doesn't contain zoo's proxy binary. ✗ Unless the proxy is a generic tool present in most images... no guarantee.
✗ The sidecar needs a dedicated image. Rejected (operational burden).
**Hmm, what about passing the token to the container in a form that's useless for the API but usable for git?**
- The token is a bearer token; any use is a full API call. There's no way to "bind" it to git.
- Unless: create a per-run, per-repo scoped token on the Forgejo side! Forgejo API: can zoo create an access token for a user? There's no API to create tokens for other users (tokens are user-scoped, created via the UI or the user's own API). ✗
- What about a **deploy key**? Deploy keys are SSH-only, per-repo, optionally write-only! But git over SSH from the sandbox: the sandbox has openssh-client (it's in the Dockerfile!). Deploy key = a per-repo SSH key with read or read/write access, scoped to one repo. That's exactly "a credential that can only do git on this repo"!
- Zoo generates an SSH keypair per run (on the host).
- Zoo adds the public key as a deploy key on the repo (via the API, using its own token — the agent's or zoo's; needs write access to the repo's admin settings... deploy keys are repo-admin: `POST /repos/{owner}/{repo}/keys`).
- The sandbox's git uses the SSH remote: `git@forge:owner/repo.git` with `core.sshCommand = ssh -i /run/zoo/id_ed25519 -o ...`.
- The private key is in the sandbox (bind-mounted or written via exec) — the agent can read it! But it's a deploy key: it can only do git operations on that one repo. Even if the agent extracts it, the blast radius is: git push/pull on one repo. That's exactly the required scope!
- Teardown: zoo removes the deploy key after the run.
- Push permission: deploy keys can be write-enabled.
- PR head refs (refs/pull/N/head) over SSH: does Forgejo expose refs/pull over SSH? The SSH transport exposes refs under refs/heads, refs/tags, and... I think Gitea/Forgejo also expose refs/pull/N/head over SSH (they're real refs in the repo). Probably yes.
- Submodules/other repos: the deploy key is per-repo → submodules from other repos fail. The current design allows same-forge submodules. A regression for multi-repo workflows. Hmm. Could zoo add deploy keys to multiple repos? It doesn't know which ones in advance. ✗ partial.
- SSH requires the forge to have SSH enabled (port 22 or custom). Many Forgejo instances run SSH on a non-standard port; the clone URL from the API (CloneURL) is HTTP. Zoo would have to construct the SSH URL (user@host:owner/repo.git) — needs the SSH host/port config. More config surface.
- Also, the agent could use the deploy key... only for that repo's git. That's the point.
- But: the agent can read the private key inside the sandbox and use it from anywhere (e.g., `ssh` from the sandbox to the forge's SSH port — needs network egress to the forge's SSH port; the sandbox has network). Still scoped to one repo's git. Acceptable.
- Complexity: key generation, deploy key API calls, ssh config, teardown, SSH port config, per-repo limitation. Moderate complexity, real security win (per-repo, git-only), but a workflow regression (submodules) and a new dependency (SSH enabled on the forge).
**Comparing the options so far:**
A. Host TCP proxy (gateway IP, source-pinned): transparent, git-only, any repo on the forge, Linux only.
B. Deploy key (SSH): per-repo git-only, works wherever SSH works, submodules regressed, needs SSH config, key is readable in the sandbox (but scoped).
C. Scoped Forgejo token (user config): git + repo API, no code change in zoo (well, docs), user manages the token.
D. Sidecar proxy container: needs a dedicated image. ✗
E. Unix socket proxy: git doesn't support it. ✗
Hmm... wait. Let me reconsider E. What if the container's git doesn't use a unix-socket proxy directly, but a small TCP→unix-socket forwarder inside the container does? The forwarder has to be a binary in the image. ✗ (arbitrary image).
What about **`GIT_PROXY_COMMAND`** (core.gitProxy)? "core.gitProxy: Command for git to execute (along with its version) when starting git remote-helpers over a proxy." Hmm, actually I think core.gitProxy is used for `git remote` helpers: it runs `gitproxy <helper> <url>`, and the helper's stdin/stdout go through the proxy program. If the remote is https (a built-in transport, not a helper), core.gitProxy doesn't apply. ✗
**What about a `url.<base>.insteadOf` rewrite to a local file path + a host-side sync?** (Option 12, the relay) — already rejected.
**Let me reconsider the problem from the top.** What's the actual threat model?
- The agent is an LLM running arbitrary bash in the container. It's semi-trusted: it's supposed to do its job, but a prompt injection (e.g., a malicious issue body) could make it exfiltrate the token.
- With the token in git config: a malicious agent could `git config --global --get http.*.extraHeader` → get the token → use it against the Forgejo API (read all repos, create issues, delete things the user can do, and if it's an admin token, admin operations).
- Goal: limit the sandbox's credentials to "git operations on the repo(s) being worked on."
Given that, **option B (deploy key)** is actually the most surgical: a per-run, per-repo, git-only credential. The agent can read it, but it's worthless beyond git on that one repo. And it's a standard git mechanism (no proxy, no special git version features, works with any image that has git + ssh).
But the submodules regression + the SSH dependency bother me. Let me check: does this forge (code.stdio.dk) have SSH? And do the agents' workflows use submodules? The zoo repo has no submodules. The current code's comment explicitly touts same-forge submodules as a feature ("including submodules and other repos on the same forge").
**Option A (host TCP proxy) preserves everything** (any repo on the forge, submodules, HTTP only, transparent) and keeps the token completely outside the sandbox. The only weakness: Linux-only (Docker Desktop). Hmm.
Actually, wait. Let me reconsider Docker Desktop. On Docker Desktop, can zoo reach the container's network? No. Can the container reach the macOS host? Yes, via host.docker.internal. So the proxy would have to run on the macOS host and be reachable via host.docker.internal. host.docker.internal on Docker Desktop resolves to an IP on the host's side of the virtual network (e.g., 192.168.65.254 → actually it's a special IP inside the VM that NATs to the host). A macOS process listening on 0.0.0.0:port is reachable from the container via host.docker.internal:port. So on Docker Desktop: listen on 0.0.0.0 (or the specific IP that host.docker.internal maps to — hard to discover portably) and use `http://host.docker.internal:port` as the proxy.
So the portable design:
- Detect the platform:
- Linux (docker daemon local): proxy on the gateway IP (or 0.0.0.0), proxy URL `http://<gateway>:<port>`; add `--add-host`? Not needed on Linux (the gateway is routable).
- Docker Desktop (macOS/Windows): proxy on 0.0.0.0, proxy URL `http://host.docker.internal:<port>`.
- Detection: check whether `host.docker.internal` is resolvable from the container? Or check the daemon's info (the "Name" field: "desktop-linux" for Docker Desktop). `docker info --format '{{.Name}}'` → "docker-desktop" / "desktop-linux". Via the API: the `Version`/`Name` field. The Go client: `cli.Info(ctx)` → `info.Name`.
- Security on 0.0.0.0 (the Docker Desktop case): the VM is private; only containers can reach it. Source-IP pinning still applies (the container's IP).
- Security on the gateway IP (the Linux case): reachable from the host's local users (they can connect to 172.17.0.1:port) → source-IP pinning to the container IP blocks them (their source would be 172.17.0.1 or 127.0.0.1). Other containers on the same bridge: blocked by source-IP pinning.
Source-IP pinning: the proxy checks `r.RemoteAddr`'s IP == the container IP. Note: the connection comes directly from the container IP (no NAT on the bridge).
Hmm, OK, wait, but actually — do I want to add all this platform detection to zoo right now? Let me look at how zoo is actually deployed in this environment: it's running on Linux (this container is Linux; the forge is code.stdio.dk). The README targets a generic Linux host. Docker Desktop support isn't explicitly claimed.
Let me look at it from the "what would a senior architect ship" angle:
- Phase 1 (this PR): a host-side git HTTP proxy on a TCP port, bound to the container's gateway IP, source-pinned to the container IP, git smart-HTTP only, per-run. Works on Linux (the supported deployment). Document the Docker Desktop limitation... hmm, that's an ugly wart.
Hmm, hold on, let me reconsider. Actually — wait. I want to double-check one thing: does git really not support unix socket proxies in any version? Because if it does (in a newer git), the unix socket design is so much cleaner (no port, no IP pinning, no platform issues). The Debian unstable git is 2.55 (per my container — wait, my container is probably also debian unstable). Let me check the git source for 2.55... I can download the git source! `git clone https://github.com/git/git` — wait, does my sandbox have network? Let me test. Actually, I can just check the git changelog on the web... let me try fetching git's http.c from a mirror.
Actually, let me check whether the network works in my sandbox:
Git 2.55 doesn't support `http+unix://` proxies — the unix socket design is dead. Let me check what git's proxy support actually looks like, and whether newer git added unix socket proxies:
Tool
🔧 bash
{"command": "cd /tmp && timeout 30 git clone -q --depth 1 https://github.com/git/git.git gitsrc 2>&1 | head -3; ls gitsrc/http.c 2>/dev/null && grep -n \"unsupported proxy scheme\" -B 30 gitsrc/http.c | grep -E \"strncasecmp|scheme|die\" | head -20"}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /tmp && timeout 30 git clone -q --depth 1 https://github.com/git/git.git gitsrc 2>&1 | head -3; ls gitsrc/http.c 2>/dev/null && grep -n \"unsupported proxy scheme\" -B 30 gitsrc/http.c | grep -E \"strncasecmp|scheme|die\" | head -20"}
Result
gitsrc/http.c
1309: die("Invalid proxy URL '%s': unsupported proxy scheme '%s'",
Thinking
The network is working. Let's take a look at the actual `setup_proxy` code in the latest git:
Tool
🔧 bash
{"command": "cd /tmp/gitsrc && sed -n '1270,1330p' http.c && git log --oneline -3 && git describe --tags 2>/dev/null"}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /tmp/gitsrc && sed -n '1270,1330p' http.c && git log --oneline -3 && git describe --tags 2>/dev/null"}
Result
ERROR CALLING TOOL: command exited with status 128: * lowercase only. It appears that CURL did not know this and implemented
* only uppercase variants, which was later corrected to take both - with
* the exception of http_proxy, which is lowercase only also in CURL. As
* the lowercase versions are the historical quasi-standard, they take
* precedence here, as in CURL.
*/
if (!curl_http_proxy) {
if (http_auth.protocol && !strcmp(http_auth.protocol, "https")) {
var_override(&curl_http_proxy, getenv("HTTPS_PROXY"));
var_override(&curl_http_proxy, getenv("https_proxy"));
} else {
var_override(&curl_http_proxy, getenv("http_proxy"));
}
if (!curl_http_proxy) {
var_override(&curl_http_proxy, getenv("ALL_PROXY"));
var_override(&curl_http_proxy, getenv("all_proxy"));
}
}
if (curl_http_proxy && curl_http_proxy[0] == '\0') {
/*
* Handle case with the empty http.proxy value here to keep
* common code clean.
* NB: empty option disables proxying at all.
*/
curl_easy_setopt(result, CURLOPT_PROXY, "");
} else if (curl_http_proxy) {
struct strbuf proxy = STRBUF_INIT;
if (strstr(curl_http_proxy, "://"))
credential_from_url(&proxy_auth, curl_http_proxy);
else {
struct strbuf url = STRBUF_INIT;
strbuf_addf(&url, "http://%s", curl_http_proxy);
credential_from_url(&proxy_auth, url.buf);
strbuf_release(&url);
}
if (set_curl_proxy_type(result, proxy_auth.protocol) < 0)
die("Invalid proxy URL '%s': unsupported proxy scheme '%s'",
curl_http_proxy, proxy_auth.protocol);
if (!proxy_auth.host)
die("Invalid proxy URL '%s'", curl_http_proxy);
strbuf_addstr(&proxy, proxy_auth.host);
if (proxy_auth.path) {
curl_version_info_data *ver = curl_version_info(CURLVERSION_NOW);
if (ver->version_num < 0x075400)
die("libcurl 7.84 or later is required to support paths in proxy URLs");
if (!is_socks_proxy_protocol(proxy_auth.protocol))
die("Invalid proxy URL '%s': only SOCKS proxies support paths",
curl_http_proxy);
if (strcasecmp(proxy_auth.host, "localhost"))
die("Invalid proxy URL '%s': host must be localhost if a path is present",
curl_http_proxy);
strbuf_addch(&proxy, '/');
2c3adbb The 18th batch
Thinking
Let's take a look at `set_curl_proxy_type`:
Tool
🔧 bash
{"command": "cd /tmp/gitsrc && grep -n \"set_curl_proxy_type\" -A 25 http.c | head -40"}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /tmp/gitsrc && grep -n \"set_curl_proxy_type\" -A 25 http.c | head -40"}
Result
795:static int set_curl_proxy_type(CURL *result, const char *protocol)
796-{
797- const struct socks_proxy_type *socks_proxy_type;
798-
799- if (!protocol || !strcmp(protocol, "http"))
800- return 0;
801-
802- socks_proxy_type = find_socks_proxy_type(protocol);
803- if (socks_proxy_type) {
804- curl_easy_setopt(result, CURLOPT_PROXYTYPE, socks_proxy_type->curlsym);
805- return 0;
806- }
807-
808- if (!strcmp(protocol, "https")) {
809- curl_easy_setopt(result, CURLOPT_PROXYTYPE, (long)CURLPROXY_HTTPS);
810-
811- if (http_proxy_ssl_cert)
812- curl_easy_setopt(result, CURLOPT_PROXY_SSLCERT,
813- http_proxy_ssl_cert);
814-
815- if (http_proxy_ssl_key)
816- curl_easy_setopt(result, CURLOPT_PROXY_SSLKEY,
817- http_proxy_ssl_key);
818-
819- if (has_proxy_cert_password())
820- curl_easy_setopt(result, CURLOPT_PROXY_KEYPASSWD,
--
1308: if (set_curl_proxy_type(result, proxy_auth.protocol) < 0)
1309- die("Invalid proxy URL '%s': unsupported proxy scheme '%s'",
1310- curl_http_proxy, proxy_auth.protocol);
1311-
1312- if (!proxy_auth.host)
1313- die("Invalid proxy URL '%s'", curl_http_proxy);
1314-
1315- strbuf_addstr(&proxy, proxy_auth.host);
1316- if (proxy_auth.path) {
1317- curl_version_info_data *ver = curl_version_info(CURLVERSION_NOW);
1318-
1319- if (ver->version_num < 0x075400)
1320- die("libcurl 7.84 or later is required to support paths in proxy URLs");
Thinking
Confirmed: git (even the latest master) only supports `http`, `https`, and `socks5`/`socks5h` proxies. Unix socket proxies are not supported. So the design needs to use a TCP proxy.
Now, the reachability issue. Let me think about this more carefully, because this is the crux.
**How can a container reach a TCP listener of a host process?**
1. **Linux, default bridge network**: the container reaches the host via the bridge gateway IP (e.g., 172.17.0.1). A host process listening on that IP (or 0.0.0.0) is reachable. Zoo can discover the gateway via the container's inspect.
2. **Docker Desktop**: the container reaches the host via `host.docker.internal`. A host (macOS/Windows) process listening on 0.0.0.0 is reachable via that name. Zoo can add `ExtraHosts: host.docker.internal:host-gateway` — on Docker Desktop, `host-gateway` is already special. Adding it explicitly is harmless.
So a portable design:
- Zoo creates the container with `ExtraHosts: ["host.docker.internal:host-gateway"]` (works on Linux Docker 20.10+; on Docker Desktop it's a no-op / already defined).
- Zoo starts the proxy on the host.
- On Linux: bind to the container's gateway IP (from inspect) — or more simply: bind to 0.0.0.0? No — bind to the gateway IP to limit exposure. Hmm, but what if the container is on a custom network (zoo doesn't specify a network, so it's the default bridge; but the daemon's default could be different, e.g., if the daemon's default network is custom, the container's network name might not be "bridge"). Inspect returns `NetworkSettings.Networks` — take the first network that has an IP, and use its Gateway.
- On Docker Desktop: the gateway IP is inside the VM — unreachable from a host process. So bind to 0.0.0.0 and use `host.docker.internal` as the proxy host.
- How does zoo know which mode it's in? Check `docker info`'s `Name`/`OperatingSystem`: Docker Desktop reports "Name: desktop-linux" / "docker-desktop". Or: try to determine whether the gateway IP is local to the host process: `net.Dial("tcp", gateway:1)`? Simpler: check `info.Name` for "desktop". Hmm, the Go client's `Info` returns `Name string` — on Docker Desktop it's "docker-desktop" (old) or "desktop-linux". Let me not over-engineer:
- Get the container's network settings: gateway G, container IP C.
- Try to listen on G:0. If successful (G is a local host address) → use `http://G:port` as the proxy URL, pin the source IP to C.
- If the listen fails (G is not local — Docker Desktop VM case) → listen on 0.0.0.0:0 and use `http://host.docker.internal:port` as the proxy URL, pin the source IP to C (the container still connects from its own IP C, which is routable in the VM's network... wait, on Docker Desktop, when the container connects to host.docker.internal, what's the source IP? The connection is NATed: the host sees the connection coming from the VM's gateway IP, not the container IP! So on Docker Desktop, source IP pinning to C fails. Pin to "the gateway of the container's network" instead? On Docker Desktop, the container's traffic to the host arrives from the VM bridge IP (e.g., 192.168.65.254). Hmm, that's exactly the container network's gateway G!
Oh, nice: in both cases, the source IP of the container→host connection is...
- Linux bridge: the container connects to G (the host's bridge IP). Source IP = C (the container IP). The host sees src=C.
- Docker Desktop: the container connects to host.docker.internal (→ host). The VM NATs it: the host sees src = VM bridge IP = G (the gateway of the container's network as seen from the container's network namespace... on Docker Desktop, the container's network gateway is the VM's interface IP, e.g., 192.168.65.254).
So: pin the source IP to C (Linux) — and on Docker Desktop, pin to G. Ugh, platform-dependent pinning. Or: don't pin the source IP, and instead use a **per-run random port + a per-run random secret in the URL path**?
**A better idea: a path-based secret.** The proxy only accepts requests whose URL path starts with a per-run random token (e.g., `/zoo-<random>/...`)? No wait — the path has to be the git path (the forge path). Hmm, but I could prepend a prefix and strip it: the proxy listens and requires `Authorization: <per-run secret>`? No — the Authorization header is exactly what the proxy injects; the client's is stripped... I could require the client to present a per-run shared secret via a custom header (e.g., `X-Zoo-Run: <random>`), and the proxy rejects anything without it. Git can send custom headers via `http.<host>.extraHeader`!
So: the container's git config gets:
- `http.<host>.proxy = http://<proxyaddr>:<port>`
- `http.<host>.extraHeader = X-Zoo-Run: <per-run-random-secret>`
The proxy: only forwards requests that carry the correct `X-Zoo-Run` header; strips it before forwarding; injects the real Authorization.
Now the security model:
- The per-run secret is in the container's git config (readable by the agent) — but it only grants git smart-HTTP access via the proxy, not the token itself. An agent that steals the secret can only do git operations (clone/fetch/push) against the forge as the run's identity — the same scope as the agent's own git operations. No API access.
- Other local processes/containers that don't know the secret: rejected.
- No source IP pinning needed → works identically on Linux and Docker Desktop!
- The proxy can bind to 0.0.0.0 (Docker Desktop) or the gateway IP (Linux) — or simply always bind to 0.0.0.0? On a shared Linux host, 0.0.0.0 exposes the listener to all interfaces, but the secret gates access. The secret is random per run (128-bit). That's acceptable — it's like a bearer token with a very narrow scope (git only). Hmm, but on a multi-user host, other users could probe... they'd just get 403. The secret is 128-bit random. Fine.
Actually, wait, even better: if the secret gates access, do we even need to worry about the bind address? Bind to 0.0.0.0 for maximum portability (works on Linux + Docker Desktop, no gateway discovery needed!). The only requirement: the container must be able to reach the proxy's address.
- Linux: the proxy address = the container's network gateway (from inspect).
- Docker Desktop: the proxy address = `host.docker.internal` (with ExtraHosts host-gateway added for Linux compatibility... on Docker Desktop it's built in).
Hmm, so we still need the gateway on Linux. Or: on Linux, also use `host.docker.internal` with `ExtraHosts: host.docker.internal:host-gateway`! Then the proxy address is `host.docker.internal` in both cases, and the proxy binds to 0.0.0.0. On Linux, host-gateway = the bridge IP; the host process listening on 0.0.0.0 accepts on the bridge IP. ✓. On Docker Desktop, host-gateway = the host (via the special route); the host process listening on 0.0.0.0 accepts. ✓.
Wait, does `host-gateway` work on Docker Desktop? On Docker Desktop, `host.docker.internal` is already defined; `host-gateway` is also supported (maps to the host). Adding `ExtraHosts: ["host.docker.internal:host-gateway"]` on Docker Desktop — does it conflict with the built-in? Docker Desktop's docs say you don't need to add it; adding it should be harmless (it just overrides the built-in entry with the equivalent value). I think it's fine.
And on Linux, Docker ≥ 20.10 supports `host-gateway`. The README says "Docker: Latest". Fine.
Hmm, one more consideration: binding to 0.0.0.0 on a multi-user Linux host — the listener is reachable from other users on the host and from other containers. The secret gates it. The secret is in the container's git config. The agent (uid 1000) can read it. So the agent can use the proxy — that's the point (the agent's git uses it). Other containers on the same host: they don't have the secret (it's per-run, in this container's git config). ✓.
But wait — is 0.0.0.0 acceptable? Alternative: bind to the specific local IP that `host.docker.internal` resolves to from the container's perspective:
- Linux: the gateway IP (a local host interface) — bind exactly there.
- Docker Desktop: the host's IP on the Docker network (e.g., 192.168.65.1) — discoverable? `host.docker.internal` from the host's perspective... on Docker Desktop, you can't easily discover it from the host process.
So: try to bind to the gateway IP (Linux: works, minimal exposure); if the bind fails (Docker Desktop: the gateway is not local), fall back to 0.0.0.0. In both cases, the proxy URL host is `host.docker.internal`. Clean!
Actually, hmm, wait: on Linux, is the gateway IP always a local address of the host process? The bridge interface (docker0, 172.17.0.1) is on the host → yes, local. If the daemon uses a custom default network with a custom subnet, the gateway is still on a host interface (the bridge for that network) → local. ✓.
**So the final design (v2):**
A **per-run git HTTP proxy** in the zoo process:
- Listens on TCP: prefer the container's network gateway IP, fall back to 0.0.0.0; random port.
- The container gets `ExtraHosts: host.docker.internal:host-gateway` and the git config:
- `http.<scheme://host>.proxy = http://host.docker.internal:<port>`
- `http.<scheme://host>.extraHeader = X-Zoo-Run: <per-run-secret>` (hmm — wait, can I use extraHeader for a custom header? Yes, `http.<url>.extraHeader` adds a header to every request to that URL. The current code uses it for Authorization; I'll use it for the run secret.)
- The proxy:
- Requires the `X-Zoo-Run` header to match the per-run secret (constant-time comparison).
- Requires the request target (absolute-form URL) to be on the forge host.
- Requires the path to be a git smart-HTTP endpoint (info/refs?service=..., git-upload-pack, git-receive-pack).
- Strips the client's Authorization + X-Zoo-Run; injects the run's `Authorization: Basic user:token`.
- Forwards to the forge (httputil.ReverseProxy).
- Teardown: close the listener at the end of the run.
**Security properties:**
1. The token never enters the container (not on disk, not in env, not in a process's memory).
2. The sandbox can only do git smart-HTTP against the forge — no API, no other hosts.
3. The per-run secret gates the proxy; even if the agent steals it, it only gets git-scope access (the same scope as its own git operations).
4. Ephemeral: per-run port + secret, torn down with the run.
**Remaining question: is the per-run secret in the git config a problem?** The agent can read it. With it, the agent can: clone/fetch/push any repo on the forge that the run's token can access. That's exactly the git scope the agent already has. It cannot: read the token, call the API, or touch other forges. ✓ This matches leon's "we only need them to perform git operations (push, pull, fetch)".
**Now, let me also reconsider the deploy key option once more**... no, the proxy is strictly better: it covers submodules/other repos, works over HTTP (no SSH dependency), keeps the credential (the secret) scoped to git. Going with the proxy.
**One more mechanism check**: git sends an absolute-form request to an HTTP proxy. My Go proxy (http.Server) handles absolute-form fine. ReverseProxy with a Director that rewrites to the target. I already verified this pattern in the mechcheck program — the clone failed only because of the proxy scheme, not because of the forwarding. Let me fix the mechcheck to use a TCP proxy on 127.0.0.1 and verify the full chain (clone + push) works.
Wait, in mechcheck, git ran on the same host, so the proxy on 127.0.0.1:port is reachable. The config key: `http.http://127.0.0.1:PORT.proxy = http://127.0.0.1:PROXYPORT`. Let me update mechcheck accordingly.
Also, I should double-check that git sends the `extraHeader` custom header through the proxy (it should — extraHeader applies to all requests to that URL, including via a proxy).
Let me update the mechcheck program:
1. Forge on 127.0.0.1:portA (http-backend CGI).
2. Proxy on 127.0.0.1:portB (TCP), with X-Zoo-Run secret check + auth injection.
3. Git config: `http.http://127.0.0.1:portA.proxy = http://127.0.0.1:portB` + `http.http://127.0.0.1:portA.extraHeader = X-Zoo-Run: secret123`.
4. Clone + push.
Confirmed: git only supports `http`/`https`/`socks5`/`socks5h` proxies — no unix sockets. So the design needs to use a **TCP proxy**. The key question is how the container can reach the host's proxy portably. Let me verify the full chain with a TCP proxy + per-run secret header (this also verifies that `extraHeader` passes through the proxy):
Tool
🔧 write_file
{"content": "package main\n\nimport (\n\t\"bufio\"\n\t\"bytes\"\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"log\"\n\t\"net\"\n\t\"net/http\"\n\t\"net/http/httputil\"\n\t\"net/url\"\n\t\"os\"\n\t\"os/exec\"\n\t\"strconv\"\n\t\"strings\"\n\t\"time\"\n)\n\nfunc main() {\n\tprojectRoot := \"/tmp/mechcheck/forge\"\n\n\t// Fake forge: git http-backend as CGI.\n\tforgeMux := http.NewServeMux()\n\tforgeMux.HandleFunc(\"/\", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\tfmt.Println(\"FORGE GOT:\", r.Method, r.URL.RequestURI(), \"auth=\"+r.Header.Get(\"Authorization\"), \"x-zoo-run=\"+r.Header.Get(\"X-Zoo-Run\"))\n\t\tcmd := exec.Command(\"git\", \"http-backend\")\n\t\tcmd.Env = append(os.Environ(),\n\t\t\t\"REQUEST_METHOD=\"+r.Method,\n\t\t\t\"PATH_INFO=\"+r.URL.Path,\n\t\t\t\"QUERY_STRING=\"+r.URL.RawQuery,\n\t\t\t\"GIT_PROJECT_ROOT=\"+projectRoot,\n\t\t\t\"GIT_HTTP_EXPORT_ALL=1\",\n\t\t\t\"REMOTE_ADDR=\"+r.RemoteAddr,\n\t\t)\n\t\tif r.ContentLength > 0 {\n\t\t\tcmd.Env = append(cmd.Env, \"CONTENT_LENGTH=\"+strconv.FormatInt(r.ContentLength, 10))\n\t\t}\n\t\tfor k, vs := range r.Header {\n\t\t\tcmd.Env = append(cmd.Env, \"HTTP_\"+strings.ToUpper(strings.ReplaceAll(k, \"-\", \"_\"))+\"=\"+strings.Join(vs, \",\"))\n\t\t}\n\t\tcmd.Stdin = r.Body\n\t\tvar out, errb bytes.Buffer\n\t\tcmd.Stdout, cmd.Stderr = &out, &errb\n\t\tif err := cmd.Run(); err != nil {\n\t\t\tfmt.Println(\"backend err:\", err, errb.String())\n\t\t\thttp.Error(w, \"backend failed\", 502)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\tresp, err := http.ReadResponse(bufio.NewReader(bytes.NewReader(out.Bytes())), r)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\thttp.Error(w, \"parse: \"+err.Error(), 502)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\tdefer resp.Body.Close()\n\t\tfor k, vv := range resp.Header {\n\t\t\tfor _, v := range vv {\n\t\t\t\tw.Header().Add(k, v)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\tw.WriteHeader(resp.StatusCode)\n\t\tbuf := new(bytes.Buffer)\n\t\tbuf.ReadFrom(resp.Body)\n\t\tw.Write(buf.Bytes())\n\t})\n\n\tfln, err := net.Listen(\"tcp\", \"127.0.0.1:0\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Fatal(err)\n\t}\n\tforgeAddr := fln.Addr().String()\n\tgo http.Serve(fln, forgeMux)\n\tforgeURL := \"http://\" + forgeAddr\n\tfmt.Println(\"forge at\", forgeURL)\n\n\t// TCP proxy with per-run secret gate + auth injection.\n\tpln, err := net.Listen(\"tcp\", \"127.0.0.1:0\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Fatal(err)\n\t}\n\tproxyAddr := pln.Addr().String()\n\tfmt.Println(\"proxy at\", proxyAddr)\n\n\tconst runSecret = \"run-secret-123\"\n\ttarget, _ := url.Parse(forgeURL)\n\trp := &httputil.ReverseProxy{\n\t\tDirector: func(req *http.Request) {\n\t\t\tif req.Header.Get(\"X-Zoo-Run\") != runSecret {\n\t\t\t\treturn // handled in wrapper below\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\treq.URL.Scheme = target.Scheme\n\t\t\treq.URL.Host = target.Host\n\t\t\treq.Host = target.Host\n\t\t\treq.Header.Del(\"Authorization\")\n\t\t\treq.Header.Del(\"X-Zoo-Run\")\n\t\t\treq.Header.Set(\"Authorization\", \"Basic Z3JlZzp0b2tlbg==\")\n\t\t},\n\t}\n\twrapper := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\tif r.Header.Get(\"X-Zoo-Run\") != runSecret {\n\t\t\thttp.Error(w, \"forbidden\", http.StatusForbidden)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\trp.ServeHTTP(w, r)\n\t})\n\tsrv := &http.Server{Handler: wrapper, ReadHeaderTimeout: 10 * time.Second}\n\tgo srv.Serve(pln)\n\n\t// Real git clone+push through the proxy.\n\tcloneURL := forgeURL + \"/acme/widgets.git\"\n\tgitcfg := \"/tmp/mechcheck/gitconfig\"\n\thost := target.Scheme + \"://\" + target.Host\n\tos.WriteFile(gitcfg, []byte(fmt.Sprintf(\n\t\t\"[http \\\"%s\\\"]\\n\\tproxy = http://%s\\n\\textraHeader = X-Zoo-Run: %s\\n\", host, proxyAddr, runSecret)), 0o600)\n\n\tenv := append(os.Environ(), \"GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL=\"+gitcfg, \"GIT_CONFIG_SYSTEM=/tmp/mechcheck/nosys\")\n\n\tcmd := exec.Command(\"git\", \"clone\", \"-v\", cloneURL, \"/tmp/mechcheck/clone\")\n\tcmd.Env = env\n\tout, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()\n\tfmt.Println(string(out))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Fatal(\"clone failed:\", err)\n\t}\n\tfmt.Println(\"CLONE OK\")\n\n\tcmd = exec.Command(\"git\", \"-C\", \"/tmp/mechcheck/clone\", \"push\", \"-v\", \"origin\", \"HEAD:refs/heads/pushed\")\n\tcmd.Env = env\n\tout, err = cmd.CombinedOutput()\n\tfmt.Println(string(out))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Fatal(\"push failed:\", err)\n\t}\n\tfmt.Println(\"PUSH OK\")\n\n\t// Negative: request without the secret must be rejected.\n\tresp, err := http.Get(forgeURL + \"/api/v1/repos\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Fatal(err)\n\t}\n\tfmt.Println(\"direct forge api (no proxy):\", resp.StatusCode) // forge itself has no auth gate in this mock\n\n\t// Negative: through proxy but wrong secret.\n\treq, _ := http.NewRequest(\"GET\", forgeURL+\"/acme/widgets.git/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack\", nil)\n\treq.Header.Set(\"X-Zoo-Run\", \"wrong\")\n\tc := &http.Client{Transport: &http.Transport{Proxy: http.ProxyURL(mustURL(\"http://\" + proxyAddr))}}\n\tresp2, err := c.Do(req)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Fatal(err)\n\t}\n\tfmt.Println(\"proxy with wrong secret:\", resp2.StatusCode)\n}\n\nfunc mustURL(s string) *url.URL {\n\tu, err := url.Parse(s)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tpanic(err)\n\t}\n\treturn u\n}\n", "path": "/tmp/mechcheck/main.go"}
Arguments
{"content": "package main\n\nimport (\n\t\"bufio\"\n\t\"bytes\"\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"log\"\n\t\"net\"\n\t\"net/http\"\n\t\"net/http/httputil\"\n\t\"net/url\"\n\t\"os\"\n\t\"os/exec\"\n\t\"strconv\"\n\t\"strings\"\n\t\"time\"\n)\n\nfunc main() {\n\tprojectRoot := \"/tmp/mechcheck/forge\"\n\n\t// Fake forge: git http-backend as CGI.\n\tforgeMux := http.NewServeMux()\n\tforgeMux.HandleFunc(\"/\", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\tfmt.Println(\"FORGE GOT:\", r.Method, r.URL.RequestURI(), \"auth=\"+r.Header.Get(\"Authorization\"), \"x-zoo-run=\"+r.Header.Get(\"X-Zoo-Run\"))\n\t\tcmd := exec.Command(\"git\", \"http-backend\")\n\t\tcmd.Env = append(os.Environ(),\n\t\t\t\"REQUEST_METHOD=\"+r.Method,\n\t\t\t\"PATH_INFO=\"+r.URL.Path,\n\t\t\t\"QUERY_STRING=\"+r.URL.RawQuery,\n\t\t\t\"GIT_PROJECT_ROOT=\"+projectRoot,\n\t\t\t\"GIT_HTTP_EXPORT_ALL=1\",\n\t\t\t\"REMOTE_ADDR=\"+r.RemoteAddr,\n\t\t)\n\t\tif r.ContentLength > 0 {\n\t\t\tcmd.Env = append(cmd.Env, \"CONTENT_LENGTH=\"+strconv.FormatInt(r.ContentLength, 10))\n\t\t}\n\t\tfor k, vs := range r.Header {\n\t\t\tcmd.Env = append(cmd.Env, \"HTTP_\"+strings.ToUpper(strings.ReplaceAll(k, \"-\", \"_\"))+\"=\"+strings.Join(vs, \",\"))\n\t\t}\n\t\tcmd.Stdin = r.Body\n\t\tvar out, errb bytes.Buffer\n\t\tcmd.Stdout, cmd.Stderr = &out, &errb\n\t\tif err := cmd.Run(); err != nil {\n\t\t\tfmt.Println(\"backend err:\", err, errb.String())\n\t\t\thttp.Error(w, \"backend failed\", 502)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\tresp, err := http.ReadResponse(bufio.NewReader(bytes.NewReader(out.Bytes())), r)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\thttp.Error(w, \"parse: \"+err.Error(), 502)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\tdefer resp.Body.Close()\n\t\tfor k, vv := range resp.Header {\n\t\t\tfor _, v := range vv {\n\t\t\t\tw.Header().Add(k, v)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\tw.WriteHeader(resp.StatusCode)\n\t\tbuf := new(bytes.Buffer)\n\t\tbuf.ReadFrom(resp.Body)\n\t\tw.Write(buf.Bytes())\n\t})\n\n\tfln, err := net.Listen(\"tcp\", \"127.0.0.1:0\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Fatal(err)\n\t}\n\tforgeAddr := fln.Addr().String()\n\tgo http.Serve(fln, forgeMux)\n\tforgeURL := \"http://\" + forgeAddr\n\tfmt.Println(\"forge at\", forgeURL)\n\n\t// TCP proxy with per-run secret gate + auth injection.\n\tpln, err := net.Listen(\"tcp\", \"127.0.0.1:0\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Fatal(err)\n\t}\n\tproxyAddr := pln.Addr().String()\n\tfmt.Println(\"proxy at\", proxyAddr)\n\n\tconst runSecret = \"run-secret-123\"\n\ttarget, _ := url.Parse(forgeURL)\n\trp := &httputil.ReverseProxy{\n\t\tDirector: func(req *http.Request) {\n\t\t\tif req.Header.Get(\"X-Zoo-Run\") != runSecret {\n\t\t\t\treturn // handled in wrapper below\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\treq.URL.Scheme = target.Scheme\n\t\t\treq.URL.Host = target.Host\n\t\t\treq.Host = target.Host\n\t\t\treq.Header.Del(\"Authorization\")\n\t\t\treq.Header.Del(\"X-Zoo-Run\")\n\t\t\treq.Header.Set(\"Authorization\", \"Basic Z3JlZzp0b2tlbg==\")\n\t\t},\n\t}\n\twrapper := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\tif r.Header.Get(\"X-Zoo-Run\") != runSecret {\n\t\t\thttp.Error(w, \"forbidden\", http.StatusForbidden)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\trp.ServeHTTP(w, r)\n\t})\n\tsrv := &http.Server{Handler: wrapper, ReadHeaderTimeout: 10 * time.Second}\n\tgo srv.Serve(pln)\n\n\t// Real git clone+push through the proxy.\n\tcloneURL := forgeURL + \"/acme/widgets.git\"\n\tgitcfg := \"/tmp/mechcheck/gitconfig\"\n\thost := target.Scheme + \"://\" + target.Host\n\tos.WriteFile(gitcfg, []byte(fmt.Sprintf(\n\t\t\"[http \\\"%s\\\"]\\n\\tproxy = http://%s\\n\\textraHeader = X-Zoo-Run: %s\\n\", host, proxyAddr, runSecret)), 0o600)\n\n\tenv := append(os.Environ(), \"GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL=\"+gitcfg, \"GIT_CONFIG_SYSTEM=/tmp/mechcheck/nosys\")\n\n\tcmd := exec.Command(\"git\", \"clone\", \"-v\", cloneURL, \"/tmp/mechcheck/clone\")\n\tcmd.Env = env\n\tout, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()\n\tfmt.Println(string(out))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Fatal(\"clone failed:\", err)\n\t}\n\tfmt.Println(\"CLONE OK\")\n\n\tcmd = exec.Command(\"git\", \"-C\", \"/tmp/mechcheck/clone\", \"push\", \"-v\", \"origin\", \"HEAD:refs/heads/pushed\")\n\tcmd.Env = env\n\tout, err = cmd.CombinedOutput()\n\tfmt.Println(string(out))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Fatal(\"push failed:\", err)\n\t}\n\tfmt.Println(\"PUSH OK\")\n\n\t// Negative: request without the secret must be rejected.\n\tresp, err := http.Get(forgeURL + \"/api/v1/repos\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Fatal(err)\n\t}\n\tfmt.Println(\"direct forge api (no proxy):\", resp.StatusCode) // forge itself has no auth gate in this mock\n\n\t// Negative: through proxy but wrong secret.\n\treq, _ := http.NewRequest(\"GET\", forgeURL+\"/acme/widgets.git/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack\", nil)\n\treq.Header.Set(\"X-Zoo-Run\", \"wrong\")\n\tc := &http.Client{Transport: &http.Transport{Proxy: http.ProxyURL(mustURL(\"http://\" + proxyAddr))}}\n\tresp2, err := c.Do(req)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Fatal(err)\n\t}\n\tfmt.Println(\"proxy with wrong secret:\", resp2.StatusCode)\n}\n\nfunc mustURL(s string) *url.URL {\n\tu, err := url.Parse(s)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tpanic(err)\n\t}\n\treturn u\n}\n", "path": "/tmp/mechcheck/main.go"}
Result
OK
Thinking
Wait, there's a problem with the negative test: when using `http.ProxyURL`, Go's client sends absolute-form requests to the proxy. Good — that's exactly the git behavior.
But in the clone test, git is using the proxy from the config. Let me try running it.
Tool
🔧 bash
{"command": "cd /tmp/mechcheck && rm -rf clone && go run main.go 2>&1 | tail -25"}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /tmp/mechcheck && rm -rf clone && go run main.go 2>&1 | tail -25"}
Result
forge at http://127.0.0.1:45869
proxy at 127.0.0.1:41805
FORGE GOT: GET /acme/widgets.git/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack auth=Basic Z3JlZzp0b2tlbg== x-zoo-run=
Cloning into '/tmp/mechcheck/clone'...
remote: parse: malformed HTTP status code "Fri,"
fatal: unable to access 'http://127.0.0.1:45869/acme/widgets.git/': The requested URL returned error: 502
2026/08/25 22:13:46 clone failed:exit status 128
exit status 1
Thinking
Progress! The proxy chain is working (the forge received the request with the injected auth, and X-Zoo-Run was stripped). But `http.ReadResponse` failed to parse http-backend's output: "malformed HTTP status code 'Fri,'".
Problem: `git http-backend`'s output starts with headers, but `http.ReadResponse` expects a `Status:` line first if a status is present... The actual issue: http-backend's output is:
```
Expires: Fri, 01 Jan 1980 00:00:00 GMT
Pragma: no-cache
...
Content-Type: application/x-git-upload-pack-advertisement
001e# service=git-upload-pack
...
```
There's no `Status:` line. `http.ReadResponse` should treat a missing Status as 200... but the error says malformed status code "Fri," — meaning it interpreted `Expires: Fri, ...` as a status line! Because `http.ReadResponse` reads the first line as the status line (e.g., "HTTP/1.1 200 OK"). CGI output doesn't have an HTTP status line — it's just headers. So `http.ReadResponse` can't be used directly on raw CGI output.
CGI response format: headers (including optional `Status:`), blank line, body. So I need to parse it manually: read lines until a blank line; if there's a `Status:` header, use it; otherwise 200.
Let me fix the handler to parse CGI output manually:
```go
// Parse CGI response: headers until blank line, then body.
reader := bufio.NewReader(bytes.NewReader(out.Bytes()))
status := 200
hdr := http.Header{}
for {
line, err := reader.ReadString('\n')
if err != nil { break }
line = strings.TrimRight(line, "\r\n")
if line == "" { break }
k, v, ok := strings.Cut(line, ":")
if !ok { continue }
k = strings.TrimSpace(k)
v = strings.TrimSpace(v)
if strings.EqualFold(k, "Status") {
// "200 OK"
parts := strings.SplitN(v, " ", 2)
status, _ = strconv.Atoi(parts[0])
continue
}
hdr.Add(k, v)
}
w.Header().Set? Add all hdr
w.WriteHeader(status)
io.Copy(w, reader)
```
Let me fix it and re-run.
The proxy chain works (auth injected, secret stripped) — but `http.ReadResponse` can't parse raw CGI output (no status line). Let me fix the CGI parsing:
Tool
🔧 edit_file
{"find": "\t\tresp, err := http.ReadResponse(bufio.NewReader(bytes.NewReader(out.Bytes())), r)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\thttp.Error(w, \"parse: \"+err.Error(), 502)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\tdefer resp.Body.Close()\n\t\tfor k, vv := range resp.Header {\n\t\t\tfor _, v := range vv {\n\t\t\t\tw.Header().Add(k, v)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\tw.WriteHeader(resp.StatusCode)\n\t\tbuf := new(bytes.Buffer)\n\t\tbuf.ReadFrom(resp.Body)\n\t\tw.Write(buf.Bytes())", "path": "/tmp/mechcheck/main.go", "replace": "\t\t// Parse CGI output: headers (optional Status:) until blank line, then body.\n\t\treader := bufio.NewReader(bytes.NewReader(out.Bytes()))\n\t\tstatus := 200\n\t\thdr := http.Header{}\n\t\tfor {\n\t\t\tline, err := reader.ReadString('\\n')\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tline = strings.TrimRight(line, \"\\r\\n\")\n\t\t\tif line == \"\" {\n\t\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tk, v, ok := strings.Cut(line, \":\")\n\t\t\tif !ok {\n\t\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tk, v = strings.TrimSpace(k), strings.TrimSpace(v)\n\t\t\tif strings.EqualFold(k, \"Status\") {\n\t\t\t\tif parts := strings.SplitN(v, \" \", 2); len(parts) > 0 {\n\t\t\t\t\tstatus, _ = strconv.Atoi(parts[0])\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\thdr.Add(k, v)\n\t\t}\n\t\tfor k, vv := range hdr {\n\t\t\tfor _, v := range vv {\n\t\t\t\tw.Header().Add(k, v)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\tw.WriteHeader(status)\n\t\tio.Copy(w, reader)"}
Arguments
{"find": "\t\tresp, err := http.ReadResponse(bufio.NewReader(bytes.NewReader(out.Bytes())), r)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\thttp.Error(w, \"parse: \"+err.Error(), 502)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\tdefer resp.Body.Close()\n\t\tfor k, vv := range resp.Header {\n\t\t\tfor _, v := range vv {\n\t\t\t\tw.Header().Add(k, v)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\tw.WriteHeader(resp.StatusCode)\n\t\tbuf := new(bytes.Buffer)\n\t\tbuf.ReadFrom(resp.Body)\n\t\tw.Write(buf.Bytes())", "path": "/tmp/mechcheck/main.go", "replace": "\t\t// Parse CGI output: headers (optional Status:) until blank line, then body.\n\t\treader := bufio.NewReader(bytes.NewReader(out.Bytes()))\n\t\tstatus := 200\n\t\thdr := http.Header{}\n\t\tfor {\n\t\t\tline, err := reader.ReadString('\\n')\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tline = strings.TrimRight(line, \"\\r\\n\")\n\t\t\tif line == \"\" {\n\t\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tk, v, ok := strings.Cut(line, \":\")\n\t\t\tif !ok {\n\t\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tk, v = strings.TrimSpace(k), strings.TrimSpace(v)\n\t\t\tif strings.EqualFold(k, \"Status\") {\n\t\t\t\tif parts := strings.SplitN(v, \" \", 2); len(parts) > 0 {\n\t\t\t\t\tstatus, _ = strconv.Atoi(parts[0])\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\thdr.Add(k, v)\n\t\t}\n\t\tfor k, vv := range hdr {\n\t\t\tfor _, v := range vv {\n\t\t\t\tw.Header().Add(k, v)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\tw.WriteHeader(status)\n\t\tio.Copy(w, reader)"}
Result
1 occurrences replaced
Thinking
I need to investigate this further. Let me check the details.
I need to add the "io" import. Let me check the imports and run it.
Tool
🔧 edit_file
{"find": "import (\n\t\"bufio\"\n\t\"bytes\"\n\t\"fmt\"", "replace": "import (\n\t\"bufio\"\n\t\"bytes\"\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"io\""}
Arguments
{"find": "import (\n\t\"bufio\"\n\t\"bytes\"\n\t\"fmt\"", "replace": "import (\n\t\"bufio\"\n\t\"bytes\"\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"io\""}
Result
ERROR CALLING TOOL: command exited with status 1: base64: read error: Is a directory
Thinking
That's a weird error — "base64: read error: Is a directory". This looks like a tool infrastructure issue, not something related to my file. Let me retry the edit.
Tool
🔧 bash
{"command": "cd /tmp/mechcheck && head -15 main.go"}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /tmp/mechcheck && head -15 main.go"}
Result
package main
import (
"bufio"
"bytes"
"fmt"
"log"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/http/httputil"
"net/url"
"os"
"os/exec"
"strconv"
"strings"
Thinking
The edit failed with a strange error. Let me check whether the "io" import was added. It wasn't added (the import list still shows the old content). Let me retry the edit.
Tool
🔧 edit_file
{"find": "\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"log\"\n\t\"net\"", "path": "/tmp/mechcheck/main.go", "replace": "\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"io\"\n\t\"log\"\n\t\"net\""}
Arguments
{"find": "\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"log\"\n\t\"net\"", "path": "/tmp/mechcheck/main.go", "replace": "\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"io\"\n\t\"log\"\n\t\"net\""}
Result
1 occurrences replaced
Thinking
I need to investigate this further. Let me check the details.
Okay, let's run it once more.
Tool
🔧 bash
{"command": "cd /tmp/mechcheck && rm -rf clone && go run main.go 2>&1 | tail -30"}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /tmp/mechcheck && rm -rf clone && go run main.go 2>&1 | tail -30"}
Result
forge at http://127.0.0.1:42077
proxy at 127.0.0.1:36707
FORGE GOT: GET /acme/widgets.git/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack auth=Basic Z3JlZzp0b2tlbg== x-zoo-run=
FORGE GOT: POST /acme/widgets.git/git-upload-pack auth=Basic Z3JlZzp0b2tlbg== x-zoo-run=
Cloning into '/tmp/mechcheck/clone'...
POST git-upload-pack (181 bytes)
error: RPC failed; HTTP 415 curl 22 The requested URL returned error: 415
fatal: expected flush after ref listing
2026/08/25 22:14:35 clone failed:exit status 128
exit status 1
Thinking
Progress: info/refs worked (clone started, POSTed to git-upload-pack). But the POST to git-upload-pack returned 415 (Unsupported Media Type) from http-backend.
Why 415? `git http-backend` checks the `Content-Type` of the POST to git-upload-pack: it must be `application/x-git-upload-pack-request`. Git's client sends `Content-Type: application/x-git-upload-pack-request`. My CGI wrapper passes headers as HTTP_* env vars — `HTTP_CONTENT_TYPE` should be set...
Wait, the problem is: I'm passing all headers as HTTP_* including Content-Type → `HTTP_CONTENT_TYPE=application/x-git-upload-pack-request`. http-backend should read CONTENT_TYPE... hmm, actually http-backend reads the `CONTENT_TYPE` env var (CGI standard), not `HTTP_CONTENT_TYPE`! In the CGI spec, Content-Type is passed as `CONTENT_TYPE` (not HTTP_CONTENT_TYPE). My wrapper puts it into HTTP_CONTENT_TYPE. Let me fix: special-case Content-Type → CONTENT_TYPE, and Content-Length → CONTENT_LENGTH.
Let me update the wrapper.
415 — `git http-backend` wants `CONTENT_TYPE` as a CGI var, not `HTTP_CONTENT_TYPE`. Fixing:
Tool
🔧 edit_file
{"find": "\t\tif r.ContentLength > 0 {\n\t\t\tcmd.Env = append(cmd.Env, \"CONTENT_LENGTH=\"+strconv.FormatInt(r.ContentLength, 10))\n\t\t}\n\t\tfor k, vs := range r.Header {\n\t\t\tcmd.Env = append(cmd.Env, \"HTTP_\"+strings.ToUpper(strings.ReplaceAll(k, \"-\", \"_\"))+\"=\"+strings.Join(vs, \",\"))\n\t\t}", "path": "/tmp/mechcheck/main.go", "replace": "\t\tif r.ContentLength > 0 {\n\t\t\tcmd.Env = append(cmd.Env, \"CONTENT_LENGTH=\"+strconv.FormatInt(r.ContentLength, 10))\n\t\t}\n\t\tif ct := r.Header.Get(\"Content-Type\"); ct != \"\" {\n\t\t\tcmd.Env = append(cmd.Env, \"CONTENT_TYPE=\"+ct)\n\t\t}\n\t\tfor k, vs := range r.Header {\n\t\t\tif k == \"Content-Type\" || k == \"Content-Length\" {\n\t\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tcmd.Env = append(cmd.Env, \"HTTP_\"+strings.ToUpper(strings.ReplaceAll(k, \"-\", \"_\"))+\"=\"+strings.Join(vs, \",\"))\n\t\t}"}
Arguments
{"find": "\t\tif r.ContentLength > 0 {\n\t\t\tcmd.Env = append(cmd.Env, \"CONTENT_LENGTH=\"+strconv.FormatInt(r.ContentLength, 10))\n\t\t}\n\t\tfor k, vs := range r.Header {\n\t\t\tcmd.Env = append(cmd.Env, \"HTTP_\"+strings.ToUpper(strings.ReplaceAll(k, \"-\", \"_\"))+\"=\"+strings.Join(vs, \",\"))\n\t\t}", "path": "/tmp/mechcheck/main.go", "replace": "\t\tif r.ContentLength > 0 {\n\t\t\tcmd.Env = append(cmd.Env, \"CONTENT_LENGTH=\"+strconv.FormatInt(r.ContentLength, 10))\n\t\t}\n\t\tif ct := r.Header.Get(\"Content-Type\"); ct != \"\" {\n\t\t\tcmd.Env = append(cmd.Env, \"CONTENT_TYPE=\"+ct)\n\t\t}\n\t\tfor k, vs := range r.Header {\n\t\t\tif k == \"Content-Type\" || k == \"Content-Length\" {\n\t\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tcmd.Env = append(cmd.Env, \"HTTP_\"+strings.ToUpper(strings.ReplaceAll(k, \"-\", \"_\"))+\"=\"+strings.Join(vs, \",\"))\n\t\t}"}
Result
1 occurrences replaced
Thinking
I need to investigate this further. Let me check the details.
Also, the earlier 415 error: "RPC failed; HTTP 415" — this occurred on the POST git-upload-pack. The 415 is probably because http-backend is checking the Content-Type of the POST to git-upload-pack: it has to be `application/x-git-upload-pack-request`. Git sends that. But my CGI wrapper was passing it as HTTP_CONTENT_TYPE rather than CONTENT_TYPE. Let me rerun it.
Tool
🔧 bash
{"command": "cd /tmp/mechcheck && rm -rf clone && go run main.go 2>&1 | tail -30"}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /tmp/mechcheck && rm -rf clone && go run main.go 2>&1 | tail -30"}
Result
forge at http://127.0.0.1:45525
proxy at 127.0.0.1:36777
FORGE GOT: GET /acme/widgets.git/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack auth=Basic Z3JlZzp0b2tlbg== x-zoo-run=
FORGE GOT: POST /acme/widgets.git/git-upload-pack auth=Basic Z3JlZzp0b2tlbg== x-zoo-run=
FORGE GOT: POST /acme/widgets.git/git-upload-pack auth=Basic Z3JlZzp0b2tlbg== x-zoo-run=
Cloning into '/tmp/mechcheck/clone'...
POST git-upload-pack (181 bytes)
POST git-upload-pack (223 bytes)
CLONE OK
FORGE GOT: GET /acme/widgets.git/info/refs?service=git-receive-pack auth=Basic Z3JlZzp0b2tlbg== x-zoo-run=
Pushing to http://127.0.0.1:45525/acme/widgets.git
fatal: unable to access 'http://127.0.0.1:45525/acme/widgets.git/': The requested URL returned error: 403
2026/08/25 22:15:05 push failed:exit status 128
exit status 1
Thinking
Clone is working end-to-end through the proxy! Push fails with a 403 from http-backend.
Why does http-backend return 403 on receive-pack? http-backend only enables receive-pack when the environment variable `GIT_HTTP.receive-pack` (or the repo config `http.receivepack`) is set... In CGI, http-backend checks the repo config `http.receivepack` or the env var `GIT_HTTP_RECEIVE_PACK`. By default, receive-pack over HTTP is disabled (for safety). Forgejo/Gitea enable it. So in my mock forge, I need to set `GIT_HTTP_RECEIVE_PACK=1` in the CGI env vars (or set the repo config `http.receivepack = true`).
Let me add the env var `GIT_HTTP_RECEIVE_PACK=1` to the mock. (In the actual test helper, I'll set it via the repo config or env var — the env var is easier.)
Clone works end-to-end through the proxy! Push needs `GIT_HTTP_RECEIVE_PACK=1` (http-backend disables receive-pack by default, like real forges configure it):
Tool
🔧 edit_file
{"find": "\t\t\t\"GIT_PROJECT_ROOT=\"+projectRoot,\n\t\t\t\"GIT_HTTP_EXPORT_ALL=1\",", "path": "/tmp/mechcheck/main.go", "replace": "\t\t\t\"GIT_PROJECT_ROOT=\"+projectRoot,\n\t\t\t\"GIT_HTTP_EXPORT_ALL=1\",\n\t\t\t\"GIT_HTTP_RECEIVE_PACK=1\","}
Arguments
{"find": "\t\t\t\"GIT_PROJECT_ROOT=\"+projectRoot,\n\t\t\t\"GIT_HTTP_EXPORT_ALL=1\",", "path": "/tmp/mechcheck/main.go", "replace": "\t\t\t\"GIT_PROJECT_ROOT=\"+projectRoot,\n\t\t\t\"GIT_HTTP_EXPORT_ALL=1\",\n\t\t\t\"GIT_HTTP_RECEIVE_PACK=1\","}
Result
1 occurrences replaced
Thinking
I need to investigate this further. Let me check the details.
Also, the push needs a committer identity — the clone has no user.name/email. The push itself doesn't need an identity (since it's just pushing existing commits). The 403 is due to receive-pack being disabled. Let me try running it.
Tool
🔧 bash
{"command": "cd /tmp/mechcheck && rm -rf clone && go run main.go 2>&1 | tail -22"}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /tmp/mechcheck && rm -rf clone && go run main.go 2>&1 | tail -22"}
Result
forge at http://127.0.0.1:41029
proxy at 127.0.0.1:41301
FORGE GOT: GET /acme/widgets.git/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack auth=Basic Z3JlZzp0b2tlbg== x-zoo-run=
FORGE GOT: POST /acme/widgets.git/git-upload-pack auth=Basic Z3JlZzp0b2tlbg== x-zoo-run=
FORGE GOT: POST /acme/widgets.git/git-upload-pack auth=Basic Z3JlZzp0b2tlbg== x-zoo-run=
Cloning into '/tmp/mechcheck/clone'...
POST git-upload-pack (181 bytes)
POST git-upload-pack (223 bytes)
CLONE OK
FORGE GOT: GET /acme/widgets.git/info/refs?service=git-receive-pack auth=Basic Z3JlZzp0b2tlbg== x-zoo-run=
Pushing to http://127.0.0.1:41029/acme/widgets.git
fatal: unable to access 'http://127.0.0.1:41029/acme/widgets.git/': The requested URL returned error: 403
2026/08/25 22:15:19 push failed:exit status 128
exit status 1
Thinking
Still 403. Hmm. Let me check what http-backend requires for receive-pack. In git's http-backend.c:
```c
if (!http_receive_pack && !cfg_http_receive_pack)
... 403
```
The actual check is:
```c
static int get_receive_pack(...)
```
Let me look at the source: http-backend.c has this:
```c
if (!strcmp(service, "git-receive-pack")) {
if (!http_receive_pack)
return 403;
}
```
Here `http_receive_pack` is set by the environment variable `GIT_HTTP_EXPORT_ALL`... no wait, that's not right. Let me grep the source.
Tool
🔧 bash
{"command": "cd /tmp/gitsrc && grep -n \"receive-pack\\|receive_pack\\|RECEIVE\" http-backend.c | head -20"}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /tmp/gitsrc && grep -n \"receive-pack\\|receive_pack\\|RECEIVE\" http-backend.c | head -20"}
Result
44: { "receive-pack", "receivepack", 0, -1 },
746: {"POST", "/git-receive-pack$", service_rpc}
Thinking
I need to investigate this further. Let me check the details.
Line 44: `{ "receive-pack", "receivepack", 0, -1 }` — this is a table of per-repository configuration options. Let's look at the context:
Tool
🔧 bash
{"command": "cd /tmp/gitsrc && sed -n '30,60p' http-backend.c && grep -n \"http.receivepack\\|check_service\\|403\" http-backend.c | head"}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /tmp/gitsrc && sed -n '30,60p' http-backend.c && grep -n \"http.receivepack\\|check_service\\|403\" http-backend.c | head"}
Result
static int getanyfile = 1;
static unsigned long max_request_buffer = 10 * 1024 * 1024;
static struct string_list *query_params;
struct rpc_service {
const char *name;
const char *config_name;
unsigned buffer_input : 1;
signed enabled : 2;
};
static struct rpc_service rpc_service[] = {
{ "upload-pack", "uploadpack", 1, 1 },
{ "receive-pack", "receivepack", 0, -1 },
{ "upload-archive", "uploadarchive", 0, -1 },
};
static struct string_list *get_parameters(void)
{
if (!query_params) {
const char *query = getenv("QUERY_STRING");
CALLOC_ARRAY(query_params, 1);
while (query && *query) {
char *name = url_decode_parameter_name(&query);
char *value = url_decode_parameter_value(&query);
struct string_list_item *i;
i = string_list_lookup(query_params, name);
if (!i)
160: http_status(hdr, 403, "Forbidden");
Thinking
I need to investigate this further. Let me check the details.
So, the `receive-pack` service has `enabled: -1` (undetermined), and it's resolved via the repository's config `http.receivepack`. Therefore, I need to set `http.receivepack = true` in the bare repository's config:
```
git -C repoDir config http.receivepack true
```
The environment variable GIT_HTTP_RECEIVE_PACK does not exist. Let me fix the mechcheck: set the repository config instead.
It's a per-repo config: `http.receivepack`. Fixing:
Tool
🔧 edit_file
{"find": "\t\t\t\"GIT_PROJECT_ROOT=\"+projectRoot,\n\t\t\t\"GIT_HTTP_EXPORT_ALL=1\",\n\t\t\t\"GIT_HTTP_RECEIVE_PACK=1\",", "path": "/tmp/mechcheck/main.go", "replace": "\t\t\t\"GIT_PROJECT_ROOT=\"+projectRoot,\n\t\t\t\"GIT_HTTP_EXPORT_ALL=1\","}
Arguments
{"find": "\t\t\t\"GIT_PROJECT_ROOT=\"+projectRoot,\n\t\t\t\"GIT_HTTP_EXPORT_ALL=1\",\n\t\t\t\"GIT_HTTP_RECEIVE_PACK=1\",", "path": "/tmp/mechcheck/main.go", "replace": "\t\t\t\"GIT_PROJECT_ROOT=\"+projectRoot,\n\t\t\t\"GIT_HTTP_EXPORT_ALL=1\","}
Result
1 occurrences replaced
Thinking
I need to investigate this further. Let me check the details.
Next, I need to set `http.receivepack = true` in the bare repository. The bare repository is at /tmp/mechcheck/forge/acme/widgets.git. Let me set this before running.
Tool
🔧 bash
{"command": "cd /tmp/mechcheck && git -C forge/acme/widgets.git config http.receivepack true && rm -rf clone && go run main.go 2>&1 | tail -22"}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /tmp/mechcheck && git -C forge/acme/widgets.git config http.receivepack true && rm -rf clone && go run main.go 2>&1 | tail -22"}
Result
forge at http://127.0.0.1:39053
proxy at 127.0.0.1:37743
FORGE GOT: GET /acme/widgets.git/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack auth=Basic Z3JlZzp0b2tlbg== x-zoo-run=
FORGE GOT: POST /acme/widgets.git/git-upload-pack auth=Basic Z3JlZzp0b2tlbg== x-zoo-run=
FORGE GOT: POST /acme/widgets.git/git-upload-pack auth=Basic Z3JlZzp0b2tlbg== x-zoo-run=
Cloning into '/tmp/mechcheck/clone'...
POST git-upload-pack (181 bytes)
POST git-upload-pack (223 bytes)
CLONE OK
FORGE GOT: GET /acme/widgets.git/info/refs?service=git-receive-pack auth=Basic Z3JlZzp0b2tlbg== x-zoo-run=
FORGE GOT: POST /acme/widgets.git/git-receive-pack auth=Basic Z3JlZzp0b2tlbg== x-zoo-run=
Pushing to http://127.0.0.1:39053/acme/widgets.git
POST git-receive-pack (219 bytes)
To http://127.0.0.1:39053/acme/widgets.git
* [new branch] HEAD -> pushed
updating local tracking ref 'refs/remotes/origin/pushed'
PUSH OK
FORGE GOT: GET /api/v1/repos auth= x-zoo-run=
direct forge api (no proxy): 404
proxy with wrong secret: 403
Thinking
The complete mechanism has been verified:
1. ✅ `git clone` via TCP proxy: info/refs + git-upload-pack, credentials injected by the proxy, per-run secret stripped before forwarding.
2. ✅ `git push` via proxy: info/refs?service=git-receive-pack + git-receive-pack POST.
3. ✅ Requests without the secret are rejected (403).
4. ✅ The token never touches the git process — it only exists in the proxy.
Now, the remaining design element: how does the container reach the host's proxy?
Plan:
- Zoo creates the container with `ExtraHosts: ["host.docker.internal:host-gateway"]`.
- Zoo starts the proxy on the host:
- First try to bind to the container's network gateway IP (from container inspect) — on Linux this is a local host interface (docker0).
- If binding fails (e.g., Docker Desktop, where the gateway is inside the VM), fall back to 0.0.0.0.
- Git config inside the container: `http.<scheme://host>.proxy = http://host.docker.internal:<port>`.
- The per-run secret gates access (X-Zoo-Run header via extraHeader).
Wait — one issue: on Linux, when the container connects to `host.docker.internal` (→ host-gateway = bridge IP), the source IP is the container's IP. The proxy binds to the gateway IP. No problem.
On Docker Desktop: `host.docker.internal` is built-in (no ExtraHosts needed, but adding it is harmless). The container's traffic to the host is NATed through the VM. The proxy binds to 0.0.0.0 on the host (macOS). Reachable. ✓
Hmm, wait, actually — on Docker Desktop, is a process on the macOS host listening on 0.0.0.0 reachable from the container via host.docker.internal? Yes — that's exactly how host.docker.internal works: it's a special DNS entry that routes to the host, and the host's listening ports are reachable.
But hmm, one more consideration for Linux: instead of binding to the gateway IP, we could always bind to 0.0.0.0. The secret gates access. But binding to the gateway IP is more hygienic (not exposed on other interfaces, e.g., the LAN). Let's do this: try gateway first, fall back to 0.0.0.0.
Hmm, actually wait. Let me reconsider: is `host.docker.internal` + `host-gateway` really necessary? On Linux, the container can reach the gateway IP directly — we could use the gateway IP as the proxy host in the git config. But then the git config value differs per platform (gateway IP vs. host.docker.internal). Using `host.docker.internal` in both cases unifies the git config. And `host-gateway` requires Docker ≥ 20.10 (2021) — acceptable for "Docker: Latest".
Edge case: what if the user's Docker setup doesn't support host-gateway (ancient Docker)? In that case, the container can't resolve host.docker.internal → git fails with "Could not resolve proxy". We could detect and fall back to the gateway IP… let's keep it simple: document the requirement (Docker 20.10+). The README says Docker: Latest.
Hmm, wait, actually — let me reconsider whether we should prefer the gateway IP on Linux. If we bind to the gateway IP and the container uses host.docker.internal → host-gateway, it works. If ExtraHosts silently fails on some daemon (very old), the container can't resolve it. Alternative for maximum compatibility: use the gateway IP directly in the git config (no DNS needed), and only fall back to host.docker.internal when the gateway bind fails (Docker Desktop).
- Linux: proxy binds to gateway (local), git config proxy = `http://<gateway>:<port>`. No DNS, no ExtraHosts needed.
- Docker Desktop: gateway bind fails (not a local address), proxy binds to 0.0.0.0, git config proxy = `http://host.docker.internal:<port>`, and the container needs ExtraHosts (built-in on DD anyway).
This avoids the host-gateway requirement entirely on Linux! And on Docker Desktop, host.docker.internal is built-in (since Docker Desktop 2.0/2019).
But wait — how do we know the gateway bind "failed" on Docker Desktop? The gateway IP (e.g., 192.168.65.254) is not assigned to any interface on the macOS host → `net.Listen("tcp", "192.168.65.254:0")` fails with "cannot assign requested address". ✓ Detectable.
But hmm, on Docker Desktop, what is the "gateway" from the container inspect? The container's network (bridge) gateway = the VM's IP (192.168.65.254). Not local on macOS. ✓ Fallback triggers.
What about podman? Podman's rootless: containers reach the host via… podman has its own slirp4netns setup; the gateway is inside the namespace. Zoo uses the docker API client (github.com/docker/docker/client) — podman has a docker-compatible API. Gateway detection works the same way. OK.
Now — what if the container has no network at all (network_mode=none)? Zoo creates the container with the default network (no NetworkMode specified → default bridge). So it always has a network. But what if the daemon's default is "none"? Unlikely. If the container has no network, git can't reach anything (including the forge directly) — no regression.
What if the gateway is empty (some weird network mode)? Fall back to 0.0.0.0 + host.docker.internal… which also won't resolve. In that case git fails with a clear error. Acceptable; log a warning.
**Next, the secret**: generate a 32-byte random hex per run. Pass it to the container via the git config's extraHeader (`X-Zoo-Run: <secret>`). The proxy requires an exact match (subtle.ConstantTimeCompare).
Hmm — wait. One more consideration about extraHeader: `http.<url>.extraHeader` — the current code uses this for Authorization. We'll now use it for the secret. Git sends it on every request to that URL (including via proxy). ✓ (verified in mechcheck — the proxy saw it; it was stripped before forwarding).
**What about `git push` to a different remote** (e.g., the agent adds a second remote to another repo on the same forge)? The extraHeader+proxy config is scoped to `http.<scheme://host>` — the forge host — so any repo on the same forge works (submodules, cross-repo). Same as current behavior. ✓
**What if the agent clones a repo from a different forge (e.g., github.com)?** No proxy configured for that host → direct connection, no credentials → same as today (today: extraHeader is also scoped to the forge host, so github clone fails auth the same way). No regression. ✓
**Security review of the final design:**
Threats from inside the sandbox:
1. Read the token: impossible — the token is only in the zoo process's memory on the host. The container has: the run secret (in git config), git identity, event file. ✓
2. Use the secret to do non-git things: the proxy only forwards git smart-HTTP paths to the forge host. API → 403. Other hosts → 403. ✓
3. Use the secret to git-push to other repos: possible (any repo the run's token can write to). = the agent's legitimate git scope. Acceptable (matches leon's "we only need them to perform git operations").
4. SSRF via the proxy: the proxy only forwards to the forge host (validated). ✓
5. Other local users/containers using the proxy: they need the per-run secret (128-bit random, per run, in the container's git config). Without it → 403. ✓
6. Token leakage via logs: the proxy must not log the Authorization header. Log only path/host. ✓ (make sure to log carefully)
7. keepOnFailure: the container is kept on failure — the git config with the secret remains in the kept container. The secret is per-run and the proxy is closed → the secret is useless after the run ends (the proxy is gone). ✓ Nice property: even in a kept container, the credential is dead.
Threats from the host:
- A local process connecting to the proxy port: needs the secret (in the container's git config on the host's temp dir — readable by the zoo user and root on the host… root on the host can read the workDir (0700? MkdirTemp → 0700). So root on the host could read the secret — but root on the host already has the token in zoo's config/env. No escalation. ✓
**Now, implementation.**
Files:
1. `internal/agentrun/gitproxy.go` (new):
- `const gitProxyContainerPath`? No longer needed (no unix socket).
- `type gitProxy struct { srv *http.Server; ln net.Listener; addr string; forgeURL *url.URL; authHeader string; runSecret string; logger *slog.Logger; proxy *httputil.ReverseProxy }`
- `func newGitProxy(bindAddr, forgeURL, user, token string, logger *slog.Logger) (*gitProxy, error)`:
- Parse forgeURL.
- Generate a 16-byte hex secret.
- Listen on `bindAddr:0` → get the port.
- Build the ReverseProxy.
- Serve in a goroutine.
- `func (p *gitProxy) Addr() string` → "host.docker.internal:port" or "gateway:port"? The proxy itself knows the bind address but not the name the container should use. Let's have newGitProxy take a `containerHost` parameter (the host name/IP the container uses to reach the proxy):
- `newGitProxy(containerHost, bindAddr, forgeURL, user, token string, logger)`.
- `ProxyValue()` → `http://<containerHost>:<port>`.
- `ExtraHeaderValue()` → `X-Zoo-Run: <secret>`.
- `func (p *gitProxy) Close() error`.
- `ServeHTTP`: check the secret (constant-time), check the target host+scheme, check the git path, strip the client's Authorization + X-Zoo-Run, forward.
- `isGitSmartHTTPRequest(path, rawQuery) bool` (pure, unit-testable).
- `gitAuthHeader(user, token) string` (moved from sandboxgit.go).
2. `internal/agentrun/sandboxgit.go`:
- `configureSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, cloneURL, proxyValue, extraHeader, name, email)` — sets `http.<host>.proxy` and `http.<host>.extraHeader` (the secret).
- Remove gitAuthHeader.
- Update docs.
3. `internal/agentrun/docker.go`:
- `createContainer` needs `ExtraHosts`? For the Docker Desktop case, host.docker.internal is built-in; on Linux we use the gateway IP directly (no DNS). So ExtraHosts is not needed at all!
- But wait — we need the container's gateway IP before configuring git (after container creation, via inspect). `createContainer` returns the containerID; then `inspect` → `NetworkSettings.Networks` → find a network with a Gateway. Add a method `func (d *dockerRuntime) containerNetwork(containerID) (gateway, ip string)`.
- Hmm, wait: the bind address decision happens before the proxy starts, and the proxy must be started before the container is created? No! The proxy is a TCP listener — no bind mount needed. Order: create container → inspect for gateway → start proxy (bind to gateway or 0.0.0.0) → configure git → clone. The proxy can start after the container exists.
4. `internal/agentrun/run.go`:
- After createContainer: inspect the network → decide bindAddr + containerHost:
```go
gateway, _ := r.docker.containerNetwork(ctx, containerID)
bindAddr, containerHost := gateway, gateway
if gateway == "" || !isLocalAddr(gateway) { bindAddr, containerHost = "0.0.0.0", "host.docker.internal" }
```
Hmm, `isLocalAddr` — instead of checking, just try to listen: `newGitProxy` tries to bind to the gateway; on error, retry with 0.0.0.0 + host.docker.internal. Cleaner:
```go
gitProxy, err := newGitProxy(containerHostFor(gateway), gateway, ...)
```
Let's design newGitProxy to take a list of (bindAddr, containerHost) candidates and try them in order:
```go
type proxyEndpoint struct{ bind, host string }
newGitProxy([]proxyEndpoint{{gateway, gateway}, {"0.0.0.0", "host.docker.internal"}}, forgeURL, user, token, logger)
```
Try each: net.Listen("tcp", bind+":0"); on success, use it. If all fail → error.
Edge case: gateway == "" → candidates: [{"0.0.0.0", "host.docker.internal"}].
Wait, but on Linux, if the gateway is e.g. 172.17.0.1, binding to 172.17.0.1:0 works (it's a local interface). containerHost = 172.17.0.1. The container's git config: `http.<host>.proxy = http://172.17.0.1:PORT`. The container connects to 172.17.0.1:PORT → arrives at the host's docker0 → the proxy. ✓
On Docker Desktop: gateway 192.168.65.254 → bind fails → 0.0.0.0 + host.docker.internal. ✓
- `defer gitProxy.Close()`.
- Pass `gitProxy.ProxyValue()` and `gitProxy.ExtraHeaderValue()` to configureSandboxGit.
5. Tests:
- `gitproxy_test.go`:
- `TestIsGitSmartHTTPRequest` (unit).
- `TestGitAuthHeader` (moved).
- `TestGitProxyRejectsWrongSecret`, `TestGitProxyRejectsNonGitPath`, `TestGitProxyRejectsForeignHost` (raw HTTP over TCP, no git needed).
- `TestGitProxyEndToEndGit` (real git clone+push via proxy + fake forge http-backend; skip if no git).
- `gitbackend_test.go` or inside gitproxy_test.go: the `gitHTTPBackendHandler` helper (CGI wrapper) + a `seedBareRepo` helper.
- `docker_integration_test.go`: update `TestDockerRuntimeSandboxGit`:
- Start a fake forge (http-backend) on the host.
- Start a git proxy targeting it (bind 127.0.0.1, containerHost 127.0.0.1 — the container can reach the host's 127.0.0.1? No! The container's 127.0.0.1 is the container itself. The container must use the gateway IP to reach the host. So the proxy must bind to the gateway. In the docker test, we can inspect the container's gateway just like run.go does. Let's do that — it also tests the real path.
- configureSandboxGit with the proxy value + extra header.
- Verify the git config round-trip (fix the --system → --global bug).
- cloneAndBranch from the fake forge URL (real HTTP clone through the proxy!) — this replaces the local /bare clone.
- Verify the branch, commit identity, and that the token is nowhere in the container (grep the working tree + gitconfig).
- Optionally, push from the container to the fake forge (receive-pack) — a full loop!
- This docker test becomes the crown jewel: a real container, real git, real proxy, fake forge.
6. README: update the token section + add a security note.
7. `forgejo/client.go` Token() doc comment: update (the token is now used by the git proxy on the host side).
Now — one more thing to verify: **does the `http.<url>.proxy` config with a host:port subsection work?** In mechcheck I used `http.http://127.0.0.1:45869.proxy` — and it worked (the clone used the proxy). ✓
And `extraHeader` with a custom header name — it worked. ✓
**What about `GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT=0` + proxy failure?** If the proxy is down, git fails immediately (no prompt). ✓
**One more: the `http.<host>` subsection in the git config — the current code uses `forgeHost(cloneURL)` = "https://code.stdio.dk". The proxy value + extraHeader use the same subsection. ✓
**Timeouts on the proxy server**: set `ReadHeaderTimeout: 10s` to avoid slowloris; no read/write timeout on the body (pack transfer can be slow/large). The run's ctx kills the container; the proxy's in-flight requests finish. OK.
**Logging**: the proxy logs rejected requests (warn) and forwards (debug). Never log the Authorization or X-Zoo-Run values.
**Now, let's also reconsider the naming**: `X-Zoo-Run` header. And the secret: 16 bytes of hex (32 chars). crypto/rand.
**Let's also handle this**: the `http.Server` on the unix… no, TCP. `srv := &http.Server{Handler: p, ReadHeaderTimeout: 10 * time.Second}`.
**ReverseProxy details**:
```go
p.proxy = &httputil.ReverseProxy{
Director: func(req *http.Request) {
req.URL.Scheme = p.forgeURL.Scheme
req.URL.Host = p.forgeURL.Host
req.Host = p.forgeURL.Host
},
ErrorHandler: func(w, r, err) { log + 502 },
}
```
The secret check + path check + header manipulation happen in ServeHTTP before calling p.proxy.ServeHTTP.
Wait, one subtlety: in ServeHTTP we mutate r (delete headers), then call p.proxy.ServeHTTP(w, r). The ReverseProxy clones the request. No problem.
**Absolute-form URL**: r.URL is absolute (scheme+host+path). The Director overwrites scheme/host with the target (same value, validated). Path/query are preserved. ✓ (verified in mechcheck)
**What if the agent's git sends `Proxy-Authorization`?** Git doesn't. Strip it anyway.
**Now, the `containerNetwork` inspect method in docker.go:**
```go
// containerNetwork returns the gateway IP of the container's first
// network (with an IP), the address the container uses to reach the
// host. Empty if the container has no such network.
func (d *dockerRuntime) containerGateway(ctx context.Context, containerID string) (string, error) {
insp, err := d.cli.ContainerInspect(ctx, containerID)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("inspect container: %w", err)
}
for _, net := range insp.NetworkSettings.Networks {
if net.Gateway != "" {
return net.Gateway, nil
}
}
return "", nil
}
```
The map iteration order is random — if there are multiple networks, the choice is arbitrary. Zoo's container is on a single (default) network. No problem.
**newGitProxy signature** — let's finalize:
```go
// newGitProxy starts a per-run git proxy... endpoints are tried in
// order: (bindAddr, containerHost) — bindAddr is where the proxy
// listens on the host, containerHost is the name the sandbox's git
// uses to reach it.
func newGitProxy(endpoints []proxyEndpoint, forgeURL, user, token string, logger *slog.Logger) (*gitProxy, error)
```
Hmm, passing a slice is a bit awkward. Alternative: newGitProxy takes (forgeURL, user, token, logger) and a `bind` callback? Over-engineered. Let's do this:
```go
type gitProxyEndpoint struct {
bind string // host address the proxy listens on, e.g. "172.17.0.1" or "0.0.0.0"
containerHost string // what the sandbox's git dials, e.g. "172.17.0.1" or "host.docker.internal"
}
```
In run.go:
```go
endpoints := []gitProxyEndpoint{{bind: "0.0.0.0", containerHost: "host.docker.internal"}}
if gw, err := r.docker.containerGateway(ctx, containerID); err == nil && gw != "" {
endpoints = append([]gitProxyEndpoint{{bind: gw, containerHost: gw}}, endpoints...)
}
gitProxy, err := newGitProxy(endpoints, repoInfo.CloneURL, gitUser, gitToken, logger)
```
newGitProxy tries each endpoint in order until the bind succeeds.
Hmm wait, actually — on Linux, is it better to bind to the gateway or to 0.0.0.0? Binding to the gateway limits exposure to the docker bridge. Let's keep the gateway-first approach.
But hmm, one edge case: on Linux, what if the daemon's default network is a user-defined network with a gateway like 172.28.0.1 (a custom bridge)? Still a local host interface. ✓
What if the container is on a macvlan network (gateway = the LAN IP, local)? The bind works; the container reaches the host's LAN IP. ✓ (rare)
What if the gateway is IPv6? net.Listen handles it. The git config value `http://[::1]:port`… git handles IPv6 proxy URLs (bracketed). OK.
**Next, the changes to configureSandboxGit:**
```go
func configureSandboxGit(ctx context.Context, rt *dockerRuntime, containerID, cloneURL, proxyValue, runSecretHeader, name, email string) error {
... safe.directory, user.name, user.email ...
if _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, "config", "--global", "http."+forgeHost(cloneURL)+".proxy", proxyValue); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("configure git proxy: %w", err)
}
if _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, "config", "--global", "http."+forgeHost(cloneURL)+".extraHeader", runSecretHeader); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("configure git run secret: %w", err)
}
... push.autoSetupRemote ...
}
```
Hmm, the naming: `runSecretHeader` = "X-Zoo-Run: <secret>". Let's name the parameter `extraHeader`.
**The doc comment** must explain the new architecture clearly — this is the heart of the issue, and the code comment should tell the story (this codebase has excellent comments).
**Now, let's write the actual code.** First gitproxy.go:
```go
package agentrun
import (
"crypto/rand"
"crypto/subtle"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/hex"
"fmt"
"log/slog"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/http/httputil"
"net/url"
"strconv"
"strings"
"time"
)
// This file keeps the run's Forgejo credential out of the agent's
// container.
//
// git can only be told to route its HTTP traffic through a TCP proxy
// (http.<url>.proxy; git supports http/https/socks5 proxies), so
// zoo runs a tiny per-run HTTP proxy next to the container and points
// the sandbox's git at it. The proxy:
//
// - only accepts requests for the forge host the run's repository
// lives on, and only for git's smart-HTTP endpoints (info/refs,
// git-upload-pack, git-receive-pack) — the Forgejo API and
// everything else is refused;
// - only accepts requests carrying the run's secret (a random
// per-run value the sandbox's git sends as an extra header) —
// so other processes on the host or in other containers can't
// ride the proxy;
// - strips any client-supplied Authorization header and injects
// the run's own credential, which therefore exists only in
// zoo's process on the host.
//
// The sandbox can read its own run secret (it's in the container's
// gitconfig), but the secret only buys git smart-HTTP against the
// forge — the same scope the agent's git operations already have.
// The token itself never enters the container: not on disk, not in
// the environment, not in any process's memory.
// gitProxyRunHeader is the header the sandbox's git sends on every
// request to the forge, carrying the per-run secret.
const gitProxyRunHeader = "X-Zoo-Run"
type gitProxyEndpoint struct {
// bind is the host address the proxy listens on.
bind string
// containerHost is the address the sandbox's git dials to reach
// the proxy.
containerHost string
}
type gitProxy struct {
srv *http.Server
ln net.Listener
forgeURL *url.URL
authHeader string
runSecret string
proxy *httputil.ReverseProxy
logger *slog.Logger
}
// newGitProxy starts a per-run git proxy. endpoints are tried in
// order until one binds; the first one that does determines the
// address the sandbox's git is told to use.
func newGitProxy(endpoints []gitProxyEndpoint, forgeURL, user, token string, logger *slog.Logger) (*gitProxy, error) {
u, err := url.Parse(forgeURL)
if err != nil || u.Host == "" || (u.Scheme != "http" && u.Scheme != "https") {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("git proxy: unsupported forge URL %q", forgeURL)
}
secret, err := randomHex(16)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("git proxy: generate run secret: %w", err)
}
p := &gitProxy{
forgeURL: u,
authHeader: gitAuthHeader(user, token),
runSecret: secret,
logger: logger,
proxy: &httputil.ReverseProxy{
Director: func(req *http.Request) {
req.URL.Scheme = u.Scheme
req.URL.Host = u.Host
req.Host = u.Host
},
ErrorHandler: func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, err error) {
logger.Error("git proxy: forwarding failed", "path", req.URL.Path, "error", err)
http.Error(w, "git proxy: upstream error", http.StatusBadGateway)
},
},
}
var lastErr error
for _, ep := range endpoints {
ln, err := net.Listen("tcp", net.JoinHostPort(ep.bind, "0"))
if err != nil {
lastErr = err
continue
}
p.ln = ln
p.srv = &http.Server{Handler: p, ReadHeaderTimeout: 10 * time.Second}
go p.srv.Serve(ln)
p.containerHost = ep.containerHost // hmm, need to store this
return p, nil
}
return nil, fmt.Errorf("git proxy: no endpoint could bind (last error: %w)", lastErr)
}
```
Hmm, I need to store the chosen containerHost + port for ProxyValue(). Let's store `addr string` = the value git should use, e.g., "172.17.0.1:54321".
```go
func (p *gitProxy) ProxyValue() string { return "http://" + p.addr }
func (p *gitProxy) RunSecretHeader() string { return gitProxyRunHeader + ": " + p.runSecret }
func (p *gitProxy) Close() error {
err := p.srv.Close()
p.logger.Debug("git proxy: closed")
return err
}
```
ServeHTTP:
```go
func (p *gitProxy) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
u := r.URL
if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(r.Header.Get(gitProxyRunHeader)), []byte(p.runSecret)) != 1 {
p.reject(w, "missing or invalid run secret")
return
}
// The request arrives in absolute form (git talks to a proxy),
// so the target host is in the URL. Only the forge the run's
// repository lives on may be addressed.
if u.Scheme != p.forgeURL.Scheme || !strings.EqualFold(u.Host, p.forgeURL.Host) {
p.reject(w, "not the run's forge host")
return
}
if !isGitSmartHTTPRequest(u.Path, u.RawQuery) {
p.reject(w, "not a git smart-HTTP endpoint")
return
}
// The client's own credentials (if any) and the run secret are
// stripped; the run's credential is injected here, on the host.
r.Header.Del("Authorization")
r.Header.Del("Proxy-Authorization")
r.Header.Del(gitProxyRunHeader)
r.Header.Set("Authorization", p.authHeader)
p.proxy.ServeHTTP(w, r)
}
func (p *gitProxy) reject(w http.ResponseWriter, reason string) {
p.logger.Warn("git proxy: rejected request", "reason", reason, "path", r.URL.Path)
http.Error(w, "zoo git proxy: "+reason, http.StatusForbidden)
}
```
Wait, reject needs r for the path — pass r too, or log in ServeHTTP. Let's pass both.
isGitSmartHTTPRequest:
```go
// gitSmartHTTPEndpoints are the endpoints of git's smart-HTTP
// protocol: the ref advertisement and the pack transfer endpoints for
// fetch (upload-pack) and push (receive-pack).
var gitSmartHTTPEndpoints = map[string]bool{
"info/refs": true,
"git-upload-pack": true,
"git-receive-pack": true,
}
// isGitSmartHTTPRequest reports whether a request for path (with the
// given raw query string) is one of git's smart-HTTP endpoints on a
// repository: /owner/repo(.git)?/<endpoint>.
func isGitSmartHTTPRequest(path, rawQuery string) bool {
segments := strings.Split(strings.Trim(path, "/"), "/")
if len(segments) != 3 || segments[0] == "" || segments[1] == "" {
return false
}
endpoint := segments[2]
if !gitSmartHTTPEndpoints[endpoint] {
return false
}
// The ref advertisement only means anything to git with a
// service parameter naming the pack protocol; a bare info/refs is
// the dumb-HTTP protocol, which git clients don't use.
if endpoint != "info/refs" {
return true
}
q, err := url.ParseQuery(rawQuery)
if err != nil {
return false
}
switch q.Get("service") {
case "git-upload-pack", "git-receive-pack":
return true
}
return false
}
```
randomHex:
```go
func randomHex(n int) (string, error) {
b := make([]byte, n)
if _, err := rand.Read(b); err != nil {
return "", err
}
return hex.EncodeToString(b), nil
}
```
gitAuthHeader (moved from sandboxgit.go):
```go
// gitAuthHeader returns the value of an Authorization header that
// authenticates git's smart-HTTP requests as user with token.
func gitAuthHeader(user, token string) string {
return "Basic " + base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(user+":"+token))
}
```
**Changes to run.go:**
```go
// The git proxy stands between the sandbox's git and the forge:
// it injects the run's credential on the host side, so the token
// never enters the container (see gitproxy.go). The container
// reaches it over TCP: on a local Docker daemon the proxy binds
// to the container's network gateway; if that address isn't
// local (e.g. Docker Desktop, where the daemon runs in a VM) it
// falls back to 0.0.0.0 and the container dials
// host.docker.internal instead.
endpoints := []gitProxyEndpoint{{bind: "0.0.0.0", containerHost: "host.docker.internal"}}
if gw, err := r.docker.containerGateway(ctx, containerID); err != nil {
logger.Warn("could not determine container gateway; git proxy will bind to all interfaces", "error", err)
} else if gw != "" {
endpoints = append([]gitProxyEndpoint{{bind: gw, containerHost: gw}}, endpoints...)
}
gitProxy, err := newGitProxy(endpoints, repoInfo.CloneURL, gitUser, gitToken, logger)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("start git proxy: %w", err)
}
defer func() {
if err := gitProxy.Close(); err != nil {
logger.Warn("failed to close git proxy", "error", err)
}
}()
```
Wait — ordering issue: the container must exist before containerGateway (inspect). And the proxy must be started before configureSandboxGit/clone. The container creation is currently:
```go
containerID, err := r.docker.createContainer(ctx, dockerImage, []string{...}, name)
defer remove container
configureSandboxGit(...)
clone...
```
New:
```go
containerID, err := r.docker.createContainer(...)
defer remove container
// proxy setup (needs containerID for the gateway)
gitProxy, err := ...
defer close
configureSandboxGit(ctx, r.docker, containerID, repoInfo.CloneURL, gitProxy.ProxyValue(), gitProxy.RunSecretHeader(), gitName, gitEmail)
clone...
```
**The docker.go addition** (containerGateway):
```go
// containerGateway returns the gateway IP of the container's network,
// the address the container uses to reach the host. Empty string if
// the container has no network with a gateway.
func (d *dockerRuntime) containerGateway(ctx context.Context, containerID string) (string, error) {
insp, err := d.cli.ContainerInspect(ctx, containerID)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("inspect container: %w", err)
}
for _, n := range insp.NetworkSettings.Networks {
if n.Gateway != "" {
return n.Gateway, nil
}
}
return "", nil
}
```
**The sandboxgit.go changes:**
```go
// configureSandboxGit writes the container's gitconfig so git works
// inside the sandbox without further setup:
//
// - safe.directory '*', so the bind-mounted /project is accepted
// regardless of which UID the container runs git as;
// - user.name / user.email, so commits are attributed to the agent;
// - http.<host>.proxy pointing at the per-run git proxy (see
// gitproxy.go) and http.<host>.extraHeader carrying the run
// secret: every remote operation (clone, fetch, pull, push, ...)
// for the forge host is routed through the proxy, which injects
// the run's credential on the host side — the token never enters
// the container. The host scope keeps submodules and other repos
// on the same forge working;
// - push.autoSetupRemote, so a bare `git push` on the fresh working
// branch pushes it to origin and sets the upstream — after which
// a bare `git pull` works too.
//
// Neither the token nor the run secret is written anywhere the host
// can read back from the working tree: the origin remote keeps the
// plain cloneURL, and the gitconfig lives in the container's own
// (ephemeral) filesystem.
func configureSandboxGit(ctx context.Context, rt *dockerRuntime, containerID, cloneURL, proxyValue, runSecretHeader, name, email string) error {
```
**The test file** — gitproxy_test.go:
```go
package agentrun
import (
"bufio"
"bytes"
"context"
"fmt"
"io"
"log/slog"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"os"
"os/exec"
"path/filepath"
"strconv"
"strings"
"sync"
"testing"
)
```
Tests:
1. TestIsGitSmartHTTPRequest — a table.
2. TestGitAuthHeader — moved.
3. TestGitProxyRejectsBadRequests — start a proxy with a fake forge (an httptest server that records requests); send raw absolute-form requests over TCP:
- no secret → 403
- wrong secret → 403
- API path with the correct secret → 403
- a different host with the correct secret → 403
- a valid git path with the correct secret → 200 (the forge records the injected auth + the absence of the secret header)
4. TestGitProxyEndToEndGit — the real git clone + push (skip if no git).
The raw-request helper:
```go
func rawProxyRequest(t *testing.T, addr, method, targetURL, secret string, headers map[string]string) (int, string) {
conn, err := net.Dial("tcp", addr)
...
var b strings.Builder
fmt.Fprintf(&b, "%s %s HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: %s\r\n", method, targetURL, host)
for k, v := range headers { fmt.Fprintf(&b, "%s: %s\r\n", k, v) }
b.WriteString("\r\n")
conn.Write([]byte(b.String()))
// read the status line
reader := bufio.NewReader(conn)
line, _ := reader.ReadString('\n')
// "HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden"
parts := strings.Fields(line)
code, _ := strconv.Atoi(parts[1])
...
}
```
Hmm, for the 200 case the response body is the fake forge's response. Let's have the fake forge return a fixed body "FORGE-OK". Read the whole response (Connection: close to make it simple — the proxy's Go server might keep the connection alive; to keep the raw read simple, send "Connection: close" in the request).
5. The fake forge helper + http-backend CGI:
```go
// gitHTTPBackendHandler serves the bare repositories under projectRoot
// over git's smart-HTTP protocol by running `git http-backend` as a
// CGI program — the same mechanism a real Forgejo/Gitea instance uses
// under the hood. record, if non-nil, observes every request.
func gitHTTPBackendHandler(projectRoot string, record func(method, path, auth, secret string)) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if record != nil {
record(r.Method, r.URL.Path, r.Header.Get("Authorization"), r.Header.Get(gitProxyRunHeader))
}
cmd := exec.Command("git", "http-backend")
cmd.Env = append(os.Environ(),
"REQUEST_METHOD="+r.Method,
"PATH_INFO="+r.URL.Path,
"QUERY_STRING="+r.URL.RawQuery,
"GIT_PROJECT_ROOT="+projectRoot,
"GIT_HTTP_EXPORT_ALL=1",
"REMOTE_ADDR="+r.RemoteAddr,
)
if r.ContentLength > 0 {
cmd.Env = append(cmd.Env, "CONTENT_LENGTH="+strconv.FormatInt(r.ContentLength, 10))
}
if ct := r.Header.Get("Content-Type"); ct != "" {
cmd.Env = append(cmd.Env, "CONTENT_TYPE="+ct)
}
for k, vs := range r.Header {
if k == "Content-Type" || k == "Content-Length" {
continue
}
cmd.Env = append(cmd.Env, "HTTP_"+strings.ToUpper(strings.ReplaceAll(k, "-", "_"))+"="+strings.Join(vs, ","))
}
cmd.Stdin = r.Body
var out, stderrBuf bytes.Buffer
cmd.Stdout = &out
cmd.Stderr = &stderrBuf
if err := cmd.Run(); err != nil {
http.Error(w, "git http-backend: "+err.Error()+" "+stderrBuf.String(), http.StatusBadGateway)
return
}
// CGI response: headers (optional Status:) until a blank line, then body.
reader := bufio.NewReader(bytes.NewReader(out.Bytes()))
status := 200
hdr := http.Header{}
for {
line, err := reader.ReadString('\n')
if err != nil {
break
}
line = strings.TrimRight(line, "\r\n")
if line == "" {
break
}
k, v, ok := strings.Cut(line, ":")
if !ok {
continue
}
k, v = strings.TrimSpace(k), strings.TrimSpace(v)
if strings.EqualFold(k, "Status") {
if parts := strings.SplitN(v, " ", 2); len(parts) > 0 {
status, _ = strconv.Atoi(parts[0])
}
continue
}
hdr.Add(k, v)
}
for k, vv := range hdr {
for _, v := range vv {
w.Header().Add(k, v)
}
}
w.WriteHeader(status)
_, _ = io.Copy(w, reader)
})
}
```
And a seed helper:
```go
// seedForgeRepo creates a bare repo at projectRoot/acme/widgets.git
// with one commit on main and push enabled over HTTP.
func seedForgeRepo(t *testing.T, projectRoot string) {
t.Helper()
seedDir := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "seed")
repoDir := filepath.Join(projectRoot, "acme", "widgets.git")
gitRun(t, "", "init", "-q", "-b", "main", seedDir)
gitRun(t, seedDir, "config", "user.name", "zoo-test")
gitRun(t, seedDir, "config", "user.email", "zoo@test")
os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(seedDir, "file.txt"), []byte("hello\n"), 0o644)
gitRun(t, seedDir, "add", ".")
gitRun(t, seedDir, "commit", "-q", "-m", "init")
gitRun(t, "", "clone", "-q", "--bare", seedDir, repoDir)
gitRun(t, repoDir, "config", "http.receivepack", "true")
}
func gitRun(t *testing.T, dir string, args ...string) {
t.Helper()
cmd := exec.Command("git", args...)
cmd.Dir = dir
if out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("git %v: %v: %s", args, err, out)
}
}
```
The e2e test:
```go
func TestGitProxyEndToEndGit(t *testing.T) {
if _, err := exec.LookPath("git"); err != nil {
t.Skip("git not available")
}
tmp := t.TempDir()
projectRoot := filepath.Join(tmp, "forge")
seedForgeRepo(t, projectRoot)
var mu sync.Mutex
var auths, secrets, paths []string
forge := httptest.NewServer(gitHTTPBackendHandler(projectRoot, func(_, path, auth, secret string) {
mu.Lock()
defer mu.Unlock()
paths = append(paths, path)
auths = append(auths, auth)
secrets = append(secrets, secret)
}))
defer forge.Close()
proxy, err := newGitProxy([]gitProxyEndpoint{{bind: "127.0.0.1", containerHost: "127.0.0.1"}}, forge.URL, "greg", "s3cr3t", testLogger(t))
if err != nil { t.Fatalf(...) }
defer proxy.Close()
// The gitconfig the sandbox would get (see configureSandboxGit):
// the forge host routed through the proxy, with the run secret.
gitcfg := filepath.Join(tmp, "gitconfig")
cloneURL := forge.URL + "/acme/widgets.git"
if err := os.WriteFile(gitcfg, []byte(fmt.Sprintf(
"[http \"%s\"]\n\tproxy = %s\n\textraHeader = %s\n",
forgeHost(cloneURL), proxy.ProxyValue(), proxy.RunSecretHeader())), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
env := func() []string {
return append(os.Environ(),
"GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL="+gitcfg,
"GIT_CONFIG_SYSTEM="+filepath.Join(tmp, "nosystem"),
"GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT=0",
)
}
cloneDir := filepath.Join(tmp, "clone")
cmd := exec.Command("git", "clone", "-q", cloneURL, cloneDir)
cmd.Env = env()
if out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("clone through proxy: %v: %s", err, out)
}
// Push a branch back through the proxy (receive-pack).
cmd = exec.Command("git", "-C", cloneDir, "push", "-q", "origin", "HEAD:refs/heads/pushed")
cmd.Env = env()
if out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("push through proxy: %v: %s", err, out)
}
// The branch must have landed in the bare repo.
cmd = exec.Command("git", "-C", filepath.Join(projectRoot, "acme", "widgets.git"), "rev-parse", "--verify", "refs/heads/pushed")
if out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("pushed branch missing: %v: %s", err, out)
}
// Every request the forge saw must carry the proxy's credential
// and none of the run secret.
mu.Lock()
defer mu.Unlock()
wantAuth := gitAuthHeader("greg", "s3cr3t")
if len(auths) == 0 {
t.Fatal("forge saw no requests")
}
for i, a := range auths {
if a != wantAuth {
t.Errorf("request %d auth = %q, want %q", i, a, wantAuth)
}
if secrets[i] != "" {
t.Errorf("request %d leaked the run secret to the forge", i)
}
}
}
```
Wait — one issue: the `GIT_CONFIG_SYSTEM` env var pointing at a nonexistent file — does git accept a nonexistent path for GIT_CONFIG_SYSTEM? It should (it just doesn't read it). Let me double-check… the git docs: GIT_CONFIG_SYSTEM — "Instead of reading $prefix/etc/gitconfig, read the given file instead." If the file doesn't exist → treated as empty? I think a nonexistent file is fine (git silently skips it). Hmm, actually I'm not 100% sure — it might error. Safer: create an empty file. Let's do that.
Also, `git clone` needs a user identity only for commits, not for the clone. The push pushes existing commits — no new identity needed. ✓
But wait — in the e2e test, the clone URL host is `127.0.0.1:PORT` and the config key is `http.http://127.0.0.1:PORT` (via forgeHost). ✓ (verified in mechcheck)
The raw-request test (TestGitProxyRejectsBadRequests):
```go
func TestGitProxyRejectsBadRequests(t *testing.T) {
var mu sync.Mutex
var gotAuth, gotSecret string
forge := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
mu.Lock()
gotAuth = r.Header.Get("Authorization")
gotSecret = r.Header.Get(gitProxyRunHeader)
mu.Unlock()
fmt.Fprint(w, "FORGE-OK")
}))
defer forge.Close()
proxy, err := newGitProxy([]gitProxyEndpoint{{bind: "127.0.0.1", containerHost: "127.0.0.1"}}, forge.URL, "greg", "s3cr3t", testLogger(t))
...
defer proxy.Close()
secret := proxy.runSecret
type req struct {
method, target, secret string
wantStatus int
}
cases := []req{
{"GET", forge.URL+"/acme/widgets.git/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack", "", 403}, // no secret
{"GET", forge.URL+"/acme/widgets.git/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack", "wrong", 403}, // wrong secret
{"GET", forge.URL+"/api/v1/repos", secret, 403}, // API path
{"GET", "http://evil.example/acme/widgets.git/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack", secret, 403}, // foreign host
{"GET", forge.URL+"/acme/widgets.git/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack", secret, 200}, // the good one
}
for _, tc := range cases {
code, _ := rawProxyRequest(t, proxy.ln.Addr().String(), tc.method, tc.target, tc.secret)
if code != tc.wantStatus {
t.Errorf("%s %s (secret=%v): got %d, want %d", tc.method, tc.target, tc.secret != "", code, tc.wantStatus)
}
}
// The good request must have arrived at the forge with the proxy's
// credential and without the run secret.
mu.Lock()
if gotAuth != gitAuthHeader("greg", "s3cr3t") { ... }
if gotSecret != "" { ... }
}
```
rawProxyRequest:
```go
// rawProxyRequest sends one absolute-form HTTP request (the way git
// addresses a proxy) to the proxy at addr and returns the response
// status code.
func rawProxyRequest(t *testing.T, addr, method, target, secret string) (int, string) {
t.Helper()
conn, err := net.Dial("tcp", addr)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("dial proxy: %v", err)
}
defer conn.Close()
var b strings.Builder
fmt.Fprintf(&b, "%s %s HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: %s\r\nConnection: close\r\n", method, target, hostOf(target))
if secret != "" {
fmt.Fprintf(&b, "%s: %s\r\n", gitProxyRunHeader, secret)
}
b.WriteString("\r\n")
if _, err := conn.Write([]byte(b.String())); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write: %v", err)
}
reader := bufio.NewReader(conn)
line, err := reader.ReadString('\n')
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("read status: %v", err)
}
fields := strings.Fields(line)
if len(fields) < 2 {
t.Fatalf("bad status line %q", line)
}
code, err := strconv.Atoi(fields[1])
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("bad status code in %q", line)
}
body, _ := io.ReadAll(reader)
return code, string(body)
}
```
hostOf: parse the URL → host.
Note: `proxy.ln.Addr().String()` — ln is a net.Listener; Addr() is a net.Addr → *net.TCPAddr → String() = "127.0.0.1:port". ✓
**The docker integration test** — rewrite TestDockerRuntimeSandboxGit:
```go
// TestDockerRuntimeSandboxGit exercises the in-sandbox git setup
// Run() performs (see sandboxgit.go and gitproxy.go): the gitconfig
// round-trip, a real clone through the per-run git proxy (the
// credential is injected by the proxy on the host side, never
// entering the container), the commit identity, and that neither the
// token nor the run secret can be used for anything but git.
func TestDockerRuntimeSandboxGit(t *testing.T) {
if _, err := exec.LookPath("git"); err != nil {
t.Skip("git not available")
}
tmp := t.TempDir()
projectRoot := filepath.Join(tmp, "forge")
seedForgeRepo(t, projectRoot)
projectDir := filepath.Join(tmp, "project")
os.MkdirAll(projectDir, 0o755)
rt, err := newDockerRuntime()
...
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 120*time.Second)
defer cancel()
const (
cloneURL = "https://forgejo.example/acme/widgets.git"
user = "greg"
token = "super-secret-token"
)
// A fake forge on the host serving the seeded repo; the proxy
// targets it. The container's git addresses the clone URL's host
// (forgejo.example) — only the proxy ever resolves it, to the
// fake forge.
...
```
Wait. Hmm. Here's a subtlety: in the real flow, the proxy validates that the request host == the forge host (the host of the clone URL, e.g., code.stdio.dk), and forwards to the same host. In the docker test, the clone URL's host is `forgejo.example` (fictional), but the fake forge is at `127.0.0.1:PORT`. The proxy would validate host == forgejo.example and forward to forgejo.example → DNS failure!
In the real flow, the proxy target == the forge host (the same thing). In the test, the target must be the fake forge (127.0.0.1:PORT), so the clone URL's host must be 127.0.0.1:PORT… but then the container's git dials the proxy (via the gateway) and sends an absolute-form URL with host 127.0.0.1:PORT — the proxy forwards to 127.0.0.1:PORT on the host. The container never dials 127.0.0.1:PORT directly. ✓ So in the docker test:
- cloneURL = forge.URL + "/acme/widgets.git" (forge.URL = http://127.0.0.1:PORT)
- The proxy's endpoints: first the gateway (bind to the gateway, containerHost=gateway) — the container dials gateway:proxyport.
- configureSandboxGit(cloneURL, proxy.ProxyValue(), ...) → the config key `http.http://127.0.0.1:PORT.proxy`.
- cloneAndBranch → the container's git → the proxy → the fake forge. ✓
This is exactly the real topology (the container only talks to the proxy; the proxy talks to the "forge").
The docker test flow:
1. Seed the repo, start the fake forge, create the container (projectDir bind).
2. gateway := rt.containerGateway(ctx, containerID)
3. proxy := newGitProxy([{gw, gw}, {0.0.0.0, host.docker.internal}], forge.URL, user, token, logger)
4. configureSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, cloneURL, proxy.ProxyValue(), proxy.RunSecretHeader(), "Greg Coolio", "greg@noreply.localhost")
5. Verify the gitconfig round-trip: `git config --global --get http.http://127.0.0.1:PORT.proxy` == proxy.ProxyValue(); and extraHeader == "X-Zoo-Run: <secret>".
6. cloneAndBranch(ctx, rt, containerID, cloneURL, "main", "issue-1-greg") — a real clone through the proxy!
7. Verify the branch.
8. Commit + verify the identity.
9. Push from the container: `git push origin HEAD:refs/heads/pushed` → verify it landed in the bare repo (receive-pack through the proxy!).
10. Verify the token is not in the working tree, not in the container's gitconfig: `grep -r super-secret-token /project /root/.gitconfig /etc/gitconfig || true` — wait, the gitconfig is at /root/.gitconfig (golang:latest, root). `git config --global --list` → grep for the token. And grep the working tree.
11. Verify the fake forge saw the injected auth on every request.
This is a comprehensive test. It needs the docker daemon + git. Build tag `docker`.
Also, the existing test used a `/bare` bind mount — no longer needed (the clone goes over HTTP). Remove the bareDir bind.
**Now — the `--global` vs `--system` bug**: the old test read `--system`; the code writes `--global`. My new test reads `--global`. ✓ (fixing the latent bug)
**Wait, one more check on the docker test**: the container image is `golang:latest` — does it have git? golang:latest is debian-based with git installed (yes, the golang image includes git). The old test already relied on that (it ran git inside the container). ✓
**Also, the `http.<host>` config key with a port**: `http.http://127.0.0.1:45869.proxy` — git config key syntax: subsections can contain colons (the old test's comment mentions "a URL full of dots and colons" — and it worked with extraHeader). ✓ (verified in mechcheck)
**Now, let's also think about the `keepOnFailure` case**: the container is kept; the gitconfig with the secret remains; the proxy is closed → the secret is dead. ✓
**What about `r.forgejo.Token()`** — the shared token fallback. No change.
**The README update**:
The agent token section currently says:
```
The optional `token` is the agent's own Forgejo token. When set, the
agent acts as itself on Forgejo (comments, PRs, ...) and its sandbox's
git authenticates with it too — the initial clone and all remote git
operations (pull, push, ...) run inside the container with that
credential. Without it, the shared `forgejo.token` is used.
```
New:
```
The optional `token` is the agent's own Forgejo token. When set, the
agent acts as itself on Forgejo (comments, PRs, ...) and its git
operations are authenticated with it too. Without it, the shared
`forgejo.token` is used.
### Sandbox credential handling
The token above is never placed inside the agent's container. Git
operations (clone, fetch, pull, push) run inside the container, but
their HTTP traffic is routed through a per-run proxy that zoo runs on
the host: the proxy injects the credential, only accepts git's
smart-HTTP endpoints for the forge, and is gated by a per-run secret.
A compromised or prompt-injected agent can therefore at most do git
operations as the agent's identity — it cannot read the token or call
the Forgejo API from the sandbox.
```
**The forgejo/client.go Token() comment**:
```go
// Token returns the shared zoo Forgejo identity's token. The git
// proxy (internal/agentrun) uses it to authenticate the sandbox's
// git operations on the host side, so the credential never enters a
// container.
```
Now, let's also double-check the **`httputil.ReverseProxy` + `Connection: close` / keep-alive** behavior — no problem, standard.
**One more design detail**: the proxy's `ReadHeaderTimeout: 10s`. No WriteTimeout (pack transfer). The server's `Error` log is the default (to stderr) — no problem.
**Potential pitfall**: `http.Server` on a TCP listener with `ReadHeaderTimeout` — OK.
**What if the forge is behind a TLS certificate the host can't verify?** Same as today (git on the host… no, today git runs in the container with the container's CA store; now the proxy (host) does the TLS with the host's CA store). A slight difference: the CA trust store is the host's, not the container's. The host is where zoo runs — it's reasonable for the host to trust the forge (zoo itself talks to the forge's API with its own TLS from the host). ✓ No problem.
**Now — the issue also mentions "git pull" and "other stuff that requires auth"**: pull/fetch = upload-pack ✓, push = receive-pack ✓, clone ✓, ls-remote ✓ (info/refs), submodule fetch ✓ (same endpoints), `git fetch origin refs/pull/N/head` ✓.
**What about `git push --force` or branch deletion?** receive-pack handles it; the token's permissions apply. ✓
**Let's also double-check the `extraHeader` + proxy interaction**: git adds the extraHeader to the request after the proxy decision — the header is included in the proxied request. ✓ (verified in mechcheck: the proxy saw X-Zoo-Run).
**Edge case: git might send `Expect: 100-continue`** — git doesn't. OK.
**Now, let's write all the code.** Also update the package doc comment in `run.go` (it says "authenticated with the agent's own Forgejo token" — update to mention the proxy).
Let me also check `seed_test.go` and `context.go` for anything credential-related… let me quickly grep for "token" in agentrun.
The full mechanism is verified: clone + push through a TCP proxy with per-run secret gating and credential injection. Now let me check remaining references before writing the real code:
Tool
🔧 bash
{"command": "cd /project && grep -rn \"token\\|Token\" internal/agentrun/*.go | grep -v \"_test.go\" | grep -vi \"llm\" | head -30; echo ===; cat internal/agentrun/context.go | head -60"}
Arguments
{"command": "cd /project && grep -rn \"token\\|Token\" internal/agentrun/*.go | grep -v \"_test.go\" | grep -vi \"llm\" | head -30; echo ===; cat internal/agentrun/context.go | head -60"}
Result
internal/agentrun/run.go:3:// inside it (authenticated with the agent's own Forgejo token), the
internal/agentrun/run.go:72:// agent (using the agent's own token from config). This lets each agent
internal/agentrun/run.go:73:// act as themselves on Forgejo without needing a global token with sudo
internal/agentrun/run.go:77:// If the agent has no token configured, falls back to the shared zoo
internal/agentrun/run.go:78:// identity so existing deployments without per-agent tokens still work.
internal/agentrun/run.go:79:func (r *Runner) forgejoAs(agentName, token string) *forgejo.Client {
internal/agentrun/run.go:88: if token != "" {
internal/agentrun/run.go:89: c = r.forgejo.As(token)
internal/agentrun/run.go:92: // if we ever want to enforce per-agent tokens.
internal/agentrun/run.go:179: // agent's own Forgejo token when configured, so its git activity is
internal/agentrun/run.go:181: // identity for deployments without per-agent tokens (mirroring
internal/agentrun/run.go:183: gitUser, gitToken := "zoo", r.forgejo.Token()
internal/agentrun/run.go:185: if agent.Token != "" {
internal/agentrun/run.go:186: gitUser, gitToken = agent.Name, agent.Token
internal/agentrun/run.go:213: if err := configureSandboxGit(ctx, r.docker, containerID, repoInfo.CloneURL, gitUser, gitToken, gitName, gitEmail); err != nil {
internal/agentrun/run.go:239: client: r.forgejoAs(agent.Name, agent.Token),
internal/agentrun/sandboxgit.go:54:// authenticates git's smart-HTTP requests as user with token.
internal/agentrun/sandboxgit.go:55:func gitAuthHeader(user, token string) string {
internal/agentrun/sandboxgit.go:56: auth := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(user + ":" + token))
internal/agentrun/sandboxgit.go:83:// for submodules and other repos on the same forge. The token is
internal/agentrun/sandboxgit.go:92:// tree: the origin remote keeps the plain cloneURL, so the token can't
internal/agentrun/sandboxgit.go:95:func configureSandboxGit(ctx context.Context, rt *dockerRuntime, containerID, cloneURL, user, token, name, email string) error {
internal/agentrun/sandboxgit.go:108: if _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, "config", "--global", "http."+forgeHost(cloneURL)+".extraHeader", gitAuthHeader(user, token)); err != nil {
===
package agentrun
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"github.com/abrander/zoo/internal/tools"
)
// runContext implements tools.Context for a single agent run, executing
// shell commands via docker exec against the run's container, and
// binding Forgejo actions to the triggering issue/PR.
type runContext struct {
docker *dockerRuntime
containerID string
forgejo tools.ForgejoActions
}
func (c *runContext) Exec(ctx context.Context, command string) (string, error) {
output, exitCode, err := c.docker.exec(ctx, c.containerID, command)
if err != nil {
return output, err
}
if exitCode != 0 {
return output, fmt.Errorf("command exited with status %d", exitCode)
}
return output, nil
}
func (c *runContext) Forgejo() tools.ForgejoActions {
return c.forgejo
}
Thinking
Now I have a grasp of the whole picture. Let me write the implementation.
**Design summary** (for the issue comment):
- A per-run git HTTP proxy inside the zoo process (host side).
- The sandbox's git is configured with `http.<forge-host>.proxy` (TCP) + `http.<forge-host>.extraHeader` (a per-run random secret).
- The proxy: secret gate (constant-time comparison), forge host only, git smart-HTTP endpoints only, strips client auth, injects the run's credentials.
- The token never enters the container.
- Bind address: the container's network gateway (Linux), with 0.0.0.0 + host.docker.internal as a fallback (Docker Desktop).
Files to change:
1. `internal/agentrun/gitproxy.go` — new.
2. `internal/agentrun/sandboxgit.go` — configureSandboxGit takes proxyValue + secret header; remove gitAuthHeader (move it).
3. `internal/agentrun/docker.go` — add containerGateway.
4. `internal/agentrun/run.go` — start the proxy, pass the value, update the package doc.
5. `internal/agentrun/gitproxy_test.go` — new tests (unit + e2e git).
6. `internal/agentrun/sandboxgit_test.go` — remove TestGitAuthHeader (moved).
7. `internal/agentrun/docker_integration_test.go` — rewrite TestDockerRuntimeSandboxGit.
8. `internal/forgejo/client.go` — update the Token() doc.
9. `README.md` — update the credentials section.
Alright, let's write gitproxy.go.
I have the full picture now. Let me write the implementation. First, the new `gitproxy.go`:
Tool
🔧 write_file
{"content": "package agentrun\n\nimport (\n\t\"crypto/rand\"\n\t\"crypto/subtle\"\n\t\"encoding/base64\"\n\t\"encoding/hex\"\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"log/slog\"\n\t\"net\"\n\t\"net/http\"\n\t\"net/http/httputil\"\n\t\"net/url\"\n\t\"strings\"\n\t\"time\"\n)\n\n// This file keeps the run's Forgejo credential out of the agent's\n// container.\n//\n// The sandbox's git must authenticate for clone/fetch/pull/push, but\n// the token it would need can do everything on the Forgejo instance —\n// handing it to a container an LLM runs arbitrary commands in is a\n// standing invitation to prompt-injection exfiltration.\n//\n// Git can only be told to route its HTTP traffic through a TCP proxy\n// (http.<url>.proxy; git supports http/https/socks5 proxies, not unix\n// sockets), so zoo runs a tiny per-run HTTP proxy next to the\n// container and points the sandbox's git at it. The proxy:\n//\n// - only accepts requests addressed to the forge host the run's\n// repository lives on, and only for git's smart-HTTP endpoints\n// (info/refs, git-upload-pack, git-receive-pack) — the Forgejo\n// API and everything else is refused;\n// - only accepts requests carrying the run's secret, a random\n// per-run value the sandbox's git sends as an extra header — so\n// other processes on the host or in other containers can't ride\n// the proxy;\n// - strips any client-supplied Authorization header and injects the\n// run's own credential, which therefore exists only in zoo's\n// process on the host.\n//\n// The sandbox can read its own run secret (it lives in the\n// container's gitconfig), but the secret only buys git smart-HTTP\n// against the forge — the same scope the agent's git operations\n// already have. The token itself never enters the container: not on\n// disk, not in the environment, not in any process's memory. When the\n// run ends the proxy is closed and the secret is dead, even in a\n// container kept around for debugging.\n\n// gitProxyRunHeader is the header the sandbox's git sends on every\n// request to the forge, carrying the per-run secret.\nconst gitProxyRunHeader = \"X-Zoo-Run\"\n\n// gitProxyEndpoint is one (bind address, address the sandbox dials)\n// pair the proxy can be started on.\ntype gitProxyEndpoint struct {\n\t// bind is the host address the proxy listens on, e.g. the\n\t// container's network gateway or \"0.0.0.0\".\n\tbind string\n\t// containerHost is the address the sandbox's git is told to use\n\t// to reach the proxy, e.g. the same gateway or\n\t// \"host.docker.internal\".\n\tcontainerHost string\n}\n\ntype gitProxy struct {\n\tsrv *http.Server\n\tln net.Listener\n\taddr string // host:port the sandbox's git dials\n\tforgeURL *url.URL\n\tauthHeader string\n\trunSecret string\n\tproxy *httputil.ReverseProxy\n\tlogger *slog.Logger\n}\n\n// newGitProxy starts a per-run git proxy. endpoints are tried in\n// order until one binds; the one that does determines the address the\n// sandbox's git is told to use. forgeURL is the forge the proxy\n// forwards to (the run's repository's clone URL).\nfunc newGitProxy(endpoints []gitProxyEndpoint, forgeURL, user, token string, logger *slog.Logger) (*gitProxy, error) {\n\tu, err := url.Parse(forgeURL)\n\tif err != nil || u.Host == \"\" || (u.Scheme != \"http\" && u.Scheme != \"https\") {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"git proxy: unsupported forge URL %q\", forgeURL)\n\t}\n\n\tsecret, err := randomHex(16)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"git proxy: generate run secret: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tp := &gitProxy{\n\t\tforgeURL: u,\n\t\tauthHeader: gitAuthHeader(user, token),\n\t\trunSecret: secret,\n\t\tlogger: logger,\n\t\tproxy: &httputil.ReverseProxy{\n\t\t\tDirector: func(req *http.Request) {\n\t\t\t\t// The request arrives in absolute form (git talks\n\t\t\t\t// to a proxy); the host was validated in\n\t\t\t\t// ServeHTTP, so pin the target here.\n\t\t\t\treq.URL.Scheme = u.Scheme\n\t\t\t\treq.URL.Host = u.Host\n\t\t\t\treq.Host = u.Host\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\tErrorHandler: func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, err error) {\n\t\t\t\tlogger.Error(\"git proxy: forwarding failed\", \"path\", req.URL.Path, \"error\", err)\n\t\t\t\thttp.Error(w, \"git proxy: upstream error\", http.StatusBadGateway)\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t},\n\t}\n\n\tvar lastErr error\n\n\tfor _, ep := range endpoints {\n\t\tln, err := net.Listen(\"tcp\", net.JoinHostPort(ep.bind, \"0\"))\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tlastErr = err\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tp.ln = ln\n\t\tp.addr = net.JoinHostPort(ep.containerHost, ln.Addr().(*net.TCPAddr).Port)\n\t\tp.srv = &http.Server{Handler: p, ReadHeaderTimeout: 10 * time.Second}\n\t\tgo p.srv.Serve(ln)\n\n\t\treturn p, nil\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"git proxy: no endpoint could bind (last error: %w)\", lastErr)\n}\n\n// ProxyValue is the value of the sandbox's http.<host>.proxy git\n// setting: the address of this proxy, as the container reaches it.\nfunc (p *gitProxy) ProxyValue() string {\n\treturn \"http://\" + p.addr\n}\n\n// RunSecretHeader is the value of the sandbox's http.<host>.extraHeader\n// git setting: the per-run secret, sent on every request to the forge.\nfunc (p *gitProxy) RunSecretHeader() string {\n\treturn gitProxyRunHeader + \": \" + p.runSecret\n}\n\n// Close stops the proxy and frees its port.\nfunc (p *gitProxy) Close() error {\n\treturn p.srv.Close()\n}\n\n// ServeHTTP gates and forwards one request from the sandbox's git.\nfunc (p *gitProxy) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\tif subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(r.Header.Get(gitProxyRunHeader)), []byte(p.runSecret)) != 1 {\n\t\tp.reject(w, r, \"missing or invalid run secret\")\n\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\t// The request is in absolute form (git talks to a proxy), so the\n\t// addressed host is in the URL. Only the forge the run's\n\t// repository lives on may be addressed.\n\tu := r.URL\n\n\tif u.Scheme != p.forgeURL.Scheme || !strings.EqualFold(u.Host, p.forgeURL.Host) {\n\t\tp.reject(w, r, \"not the run's forge host\")\n\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tif !isGitSmartHTTPRequest(u.Path, u.RawQuery) {\n\t\tp.reject(w, r, \"not a git smart-HTTP endpoint\")\n\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\t// The client's own credentials (if any) and the run secret are\n\t// stripped; the run's credential is injected here, on the host.\n\tr.Header.Del(\"Authorization\")\n\tr.Header.Del(\"Proxy-Authorization\")\n\tr.Header.Del(gitProxyRunHeader)\n\tr.Header.Set(\"Authorization\", p.authHeader)\n\n\tp.proxy.ServeHTTP(w, r)\n}\n\nfunc (p *gitProxy) reject(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, reason string) {\n\tp.logger.Warn(\"git proxy: rejected request\", \"reason\", reason, \"path\", r.URL.Path)\n\thttp.Error(w, \"zoo git proxy: \"+reason, http.StatusForbidden)\n}\n\n// gitSmartHTTPEndpoints are the endpoints of git's smart-HTTP\n// protocol: the ref advertisement, and the pack transfer endpoints\n// for fetch (upload-pack) and push (receive-pack).\nvar gitSmartHTTPEndpoints = map[string]bool{\n\t\"info/refs\": true,\n\t\"git-upload-pack\": true,\n\t\"git-receive-pack\": true,\n}\n\n// isGitSmartHTTPRequest reports whether a request for path (with the\n// given raw query string) is one of git's smart-HTTP endpoints on a\n// repository: /owner/repo(.git)?/<endpoint>.\nfunc isGitSmartHTTPRequest(path, rawQuery string) bool {\n\tsegments := strings.Split(strings.Trim(path, \"/\"), \"/\")\n\tif len(segments) != 3 || segments[0] == \"\" || segments[1] == \"\" {\n\t\treturn false\n\t}\n\n\tendpoint := segments[2]\n\tif !gitSmartHTTPEndpoints[endpoint] {\n\t\treturn false\n\t}\n\n\t// The ref advertisement only means anything to git with a\n\t// service parameter naming the pack protocol; a bare info/refs is\n\t// the dumb-HTTP protocol, which git clients don't use.\n\tif endpoint != \"info/refs\" {\n\t\treturn true\n\t}\n\n\tq, err := url.ParseQuery(rawQuery)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn false\n\t}\n\n\tswitch q.Get(\"service\") {\n\tcase \"git-upload-pack\", \"git-receive-pack\":\n\t\treturn true\n\t}\n\n\treturn false\n}\n\n// gitAuthHeader returns the value of an Authorization header that\n// authenticates git's smart-HTTP requests as user with token.\nfunc gitAuthHeader(user, token string) string {\n\treturn \"Basic \" + base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(user+\":\"+token))\n}\n\n// randomHex returns n random bytes as a hex string.\nfunc randomHex(n int) (string, error) {\n\tb := make([]byte, n)\n\tif _, err := rand.Read(b); err != nil {\n\t\treturn \"\", err\n\t}\n\n\treturn hex.EncodeToString(b), nil\n}\n", "path": "internal/agentrun/gitproxy.go"}
Arguments
{"content": "package agentrun\n\nimport (\n\t\"crypto/rand\"\n\t\"crypto/subtle\"\n\t\"encoding/base64\"\n\t\"encoding/hex\"\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"log/slog\"\n\t\"net\"\n\t\"net/http\"\n\t\"net/http/httputil\"\n\t\"net/url\"\n\t\"strings\"\n\t\"time\"\n)\n\n// This file keeps the run's Forgejo credential out of the agent's\n// container.\n//\n// The sandbox's git must authenticate for clone/fetch/pull/push, but\n// the token it would need can do everything on the Forgejo instance —\n// handing it to a container an LLM runs arbitrary commands in is a\n// standing invitation to prompt-injection exfiltration.\n//\n// Git can only be told to route its HTTP traffic through a TCP proxy\n// (http.<url>.proxy; git supports http/https/socks5 proxies, not unix\n// sockets), so zoo runs a tiny per-run HTTP proxy next to the\n// container and points the sandbox's git at it. The proxy:\n//\n// - only accepts requests addressed to the forge host the run's\n// repository lives on, and only for git's smart-HTTP endpoints\n// (info/refs, git-upload-pack, git-receive-pack) — the Forgejo\n// API and everything else is refused;\n// - only accepts requests carrying the run's secret, a random\n// per-run value the sandbox's git sends as an extra header — so\n// other processes on the host or in other containers can't ride\n// the proxy;\n// - strips any client-supplied Authorization header and injects the\n// run's own credential, which therefore exists only in zoo's\n// process on the host.\n//\n// The sandbox can read its own run secret (it lives in the\n// container's gitconfig), but the secret only buys git smart-HTTP\n// against the forge — the same scope the agent's git operations\n// already have. The token itself never enters the container: not on\n// disk, not in the environment, not in any process's memory. When the\n// run ends the proxy is closed and the secret is dead, even in a\n// container kept around for debugging.\n\n// gitProxyRunHeader is the header the sandbox's git sends on every\n// request to the forge, carrying the per-run secret.\nconst gitProxyRunHeader = \"X-Zoo-Run\"\n\n// gitProxyEndpoint is one (bind address, address the sandbox dials)\n// pair the proxy can be started on.\ntype gitProxyEndpoint struct {\n\t// bind is the host address the proxy listens on, e.g. the\n\t// container's network gateway or \"0.0.0.0\".\n\tbind string\n\t// containerHost is the address the sandbox's git is told to use\n\t// to reach the proxy, e.g. the same gateway or\n\t// \"host.docker.internal\".\n\tcontainerHost string\n}\n\ntype gitProxy struct {\n\tsrv *http.Server\n\tln net.Listener\n\taddr string // host:port the sandbox's git dials\n\tforgeURL *url.URL\n\tauthHeader string\n\trunSecret string\n\tproxy *httputil.ReverseProxy\n\tlogger *slog.Logger\n}\n\n// newGitProxy starts a per-run git proxy. endpoints are tried in\n// order until one binds; the one that does determines the address the\n// sandbox's git is told to use. forgeURL is the forge the proxy\n// forwards to (the run's repository's clone URL).\nfunc newGitProxy(endpoints []gitProxyEndpoint, forgeURL, user, token string, logger *slog.Logger) (*gitProxy, error) {\n\tu, err := url.Parse(forgeURL)\n\tif err != nil || u.Host == \"\" || (u.Scheme != \"http\" && u.Scheme != \"https\") {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"git proxy: unsupported forge URL %q\", forgeURL)\n\t}\n\n\tsecret, err := randomHex(16)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"git proxy: generate run secret: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tp := &gitProxy{\n\t\tforgeURL: u,\n\t\tauthHeader: gitAuthHeader(user, token),\n\t\trunSecret: secret,\n\t\tlogger: logger,\n\t\tproxy: &httputil.ReverseProxy{\n\t\t\tDirector: func(req *http.Request) {\n\t\t\t\t// The request arrives in absolute form (git talks\n\t\t\t\t// to a proxy); the host was validated in\n\t\t\t\t// ServeHTTP, so pin the target here.\n\t\t\t\treq.URL.Scheme = u.Scheme\n\t\t\t\treq.URL.Host = u.Host\n\t\t\t\treq.Host = u.Host\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\tErrorHandler: func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, err error) {\n\t\t\t\tlogger.Error(\"git proxy: forwarding failed\", \"path\", req.URL.Path, \"error\", err)\n\t\t\t\thttp.Error(w, \"git proxy: upstream error\", http.StatusBadGateway)\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t},\n\t}\n\n\tvar lastErr error\n\n\tfor _, ep := range endpoints {\n\t\tln, err := net.Listen(\"tcp\", net.JoinHostPort(ep.bind, \"0\"))\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tlastErr = err\n\t\t\tcontinue\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tp.ln = ln\n\t\tp.addr = net.JoinHostPort(ep.containerHost, ln.Addr().(*net.TCPAddr).Port)\n\t\tp.srv = &http.Server{Handler: p, ReadHeaderTimeout: 10 * time.Second}\n\t\tgo p.srv.Serve(ln)\n\n\t\treturn p, nil\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"git proxy: no endpoint could bind (last error: %w)\", lastErr)\n}\n\n// ProxyValue is the value of the sandbox's http.<host>.proxy git\n// setting: the address of this proxy, as the container reaches it.\nfunc (p *gitProxy) ProxyValue() string {\n\treturn \"http://\" + p.addr\n}\n\n// RunSecretHeader is the value of the sandbox's http.<host>.extraHeader\n// git setting: the per-run secret, sent on every request to the forge.\nfunc (p *gitProxy) RunSecretHeader() string {\n\treturn gitProxyRunHeader + \": \" + p.runSecret\n}\n\n// Close stops the proxy and frees its port.\nfunc (p *gitProxy) Close() error {\n\treturn p.srv.Close()\n}\n\n// ServeHTTP gates and forwards one request from the sandbox's git.\nfunc (p *gitProxy) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\tif subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(r.Header.Get(gitProxyRunHeader)), []byte(p.runSecret)) != 1 {\n\t\tp.reject(w, r, \"missing or invalid run secret\")\n\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\t// The request is in absolute form (git talks to a proxy), so the\n\t// addressed host is in the URL. Only the forge the run's\n\t// repository lives on may be addressed.\n\tu := r.URL\n\n\tif u.Scheme != p.forgeURL.Scheme || !strings.EqualFold(u.Host, p.forgeURL.Host) {\n\t\tp.reject(w, r, \"not the run's forge host\")\n\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tif !isGitSmartHTTPRequest(u.Path, u.RawQuery) {\n\t\tp.reject(w, r, \"not a git smart-HTTP endpoint\")\n\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\t// The client's own credentials (if any) and the run secret are\n\t// stripped; the run's credential is injected here, on the host.\n\tr.Header.Del(\"Authorization\")\n\tr.Header.Del(\"Proxy-Authorization\")\n\tr.Header.Del(gitProxyRunHeader)\n\tr.Header.Set(\"Authorization\", p.authHeader)\n\n\tp.proxy.ServeHTTP(w, r)\n}\n\nfunc (p *gitProxy) reject(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, reason string) {\n\tp.logger.Warn(\"git proxy: rejected request\", \"reason\", reason, \"path\", r.URL.Path)\n\thttp.Error(w, \"zoo git proxy: \"+reason, http.StatusForbidden)\n}\n\n// gitSmartHTTPEndpoints are the endpoints of git's smart-HTTP\n// protocol: the ref advertisement, and the pack transfer endpoints\n// for fetch (upload-pack) and push (receive-pack).\nvar gitSmartHTTPEndpoints = map[string]bool{\n\t\"info/refs\": true,\n\t\"git-upload-pack\": true,\n\t\"git-receive-pack\": true,\n}\n\n// isGitSmartHTTPRequest reports whether a request for path (with the\n// given raw query string) is one of git's smart-HTTP endpoints on a\n// repository: /owner/repo(.git)?/<endpoint>.\nfunc isGitSmartHTTPRequest(path, rawQuery string) bool {\n\tsegments := strings.Split(strings.Trim(path, \"/\"), \"/\")\n\tif len(segments) != 3 || segments[0] == \"\" || segments[1] == \"\" {\n\t\treturn false\n\t}\n\n\tendpoint := segments[2]\n\tif !gitSmartHTTPEndpoints[endpoint] {\n\t\treturn false\n\t}\n\n\t// The ref advertisement only means anything to git with a\n\t// service parameter naming the pack protocol; a bare info/refs is\n\t// the dumb-HTTP protocol, which git clients don't use.\n\tif endpoint != \"info/refs\" {\n\t\treturn true\n\t}\n\n\tq, err := url.ParseQuery(rawQuery)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn false\n\t}\n\n\tswitch q.Get(\"service\") {\n\tcase \"git-upload-pack\", \"git-receive-pack\":\n\t\treturn true\n\t}\n\n\treturn false\n}\n\n// gitAuthHeader returns the value of an Authorization header that\n// authenticates git's smart-HTTP requests as user with token.\nfunc gitAuthHeader(user, token string) string {\n\treturn \"Basic \" + base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(user+\":\"+token))\n}\n\n// randomHex returns n random bytes as a hex string.\nfunc randomHex(n int) (string, error) {\n\tb := make([]byte, n)\n\tif _, err := rand.Read(b); err != nil {\n\t\treturn \"\", err\n\t}\n\n\treturn hex.EncodeToString(b), nil\n}\n", "path": "internal/agentrun/gitproxy.go"}
Result
OK
Thinking
Next, I'll update `sandboxgit.go` — replacing the extraHeader with the token, and using the proxy and the execution secret instead:
Now update `sandboxgit.go`:
Tool
🔧 edit_file
{"find": "// This file makes git \"just work\" inside the agent's container: the\n// initial clone happens in the sandbox, and the sandbox's git\n// credential is written to the container's system gitconfig so every\n// subsequent remote operation (pull, fetch, push, ...) authenticates\n// without any per-invocation plumbing. Zoo itself never runs git\n// outside the sandbox.", "path": "internal/agentrun/sandboxgit.go", "replace": "// This file makes git \"just work\" inside the agent's container: the\n// initial clone happens in the sandbox, and the sandbox's git is\n// pointed at the per-run git proxy (see gitproxy.go) so every\n// subsequent remote operation (pull, fetch, push, ...) authenticates\n// without any per-invocation plumbing. The run's Forgejo credential\n// is injected by the proxy on the host side and never enters the\n// container. Zoo itself never runs git outside the sandbox."}
Arguments
{"find": "// This file makes git \"just work\" inside the agent's container: the\n// initial clone happens in the sandbox, and the sandbox's git\n// credential is written to the container's system gitconfig so every\n// subsequent remote operation (pull, fetch, push, ...) authenticates\n// without any per-invocation plumbing. Zoo itself never runs git\n// outside the sandbox.", "path": "internal/agentrun/sandboxgit.go", "replace": "// This file makes git \"just work\" inside the agent's container: the\n// initial clone happens in the sandbox, and the sandbox's git is\n// pointed at the per-run git proxy (see gitproxy.go) so every\n// subsequent remote operation (pull, fetch, push, ...) authenticates\n// without any per-invocation plumbing. The run's Forgejo credential\n// is injected by the proxy on the host side and never enters the\n// container. Zoo itself never runs git outside the sandbox."}
Result
1 occurrences replaced
Thinking
I need to investigate this further. Let me check the details.
Next, I'll remove gitAuthHeader from sandboxgit.go (it's been moved to gitproxy.go) and update configureSandboxGit:
Tool
🔧 edit_file
{"find": "// gitAuthHeader returns the value of an Authorization header that\n// authenticates git's smart-HTTP requests as user with token.\nfunc gitAuthHeader(user, token string) string {\n\tauth := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(user + \":\" + token))\n\n\treturn \"Authorization: Basic \" + auth\n}\n\n// forgeHost returns", "path": "internal/agentrun/sandboxgit.go", "replace": "// forgeHost returns"}
Arguments
{"find": "// gitAuthHeader returns the value of an Authorization header that\n// authenticates git's smart-HTTP requests as user with token.\nfunc gitAuthHeader(user, token string) string {\n\tauth := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(user + \":\" + token))\n\n\treturn \"Authorization: Basic \" + auth\n}\n\n// forgeHost returns", "path": "internal/agentrun/sandboxgit.go", "replace": "// forgeHost returns"}
Result
1 occurrences replaced
Thinking
Wait — the old gitAuthHeader returned `"Authorization: Basic " + auth`, but the new one in gitproxy.go returns `"Basic " + ...`. Let me check the old test:
```go
func TestGitAuthHeader(t *testing.T) {
got := gitAuthHeader("greg", "s3cr3t")
want := "Authorization: Basic " + base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte("greg:s3cr3t"))
...
}
```
The old function returned the complete header value including the "Authorization: " prefix. This is because it was used directly as the value of extraHeader (`extraHeader = Authorization: Basic xxx`).
In the new design, the proxy sets the header via `r.Header.Set("Authorization", p.authHeader)`, so authHeader should be just `Basic xxx` (without the "Authorization: " prefix). I wrote the new gitAuthHeader to return `"Basic " + b64`. This is correct for `Header.Set("Authorization", ...)`.
Next, I'll update configureSandboxGit:
Tool
🔧 edit_file
{"find": "// configureSandboxGit writes the container's system gitconfig so git\n// works inside the sandbox without further setup:\n//\n// - safe.directory '*', so the bind-mounted /project is accepted\n// regardless of which UID the container runs git as;\n// - user.name / user.email, so commits are attributed to the agent;\n// - http.<host>.extraHeader carrying the run's Forgejo credential,\n// scoped to the forge host the repository lives on, so\n// clone/fetch/pull/push all authenticate transparently — including\n// for submodules and other repos on the same forge. The token is\n// only valid on that forge anyway, so the host scope grants no\n// extra access; git never sends it anywhere else;\n// - push.autoSetupRemote, so a bare `git push` on the fresh working\n// branch pushes it to origin and sets the upstream — after which\n// a bare `git pull` works too.\n//\n// The credential lives in the container's own filesystem (ephemeral,\n// torn down with the container), never in the bind-mounted working\n// tree: the origin remote keeps the plain cloneURL, so the token can't\n// leak into the repo's .git/config, into a work dir zoo keeps on\n// failure, or anywhere the host can read it back.\nfunc configureSandboxGit(ctx context.Context, rt *dockerRuntime, containerID, cloneURL, user, token, name, email string) error {\n\tif _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"config\", \"--global\", \"--add\", \"safe.directory\", \"*\"); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure safe.directory: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tif _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"config\", \"--global\", \"user.name\", name); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure user.name: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tif _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"config\", \"--global\", \"user.email\", email); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure user.email: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tif _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"config\", \"--global\", \"http.\"+forgeHost(cloneURL)+\".extraHeader\", gitAuthHeader(user, token)); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure git credential: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tif _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"config\", \"--global\", \"push.autoSetupRemote\", \"true\"); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure push.autoSetupRemote: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}\n\n// cloneAndBranch clones cloneURL into /project inside the container\n// and checks out a fresh branch off defaultBranch. The clone\n// authenticates via the http.<host>.extraHeader configured by\n// configureSandboxGit, and the origin remote is left with the plain\n// cloneURL: no credential ends up in the working tree.", "path": "internal/agentrun/sandboxgit.go", "replace": "// configureSandboxGit writes the container's gitconfig so git works\n// inside the sandbox without further setup:\n//\n// - safe.directory '*', so the bind-mounted /project is accepted\n// regardless of which UID the container runs git as;\n// - user.name / user.email, so commits are attributed to the agent;\n// - http.<host>.proxy pointing at the per-run git proxy (see\n// gitproxy.go) and http.<host>.extraHeader carrying the run\n// secret, both scoped to the forge host the repository lives on:\n// every remote operation (clone/fetch/pull/push) is routed through\n// the proxy, which injects the run's credential on the host side —\n// the token never enters the container. The host scope keeps\n// submodules and other repos on the same forge working; git never\n// sends the secret anywhere else;\n// - push.autoSetupRemote, so a bare `git push` on the fresh working\n// branch pushes it to origin and sets the upstream — after which\n// a bare `git pull` works too.\n//\n// The run secret lives in the container's own filesystem (ephemeral,\n// torn down with the container), never in the bind-mounted working\n// tree: the origin remote keeps the plain cloneURL, so nothing\n// credential-shaped leaks into the repo's .git/config, into a work dir\n// zoo keeps on failure, or anywhere the host can read it back.\nfunc configureSandboxGit(ctx context.Context, rt *dockerRuntime, containerID, cloneURL, proxyValue, runSecretHeader, name, email string) error {\n\tif _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"config\", \"--global\", \"--add\", \"safe.directory\", \"*\"); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure safe.directory: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tif _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"config\", \"--global\", \"user.name\", name); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure user.name: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tif _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"config\", \"--global\", \"user.email\", email); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure user.email: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tif _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"config\", \"--global\", \"http.\"+forgeHost(cloneURL)+\".proxy\", proxyValue); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure git proxy: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tif _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"config\", \"--global\", \"http.\"+forgeHost(cloneURL)+\".extraHeader\", runSecretHeader); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure git run secret: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tif _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"config\", \"--global\", \"push.autoSetupRemote\", \"true\"); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure push.autoSetupRemote: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}\n\n// cloneAndBranch clones cloneURL into /project inside the container\n// and checks out a fresh branch off defaultBranch. The clone\n// authenticates via the per-run git proxy configured by\n// configureSandboxGit, and the origin remote is left with the plain\n// cloneURL: no credential ends up in the working tree."}
Arguments
{"find": "// configureSandboxGit writes the container's system gitconfig so git\n// works inside the sandbox without further setup:\n//\n// - safe.directory '*', so the bind-mounted /project is accepted\n// regardless of which UID the container runs git as;\n// - user.name / user.email, so commits are attributed to the agent;\n// - http.<host>.extraHeader carrying the run's Forgejo credential,\n// scoped to the forge host the repository lives on, so\n// clone/fetch/pull/push all authenticate transparently — including\n// for submodules and other repos on the same forge. The token is\n// only valid on that forge anyway, so the host scope grants no\n// extra access; git never sends it anywhere else;\n// - push.autoSetupRemote, so a bare `git push` on the fresh working\n// branch pushes it to origin and sets the upstream — after which\n// a bare `git pull` works too.\n//\n// The credential lives in the container's own filesystem (ephemeral,\n// torn down with the container), never in the bind-mounted working\n// tree: the origin remote keeps the plain cloneURL, so the token can't\n// leak into the repo's .git/config, into a work dir zoo keeps on\n// failure, or anywhere the host can read it back.\nfunc configureSandboxGit(ctx context.Context, rt *dockerRuntime, containerID, cloneURL, user, token, name, email string) error {\n\tif _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"config\", \"--global\", \"--add\", \"safe.directory\", \"*\"); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure safe.directory: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tif _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"config\", \"--global\", \"user.name\", name); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure user.name: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tif _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"config\", \"--global\", \"user.email\", email); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure user.email: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tif _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"config\", \"--global\", \"http.\"+forgeHost(cloneURL)+\".extraHeader\", gitAuthHeader(user, token)); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure git credential: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tif _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"config\", \"--global\", \"push.autoSetupRemote\", \"true\"); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure push.autoSetupRemote: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}\n\n// cloneAndBranch clones cloneURL into /project inside the container\n// and checks out a fresh branch off defaultBranch. The clone\n// authenticates via the http.<host>.extraHeader configured by\n// configureSandboxGit, and the origin remote is left with the plain\n// cloneURL: no credential ends up in the working tree.", "path": "internal/agentrun/sandboxgit.go", "replace": "// configureSandboxGit writes the container's gitconfig so git works\n// inside the sandbox without further setup:\n//\n// - safe.directory '*', so the bind-mounted /project is accepted\n// regardless of which UID the container runs git as;\n// - user.name / user.email, so commits are attributed to the agent;\n// - http.<host>.proxy pointing at the per-run git proxy (see\n// gitproxy.go) and http.<host>.extraHeader carrying the run\n// secret, both scoped to the forge host the repository lives on:\n// every remote operation (clone/fetch/pull/push) is routed through\n// the proxy, which injects the run's credential on the host side —\n// the token never enters the container. The host scope keeps\n// submodules and other repos on the same forge working; git never\n// sends the secret anywhere else;\n// - push.autoSetupRemote, so a bare `git push` on the fresh working\n// branch pushes it to origin and sets the upstream — after which\n// a bare `git pull` works too.\n//\n// The run secret lives in the container's own filesystem (ephemeral,\n// torn down with the container), never in the bind-mounted working\n// tree: the origin remote keeps the plain cloneURL, so nothing\n// credential-shaped leaks into the repo's .git/config, into a work dir\n// zoo keeps on failure, or anywhere the host can read it back.\nfunc configureSandboxGit(ctx context.Context, rt *dockerRuntime, containerID, cloneURL, proxyValue, runSecretHeader, name, email string) error {\n\tif _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"config\", \"--global\", \"--add\", \"safe.directory\", \"*\"); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure safe.directory: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tif _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"config\", \"--global\", \"user.name\", name); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure user.name: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tif _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"config\", \"--global\", \"user.email\", email); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure user.email: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tif _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"config\", \"--global\", \"http.\"+forgeHost(cloneURL)+\".proxy\", proxyValue); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure git proxy: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tif _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"config\", \"--global\", \"http.\"+forgeHost(cloneURL)+\".extraHeader\", runSecretHeader); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure git run secret: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tif _, err := runSandboxGit(ctx, rt, containerID, \"config\", \"--global\", \"push.autoSetupRemote\", \"true\"); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure push.autoSetupRemote: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n}\n\n// cloneAndBranch clones cloneURL into /project inside the container\n// and checks out a fresh branch off defaultBranch. The clone\n// authenticates via the per-run git proxy configured by\n// configureSandboxGit, and the origin remote is left with the plain\n// cloneURL: no credential ends up in the working tree."}
Result
1 occurrences replaced
Thinking
Next, I'll fix the unused `encoding/base64` import in sandboxgit.go (since gitAuthHeader was moved). Let me check the imports.
Tool
🔧 read_file
{"end_line": 15, "path": "internal/agentrun/sandboxgit.go", "start_line": 1}
Arguments
{"end_line": 15, "path": "internal/agentrun/sandboxgit.go", "start_line": 1}
Result
{"path":"internal/agentrun/sandboxgit.go","content":"package agentrun\n\nimport (\n\t\"context\"\n\t\"encoding/base64\"\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"net/url\"\n\t\"strings\"\n)\n\n// This file makes git \"just work\" inside the agent's container: the\n// initial clone happens in the sandbox, and the sandbox's git is\n// pointed at the per-run git proxy (see gitproxy.go) so every\n// subsequent remote operation (pull, fetch, push, ...) authenticates\n// without any per-invocation plumbing. The run's Forgejo credential","start_line":1,"end_line":15,"total_lines":157,"truncated":true}
Thinking
I need to investigate this further. Let me check the details.
`encoding/base64` is no longer used in sandboxgit.go (gitAuthHeader was moved to gitproxy.go). I'll remove it.
Tool
🔧 edit_file
{"find": "import (\n\t\"context\"\n\t\"encoding/base64\"\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"net/url\"\n\t\"strings\"\n)", "path": "internal/agentrun/sandboxgit.go", "replace": "import (\n\t\"context\"\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"net/url\"\n\t\"strings\"\n)"}
Arguments
{"find": "import (\n\t\"context\"\n\t\"encoding/base64\"\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"net/url\"\n\t\"strings\"\n)", "path": "internal/agentrun/sandboxgit.go", "replace": "import (\n\t\"context\"\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"net/url\"\n\t\"strings\"\n)"}
Result
1 occurrences replaced
Thinking
I need to investigate this further. Let me check the details.
Next, I'll update `docker.go` to add the `containerGateway` method. I'll add it after `createContainer`:
Now add `containerGateway` to `docker.go`:
Tool
🔧 edit_file
{"find": "// exec runs command via `sh -c` inside containerID and returns its", "path": "internal/agentrun/docker.go", "replace": "// containerGateway returns the gateway IP of the container's network:\n// the address the container uses to reach the host. It's how the\n// per-run git proxy (see gitproxy.go) finds an address it can bind to\n// that the container can dial. Empty string if the container has no\n// network with a gateway.\nfunc (d *dockerRuntime) containerGateway(ctx context.Context, containerID string) (string, error) {\n\tinsp, err := d.cli.ContainerInspect(ctx, containerID)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"inspect container: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tfor _, n := range insp.NetworkSettings.Networks {\n\t\tif n.Gateway != \"\" {\n\t\t\treturn n.Gateway, nil\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn \"\", nil\n}\n\n// exec runs command via `sh -c` inside containerID and returns its"}
Arguments
{"find": "// exec runs command via `sh -c` inside containerID and returns its", "path": "internal/agentrun/docker.go", "replace": "// containerGateway returns the gateway IP of the container's network:\n// the address the container uses to reach the host. It's how the\n// per-run git proxy (see gitproxy.go) finds an address it can bind to\n// that the container can dial. Empty string if the container has no\n// network with a gateway.\nfunc (d *dockerRuntime) containerGateway(ctx context.Context, containerID string) (string, error) {\n\tinsp, err := d.cli.ContainerInspect(ctx, containerID)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"inspect container: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tfor _, n := range insp.NetworkSettings.Networks {\n\t\tif n.Gateway != \"\" {\n\t\t\treturn n.Gateway, nil\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn \"\", nil\n}\n\n// exec runs command via `sh -c` inside containerID and returns its"}
Result
1 occurrences replaced
Thinking
I need to investigate this further. Let me check the details.
Next, I'll update `run.go`:
1. The package's documentation comment.
2. Start the git proxy after creating the container.
3. Pass the proxy's value to configureSandboxGit.
Now update `run.go` — the package doc and the run flow:
Tool
🔧 edit_file
{"find": "// Package agentrun creates the throwaway per-job environment an agent\n// runs in: a Docker container with the agent's git working tree cloned\n// inside it (authenticated with the agent's own Forgejo token), the\n// triggering event written to /event, and the tool-calling loop\n// (internal/llm + internal/tools) driven against it.", "path": "internal/agentrun/run.go", "replace": "// Package agentrun creates the throwaway per-job environment an agent\n// runs in: a Docker container with the agent's git working tree cloned\n// inside it (git traffic routed through a per-run proxy that injects\n// the agent's Forgejo credential on the host side, so the token never\n// enters the container — see gitproxy.go), the triggering event\n// written to /event, and the tool-calling loop (internal/llm +\n// internal/tools) driven against it."}
Arguments
{"find": "// Package agentrun creates the throwaway per-job environment an agent\n// runs in: a Docker container with the agent's git working tree cloned\n// inside it (authenticated with the agent's own Forgejo token), the\n// triggering event written to /event, and the tool-calling loop\n// (internal/llm + internal/tools) driven against it.", "path": "internal/agentrun/run.go", "replace": "// Package agentrun creates the throwaway per-job environment an agent\n// runs in: a Docker container with the agent's git working tree cloned\n// inside it (git traffic routed through a per-run proxy that injects\n// the agent's Forgejo credential on the host side, so the token never\n// enters the container — see gitproxy.go), the triggering event\n// written to /event, and the tool-calling loop (internal/llm +\n// internal/tools) driven against it."}
Result
1 occurrences replaced
Thinking
I need to investigate this further. Let me check the details.
Next, the main changes to run.go. The current code (around lines 176-220):
```go
roster := buildRoster(r.forgejo, r.cfg.Agents, logger)
gitName, gitEmail := gitIdentity(agent.Name, roster)
// The credentials the sandbox's git uses for remote operations:
// if configured, the agent's own Forgejo token (so its git activity
// is attributed to its own account). Otherwise, fall back to the
// shared zoo identity for deployments without per-agent tokens
// (mirroring forgejoAs).
gitUser, gitToken := "zoo", r.forgejo.Token()
if agent.Token != "" {
gitUser, gitToken = agent.Name, agent.Token
}
eventPath := filepath.Join(workDir, "event.json")
if err := os.WriteFile(eventPath, ev.Raw, 0o644); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("write event file: %w", err)
}
containerID, err := r.docker.createContainer(ctx, dockerImage, []string{
projectDir + ":/project",
eventPath + ":/event:ro",
}, fmt.Sprintf("zoo-issue-%d-%s", ev.Index, agent.Name))
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("start container: %w", err)
}
defer func() {
cleanupCtx, cleanupCancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 30*time.Second)
defer cleanupCancel()
if err := r.docker.remove(cleanupCtx, containerID); err != nil {
logger.Warn("failed to remove container", "container", containerID, "error", err)
}
}()
// Git must work as-is inside the sandbox: safe.directory, commit
// identity, and remote credentials all go into the container's
// system gitconfig (see configureSandboxGit).
if err := configureSandboxGit(ctx, r.docker, containerID, repoInfo.CloneURL, gitUser, gitToken, gitName, gitEmail); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("configure git in container: %w", err)
}
```
I'll insert the proxy setup between the container creation and configureSandboxGit.
Tool
🔧 edit_file
{"find": "\tdefer func() {\n\t\tcleanupCtx, cleanupCancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 30*time.Second)\n\t\tdefer cleanupCancel()\n\t\tif err := r.docker.remove(cleanupCtx, containerID); err != nil {\n\t\t\tlogger.Warn(\"failed to remove container\", \"container\", containerID, \"error\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t}()\n\n\t// Git must simply work inside the sandbox: safe.directory, commit\n\t// identity, and the remote credential all go into the container's\n\t// system gitconfig (see configureSandboxGit).\n\tif err := configureSandboxGit(ctx, r.docker, containerID, repoInfo.CloneURL, gitUser, gitToken, gitName, gitEmail); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure git in container: %w\", err)\n\t}", "path": "internal/agentrun/run.go", "replace": "\tdefer func() {\n\t\tcleanupCtx, cleanupCancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 30*time.Second)\n\t\tdefer cleanupCancel()\n\t\tif err := r.docker.remove(cleanupCtx, containerID); err != nil {\n\t\t\tlogger.Warn(\"failed to remove container\", \"container\", containerID, \"error\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t}()\n\n\t// The git proxy stands between the sandbox's git and the forge,\n\t// injecting the run's credential on the host side so the token\n\t// never enters the container (see gitproxy.go). The container\n\t// reaches it over TCP: prefer the container's network gateway,\n\t// which is a local host address on a local Docker daemon; if that\n\t// doesn't bind (e.g. Docker Desktop, where the daemon runs in a\n\t// VM) fall back to all interfaces, which the container dials via\n\t// host.docker.internal.\n\tendpoints := []gitProxyEndpoint{{bind: \"0.0.0.0\", containerHost: \"host.docker.internal\"}}\n\n\tif gw, err := r.docker.containerGateway(ctx, containerID); err != nil {\n\t\tlogger.Warn(\"could not determine container gateway; git proxy will bind to all interfaces\", \"error\", err)\n\t} else if gw != \"\" {\n\t\tendpoints = append([]gitProxyEndpoint{{bind: gw, containerHost: gw}}, endpoints...)\n\t}\n\n\tgitProxy, err := newGitProxy(endpoints, repoInfo.CloneURL, gitUser, gitToken, logger)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"start git proxy: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tdefer func() {\n\t\tif err := gitProxy.Close(); err != nil {\n\t\t\tlogger.Warn(\"failed to close git proxy\", \"error\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t}()\n\n\t// Git must simply work inside the sandbox: safe.directory, commit\n\t// identity, and the route to the git proxy all go into the\n\t// container's gitconfig (see configureSandboxGit).\n\tif err := configureSandboxGit(ctx, r.docker, containerID, repoInfo.CloneURL, gitProxy.ProxyValue(), gitProxy.RunSecretHeader(), gitName, gitEmail); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure git in container: %w\", err)\n\t}"}
Arguments
{"find": "\tdefer func() {\n\t\tcleanupCtx, cleanupCancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 30*time.Second)\n\t\tdefer cleanupCancel()\n\t\tif err := r.docker.remove(cleanupCtx, containerID); err != nil {\n\t\t\tlogger.Warn(\"failed to remove container\", \"container\", containerID, \"error\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t}()\n\n\t// Git must simply work inside the sandbox: safe.directory, commit\n\t// identity, and the remote credential all go into the container's\n\t// system gitconfig (see configureSandboxGit).\n\tif err := configureSandboxGit(ctx, r.docker, containerID, repoInfo.CloneURL, gitUser, gitToken, gitName, gitEmail); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure git in container: %w\", err)\n\t}", "path": "internal/agentrun/run.go", "replace": "\tdefer func() {\n\t\tcleanupCtx, cleanupCancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 30*time.Second)\n\t\tdefer cleanupCancel()\n\t\tif err := r.docker.remove(cleanupCtx, containerID); err != nil {\n\t\t\tlogger.Warn(\"failed to remove container\", \"container\", containerID, \"error\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t}()\n\n\t// The git proxy stands between the sandbox's git and the forge,\n\t// injecting the run's credential on the host side so the token\n\t// never enters the container (see gitproxy.go). The container\n\t// reaches it over TCP: prefer the container's network gateway,\n\t// which is a local host address on a local Docker daemon; if that\n\t// doesn't bind (e.g. Docker Desktop, where the daemon runs in a\n\t// VM) fall back to all interfaces, which the container dials via\n\t// host.docker.internal.\n\tendpoints := []gitProxyEndpoint{{bind: \"0.0.0.0\", containerHost: \"host.docker.internal\"}}\n\n\tif gw, err := r.docker.containerGateway(ctx, containerID); err != nil {\n\t\tlogger.Warn(\"could not determine container gateway; git proxy will bind to all interfaces\", \"error\", err)\n\t} else if gw != \"\" {\n\t\tendpoints = append([]gitProxyEndpoint{{bind: gw, containerHost: gw}}, endpoints...)\n\t}\n\n\tgitProxy, err := newGitProxy(endpoints, repoInfo.CloneURL, gitUser, gitToken, logger)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"start git proxy: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tdefer func() {\n\t\tif err := gitProxy.Close(); err != nil {\n\t\t\tlogger.Warn(\"failed to close git proxy\", \"error\", err)\n\t\t}\n\t}()\n\n\t// Git must simply work inside the sandbox: safe.directory, commit\n\t// identity, and the route to the git proxy all go into the\n\t// container's gitconfig (see configureSandboxGit).\n\tif err := configureSandboxGit(ctx, r.docker, containerID, repoInfo.CloneURL, gitProxy.ProxyValue(), gitProxy.RunSecretHeader(), gitName, gitEmail); err != nil {\n\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"configure git in container: %w\", err)\n\t}"}
Result
1 occurrences replaced
Thinking
I need to investigate this further. Let me check the details.
Next, I'll update the `Token()` documentation comment in `forgejo/client.go`:
Now update the `Token()` doc in `forgejo/client.go`:
Tool
🔧 edit_file
{"find": "// Token returns the shared zoo Forgejo identity's token, e.g. for\n// authenticating a host-side git clone/push against Forgejo (see\n// internal/agentrun) without ever writing the credential into a working\n// tree an agent's container can read.", "path": "internal/forgejo/client.go", "replace": "// Token returns the shared zoo Forgejo identity's token. The git proxy\n// (internal/agentrun) uses it to authenticate the sandbox's git\n// operations on the host side, so the credential never enters a\n// container."}
Arguments
{"find": "// Token returns the shared zoo Forgejo identity's token, e.g. for\n// authenticating a host-side git clone/push against Forgejo (see\n// internal/agentrun) without ever writing the credential into a working\n// tree an agent's container can read.", "path": "internal/forgejo/client.go", "replace": "// Token returns the shared zoo Forgejo identity's token. The git proxy\n// (internal/agentrun) uses it to authenticate the sandbox's git\n// operations on the host side, so the credential never enters a\n// container."}
Result
1 occurrences replaced
Thinking
I need to investigate this further. Let me check the details.
Next, I'll update the tests. First, `sandboxgit_test.go` — I'll remove `TestGitAuthHeader` (since it's been moved to gitproxy_test.go):
Now the tests. First remove the moved `TestGitAuthHeader` from `sandboxgit_test.go`:
Tool
🔧 edit_file
{"find": "import (\n\t\"encoding/base64\"\n\t\"strings\"\n\t\"testing\"\n)", "path": "internal/agentrun/sandboxgit_test.go", "replace": "import (\n\t\"strings\"\n\t\"testing\"\n)"}
Arguments
{"find": "import (\n\t\"encoding/base64\"\n\t\"strings\"\n\t\"testing\"\n)", "path": "internal/agentrun/sandboxgit_test.go", "replace": "import (\n\t\"strings\"\n\t\"testing\"\n)"}
Result
1 occurrences replaced